Economic and non-economic drivers of the low-carbon energy transition: evidence from households in the UK, rural India, and refugee settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa by Talevi, Marta
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Economic and non-economic drivers of the
low-carbon energy transition:
Evidence from households in the UK, rural
India, and refugee settlements in
Sub-Saharan Africa
Marta Talevi
A thesis submitted to the Department of Geography and Environment
of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2020
1
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without the prior written consent of the author.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of approximately 72,000 words.
Statement of co-authored work
I confirm that Chapter 4 was jointly co-authored with Subhrendu K. Pattanayak,
Ipsita Das, Jessica Lewis, and Ashok Kumar Singha, and I contributed 55% of
this work. My contribution consisted of specifying the research question together
with Subhrendu Pattanayak, analysing the data and writing the paper. Subhrendu
Pattanayak, Ipsita Das, Jessica Lewis, and Ashok Kumar Singha contributed to
define the broader research project of which this study is part and led the data
collection.
2
Abstract
In this thesis I investigate the drivers of household clean energy technology adoption,
looking at the role of economic variables, such as prices and monetary incentives,
but also at non-strictly economic dimensions, such as geography, peer influence,
health concerns, and heterogeneity in experience, priorities and perceptions of the
technology.
The topic develops into two main lines of inquiry. The first one explores the
uptake of residential solar PV systems in the UK. In Chapter 1 I look at how the
UK feed-in tariff (FIT) scheme contributed to shape the distribution of decentralised
electricity generation around the country. I ask in particular how effective the policy
was at triggering the siting of solar installations in locations with better generation
potential. In Chapter 2 I show that peer effects contribute to the diffusion of this
technology, and they act as complements to the monetary incentives. I discuss two
possible channels through which peer effects may operate  social utility derived
from imitation, and social learning from information sharing among neighbours 
and find evidence consistent with a dominant role of the latter.
The second line of research focuses on valuation of non-traditional cookstoves
in Sub-Saharan refugee settlements (Chapter 3) and rural villages in Odisha, India
(Chapter 4). I use stated preferences to investigate how different features of the
cooking technologies and household heterogeneity affect willingness to pay. In the
context of refugee settlements in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 3), I complement
the analysis by looking at how the non-traditional cookstoves distributed among
the residents affect fuel efficiency, health and safety, time use and the gendered
distribution of the cooking workload. In Chapter 4, I focus instead on how positive
and negative experiences with biogas for cooking affect the stated willingness to pay
for that technology in rural India, and how experience interacts with risk aversion,
time preferences, and credit constraints.
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Introduction
Technological innovation is often cited in sustainable development discussions as the
key to conciliate environmental protection with development objectives (Jaffe et al.,
2003). If new inventions are fundamental to this purpose, attention must also be
paid to the process of adoption and diffusion of the new technologies on the ground,
and to the feedback that actual use under different circumstances may provide to
innovation. To this purpose, behavioural and technical change need to go hand in
hand.
Given the monetary but also cognitive investments needed to switch to a new,
and therefore uncertain, technology, as well as the informational and economic exter-
nalities stemming from its adoption, diffusion is likely to be slower than the socially
optimal path would recommend (Jaffe et al., 2005). This picture becomes even more
complicated in the case of low-carbon energy technologies, as the issues linked to
the diffusion of innovation are compounded by the environmental dimension, and in
particular by the presence of environmental externalities and services whose benefits
or costs are non-rival and non-excludable.
The result of this, as Jaffe et al. (2003) point out, is a paradox of low rates
of adoption despite cost-effectiveness. Technological, organizational, social, and
institutional path dependency have resulted in a carbon lock-in, which requires
exogenous forces to be escaped (Unruh, 2000; Unruh, 2002; Unruh and Carrillo-
Hermosilla, 2006).
From an academic standpoint, this thesis contributes new perspectives and new
evidence to the literature on technology adoption, pro-environmental behaviour, and
the costs and benefits of the sustainable energy transition. In particular, the thesis
focuses on low-carbon energy generating technologies, and explores household pref-
erences and decisions when they are offered monetary incentives to adopt (Chapter
1), when they interact with peers (Chapter 2), when they have heterogeneous expec-
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tations but also heterogeneous priorities with respect to the service the technology is
offering (Chapter 3), and when they have different levels of relevant past experiences
(Chapter 4).
From a policy perspective incentives, past experience, expectations and peer
effects all contribute to shape the economic trade-offs and social norms that are
critical in the transition towards a more sustainable and clean energy system. In
each setting, I therefore acknowledge the role of economic drivers and market failures
(in particular externalities, imperfect information, split incentives, and lack of access
to credit), but also behavioural features (such as bounded rationality, inertia and
default bias, risk and uncertainty aversion, myopia, environmental attitudes and
social norms), and discuss how policy instruments may be designed to leverage the
interdependencies between the two dimensions.
This thesis explores several of the promising and unanswered research questions
identified by Greenstone and Jack (2015), which are relevant for countries at all
income levels, as we grapple with the current climate crisis. In particular What
factors or design elements cause people [...] to make energy efficiency investments,
What are the costs and benefits of policies to improve environmental quality and
access to energy?, Will clean-energy products that work in the lab have the same
results when real people use them in real world settings?, and What policies can
be effective for climate mitigation?.
In particular, Chapter 1 focuses on output-based incentives for small-scale re-
newables generation in the UK and their effectiveness in pushing the adoption of
residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems towards locations with better potential
for electricity generation. Features of the UK Feed-in Tariff design and frequent up-
dates to the amount of subsidies offered are used to identify the effects of the scheme
on the geographical distribution of residential PV installations in the country. With
the estimated parameters, I then predict the uptake of residential photovoltaic ar-
rays under a hypothetical alternative policy scenario - a capacity-based subsidy -
and compare the resulting geographical distributions of installations and the rel-
ative cost-effectiveness. The main contribution of this paper is the estimation of
the responsiveness of residential PV demand to subsidy and installation price in
a context where incentives are output-based. As predicted by the theory, I find a
positive subsidy elasticity of demand, and a negative price elasticity. The geograph-
ical distribution of residential solar PV triggered by the policy appears to be only
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weakly correlated to the generation potential. This is the result of counteracting
effects due to of socio-demographic composition, work arrangements and character-
istics of the built environment. In fact, many of these contextual elements tend to
be more favourable for solar adoption in areas with lower solar potential. As a con-
sequence, the output-based subsidy is still more cost-effective than the hypothetical
capacity-based one, which fails to counteract those effects and results in a negative
correlation between installations and generation potential. On the other side, the
estimated trade-off between the upfront price and periodic subsidies point towards
a high implicit discount rate of households, suggesting that an upfront incentive ad-
justed according to generation potential would have been more cost-effective. The
paper concludes with a discussion of the additionality of the policy and the amount
and cost of averted emissions from offset generation.
Chapter 2 investigates how peer effects shape the spatial and temporal diffusion
patterns of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) systems in the UK, while a monetary
incentive scheme is in place. The literature suggests that household decision to
install solar panels, as well as to adopt other innovative technologies or practices, is
affected by peers who have already done so. This influence could operate through
information sharing with neighbours or peers  the social learning channel  or
because households obtain a non-monetary payoff when conforming with peers, that
increases the utility of adopting  the social utility channel.
I set up a simple model of technology adoption which considers the two channels
of peer influence, and obtain a set of hypotheses on the direction of peer effects,
how they evolve over time, and how they interact with the monetary incentives.
I then use spatial econometrics and purposely constructed estimators to test the
hypotheses with data from the UK, and find that the social learning channel seems
to be the dominant mechanism in the context under analysis. Of relevance for policy,
I find that peer effects are economically significant, but they tend to be stronger in
the early period of the policy and become weaker in later years. I also find that
peer effects and monetary incentives act as complements, and discuss how this result
could be leveraged in policy design.
The second half of the thesis focuses on a different set of energy-generating
technologies  clean cookstoves in low and middle income countries  that is similarly
associated to low rate of adoption, despite large potential private and social benefits.
Chapter 3 investigates whether low willingness to pay for non-traditional cookstoves
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is linked to mismatches between expected and actual performances, and between
the type of improvements promised and those each user is interested in. I use a
new and rich dataset compiled from surveys in two refugee settlements in Burkina
Faso and Kenya to test two competing interpretations: (i) users have low valuation
for the improvements offered by non-traditional cookstoves, or (ii) users value the
improvements but do not expect the stoves to deliver on them. In doing this, I show
the importance of controlling for respondents' expectations regarding the technology
offered, and heterogeneity of priorities on cooking.
In the second part of the paper, I look at whether the non-traditional cookstoves
distributed in the camps (mainly basic models of fuelwood improved cookstoves,
or ICS) delivers any significant improvement in four dimensions of welfare - fuel
efficiency, health and safety, time use, and women and children workload. In the last
part of the paper, I bridge the results on the benefits provided by non-traditional
cooking systems with the stated preferences and show that women are relatively
better than men at factoring the gains into their valuation.
Finally, Chapter 4 investigates preferences for small-scale biogas plants for cook-
ing among households in rural India. In addition to improving health thanks to
reduced smoke and indoor air pollution, biogas has the potential to be cheaper than
other cooking fuels, improve waste disposal and provide high-quality fertiliser for
agriculture. Data come from a discrete choice experiment (DCE) with over 500
households in rural Odisha, India, in an area that already has some penetration of
biogas thanks to subsidisation schemes. Using a stratified random sample, the paper
examines how previous experience with biogas is associated with the willingness to
pay (WTP) for the technology.
My co-authors and I find that households have strong interest for decrease in
smoke emissions and fuel savings, and appear to be highly interested in biogas
rather than non-traditional biomass-fuelled cookstoves. Households who have no
experience but are planning to build a biogas plant have similar preferences to
households who already have biogas and did not experience any malfunctions, while
households who had negative experience have a less enthusiastic taste for biogas. We
also find that experience (both positive and negative) counteracts the negative effects
on willingness to pay of risk aversion, impatience and concerns regarding access to
credit, and find no evidence of price anchoring, i.e. respondents who already have
biogas do not appear to tie their valuation to the price they paid. Policy implications
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are discussed for how to encourage uptake and use of the technology, and insights are
provided on the risk of abandonment of the new technology and on why households
engage in fuel stacking.
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Chapter 1
Output-based incentives for
residential solar PV: Demand
responsiveness, geographical
distribution, and alternative policy
scenarios
1.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, governments around the globe  as well as local authorities,
consumers' associations, and even utilities and private companies  have come up
with a rich variety of policy tools and incentives in support of the uptake of residen-
tial solar photovoltaic (PV) generation to help decarbonise the energy system. This
paper focuses specifically on output-based subsidies, a type of monetary incentive
that is paid periodically  for example every quarter or every year  and depends on
the amount of electricity generated by the PV system in each period. According to
economic theory, this feature of the policy design should trigger more installations
to occur where there is better potential for electricity generation, as in this case
the system would produce more and the household would receive larger payments
compared to a household in an area with lower solar potential (other things equal).
At the same time, households have to face an inter-temporal trade-off between the
costs and benefits of adopting solar PV, as the price for the system and its installa-
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tion is mostly paid upfront (or over a short period), while the subsidy payments are
received periodically over several years. I exploit these two features of the policy
design to identify the effects of the output-based subsidy scheme on the geographical
distribution of residential PV systems, and investigate the implicit trade-off between
upfront costs and future benefits that is revealed by households' observed behaviour.
Data for the empirical analysis come from England and Wales1, a territory where
there is a relevant geographical variation in solar potential, and a de facto pure
output-based subsidy scheme was in place between April 2010 and March 2019.
Frequent changes in the FIT rate assigned to new adopters, combined with the ex-
pected electricity generation outcome of each location, provide the variation needed
to identify the key parameters in the model, and estimate how the subsidy affects
the decision to install. This estimation strategy faces a number of challenges that I
address in the chapter, in particular endogeneity of the main regressors, self-selection
and correlated unobservables, bunching, and the use of a count outcome variable.
The estimated parameters are then used to investigate the trade-off between up-
front costs and future subsidies and estimate the implicit discount factor. If house-
holds discount future subsidies at a higher rate than the government can borrow
at, then an upfront incentive would be more cost-effective than a periodic payment.
Finally, the estimated model is used to predict and compare the uptake of residential
solar PV under the observed policy scenario and under a hypothetical alternative
scheme, with subsidies still paid periodically but independent of the output gen-
erated  i.e. a capacity-based scheme, as one kW of installed capacity is paid the
same annual subsidy no matter how much it produces and where it is located in
the country. For each scheme, I investigate the resulting geographical distribution
of PV systems and the relative cost-effectiveness in terms of installed capacity and
generated electricity. If the output-based incentive is more successful in triggering
installations in locations with better solar potential than the capacity-based incen-
tive, then the former should result in a lower marginal cost of generation.
The research questions explored in this Chapter contribute to our understanding
of how centralised market-based incentives, such as Feed-in Tariff schemes, interact
with the behaviour of decentralised agents, that are now both consumers and produc-
ers of electricity. More broadly, the paper contributes to the literature on the future
1Northern Ireland is excluded as it is not involved in the UK Feed-in Tariff scheme. Scotland
is excluded because statistical areas in the country are constructed in a different way as compared
to England and Wales.
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of electricity system regulation, load and capacity management, and integration of
renewables, and discusses practical policy alternatives to improve cost-effectiveness
of renewable energy subsidies, given budgetary pressure.
The paper develops as follows: Section 1.2 presents the main literature of refer-
ence and details the research questions addressed in the rest of the Chapter, while
Section 1.3 outlines the theoretical framework for the analysis. Section 1.4 provides
information on the UK Feed-in Tariff policy and the data used; Section 1.5 focuses on
the estimation of the parameters of interest, discussing the main challenges and the
identification strategy, and presenting the results. Alternative policy scenarios and
cost-effectiveness are then investigated in Section 1.6, while Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Motivation
1.2.1 Main literature of reference
This research builds on a growing body of literature investigating the demand for
residential solar PV systems and the effectiveness of incentives for their adoption,
with applications mainly to the US, and most frequently California  De Groote
and Verboven (2019) on Flanders being a notable exception. The Flemish incentive
scheme consists of a mix of output-based subsidies  similar to the UK scheme  and
net metering  which is instead absent in the UK. In the US, support for residential
solar systems is offered at the federal level through a tax credit for around 30% of
the system cost. This is complemented by state-specific schemes, usually consisting
of some form of subsidies and net metering. Under the California Solar Initiative
(CSI) General Market Program, for example, residential solar PV owners can choose
between an output-based subsidy called Performance Based Incentive paid monthly
for 5 years, or an upfront lump-sum payment called Expected Performance-Based
Buydown  with the vast majority choosing the latter (Hughes and Podolefsky,
2015). Although classified as a capacity-based subsidy, the Expected Performance-
Based Buydown is actually adjusted depending on the expected generation of the
solar array, calculated taking into account the characteristics of the system and the
roof, as well as the solar insolation of the location where it is installed. In the rest of
the Chapter, I will draw comparisons between the results reported by the literature
on the CSI and the results obtained here for the UK, and I will discuss the strengths
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and weaknesses of each policy design.
The literature looking at the microeconomics of residential solar subsidies may
be classified according to two main approaches  reduced-form models and static
estimates on one side, and dynamic decision-making problems employing structural
models on the other. Among the works in the first strand, Hughes and Podolefsky
(2015) and Pless and van Benthem (2019) focus on the California Solar Initiative,
using different empirical strategies. Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) exploit the dif-
ference in rebate amounts offered by different utilities to identify the effects of the
rebate. As each utility serves a different territory, the boundaries of the catchment
areas provide the discontinuity needed for identification. This is combined with time
fixed effects and utility-specific time-varying fixed effects to control for unobservables
that might bias the estimates. Allowing the elasticity parameter to vary, they find
that a 0.10 USD (6%) increase in the rebate rate results in 20% more installations
in the early periods of the policy, but this effects decreases to 8% in later times,
corresponding to an average elasticity of -1.2. They estimate that the cost of the
policy is 0.06 USD/kWh generated. Pless and van Benthem (2019) focus instead on
the pass-through of the CSI rebate that is paid to the installers rather than to the
end-users, and in their analysis they estimate a price elasticity of demand for solar
panels of -0.85. Another important work to mention for its methodological as well as
empirical contribution, is Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019). The authors estimate
the demand for residential PV in Connecticut, where systems are eligible for upfront
rebates. Their estimation model addresses three main issues that commonly arise
in this type of analyses, namely the use of a count outcome variable with excess
zeros, unobserved heterogeneity, and endogeneity of the main regressor - the price
of the PV installation. They develop a consistent estimator for an instrumental vari-
able (IV) Poisson hurdle model with fixed effects, and use subsidy rates and roofing
contractor wages after controlling for general local wages as instruments. The iden-
tification strategy relies on differences in the rebate levels over time  due to cuts
to the incentives  and over different location  due to time lags in the incentive
registration procedure. They estimate a price elasticity of -0.65.
Among the structural models, again focusing on California, Benthem et al. (2008)
build an inter-temporal model to derive the optimal solar subsidy schedule in Cali-
fornia, in the presence of environmental externalities and unappropriated learning-
by-doing, and find that the existing incentive schemes in the state are very close to
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the model's optimum, while without learning-by-doing, environmental externalities
alone cannot justify the high levels of subsidy. Burr (2016) analyses different types
of incentives, concluding that upfront subsidies tend to result in more installations,
but output-based subsidies are more efficient. She also notes that sub-optimal siting
of residential PV results in high welfare cost. Langer and Lemoine (2018) estimate
what the efficient subsidy schedule looks like when taking into account expecta-
tions about future subsidy and technology cost. Bollinger and Gillingham (2019)
use a dynamic model of demand and supply to investigate the role of a rebate paid
through the installers in fostering learning-by-doing in the industry. Allowing the
elasticity to vary over time, they find values between -1.2 and -0.8, consistent with
results from previous reduced-form analysis. In a recent working paper, Snashall-
Woodhams (2019) uses highly disaggregated data on electricity consumption and
estimates of solar generation potential at the rooftop level to model households'
choice to adopt solar and compare the CSI with an optimally targeted subsidy. He
finds that households discount heavily future benefits from solar, estimating an an-
nual discount factor of about 82%. Finally, De Groote and Verboven (2019) use
variation in subsidies for residential PV in the Flanders, Belgium, and a detailed
structural model to identify the discount rate users appear to employ when choos-
ing whether to install residential solar. As in the paper on California, they find
the annual discount rate to be very high at 15% (equivalent to an annual discount
factor of 0.86), and conclude that in cases in which the agents are myopic or dis-
count heavily the future for other reasons, upfront subsidies are more cost-effective.
On the issue of siting and geographical distribution of residential solar, it is worth
mentioning recent work by Sexton et al. (2018), estimating the effects of solar elec-
tricity generation on averted pollution damages and on grid congestion, and how
they vary over the US territory. They find substantial heterogeneity and spillovers
across states, and conclude that incentives could be made more efficient and more
environmental benefits could be achieved by better linking the level of subsidies to
the location-specific outcome.
1.2.2 Research questions
Building on this literature, this Chapter aims to estimate the elasticity of residential
solar demand to an output-based subsidy, such is the one employed in the UK, and
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to the investment price of the system. This first step serves then as an input to
investigate and discuss how output-based subsidies shape the geographical distribu-
tion of solar PV systems over the country, and their effectiveness in triggering more
installations in locations with better potential for electricity generation.
To delve deeper into what mechanisms might be at play I use event study analysis
to test whether there is a bunching issue in the data and evidence of inter-temporal
substitution, and I exploit features of the policy design to investigate time pref-
erences and discounting, following a similar approach as De Groote and Verboven
(2019). I also briefly start exploring the role of peer effects and heterogeneity of
the elasticity parameters over time, which are the focus of the next Chapter, and
I provide some estimates of the share of marginal and infra-marginal adopters (i.e.
the additionality of the policy), and the rents appropriated by the latter group.
In the second part of the paper, I use the estimates for the parameters of interest
to predict the pattern of installation under an alternative policy design  a capacity-
based subsidy constant throughout the country, but paid periodically so to preserve
the inter-temporal trade-off between costs and benefits. By keeping all else equal 
i.e. the cost of the panels, geographic and climatic characteristics of each location,
and the idiosyncratic `preferences' of the residents of each area  I can therefore
compare how linking the incentive to the solar potential of a location improves the
cost-effectiveness of the scheme.
The UK FIT scheme is particularly interesting because it is an output-based
incentive  a production subsidy is paid periodically for each kWh of generated
electricity, according to the rate in effect at the date of installation. Variation in the
level of (expected) subsidy results from differences in the expected electricity output
in different locations in the country and from changes in the FIT rate over time.
In fact, because the subsidy is output-based an installation in a location with high
solar potential receives a higher subsidy than a location with low solar potential, all
else equal. Similarly, a system installed in the early years of the programme receives
a different subsidy than a system installed after the policy reforms.
Estimation in this setting presents a number of challenges. First, while the
subsidy rate was progressively curtailed, the cost of PV systems has also been falling
over time. I therefore control for changes in the cost. To control for potential
endogeneity and measurement error in my main regressors, I use an instrumental
variable approach. More specifically, I use local installers' wage, after controlling for
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general wage in the area, and price index of PV modules in international markets to
instrument for the cost of installation. To instrument for the subsidy, I instead use
relative latitude and longitude within municipalities and the FIT rate for different
types of system. The former affects how much electricity the household can expect
from the panels, due to the solar potential of the location, while the latter is a
measure of government support for solar adoption and renewables in general and is
therefore correlated to the FIT rate of residential panels. In turn, the amount of
electricity generated and the FIT rate determine the subsidy the household receives.
Areas and time fixed effects are then used to correct for self-selection and cor-
related unobservables. Because the outcome is a count variable, I construct an
estimator based on Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019) that assumes a Poisson data-
generating process, and provides consistent estimates when introducing IV and fixed
effects. I then perform robustness checks to address bunching  in case households
respond strategically to changes in the subsidy rate by installing later or earlier 
and investigate two mechanisms that might cause heterogeneity in the effects of the
main regressors, namely change in the parameters over time and peer effects.
Once I have estimated the parameters of interest, I use the fitted model to
predict the number of installations that would have occurred without subsidy and
when and where these installations would have occurred. I can then estimate the
rent that is appropriated by these inframarginal adopters, and identify the marginal
installations that have been induced by the policy, and would not have happened
without it. In the last part of the paper I predict the geographical distribution of
installations under an alternative policy scenario with a capacity-based subsidy. I
then use the results of this analysis to discuss the cost-effectiveness of the policy,
comparing the costs, the capacity installed and the electricity generated under each
scenario. The cost of decreased GHG emissions is also discussed.
1.3 Theoretical framework
1.3.1 Single agent problem
In the context of small-scale electricity generation, it is becoming more and more
common to refer to the owner of a system as a `prosumer' - a portmanteau between
the terms producer and consumer. The term aims to stress the change that these
25
systems introduce in the relationship between the agent and the energy they consume
and produce, introducing new processes and frameworks of analysis. According to
this theoretical framework, the households involved in the decision to adopt a PV
system may be modelled as profit-maximising and cost-minimising agents, following
the theory of the firm in microeconomics:
max
qk={0,1}
Π(qk, ψk) = Sk(yk(qk, ψk))− Ck(qk) (1.1)
that is, agent k chooses whether to adopt (qk = 1) or not (qk = 0)  or the capacity
to install  in the same way a firm may choose to `enter the market' or to make
an investment, so to maximise their profits (Π). ψk represents the solar generation
potential of the location where the installation is being considered, and depends on
conditions such as weather and cloud coverage, as well as tilt and azimuth of the
roof, and shading.
Profits are given by the difference between the revenues that can be obtained
from the production of electricity (i.e. the subsidy S) and the cost, or investment
price, required to install (C). The cost includes the price of the modules, the inverter,
and any other component of the system, as well as the service of getting the panels
physically installed on the roof and the system up and running. In line with the
information collected from in-depth interviews with UK prosumers,2 the cost is
assumed to be paid upfront and without taking loans  but the analysis can be
easily adapted to accommodate instalments and loans. Given the specific case of
solar PVs in the UK, the revenues correspond to the output-based FIT subsidy and
depends positively on the electricity generated by the system (yk), which in turns
depends positively on the decision to install and on the solar potential of the location,
i.e. ∂S
out
k (yk)
∂yk
> 0 and ∂yk(qk,ψk)
∂ψk
> 0. As the UK incentive is purely output-based and
does not depend on the amount of electricity consumed by the household,3 there is
no need to model the consumption side in this framework. Therefore:
∂Πout(qk, ψk)
∂ψk
=
∂Soutk (yk(qk, ψk))
∂ψk
− ∂Ck(qk)
∂ψk
=
∂Soutk (yk(qk, ψk))
∂yk(qk, ψk)
∂yk(qk, ψk)
∂ψk
> 0
To understand how this scheme differs from a capacity-based incentive, consider
2In-depth interviews were conducted as part of the ENABLE EU project. More information on
the project and the methodology may be found in Standal et al. (2018, 2020).
3For example, the UK does not have any form of net metering, a scheme frequently used in
other countries. More details on the policy background are presented in the next Section.
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that under the latter the subsidy would only depend on the installation decision, i.e.
Scap = S(qk), and the solar generation potential parameter drops out of the profit
formula, so that:
∂Πcap(qk)
∂ψk
=
∂Scapk (qk)
∂ψk
− ∂Ck(qk)
∂ψk
= 0
That is, compared with capacity-based subsidies, output-based subsidies should trig-
ger more installations in areas with higher solar potential, and the difference between
the two distribution is larger the more variation in solar potential there is over the
country (i.e. the larger ∂yk(qk,ψk)
∂ψk
is), the higher the payment of an additional unit
of electricity generation is (∂S
out
k (yk(qk,ψk))
∂yk(qk,ψk)
), and the more responsive households are
to the level of subsidy.
Output-based subsidies are paid periodically4 in the case of the UK FIT for 20
years (or 25 for early stages of the scheme). The total subsidy Sk is therefore the
present value of the flow of annual payments sk. Each payment is calculated as the
product between the FIT rate per kWh and the total amount of electricity generated
in the corresponding period. The latter is not a pre-determined amount, but depends
on several factors outside of the agent's control, including the solar potential of the
location and actual weather conditions. When considering whether or not to install,
the actual generation is therefore unobservable by the agent, and they consider
instead an `expected outcome'. I calculate the latter as the average estimated yearly
amount of electricity generated by a system according to its geographical location,
under some standard technical parameters.5 This value approximates the estimates
of electricity production that are provided by websites and solar installers.6
When the agent considers installing, the expected outcome is therefore the same
in every year  as roof characteristics are fixed, there is no reason to expect sys-
tematic differences in the weather in one direction or the other between years, and
the FIT rate per kWh generated is determined by the rate in place at the time of
adoption and is held fixed throughout the subsidy period.7 The annual subsidy can
therefore be considered as an annuity, calculated as the product of the expected an-
4Payments are usually monthly, quarterly or annually  here I consider annually, but this does
not affect the rest of the analysis.
5See Section 1.4 for more details.
6Interviews confirm that households in the UK consider these estimates when deciding whether
to install PVs.
7The rate is indexed to the Retail Price Index (RPI) and is therefore adjusted for inflation on
a yearly basis. There is therefore no need for the household to take inflation into consideration in
their decision.
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nual generation (a random variable) times the FIT rate at the time of the installation
(a constant):
sk,t(yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk)) = yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk) · FITt=0 (1.2)
and taking the expectation at the time of the adoption decision:
E[sk,t(yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk)] = E[yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk) · FITt=0] =
= E[yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk)] · FITt=0 =
= sk(y¯k(qk,t=0, ψk) ∀t = 1, ..., T (1.3)
The total subsidy is therefore the present value of an annuity over a finite period of
time:
Sk(qk) =
n∑
t=0
sk,t(yk,t(qk,t=0, ψk)
(1 + r)t
=
1− (1 + r)−T
r
sk(y¯k(qk,t=0)) = ρ sk(y¯k(qk,t=0))
(1.4)
where T is the number of years the subsidy is paid for (in this case 20 years), and
r is the discount rate. I do not make any assumption on the discount rate but
consider it as one of the parameter to be estimated. In the estimation section I
therefore calculate the implicit discount rate derived from the inter-temporal trade-
off between upfront costs and future subsidies.
As the government sets the FIT rates, agents are `subsidy-takers' (equivalent to
price-takers firms in the theory of the firm). Similarly, agents can be considered to
be cost-takers, as their individual choices are unlikely to affect the investment cost
(in this case the price of the PV system and its installation). To support the latter
assumption, it is worth remembering that PV modules and inverters are mostly
imported from abroad and their price is determined in the international market.
1.3.2 Aggregate demand
The dependent variable for the empirical analysis is Qi,t, the count of new installa-
tions in a location i at a given time t, so from the single-agent problem, I aggregate
as follows:
Qi,t =
∑
k∈i,t
qk (1.5)
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Changes in the subsidies and in the installation price result in changes in the prof-
itability of the investment, and therefore trigger adjustment responses in how many
prosumers decide to install, which can be captured by a total elasticity term:
ηΠ =
∆Q
∆Π
Π
Q
=
∆Q
Q
S − C
∆S −∆C =
ηS ∆S − ηC ∆C
∆S −∆C (1.6)
and substituting for the expression of S in equation 1.4:
ηΠ =
ηs ρ∆s− ηC ∆C
ρ∆s−∆C
The parameters of interest in the estimation are therefore the partial elasticity
of installations to changes in the annual subsidy:
ηs =
% change in #installations
% change in subsidy
=
∆Q
∆s
s
Q
= βs
s
Q
(1.7)
and the partial elasticity to changes in the cost of purchasing and installing a PV
systems:
ηC =
% change in #installations
% change in cost
=
∆Q
∆C
C
Q
= βC
C
Q
(1.8)
I assume that agents display a constant response to changes in the levels of subsidies
and installation cost (β), and the elasticity therefore varies depending on the value
of these variables and of the number of installations (Q). I obtain estimates of the
β coefficients through a reduced-form regression analysis in the next Section, and
then calculate the elasticity at the means of the parameters.
Another element of interest is the discount rate r. It is possible to recover
an implicit discount rate from the regression coefficients by imposing that agents
respond in the same way to an increase (or decrease) in the total revenues S, as they
respond to a decrease (or increase) of the same magnitude in the installation cost C
(the same assumption is made implicitly in De Groote and Verboven, 2019). This
implies that the only difference between changes in the annual subsidy and changes
in the cost is that the former entails future cash flows that need to be discounted,
while the latter is an upfront payment. Details of how the implicit discount rate is
obtained are presented in Section 1.5 when the regression model is presented.
Within this framework, I consider the main decision for a household to be
whether to install a PV system or not. I do not model the decision on the ca-
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pacity, or size to be installed, as in the UK there is evidence that this is constrained
by the available space on the roof and by the barrier of smaller FIT rates and au-
thorisation requirements for systems larger than 4kW. In fact, under the UK FIT
scheme (which applies to solar PV system up to 5MW), only systems 0-4kW are
eligible for the highest subsidy rate and do not require any authorization to be in-
stalled and connected to the grid, so that over 90% of the installations eligible for
FIT in the UK (i.e. solar PV systems up to 5MW) have a declared net capacity
smaller than 4kW (see Figure 1.3).
The size of the system is therefore implicitly constrained to a maximum of 4kW
in order to obtain the highest FIT rate and avoid the bureaucracy of obtaining
the authorization. Within the 0-4kW range, I assume that the size of the system
depends exogenously on the rooftop space available and is uncorrelated to the solar
potential of an area. UK prosumers interviewed by the author (Standal et al., 2018,
2020) often mentioned that the number of panels installed was constrained by the
size of their roof. I do take into consideration that as the technology evolves, a panel
of the same surface area may correspond to greater installed capacity. To do this,
I compute the median panel size installed in each local authority8 in each year (see
Figure 1.1) and use this value whenever I need to convert the number of installations
into installed capacity.
The analysis can be easily extended to model the choice of the panel size, by
considering a continuous qk bounded at zero, rather than a dichotomous variable. In
this case the aggregated demand Q =
∑
k qk would represent the installed capacity
rather than the count of installations, and would be continuous, but still bounded
at zero.
To estimate how responsive demand is to changes in the subsidy, I use a reduced-
form model (described in more details in Section 1.5) with the number of new PV
installations on the left-hand side, and the annual expected subsidy that could be
received given the location and the date of the installation on the right-hand side.
The dataset consists of a panel of installation counts for each location in England
and Wales, observed at the monthly level. For each observation unit I calculate
the corresponding expected annual subsidy given the location and date. The next
Section provides additional information on the policy context and the data used.
8Local authorities are administrative areas at a higher aggregation level than the statistical
areas considered as observation units.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of system size in each year, in the 0-4kW category.
1.4 Policy background and data
1.4.1 The UK Feed-in Tariff scheme: a pure output-based
subsidy
Between 2010 and 2019, the UK supported small-scale clean electricity generation
through a Feed-In Tariff (FIT) scheme, which covered solar PV, wind turbines,
hydroelectric, micro combined heat and power (CHP), and anaerobic digestion sys-
tems, up to 5MW. The scheme provides direct economic benefits to the owner of the
system through two rates, the generation or production rate for generated electric-
ity, and the export rate for the electricity that is sold to the grid. The production
rate is paid on the total amount of generated electricity, recorded by an appropriate
meter, while the export rate is paid on the assumption that 50% of the electricity
generated is exported, as the quantity effectively exported is not currently metered
for residential small-scale systems (McKenna et al., 2018). This makes the subsidy
purely output-based, as its amount only depends on the electricity generated, and
does not require to model and estimate how much of the electricity generated is
used for self-consumption and how much is exported (in the UK there was no net
metering scheme in place in the years included in the analysis).
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The rates are assigned according to the date of the installation, with different
values depending on the technology and the installed capacity of the system. These
rates are then paid for 20 years (25 for solar installations in the early years of the
scheme, later shortened to 20 for consistency with the other eligible technologies),
and every year they are adjusted for inflation, according to the changes in the
Retail Price Index over the previous year. The budget for the scheme comes from
the general electricity bills of all energy suppliers' customers - as it is the case for
other energy-related schemes in the country. This funding mechanism has attracted
a lively political debate on the distributional equity of the scheme, and was one of
the main arguments behind the closure of the scheme in 2019. While this issue is
not convered in this Chapter, I refer to Grover and Daniels (2017) for a discussion
on the UK, and Borenstein (2017) for California.
Figure 1.2: Changes in the FIT rates (production and export), for 0-4kW solar PV systems.
The FIT scheme was reformed various times since its introduction in April 2010.9
The evolution of the rates for 0-4 kW solar PV systems, is shown in Figure 1.2.
Quoting the sustained decrease in capital costs of solar PVs as the main rationale,
the production rate has been repeatedly adjusted downward, moving from 54.17
9Details on the various phases and reforms of the policy have been collected from materials and
reports by the UK Office of Gas and Electricity Market (Ofgem) and the former Department of
Energy and Climate Change (DECC), now merged in the Department for Business, Energy and
Industrial Strategy (BEIS).
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p/kWh10 in 2010 to 3.79 at the beginning of 2019, to be definitely phased out in
March 2019. Major reforms to the rate and other features of the scheme were intro-
duced in 2012 and 2016. In particular, an automatic and roughly quarterly degres-
sion mechanism was introduced at the end of 2012. The degression mechanism was
pegged to pre-determined deployment objectives, that were nonetheless frequently
modified. If these were not met and uptake was lower than the required threshold,
the degression was postponed for up to two consecutive quarters. The rationale was
that in this way the rate could be progressively reduced in line with the reduction in
costs and increase in uptake without the need for government intervention, therefore
reducing uncertainty in the sector. The scheme was initially intended until 2015,
triggering a period of policy uncertainty as reforms to the system were discussed and
the renewal of the scheme was questioned. The FIT scheme was then suspended at
the beginning of 2016, before being reformed and re-instated in February.
Contrarily to the production tariff, the export tariff rate has undergone fewer
amendments, and was adjusted upward, from 3.82 p/kWh to 5.38 p/kWh, in mid-
2012. These progressive and sharp changes to the subsidy rate provide the main
source of variation over time for the identification of the subsidy elasticity as ex-
plained in the following sections.
Aggregated data and trends on adoption of small-scale PVs in the UK are pre-
sented in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. Residential installations of less than 4kW constitute
the vast majority (more than 90%) of small-scale electricity generating installations
in the UK, both in terms of number and aggregated capacity. The trends in both
figures show evident changes in correspondence of the major policy reforms.
1.4.2 Data
I compile two versions of my main dataset, one using as units of observation the
Lower-layer Super Output Areas (LSOAs) as defined in the 2001 Census, and one
using a higher level of aggregation, the Middle-layer Super Output Areas (MSOAs).
The final dataset consists of observations for all the 34,378 LSOAs  or 7,194 MSOAs
 in England and Wales.11 Super output areas at different aggregation levels are
10The tariff is indexed to inflation and updated every year. All the tariff values are expressed at
their 2019 level, at the time the FIT scheme was closed.
11Northern Ireland is excluded as it is not involved in the UK Feed-in Tariff scheme. Scotland
is excluded because statistical areas in the country are constructed in a different way as compared
to England and Wales.
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative installed capacity in the UK (kW), by month.
Figure 1.4: Number of installation in the UK, by month.
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a statistical construct, developed for presenting local statistical information from
different sources and offices in a standardized way.
The choice of LSOAs and MSOAs as aggregation levels is driven on one side
by data availability, as these are the most granular level at which PV installa-
tion data could be obtained, but at the same time is preferred over post-code
district (the other available unit) due to the way they are constructed. In fact,
the LSOAs ans MSOAs are purposedly defined to insure within-homogeneity and
between-comparability in the context of Neighbourhood Statistics and Census data
collection, and to be roughly comparable to one another in terms of size of resi-
dent population. Geographical proximity and information on the prevalent type of
dwelling, tenure, etc. are also used to ensure a compact shape and socio-demographic
homogeneity12. LSOAs have a minimum of 1,000 residents, a maximum of 3,000 and
an average of 1,500 (equivalent to 650 households, with a minimum and maximum
of 400 and 1,200 respectively). MSOAs contain a minimum of 5,000 residents (or
2,000 households) and a maximum of 15,000 (or 6,000 households).
These are all desirable properties for an areal unit in spatial analysis, given that
the exact coordinates of the installations are not available. Nevertheless, we must be
aware of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem which comes with such aggregations, as
results may be sensitive to the level of aggregation as well as the shape and where the
boundaries are set, and an extension of the present work may check the robustness
of the results when other specifications are chosen (e.g. LSOAs, local authorities
or postcode districts. See Briant et al., 2010 for the general issue and Flowerdew,
2011 for the specific case of UK Census data). Details of the main variables used
for the analysis are described in the next paragraphs, while summary statistics are
presented in Table 1.1.
Data on residential solar PV installations
Data on residential PV installations are obtained from the Ofgem Feed-in Tariff
Installation Report, which contains information on the country's small-scale (i.e.
below 5MW) renewable energy generation systems that are connected to the grid,
12The official definition and methodology are provided by the Neighbourhood Statistics division
of the Office for National Statistics (ONS). Some LSOAs and MSOAs were merged or split in 2011,
due to changes in their composition, however these changes only affected 2.5% LSOAs and 2.1% of
MSOAs. See Census geography - An overview of the various geographies used in the production
of statistics collected via the UK census., on the ONS portal.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics.
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
PV count 1.01 2.66 0 0 0 1 219
Installed base 38 46 0 5 21 54 474
Generation potential 957.17 58.77 729.16 919.68 966.18 986.04 1121.76
(kWh/year)
Subsidy 2.53 1.26 1.05 1.58 1.73 4.12 5.03
(100GBP/kW)
Install. cost 2.23 0.71 .13 1.71 1.91 2.62 7.68
(1,000GBP/kW)
Pres.Value of Profitability 0.45 0.86 -3.23 -0.13 0.06 1.03 4.58
(1,000GBP/kW)
Internal Rate of Return 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.11 3.60
Electricity price (p/kWh) 14.49 1.07 12.06 13.69 14.75 15.25 16.67
Av. electricity cons. 2010 3865.56 611.22 2388.93 3456.26 3734.87 4128.44 7779.3
(kWh/year)
Density 3265 3508 6 650 2466 4478 27673
Surface area (km2) 21.01 52.78 0.29 1.73 3.19 11.86 1128.07
Owner-occupied houses 1906 695 24 1488 1926 2357 5182
Median house price 202.09 125.56 30.00 124.98 172.75 243.66 3500.00
(1,000GBP)
Total resident population 7904 1694 2225 6618 7695 8867 25245
 40-64 year old 2557 555 545 2165 2496 2882 6226
 ≥65 year old 1363 495 194 1015 1310 1642 4656
 socio-economic group A 179 112 16 96 153 235 868
 socio-economic group B 263 180 24 136 220 340 1593
 socio-economic group C 972 347 228 723 945 1186 2849
 socio-economic group D 491 163 70 375 470 586 2384
 socio-economic group E 365 154 81 260 336 438 1388
 socio-economic group F 374 130 55 282 365 456 1105
 socio-economic group G 611 199 121 467 597 736 1580
 socio-economic group H 474 223 59 304 442 611 1513
Flats 601 686 11 184 363 717 5725
Terraced houses 816 559 17 394 684 1112 3710
Semi-detached houses 989 508 11 646 939 1286 3569
Detached houses 713 593 3 199 546 1140 3716
Work from home 302 136 57 206 274 364 1167
Homemaker 340 114 46 261 323 398 1123
Retired 712 241 94 547 688 848 2445
Unemployed 175 95 18 104 148 224 838
Born in UK 6588 1395 2082 5583 6478 7399 13536
Born in EU 166 146 16 78 120 195 1550
Born elsewhere 480 660 17 121 213 470 6143
PV FIT rate, 1-5MW 12.44 9.97 5.73 6.38 7.10 8.90 30.70
(p/kWh)
Wind FIT rate, 0-2kW 26.22 9.31 13.73 17.78 21 36.2 36.2
(p/kWh)
Latitude 52.356 1.129 49.922 51.478 52.134 53.369 55.765
Longitude -1.353 1.303 -6.312 -2.216 -1.382 -0.250 1.747
Chinese PV price index 0.81 0.38 0.53 0.55 0.57 0.98 1.62
Median earnings 510.24 62.52 443.10 469.20 484.50 529.00 670.80
(GBP/week)
Median wage, electric 12.53 1.02 11.14 11.86 12.2 12.92 15.35
(GBP/hour)
# Months 70
# Statistical areas 7,194
# Local authorities 348
Tot. observations 503,580
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as well as stand-alone systems. Each installation record contains among other pieces
of information the LSOA in which the system is located, the date the system was
commissioned, the declared net capacity of the system, the technology,13 and a
code for the FIT rate it receives. To construct my dataset, I select the solar PV
installations that receive the FIT rate for 0-4 kW systems. Of these, I remove
the installations assigned to the middle rate, as this indicates the owner has 25
or more installations  and is therefore likely to be a solar company installing on
rented rooftop space, rather than a household  as well as installations receiving the
lower rate, meaning that the building where the solar PV system is being installed
does not satisfy the minimum Energy Efficiency Requirement (this only affects 1%
of installations in the 0-4 kW category).
13The report includes all the technologies eligible for FIT, i.e. solar PV, wind turbines, hydro-
electric, micro combined heat and power (CHP), and anaerobic digestion systems.
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(a) 2011 (b) 2017
Figure 1.5: Geographical distribution of residential solar PV systems in England and Wales.
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The total stock of 0-4 kW solar PV systems in each LSOA is mapped in Figure
1.5 for 2011 and 2017. Comparing this Figure with Figure 1.6, it can be seen that
installations appear to be mainly concentrated in rural and less dense areas, while
the major cities - London in particular - display a substantially lower installed base,
consistent with the literature (Graziano and Gillingham, 2015). Although income
is considered as a key determinant of PV adoption  both directly, because of the
investment required, and indirectly, as higher-income households are more likely to
live in a house rather than in a flat and to be owners rather than tenants  there does
not seem to be an evident correlation between the two variables (Figure 1.7), as the
wealthy South-East has a relatively low number of adoptions, while the South-West
and part of Wales have the largest installed base in the country, despite not being
rich areas. At the same time, areas around Leeds are relatively wealthy and rich in
residential PVs, while the northernmost parts of Wales and Yorkshire are neither.
Solar irradiation is another relevant variable, as it is the key determinant of PV
electricity yield (see Figure 1.8). Again, if compared with the PV system distribution
maps, it can be seen that although some areas, such as the South-West, have a
consistent positive relationship between insolation and PV adoption, the situation in
other areas is more puzzling, with the South-East showing substantial unexploited
potential for solar power, while adoption is higher at the border with Scotland
despite receiving considerably less solar radiation. Understanding the drivers behind
the adoption of residential solar PV is therefore a less straightforward task than one
might think, as socio-economic, demographic, geographical and built-environment
characteristics all contribute to shape the uptake of this technology.
Annual (expected) subsidy and the investment cost of PV installations
To estimate the role monetary incentives play in this context, I need a measure
of the annual subsidy (i.e. the `revenues') that can be expected when installing
a residential solar PV system at a given time and in a given location. I compute
these annual potential revenues as the product of the estimated annual electricity
output of a panel of 1kW of installed power at a given location, by the FIT rates
applicable in a given month. The electricity output is measured in kWh/year for kW
of installed power, and varies according to the geographical location and its solar
insolation, as well as contextual factors such as cloud cover and rainy days, buildings
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Figure 1.6: Geographical distribution of rural and urban areas in England and Wales.
Figure 1.7: Geographical distribution of income in England and Wales.
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and trees shadows, as well as the tilt, azimuth and direction of the roofs. Data on
the output for each year between 2009 and 2016, under some standard installation
conditions14, were obtained from the Photovoltaic Geographical Information System
(PVGIS European Communities, 2001-2017)15 for each LSOA population-weighted
centroid, and averaged over the different years to smooth the effects of meteorological
factors. The resulting distribution of the electricity output over England and Wales
is presented in Figure 1.8.
These values change over space, but are time-invariant. The FIT rates per kWh
generated, on the contrary, are constant throughout the country, but vary in time.
Each installation is assigned the FIT rate in place on the date of the installation,
and that rate is paid for 20 years according to the kWh of electricity generated in
each year. As described above, the owner of the system is paid a production rate for
the electricity generated, and an export rate for 50% of the total generation, which
is assumed to be the quantity exported to the grid, as the actual amount exported is
not metered. I therefore obtain the annual expected revenue for each LSOA-month
combination as the product of the yearly expected electricity generation for 1kW
installed in that LSOA and the rate corresponding to that month (in p/year per kW
of installed power). MSOA-level data are obtained as average of the LSOAs values.
The total rate is given by the production rate plus 0.5 times the generation rate.
The resulting annual subsidy variable varies in both time and space  due to
the changes in FIT rate and the variation in solar generation potential, respectively
 and this variation is exploited to identify the effect of subsidy on adoption in
the following section. The range of the expected revenues for each month across
the different locations are presented in Figure 1.9, while summary statistics are
presented in Table 1.1. The average subsidy varies from more than 400 GBP per
year per kW of installed capacity at the start of the scheme, to between 150-200
GBP after the reforms in 2012, to only around 65 GBP after the 2016 reform.
The way subsidy data are calculated and the way subsidy rates are determined
by the government may raise concerns of measurement errors and endogeneity. Mea-
14Peak power: 1kW; slope: 35 degrees; system losses: 14%. System losses gives an average of
the performance over the 20 years the FIT is paid out, and include module degradation of about
0.5% per year.
15Data were obtained from the European Commission Joint Research Centre in Ispra. Values are
based on the PVGIS SARAH database. Details on the methodology and the dataset can be found
in Huld and Amillo (2015) and Huld et al. (2012). More information on the data and methodology
can be found at https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/PVGIS/docs/methods.
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surement errors may arise because the expected electricity outcome is obtained for
standard parameters levels and at the population-weighted centroids, rather than
using actual values (which are unobservables). Regarding endogeneity, the frequent
adjustments and cut to the subsidy rate may have been affected by the demand for
solar systems. Instrumental variables (IV) for subsidies are therefore introduced in
the next Section.
Figure 1.8: Map of electricity generation. Output, kWh/year for kW of installed power,
average 2009-2016. Own elaboration on Photovoltaic Geographical Information System
(PVGIS) data.
I refer to the price paid to purchase and install a solar system as `cost' of the
installation, as I am framing the installation problem as an investment decision
with a trade-off between costs and future revenues. Data on the median cost for
an installation per postcode area per quarter comes from the Micro Certification
Scheme (MCS) to which each installation must register to be eligible for the FIT.
Additional data on the countrywide average cost per month comes from the Depart-
ment of Energy and Climate Change (DECC, now part of BEIS, the Department
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Figure 1.9: Expected annual FIT payments for kW of installed power, according to month
of installation and location (left axis; average value highlighted), and number of residential
PV installations in each month (right axis). Own calculation on Photovoltaic Geographical
Information System (PVGIS) data and Ofgem data.
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy) Annual Cost of Small-Scale Solar
Technology Summary, May 2017. Cost data were only collected in a systematic
manner starting from April 2013, and the Department does not provide data for
previous years; for years before 2013, estimates of the average country-wide cost are
obtained from the Green Business Watch report UK residential solar panel costs
and returns: 2010-2017. These are used for consistency checks.
MCS data are converted from cost per installation to cost per kW installed,
by dividing them by the capacity of the median installation in the corresponding
area and quarter. The resulting postcode-area-by-quarter dataset contains missing
values for cases in which no installation was recorded or the price was not reported.
I first assign the costs of each postcode area to all of the MSOAs within it, and the
average price of multiple postcode areas to MSOAs that cross postcode boundaries.
Imputing the postcode area-level data (this is a higher level of aggregation with
respect to MSOAs, but is the most disaggregated level MCS agreed to disclose) to
the MSOAs is a sensible approach in this setting, as installers compete over large
areas and could carry out installations far from their headquarters.16. Moreover, the
16Based on interviews with prosumers (Standal et al., 2018, 2020) and information from installers'
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supermarket chain Tesco, and more recently Ikea, sell solar panels throughout the
country, contributing to make the cost of installations more uniform across larger
areas. I then interpolate the existing data for each MSOA over time, to fill the
gaps in the time series. This approach leaves missing data before the first price in
a location is recorded and after the last one, as well as missing data for postcode
areas with no cost data throughout the period. This missing data are imputed by
using the average cost for the region17 to which the MSOA belongs, for any given
year, based on the same rationale of competition among suppliers discussed above.
Finally, the quarterly data are converted into monthly data using the moving
average over the two months before and after each observation, to smooth the trends.
The distribution of the final cost data for every year is presented in Figure 1.10 and
summary statistics are presented in Table 1.1. The average cost across the country
decreased from about 3,000 GBP per kW of installed capacity in 2010-2011 to about
2,000 in 2012-2015, to plateau around 1,600 GBP from 2016 onwards.
The need to use data at a higher aggregation level, impute missing data that
cannot be observed and to smooth data trends to convert them from quarterly
into monthly can be framed as an issue of measurement error, and might produce
measurement error bias. The cost of the installations might also be affected by
the demand for systems in each period, therefore challenging the assumption of
exogeneity of this regressor  although most of the hardware components, inverter
and PV modules are imported from other countries and their price is therefore
determined in the international market. As for the subsidy variable, these issues are
addressed using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, as illustrated in the next
Section.
As shown in Section 1.3, installing a solar PV system can be thought of as
an investment, as households pay the upfront installation cost, and then receive a
return over time thanks to the FIT scheme, here approximated by constant expected
annual revenues. To have an idea of how attractive this investment is, I build cash-
flow vectors of the (negative) upfront installation cost and 20 successive constant
(positive) payments of the expected annual revenues, and use them to calculate the
internal rate of return (IRR) of the investment for each area-month combination.
The results of the calculation are presented in Figure 1.11, comparing the trend in
websites.
17Regions are a more aggregated administrative level, in total there are 10 regions in England
and Wales.
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Figure 1.10: Trend in the cost of residential solar PV systems. Own elaboration on data
from MCS.
the IRR with the observed trend in installations.
It can be noticed that the estimated IRR (calculated for every area-month, not
just for those with a positive number of installations) before 2016 is almost always
above 3%, and in the early period of the policy, when the tariff rates were held fixed
while the cost was falling, it scored as high as 10-18% for the average area, well above
the returns from low-risk investments in financial instruments in the country.18 The
trend in installations appear to follows the trend in the IRR, and the values are
positively correlated.
Savings on electricity bills and other covariates
More indirect benefits of adopting residential solar are provided through savings in
the electricity bills, as the generated electricity can be used for free reducing the
amount of energy bought from the utility. In fact, given that export to the grid is
`deemed' and not actually measured, self-consumption does not affect the payment
received through the generation and export rate, and it therefore has no opportunity
cost.
18During in-depth interviews with households who installed residential PV at various moments,
it was often mentioned that the solar panels were seen as a sensible investment and a better
alternative than keeping money in the bank (Standal et al., 2020).
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Figure 1.11: Internal rate of return, for kW of installed power, according to the month of
installation and location (left axis, average value highlighted), and number of residential PV
installations in each month (right axis). Own calculation on data provided by Photovoltaic
Geographical Information System (PVGIS, Huld et al., 2012), Micro Certification Scheme
and Ofgem.
McKenna et al. (2018) monitored data from more than 300 UK households in-
volved in a smart grid project, and found that on average the annual self-consumption
level for households with solar PV systems is around 45% of the total PV generation,
covering around 24% of households electricity demand. For reference, the yearly
electricity demand of a household in the UK is around 4,000 kWh and the average
retail price of electricity in the period of reference is around 15 p/kWh, resulting
in estimated savings of around 138 GBP/year per household. This is equivalent to
less than a third of the expected annual subsidy in the early period of the policy,
while it is comparable with the expected annual subsidy in the last months of the
policy. The relevance of bill savings with respect to the subsidy has therefore grown
over time, as the amount of subsidies decreased. The study, together with other
quantitative and qualitative work on the UK (see for example Standal et al., 2020,
2018; Bulkeley et al., 2016; Bell et al., 2015; Bulkeley et al., 2015) finds a large
range for self-consumption values (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of
total electricity demand), and show that the level achieved by a households is highly
heterogeneous and depends on a wide variety of factors, including social, economic,
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educational, geographical, technical and demographic characteristics (including for
example how much time member of the household spend at home during the day,
i.e. when the system is generating; whether they have timers to schedule the use
of appliances; age and gender composition; education level and background; load
profile of the household and the type of appliances used), inter-household dynamics,
the level of internalization of green preferences and of familiarity and understanding
of `smart' grid procedures and technical aspects of the grids. They find that the size
and generation of the solar PV system are therefore only part of the explanation
for the level of self-consumption and bill savings. Qualitative evidence from these
studies also show that many UK households are unwilling to change their habits
and to put much efforts in monitoring generation and shifting their electricity use
accordingly. In particular, quoting Bulkeley et al. (2015): The UK's feed-in tariff,
particularly in the presence of low interest rates and insecurity about housing and
financial markets, led to PV being regarded as one of the most secure and prof-
itable forms of investment during 2010 2011 [...] and has given rise to a logic of
investing in PV and focusing on the export of power rather than any engagement
with how using the electricity generated by PV could also lead to financial (and
environmental) benefits. It should also be noticed that in the UK residential sector
electricity is used for lighting and electrical appliances, while space heating  the
demand for which is correlated to weather and climatic condition, and therefore to
the generation of the solar module  is mainly achieved using natural gas (according
to Palmer and Cooper, 2013, pp. 46-49, 90% of UK households had central heating
in 2011, and of these 91% used natural gas; these shares are even higher if excluding
flats and considering only houses). The need for space heating therefore does not
directly affect electricity consumption, nor self-consumption of electricity generated
by the solar PV system.
For all these reasons, I consider savings on the electricity bills as an indirect
benefit of adoption rather than one of the main explanatory variables, and control
for it in the regression analysis using:
 Average electricity price in each electricity Distribution Network Operator
(DNO) region19 in each year  as larger savings may be obtained in areas where
19Electricity distribution in England and Wales is divided in the following network regions: East
Midlands; Eastern; London; Merseyside and North Wales; North East; North West; South East;
South Wales; South West; Southern; West Midlands; Yorkshire.
47
electricity is more expensive. Data on the average annual domestic standard
electricity unit cost in pence per kWh are obtained from BEIS (2018).
 Average electricity consumption in each location before the FIT scheme started
 as households who consume more have more to gain from free electricity.
Data on the Average Ordinary Domestic Consumption in kWh come from
DECC (2012).
 Resident population working from home, working as homemakers, and retired
 as they spend more time at home during daytime and therefore have the
possibility to shift their energy demand to times when the panels are generating
and to use the free electricity. Data are obtained from the UK Census (ONS,
2005).
Other control variables used in the regression analysis are:
 Population density, constructed by dividing the resident population by the
surface area. Previous literature, for example Graziano and Gillingham (2015),
found that households in areas with lower density and rural areas, are more
likely to adopt solar PV, due to the characteristics of the built environment,
more suitable housing stock, and less shading from nearby buildings.
 Number of owner-occupied houses, from ONS (2018) to control for the po-
tential market size of residential customers. Tenants and households living in
multi-apartment buildings suffer from split-incentive and coordination prob-
lems, and adoption of solar PV is therefore less likely.
 Median house price from ONS (2017)), to control for house value.
 Total resident population, population 40-64 and population above 65 years
of age from ONS (2016) and previous editions, to control for demographic
composition. People in these age brackets are more likely to own a house, to
not be thinking about moving in the immediate future, and to have finished
repaying the mortgage and therefore to have available liquidity to invest, all
favourable conditions for purchasing solar PV.
 Socio-economic group A (Large employers and higher managerial and admin-
istrative occupations), B (Higher professional occupations), C (Lower man-
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agerial, administrative and professional occupations), D (Intermediate occu-
pations), E (Small employers and own account workers), F (Lower supervisory
and technical occupations), G (Semi-routine occupations), and H (Routine
occupations) from ONS (2005), to capture household income and other socio-
economic characteristics.
 Unemployment level from ONS (2005), to control for economic conditions in
the area.
 Flats, Terraced houses, Semi-detached houses, Detached houses from ONS
(2005). To control for house type and available rooftop space. Households
living in flats are likely to suffer from a coordination problem or constraints
on the use of the rooftop, so I expect less installations in areas with more flats.
 Born in UK, EU, or elsewhere from ONS (2005) to control for the likelihood
of remaining in the country and in the same house until old age, and therefore
to be able to appropriate the benefits from the solar system. Foreign-born
residents may have family and connections in other countries and may therefore
be more mobile.
It is to be noted that data from the 2001 Census (ONS, 2005), the number of owner-
occupied houses and the average electricity consumption before the FIT scheme
started are time invariant values. Summary statistics were presented in Table 1.1.
1.5 Estimation model
1.5.1 Identification strategy
Following from eq. (1.5) from the theoretical framework developed above, I specify a
linear estimation equation to estimate the demand for residential PV. By developing
the expression of the profitability in terms of subsidy and cost, and the total subsidy
in terms of the annual payments, the regression equation becomes:
Qi,t = β0 + βΠ Πi,t + ui,t =
= β0 + βΠ (Si,t − Ci,t) + ui,t =
= β0 + βΠ
(1− 1
(1+r)n
r
si,t − Ci,t
)
+ ui,t
49
I then re-name the coefficients to obtain the more familiar regression form:
Qi,t = β0 + βssi,t + βCCi,t + ui,t (1.9)
with
βs = βΠ
(1− 1
(1+r)n
r
)
βC = −βΠ
(1.10)
where Qi,t is the number of new installations in location i at time t; Ci,t is the cost
for a 1kW installation in location i at time t; and si,t is the expected annual subsidy
for a 1kW system installed at time t in location i. βs captures the responsiveness of
demand to changes in the subsidy and βC the responsiveness of demand to changes
in the cost of the system, as described in Section 1.3. I run the regression in (1.9)
to estimate βˆs and βˆC and use them to compute the partial elasticities at the mean.
I then obtain the implicit discount rate rˆ by solving the two-equation system in two
unknowns in (1.10).
βs is identified thanks to variation in the expected subsidy si,t over time  due to
changes in the FIT rate  and over space  because the subsidy is output-based and
there is heterogeneity in the expected outcome at each location according to climatic
and geographic conditions. In the case of βC , there is an issue of measurement error,
as I do not observe Ci,t, but only its median across postcode-areas:
Cit = C¯jt + vit
Moreover, both regressors may be correlated with the error term, if for example the
subsidy and the cost are adjusted by the government and the installers according
to the demand for solar PV systems, casting doubts on whether the exogeneity
assumption required for the identification and estimation of the parameters is valid.
In the following paragraphs I present the main challenges for the estimation of these
parameters and refine the regression model to obtain consistent estimates. The
results of the regression analysis are then presented.
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1.5.2 Estimation challenges
Bunching
Short-term dynamics - such as delaying or anticipating installations to benefit from
a higher subsidy or a lower cost - might confound identification of long-term effects.
Figure 1.12 plots the installation trend against the changes in subsidy, showing
spikes in uptake in the months just before a subsidy change, and downturns just
after. To investigate bunching in the data, I consider two main strategies:
 restrict the sample by dropping observations in the month before and after
the tariff change (Hughes and Podolefsky, 2015); given the frequent subsidy
updates, this technique reduces the sample size substantially, hindering the
identification of the parameters;
 perform an event study analysis and control for time to/since subsidy change
in the regression (Rogers and Sexton, 2014).
Figure 1.12: Trend in the monthly number of residential PV installations. The vertical
lines highlight the months in which a change in the subsidy rate occurred (the dashed lines
represent changes outside the time-frame considered in this paper).
The results from the event study analysis are reported in Figure 1.13. Regressing
the number of adoptions over the number of months before or after the nearest tariff
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Figure 1.13: Event-study analysis. Results from regressing the number of installations per
month per MSOA over the number of months before/after the nearest subsidy rate change.
change shows how a positive anticipation effect exists in the two months before the
change, getting stronger as the event approaches. This effect is counterbalanced
by lower than expected level of adoptions in the two months after the event, again
stronger in size the closer the event is. These results suggest that households substi-
tute adoptions over time, as the two effects almost exactly cancel each other out. No
significant effect is detected for earlier or later months. In the regression I therefore
include indicators to control for whether the observation is one month before a tariff
change, two months before, one month after, or two months after, with any other
time being the baseline.
Measurement error, Endogeneity and IVs
If the explanatory variables suffer from classical errors-in-variables, then OLS es-
timation results in an attenuation bias and the estimated βˆ coefficient is biased
towards zero (Pischke, 2007). I therefore use an instrumental variable (IV) strategy
to obtain a consistent estimator in the presence of measurement error and, more
generally, endogeneity. In order to use IVs, both the relevance and the exclusion
assumption must hold, i.e. the instrument chosen must be correlated with the re-
gressor (relevance assumption) and only affect the outcome through the regressor
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and no other channel (exclusion restriction).
Following the previous literature, I look for supply shifters to instrument for the
cost of the installations. In particular, I use the monthly Chinese PV modules price
index (as in De Groote and Verboven, 2018), and the regional median hourly pay for
Skilled Metal, Electrical and Electronic Trades workers20, a proxy for installers'
wage. The latter is first regressed on the median general wage for the region to
remove possible income effects, which would be correlated with the error term in
the demand equation (as discussed in Gillingham and Tsvetanov, 2019). While the
price index only varies over time, the wage data are disaggregated for each of the
10 regions of England and Wales, introducing variations over space, although they
are not available at the monthly level, but only yearly. I perform robustness checks
using the German-European and the Japanese-Korean PV modules price indices,
and wage data at the 3- and 4-digits SOC, and results do not change.
To instrument for the subsidy, I use geographic location  and in particular
the latitude and longitude of the population-weighted centroid of each area  and
the FIT production rate for systems of larger size (1-5MW) and for a different
technology (residential wind turbines, 0-2kW). As can be seen from Figure 1.8,
the expected electricity generation, and therefore the subsidy, becomes larger when
moving from North to South, and from West to East. Once area-specific fixed
effects and location covariates are controlled for (see next paragraph), the relative
latitude and longitude of the location with respect to the average of the fixed effect
should only affect the demand for solar panels through the electricity output that
may be expected from the panels, and therefore the subsidy that may be received.
This instrument only varies over space, so I combine it with another instrument
that captures variation over time. I use the FIT production rate for residential
wind turbines with capacity 0-2kW and the FIT production rate for solar farm with
capacity 1-5MW as proxies for the government's general support to residential-level
smallest-scale distributed generation, and to solar generation respectively. This
instrument controls for the fact that the government might change the FIT rate for
residential solar PV systems depending on their demand, and therefore introduce
endogeneity in the regression. I perform robustness checks using the FIT production
20Here I use data for the 2-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC): 52 Skilled Metal,
Electrical and Electronic Trades. Data at lower levels are missing for some regions. The codes
for the lower levels are 3-digit SOC: 524 Electrical and Electronic Trades; 4-digit SOC: 5241
Electricians and electrical fitters.
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rates for 0-4kW systems and a draft of FIT rate changes pre-announced in 2010 as
alternative instruments, and results do not change substantially. Summary statistics
for the instrumental variables are also included in Table 1.1, previously presented.
The exclusion restriction cannot be tested, but it is credible that the price of PV
modules on the international market can only affect the uptake of solar PV systems
by affecting the cost of installing them, and possibly by affecting the subsidies, if
the government decides to cut them as the technology gets cheaper. Raw data
on installers' wages may reflect the living conditions in an area and the income of
its residents, and would therefore violate the exclusion restriction; for this reason
the wages are regressed on the median income of the area and only the residuals
used. Similarly, the FIT rates and the latitude and longitude of a location should
only affect the uptake through the subsidy channel, especially once fixed effects and
location covariates are controlled for.
The result Section presents estimates for the first stage of the two-stage least-
square (2SLS) regressions with IVs in Table 1.4, showing that the instruments chosen
are significantly correlated with the regressors, and can explain changes in those
variables. In fact, the price of the PV modules and the wage paid to installers
are important components of the total installation costs (Gillingham et al., 2016;
Seel et al., 2014). Similarly, due to the way the policy is designed, the only two
components of the subsidy amount are the FIT rate and the electricity generated;
as discussed above, latitude and longitude of the location are good predictors of
the latter component, as it is highly affected by climatic and weather conditions,
which in turn tend to worsen when moving towards the North and towards the
West, i.e. towards the Atlantic Ocean. The second component  the FIT rate 
is determined by the government as part of their strategy to support distributed
renewable generation, and therefore the rates for different technologies and different
capacity bands are likely to move in the same direction.
Another issue that may undermine the use of IVs, is the weak instrument problem
 if the instrument has low explanatory power for the regressor, the regression may
fail to detect the effect of the regressor on the outcome, even if in the true model
the effect is significant. Diagnostic statistics and tests for weak instruments are
presented in the result Section, in Table 1.4. When there is only one endogenous
variable, a common statistics of reference for weak instruments is the F statistics of
the excluded regressors. When there is more than one endogenous regressor, as in
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this case, Stock and Yogo (2005) tests can be used. Stock and Yogo (2005) provide
critical values for a test of relative bias and for a test of size distortion induced
by weak instruments, for different sets of parameters. The null hypothesis for both
tests is that the instruments are weak, and the test statistic is given by the minimum
eigenvalue statistic developed by Cragg and Donald (1993), which coincides with the
F statistic of the excluded regressors when there is only one endogenous variable. If
the test statistic is larger than the critical value, then weak instruments should not be
an issue. I perform the test using the largest critical values reported by the software
package21, i.e. setting the largest tolerable bias of the 2SLS estimator at 5% for the
2SLS relative bias test, and the largest actual rejection rate for a 5% significance
level Wald test at 10% for the 2SLS nominal 5% Wald test (StataCorp, 2017).
As a measure of correlation between the regressors and the excluded instruments, I
calculate and report in the Table the partial R2 statistic from Shea (1997), and the
adjusted partial R2  which applies a correction according to the degrees-of-freedom
of the estimation model, to account for the fact that the more instruments are used
the larger the bias of the estimator becomes.
Unobserved heterogeneity and fixed effects
To control for unobserved heterogeneity, I introduce different sets of area-specific and
time-specific fixed effects. Events that affect the whole country in a given period,
or specific characteristics or local policies and institutions that make areas different
from each other but are not observed in my dataset, would in fact bias the results
of the analysis if not taken into consideration. In these cases, the error term in
eq. (1.9) violates the assumptions required to have a consistent OLS estimator. I
assume a basic specification of the error term as:
ui,t = µi + γt + i,t (1.11)
where µi represents the time-invariant area-specific fixed effect and γt is a country-
wide time fixed effect; i,t is a zero-mean i.i.d. error.
In my preferred specification, I estimate the parameters using a regression speci-
fication with lower-tier local authority fixed effects. Local authorities are the admin-
istrative divisions corresponding to the local governments, and I expect differences in
21The model is etimated in Stata 15 using the ivregress and estat firststage packages.
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local institutions and policies  if any  to occur at this level, while LSOAs, MSOAs,
and statistical areas' boundaries in general do not have any administrative meaning.
In total, there are 348 lower-tier local authorities in England and Wales, consisting
of local authority (or non-metropolitan) districts, unitary authorities, metropolitan
districts, and London boroughs.22 location-specific covariates (where the location
can be the LSOA or the MSOA, depending on the level of aggregation chosen; some
of the covariates are time-invariant) and the main regressors are then used to control
for the relevant drivers of PV adoptions within each location  built-environment,
socio-economic characteristics, work arrangements and demographic composition,
as described in the data section.
For time fixed effects I use year and month of the year fixed effect; the first
is intended to control for macro-trends in the country, while the latter is used to
control for seasonality effects.
As a robustness check, the regression is also estimated using two other alternative
specifications for fixed effects, one using area fixed effects at the lowest level available
(in this case any time-invariant variable is removed from the regression equation as
they are absorbed in the fixed-effect term), and one with year-varying local-authority
fixed effect, obtained by interacting local authority district with the year, rather than
adding them separately. In all the specifications month-of-the-year fixed effects are
used to control for seasonality in adoptions.
Count models, fractional models, and prevalence of zeros
Finally, another concern with the estimation model presented above is the use of a
linear specification. In fact, a linear specification assumes that the outcome variable
is continuous, unbounded and measured on an interval or ratio scale. Continuity
and unboundedness are restrictive assumptions in this case, as the outcome variable
is the count of installations, and therefore discrete and bounded at zero. Non-linear
models for discrete and count outcome would be more appropriate in this case.
Nevertheless, the linear model has the important advantages to be able to exploit
the panel structure of the dataset to control for area-specific and time-specific fixed
effects, while at the same time addressing the problem of endogenous subsidies and
PV installation costs, which is more problematic to do with non-linear models. In
22For more information on local authorities see the Office for National Statistics (ONS) website:
https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2001censusandearlier/glossary.
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particular, fixed effects do not simply cancel out as in a linear model, and non-linear
models can suffer from the incidental parameters problem. To resolve these issues,
I use a Poisson regression model, as the Poisson distribution is more appropriate
for count outcome variables and at the same time a consistent estimator can be
constructed to include fixed effects and endogenous regressors, as discussed in the
next paragraph.
Using a Poisson distribution, the estimation equation (1.9) becomes:
Pr(Qi,t|λ) = e
−λ λQi,t
Qi,t!
with λ = eβ0+βssi,t+βCCi,t (1.12)
where Pr(Qi,t) is the probability of observing a count of Qi,t installations in a given
area at a given time. While equation (1.10) used to estimate the time discount does
not change.
A further issue is the large share of observations with zero new installations in the
dataset, especially when LSOAs are used as units of analysis. I address this issue by
aggregating the data at the MSOA-level, and restricting the sample of observations
to the period between April 2010, when the FIT scheme started, to January 2016,
just after a major reform took place and imposed severe cuts to the subsidy. After
this time, installation rates in the country went substantially down (as can be seen in
Figure 1.4 in the previous Section), and many solar installers filed for bankruptcy or
moved out of the solar sector. This might have caused a structural break in the data
and the mechanisms behind households' adoption behaviour might be different than
in the previous period. Distribution of the observations at the LSOA-level, in this
period contains 81% of zero, and only 14% of the observations have one installation,
3% have two, 1% three, etc.; more variation exists instead at the MSOA-level, as
the share of observations with zero installations goes down to 58%, while 23% have
one, 10% two, 4% three, etc. (see Figure 1.14).
In this case the dependent variable is not left-censored, but might also include
structural zeros, as a different data generating process may be required to model
whether the outcome is zero or non-zero, as opposed to how many installations
there are conditional on there being at least one (see e.g. Gillingham and Tsve-
tanov, 2019). A strategy to deal with count data bounded at zero and structural
zeros is the use of Tobit models, zero-inflated models and hurdle models, although
these have less desirable properties when dealing with fixed effects and endogenous
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Figure 1.14: Histogram of the number of installations observed per MSOA per month (in
the period 2010-2015).
regressors. Results from a Tobit model with and without instrumental variables (IV)
but without fixed effects are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix as robustness
check.
I conduct further robustness checks using the proportion of households adopting
PVs as dependent variable, instead of the count, as another way to address the
issues posed by count outcome variables censored ar zero. To do this, I take the
ratio of PV installations over the number of `available' owner-occupied houses in
each area in each month. The denominator is calculated using data on the number
of owner-occupied houses in each area and subtracting the existing installed-base of
PV systems to obtain the houses that are still available to host new installations.
Owner-occupied houses are chosen as the reference market base because in the case
of tenants and flats, split-incentives, property rights and coordination problems may
arise. This is of course a proxy, as residential installations may still occur in other
types of buildings and under other types of tenancy, and multiple installations may
occur on the same building in case of enlargement of existing systems, nevertheless
I believe this to be a reasonable assumption for the purpose at hand. In this case,
the outcome variable is a share bounded between zero and one, and a fractional
model based on a logistic or probit regression can be used. To address the issue of
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structural zeros in this context, I also estimate a zero-inflated beta model. Results
from this robustness checks are presented in Table A.2 in the Appendix.
Consistent estimator for Poisson model with endogenous regressors and
fixed effects
To incorporate the considerations presented in this Section, my preferred approach is
to use a Poisson model with endogenous regressors and fixed effects, as presented in
Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019). Endogeneity of the regressors is addressed usins
a control function approach. In the first stage, I regress the endogenous regressors
on the excluded and included instruments, using a linear model with fixed effects,
and recover the residuals. In the second stage, I use a Poisson model to regress the
number of installations in each area and in each month on the main regressors, the
estimated residuals from the previous stage, and the covariates and fixed effects. I
assume a Poisson data-generating process, and use a maximum likelihood estimator,
as Blundell et al. (2002) show that this does not suffer from the incidental parameter
problem (the main concern which makes linear models preferable to non-linear ones
when fixed effects need to be used) in this setting. I use bootstrapping to obtain
standard errors. Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019) provide details on the consistency
of this estimator.
1.5.3 Results
Results from the regression analysis are presented in Tables 1.2-1.7 for the main
specifications. Results from relevant robustness checks mentioned in the previous
section are presented in Appendix A.1. Regression tables include estimates of the
coefficients of the main regressors (subsidies and installation costs), as well as their
partial elasticities evaluated at the mean (percentage change in the outcome variable
due to a 1% change in the regressor, everything else being equal) and the mean values
for the number of residential solar PV systems installed, the amount of the expected
annual subsidy and the cost of installing, to facilitate interpretation. Standard errors
are clustered at the MSOA level.
The model is estimated in levels, so elasticity is not constant but depends on the
value of the variables. Regression tables show the elasticity calculated at the mean
values to allow comparisons between linear and non-linear models, as in these cases
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the coefficients obtained from the regressions have different meanings and cannot be
compared directly. In most cases, the values for the elasticity to the subsidy and to
the cost are high and above 1. This is not worrying, as those values only represent
partial elasticities. The parameter usually reported in the literature, especially in
the case of rebates to the installation costs, is the total elasticity to the cost net of
subsidies  or equivalent, but with opposite sign, the total elasticity to the subsidies
net of the installation costs, i.e. ηΠ in equation (1.6). To facilitate comparison
with results from the literature, I re-estimate the model using the present value of
subsidies net of installation costs, using a 7% discount rate (as assumed in Benthem
et al., 2008) that take into consideration the opportunity cost of paying to install a
solar PV system rather than investing the same amount in a financial instrument
with a comparable risk profile. I can then directly estimate ηΠ. Standard errors for
the elasticity parameters are obtained using the delta method.
Finally, the tables also include the implicit annual discount rate and discount
factor. This is obtained by solving the system of equations (1.10) for r, using the
estimates for the beta coefficients obtained from the regression βˆs and βˆC in place
of their true values βs and βC . Some regression specifications result in values of
βˆC that are too low compared to βˆs, so that the equation does not have any real
positive solution. When this is the case, the implicit discount rate is missing.
Tables 1.2 and 1.3 shows the results for various specifications of the generalised
linear model. The first table includes the coefficients and diagnostic statistics ob-
tained from the regressions, while the second one includes estimates for the elasticity
parameters and the implicit discount rate and factor. The first column (1) contains
the results from a basic OLS regression of the number of PV installation in each
area in each month on the expected annual subsidy (i.e. the annual `revenue' the
prosumer expects to make) and the cost of the installations. Models (2) and (3)
includes local authority, year, and month fixed effects to capture unobserved ge-
ographical (but time-invariant) characteristics and temporal (but space-invariant)
events, with a short and a longer set of covariates as controls. The short set of
covariates include the price of electricity, the number of owner-occupied houses,
and indicators of proximity to a change in the rate, as described in the Section on
bunching. The longer set of covariates include all the other controls described in
the Section on data. Model (4) is the traditional fixed-effects specification, with
MSOA-level fixed effects. This model only includes time-varying covariates (price of
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electricity, the number of owner-occupied houses, and indicators of proximity to a
change in the rate, median house price, density, population between 40-64 years old,
and population above 65), as the others are absorbed by the fixed effects. The two
final columns (5) and (6) use the interaction between local authorities and years in-
stead of introducing them separately to control for time-varying fixed effects. Again,
the two models differ by a shorter and a longer set of covariates.
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Table 1.2: Regression table for the linear models with different specifications of the fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 0.810∗∗∗ 1.145∗∗∗ 1.141∗∗∗ 1.155∗∗∗ 1.201∗∗∗ 1.198∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -1.195∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗ -0.868∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.013) (0.059) (0.058)
Covariates No Short Long Time-varying Short Long
MSOA FE No No No Yes No No
Local authority FE No Yes Yes No No No
Loc. auth. X Year No No No No Yes Yes
Year No Yes Yes Yes No No
Month of the year No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580
R2 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.22 0.23
adj. R2 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.22 0.23
F 1852.5 390.5 268.4 2470.1 440.6 276.9
AIC 2388415.70 2312438.25 2308850.62 2295182.91 2286235.55 2282436.49
BIC 2388449.09 2312738.75 2309384.83 2295505.67 2286469.27 2282903.93
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the MSOA level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
62
Table 1.3: Estimated elasticities and implicit discount rate for the linear models with different specifications of the fixed effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS FE FE FE FE FE
mean values:
PV count 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Subsidy (10GBP/kW) 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53
Install. cost (100GBP/kW) 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23
partial elasticities:
Subs.elasticity 2.04∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 2.90 ∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗ 3.01∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.054) (0.054) (0.027) (0.056) (0.055)
Cost elasticity -2.65∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗ -1.92∗∗∗ -1.93∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.049) (0.048) (0.029) (0.131) (0.128)
overall elasticity1:
Pres. value of net subsidy 0.275∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Impl.discount rate 13.6% 3.4% 3.4%
Impl.discount factor 88.0% 96.4% 96.3%
Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the delta method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1Elasticity to the present value of net subsidies (i.e. present value of subsidies net of installation costs), with 7% discount rate.
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The coefficient of the annual subsidy (and therefore the corresponding partial
elasticity) are robust through all the fixed effects specifications, and slightly lower
in the basic OLS specification. The coefficient of the system costs are robust to the
use of local authority or MSOA-level fixed effects in models (2), (3), and (4), but
becomes larger when local authority fixed effects are interacted with years (models
(5) and (6)), and even larger in the basic OLS specifications. The implicit discount
rate and factor, and the overall elasticity parameter are lower than corresponding
estimates for US and Belgium found in the literature.
As discussed in the previous Section, these model specifications are not satisfac-
tory as they fail to address two main problems of the data, namely the fact that
the outcome variable is a discrete count variable, bounded at zero, and that the
main regressors may be endogenous. Tables 1.4 and 1.5 improve upon the analysis
by addressing the endogeneity problem through the use of IVs in a two-stage least
squares (2SLS) regression. To check for robustness, specifications with different sets
of fixed effects are estimated. Model (1) and (2) include the preferred set: local au-
thority, year, and month-of-the-year fixed effects. Model (3) uses MSOA-level fixed
effects in place of the local authorities, while the last model (4) uses the interaction
between local authorities and years.
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Table 1.4: Regression table for the first stage of the linear models with IV.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Subsidy Install. cost Subsidy Install. cost Subsidy Install. cost Subsidy Install. cost
FIT production rate, 1-5MW -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.00656∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.00655∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.00656∗∗∗ -0.0469∗∗∗ -0.00656∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Wind FIT productionrate, 0-2kW 0.00161∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ 0.00159∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ 0.00161∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗ 0.00161∗∗∗ -0.0182∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Latitude -0.187∗∗∗ -0.0347 -0.191∗∗∗ -0.0483∗ . . -0.181∗∗∗ -0.0276
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) (.) (.) (0.014) (0.024)
Longitude 0.0251∗ 0.0196 0.0250∗ 0.0185 . . 0.0143 0.00707
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (.) (.) (0.010) (0.017)
Chinese PV price index 2.243∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 2.244∗∗∗ 0.804∗∗∗ 2.243∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 2.243∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Wage electric sector (residuals) -0.0587∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ -0.0594∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ -0.0572∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ -2.328∗∗∗ -1.402∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.041) (0.082)
Covariates Short Long Short Short
MOSA FE No No Yes No
Local authority FE Yes Yes No No
Loc. auth. X Year No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes No
Month of the year Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580
R2 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.96
adj. R2 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.95
Shea's Partial R2 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.04 . . 0.10 0.08
Shea's Partial adj.R2 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.03 . . 0.09 0.07
min eigenvalue stats 2887.15 2904.69 . 7134.42
relative bias test crit.val.1 15.72 15.72 . 13.97
nom.5% Wald test crit.val.2 21.68 21.68 . 19.45
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the MSOA level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
1 Critical value for 2SLS relative bias test at 5%; 2 Critical value for 2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald test at 10%.
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Results for the first stage are included in Table 1.4, showing the coefficients of
the excluded instruments and diagnostic statistics. Reassuringly, the Shea's mea-
sure for correlation between the instruments and the regressors, and the two tests
from Stock and Yogo (2005) do not point to a weak instrument problem. As ex-
pected, the annual subsidy is negatively correlated with the latitude and positively
with the longitude (i.e. it is larger moving towards the South and the East), and
is positively correlated with the FIT rate for small scale wind. The coefficient for
the FIT production rate for larger scale solar has a negative sign  a possible in-
terpretation for this result is that once covariates and fixed effects are taken into
consideration, residential small-scale solar PV and larger scale solar farm are consid-
ered as substitutes to the government, and therefore they are negatively correlated,
for example to make sure that sales of solar systems are stable over time and provide
more certainty and stability to the solar sector and to installers. To make sure this
is not problematic for the estimation, robustness checks using the FIT production
rates for 0-4kW systems and a FIT rate schedule pre-announced in 2010 instead of
the 1-5MW rate are presented in Table A.3 in the Appendix, confirming the same
results. The subsidy is also positively correlated with the Chinese PV module price
index, as both the subsidies and the price tend to decrease over time, and negatively
correlated with the residuals of wage in the electric sector, although the latter coef-
ficient is small in magnitude. Installation cost is strongly and positively correlated
with the price index and the wage, as expected, with the exception of the last model
with year-varying local authority fixed effects.
Results for the second stage are presented in Table 1.5. Coefficients are robust
to the different specifications, and much larger in magnitude than the estimates
without IV, consistent with an attenuation bias from classical errors-in-variables.
The estimates suggest that a cut of 1 GBP in the annual expected subsidy per kW
of installed capacity would result in around 0.026 fewer installations per MSOA,
equivalent to 187 fewer installations across the country; while a decrease of 10 GBP
in the upfront cost for installing would result in 0.079 more installations in each
MSOA, i.e. 568 over the country. This time the implicit discount rate, and the
overall elasticity parameter are larger than corresponding estimates for US and Bel-
gium found in the literature, but again, results should be taken with caution due to
issues of model misspecification.
Finally, Table 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate the results from the Poisson regression, with
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Table 1.5: Regression table for the second stage of the 2SLS estimator, with IV. Estimated
elasticities and implicit discount rate included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV,2SLS IV,2SLS IV,2SLS IV,2SLS
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.584∗∗∗ 2.617∗∗∗ 2.675∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.044) (0.057)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -7.823∗∗∗ -7.859∗∗∗ -7.966∗∗∗ -8.738∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.169) (0.092) (0.169)
Covariates Short Long Time-varying Short
MSOA FE No No Yes No
Local authority FE Yes Yes No No
Loc. auth. X Year No No No Yes
Year Yes Yes Yes No
Month of the year Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 503580 503580 503580 503580
χ2 1194226.0 38174.7 93437.6 356864.6
mean values:
PV count 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23
partial elasticities:
Subs.elasticity 6.49∗∗∗ 6.58∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗∗ 7.14 ∗∗∗
(0.144) (0.143) (0.111) (0.143)
Cost elasticity -17.32∗∗∗ -17.40∗∗∗ -17.64∗∗∗ -19.35∗∗∗
(0.378) (0.374) (0.203) (0.374)
overall elasticity1:
Pres. value of net subsidy 1.114∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.143∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019)
Impl.discount rate 30.1% 29.9% 29.6% 30.6%
Impl. discount factor 76.8% 77.0% 77.2% 76.6%
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the MSOA-level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
1Elasticity to the present value of net subsidies (i.e. present value of subsidies net of installation costs),
using a 7% discount rate.
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and without fixed effects, and with and without IVs, to better account for the
discrete and bounded nature of the count outcome variable. The model is again
estimated using different specifications of the fixed effects and covariate sets to
check for robustness of the results. Specification (1) and (2) include the main set
of fixed effects (local authority, year, and month of the year) with the short and
long covariate set respectively; specification (3) is estimated using covariates but
no fixed effects; while specification (4) uses MSOA-level fixed effects instead of the
local authorities.23
The two final models, (5) and (6), take into consideration the potential endo-
geneity of the regressors, using a control function appraoch in a two-stage estimation
procedure with fixed effects in both stages and a Poisson specification for the second
stage, following Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019) (see Section 1.5). Standard errors
are bootstrapped. The former model uses the long covariate set and the preferred
fixed effect specifications (local authority, year, and month of the year), while the lat-
ter replaces the local authority effects with MSOA-level, and therefore only includes
time-varying controls. The first stage for these two models are the same as those
used in specification (2) and (3) of the 2SLS linear model presented above (in Table
1.4). Coefficients are very similar in the two specifications. Results are robust across
the different fixed-effects specifications without IVs, but the coefficients appear once
again to be underestimated with respect to the regression models with IVs, consis-
tent with the presence of attenuation bias from classical errors-in-variables. As for
the linear specification, the model without fixed effects still result in an estimate for
the subsidy coefficient that is very close to those obtained with fixed effects, while
the cost coefficient is less robust.
23The specification with time variant local authority-level fixed effects could not be estimated
due to lack of computational power.
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Table 1.6: Regression table for the Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
w. IV, MLE w. IV, MLE
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 0.704∗∗∗ 0.702∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗ 1.907∗∗∗ 1.951∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.027) (0.022)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -0.0399∗∗∗ -0.0402∗∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ -0.0586∗∗∗ -4.182∗∗∗ -4.245∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.056) (0.043)
Covariates Short Long Long Time-varying Long Time-varying
MSOA FE No No No Yes No Yes
Local authority FE Yes Yes No No Yes No
Year Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Month Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Var. instrumented Subsidy Subsidy
Install. cost Install. cost
N 503580 503580 503580 502250 503580 502250
pseudo R2 0.30 0.31 0.24 0.33
χ2 567162.9 584687.6 54713.3 335423.5 . 233670.8
AIC 1293795.18 1276312.46 1406601.00 1175195.14 1254529.88 1153547.38
BIC 1297957.61 1280708.61 1406946.02 1175506.69 1255075.22 1153881.19
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the MSOA-level. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.7: Estimated elasticities and implicit discount rate for the Poisson models.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
w. IV, MLE w. IV, MLE
mean values:
PV count 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23
partial elasticities:
Subs.elasticity 1.78∗∗∗ 1.77∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 4.82∗∗∗ 4.93∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.069) (0.055)
Cost elasticity -0.09∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.69∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -9.31∗∗∗ -9.45∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.030) (0.012) (0.124) (0.095)
overall elasticity1:
Pres. value of net subsidy 0.203∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.012)
Impl.discount rate 0.05% 21.5% 21.3%
Impl. discount factor 99.95% 82.3% 82.4%
Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated using the delta method. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
1Elasticity to the present value of net subsidies (i.e. present value of subsidies net of installation costs), with 7% discount rate.
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Coefficients from Poisson models are not directly comparable with those of lin-
ear models, due to the different meaning they have. For this reason, Table 1.7
reports estimates of the partial elasticity at the mean, as well as the overall elastic-
ity estimated using net subsidies rather than subsidies and costs separately. Both
the partial and overall elasticities and the time discount from the Poisson models
without IVs are smaller in magnitude than the parameters obtained from the corre-
sponding linear models. The same holds for the partial and overall elasticities and
time discount from the Poisson models with IVs, which are smaller than those from
the 2SLS linear models. Due to the theoretical considerations described in Section
1.5, the preferred specifications are the Poisson models with instrumental variables
and fixed effects presented in column (5) and (6).
The coefficients estimated with this model have a less straightforward interpre-
tation, as they show the the expected increase in log count for a one-unit increase
in the regressor, all else equal. The estimates for elasticity at the mean show that
a 1% cut in the annual subsidy would result in a much higher 4.82% decrease in
installation, although if the installation costs also drop 1% at the same time, this
would push adoption up 9.31%. At the mean values of 253 GBP of annual subsidy
per kW of installed capacity, 2,230 GBP of installation costs per kW of installed ca-
pacity, and 1.01 installations per MSOA in each month, these results would translate
into 0.19 fewer installations per MSOA (or 1,393 fewer installations over the whole
territory) if the annual expected subsidy per kW of installed capacity decreases by
10 GBP, and 0.42 more installations per MSOA (or 3,032 over the whole territory)
if the costs per kW of installed capacity decrease by 100 GBP, holding all the other
variables constant.
Comparing estimates from model (5) with results from the literature, I find
substantial similarities. The estimate of 0.87 for the overall elasticity to net subsidies
at the means, can be interpreted as an elasticity of -0.87 to the cost of installing the
system, net of the subsidy. This means that a 1% decrease in the overall costs net of
subsidies  or equivalently a 1% increase in the overall profitability of the investment
 results in 0.87% more installations. At the mean value of 1.01 installations per
MSOA per month and 451 GBP of expected profits per kW of installed capacity, this
is equivalent to 0.0195 more installations per MSOA, or 140 throughout the territory
for a 10 GBP decrease in the cost of the system net of subsidies. In this sense, this
result is very close to the estimate of -0.85 found using a dynamic structural model
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by Pless and van Benthem (2019) for the California rebate policy, and close to the
-0.65 found by Gillingham and Tsvetanov (2019) for Connecticut, using reduced-
form. In all of these cases, the main takeaway is that the elasticity parameter is
high, pointing to the fact that households are highly responsive to changes in the
subsidies and costs of solar PV systems.
The annual discount rate and discount factor estimated from the coefficients in
model (5) are 21.5% and 82.3% respectively. This result is again very close to the
estimated 82% discount factor on future electricity savings for California obtained
by Snashall-Woodhams (2019). The discount rate is larger than  but still compa-
rable to  the 15% discount rate for FIT payments estimated by De Groote and
Verboven (2019) for Belgium. Both papers use dynamic structural models and are
therefore better suited than the reduced-form analysis of this Chapter to identify
the parameter; yet, it is reassuring that results are consistent, and contribute to
the evidence that households `behave as if' they discount heavily the future, when
considering whether to adopt solar panels. It is worth remarking that this parame-
ter can capture other behavioural features in addition to pure time preferences, so
that it does not necessarily mean that agents are myopic. For example, it might
capture time inconsistent discounting, such as hyperbolic discounting; mistakes in
calculating the subsidies or undervaluation due to uncertainty and risk aversion, as
future subsidies are not as certain as the upfront cost; default bias, as households
might prefer to stick with their current energy setting rather than investing cogni-
tive efforts in modifying it; unobserved search costs to obtain relevant information
or other transaction costs; or households might be afraid they will not be able to
appropriate all of the subsidies, for example if they think they may move out of the
house before the end of the 20 year subsidy period. Such high trade-off between
upfront costs and future benefits suggest that in general upfront subsidies are more
cost-effective, as discussed in the next Section.
In the next section, I will use model (5) as the preferred specification for pre-
dictions rather than model (6), which uses MSOA-level fixed effects instead of local
authority fixed effects, because the latter does not allow the use of latitude and
longitude as instruments (as they are time invariant), and for the same reason, sev-
eral covariates of interest cannot be included. This makes the interpretation of the
mechanisms at play more difficult, as most channels get absorbed in the MSOA fixed
effects. Moreover, MSOA level fixed effects may also absorb a substantial share of
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the variation in subsidies used for identification  especially in the months when
there is no change in the FIT rate and the identification relies on spatial differences
among the MSOAs. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that the estimates for the two
models are very close.24
Robustness checks using a Tobit model bounded at zero, and fractional models
with the shares of new installations as outcome variable, are presented in Tables
A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix. The fractional models used are fractional logit,
fractional probit and fractional probit with heteroskedasticity, with and without
area- and time-specific fixed effects. To account for structural zeros, a zero-inflated
beta model is also estimated.
Further analysis on the possibility that effects are heterogeneous is described in
Appendix A.2. In particular, I test for the hypothesis that effects are heterogeneous
over time, as found by Hughes and Podolefsky (2015), or depend on the existing
installed base due to the presence of peer effects, as in Bollinger and Gillingham
(2012); Richter (2014); Graziano and Gillingham (2015); Müller and Rode (2013);
Rode and Weber (2016); Baranzini et al. (2017). These topics will be the focus of
the next Chapter.
1.6 Cost-effectiveness and alternative policy design
1.6.1 Additionality of the subsidy, rent appropriation and
comparison between FIT and upfront incentives
In this section, I discuss the cost-effectiveness of the UK FIT scheme given the results
of the previous Sections. To start this analysis, I use the preferred specification  the
Poisson model with endogenous regressors and fixed effects  to predict the number
of installations that would have occurred even with no subsidies, to understand the
additionality of the policy. In particular, I assume that the production rate is zero
and only the export rate is paid for the electricity sold to the grid, estimated to be
50% of the total generation, as for the existing policy. Estimates have been repeated
assuming not even the export rate is offered and the results are very similar.
Figures 1.15, 1.16, and 1.17 show the fitness of the estimated model, by compar-
24As a robustness check, the analysis in the next Section has been replicated using model (6),
and the results are robust.
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ing the observed and predicted number of installations over time (by month) and
over space (by MSOA, and by local authority) respectively. In what follows I refer to
the marginal adopters as the `policy-induced' installations, computed by subtracting
the number of inframarginal adopters from the number of installations predicted for
each subsidy scenario. I predict that without the subsidy, 13,136 installations would
have happened anyway in the period under consideration, corresponding to about
2.6% of the predicted total under the existing scheme.25 Nevertheless, the rents ap-
propriated by these inframarginal adopters are even lower than this share, because
compared to the marginal installations they tend to occur in later times, when the
cost of installing and the FIT rate are lower, and in areas with lower solar generation
potential. I estimate that the amount of subsidy paid out to these households is
1.5% of the total, suggesting that the scheme has a very high additionality and not
many households would have adopted without incentives to do so.
Figure 1.15: Comparison of the number of installed PV systems observed and predicted,
in each month.
By inducing more installations, the objective of the scheme is to decrease emis-
sions from electricity generation in the country. Before the introduction of the FIT
25The number of per capita installations predicted in absence of subsidies is comparable to the
number of installations in Norway, a country with almost no support scheme for solar as of 2016
(Standal et al., 2020); in fact it is even larger, consistent with the better solar potential of the UK
compared to Norway. This comparison suggests that the estimates are in a sensible range.
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Figure 1.16: Comparison of the number of installed PV systems by the end of the sample
observed and predicted, in each location.
Figure 1.17: Comparison of the number of installed PV systems by the end of the sample
observed and predicted, in each local authority.
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scheme in April 2010, the carbon intensity of electricity generation in the UK was
estimated to be around 500 grams of CO2-equivalent per kWh (Staffell, 2017). I
estimate that the installations of residential solar PV systems induced by the policy
between April 2010 and January 2016 (i.e. the marginal installations) will have pro-
duced more than 46,700 GWh during their lifetime. Useful lifetime is assumed to be
30 years as in Benthem et al. (2008) and in the pessimistic scenario of Frischknecht
et al. (2015)  although this assumption might be conservative, as the latter study
considers 35 and 40 years in their realistic and optimistic scenario respectively. This
is equivalent to 23.35 million metric tons of CO2-eq emission avoided, as compared
to the case in which the same amount of electricity was generated using the energy
mix the country had in 2010.
This is achieved with an expenditure of around 7.31 billion GBP in FIT payments
over the 20 years each installation is eligible for support (present value calculated
using a 5% discount rate; this would be 5.23 billion GBP with a 10% discount rate
 see Table 1.8). This is equivalent to approximately 313 GBP per metric ton of
CO2-eq avoided (224 GBP per metric ton, if considering a discount rate of 10%),
more than twice as expensive as the California upfront rebate scheme, estimated
at between 130 and 196 USD26 by Hughes and Podolefsky (2015). In terms of
electricity generated, I estimate a cost of the policy of 0.156 GBP per kWh (present
value calculated using a 5% discount rate; this would be 0.112 using a 10% discount
rate), about three times the cost per kWh of the California CSI, estimated at 0.06
USD in the same study.27
This difference can be explained by the fact that the California CSI consists
of rebates on the upfront cost of the PV systems, while the UK FIT consists of
subsidies paid periodically over a 20-year period. As households are estimated to
have a high discount rate for the subsidy  which I have estimated at 21% per year
for the UK  part of the subsidies in the FIT scheme end up paying for households'
`impatience', and other behavioural features that make households undervalue their
future benefits (default bias, uncertainty and risk aversion, mistakes in calculating
the present value, and so on). In fact, at a 21% discount rate, the cost of the
policy drops to 0.06 GBP per kWh generated and 135 GBP per metric ton of CO2-
eq avoided, in line with the corresponding estimates for the upfront incentives in
26Equivalent to 100-150 GBP, at an exchange rate of 1.31 USD for 1 GBP.
27Equivalent to 0.046 GBP, at an exchange rate of 1.31 USD for 1 GBP.
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California.
As long as this discount rate is higher than the interest rate on loans for the
government or the utilities, upfront incentives would have been more cost-effective
than the FIT scheme, all else equal. Even in this case, the policy remains very
expensive if considered only as a tool to correct environmental externalities; as a
reference point the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) carbon
market price has never been above 25 GBP per metric ton of CO2-eq avoided, and
the estimates for the social cost of carbon (SCC) proposed in the Stern Review do
not exceed 100 GBP (Stern, 2007). Yet, support for renewables provides additional
benefits, including fostering innovation and learning-by-doing (Jaffe et al., 2005). In
particular, Benthem et al. (2008) find that when both environmental externalities
and unappropriated learning-by-doing are taken into account, the incentive schemes
in California are very close to the optimal incentive schedule.
1.6.2 Alternative policy scenarios: output-based v. capacity-
based
While the high estimated discount rate suggests that upfront incentives would have
been more cost-effective than the existing FIT scheme, an advantage of the latter is
that it provides stronger incentives to install in locations with higher solar generation
potential. To assess the benefits of this feature, in this Section the existing FIT
scheme is compared with an hypothetical alternative policy design that pays the
same annual subsidy throughout the country, keeping the timeline and scale of
changes as in the original. In what follows, I use again the preferred specification, the
Poisson model with endogenous regressors and local authority-level fixed effects, to
predict and compare the distribution of installations under the following conditions:
 annual output-based subsidy, as observed in the UK.
 annual capacity-based subsidy, set as the mean of the expected annual output-
based subsidy over the country, in each month. In this case I use the newly
created values for the subsidy and the original cost data to obtain the predicted
number of installations.
Figure 1.18 shows the subsidy schedule under the two scenarios. The main objec-
tive of the following analysis is to investigate how linking the subsidy to electricity
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generation, and therefore implicitly to the solar generation potential of a location,
affects the siting of installations. To do this, I look at how much solar capacity and
electricity generation each subsidy induces, where the installations occur, and at
what cost to the bill-payers.
Figure 1.18: Schedules of subsidies under the different policy scenarios.
For each subsidy scenario, I fit the model using the two subsidy schedules and
keep the rest of the variables as they are, and predict the number of installations in
each MSOA in each month. I then net them out of the inframarginal adopters and
convert them into equivalent installed capacity and generation. To obtain an esti-
mate of the installed capacity, I multiply the count of installations by the median size
of the observed installations in each year in each local authority area (see Figure 1.3).
The use of year-specific size values should capture the technological improvements
in the sector, as newer panels have a larger capacity than older ones. Generation
is obtained by multiplying the estimated installed capacity in each MSOA for the
average estimated output of that area. I then compute the total subsidies paid, the
subsidy per `induced' kW installed, and the subsidy per `induced' kWh generated.
Comparisons between the capacity and generation induced by each type of subsidy
and the cost of the policy, are presented in Figure 1.19 and Table 1.8.
The first two panels of the Table show the total installed capacity net of infra-
marginal adoptions, and the electricity that is expected to be generated over the
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1.19: New capacity (a) and generation (b) induced by different subsidies (net of
inframarginal adopters) in each year.
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Table 1.8: Subsidies per kW of installed capacity and per kWh generated, total capacity
installed, total generation and total expenditures for each subsidy scheme, net of infra-
marginal adoptions.
Total MW of (net) capacity installed between 2010-2015
output-based subsidy capacity-based subsidy
1,575 1,620
Overall GWh generated assuming panel life is 30 years
output-based subsidy capacity-based subsidy
46,781 47,028
Total subsidies for panels installed between 2010-2015, present value (billion GBP)
output-based subsidy capacity-based subsidy
disc. rate = 0 11.17 11.54
disc. rate = 5% 7.31 7.55
disc. rate = 10% 5.23 5.40
Subsidies per kW of installed capacity, present value (GBP/kW)
output-based subsidy capacity-based subsidy
disc. rate = 0 7,092 7,124
disc. rate = 5% 4,640 4,661
disc. rate = 10% 3,320 3,336
Subsidies per kWh generated, present value (GBP/kWh)
output-based subsidy capacity-based subsidy
disc. rate = 0 0.239 0.245
disc. rate = 5% 0.156 0.161
disc. rate = 10% 0.112 0.115
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lifetime of the PV systems, assuming it to be 30 years. Consistent with findings in
Burr (2016), the capacity-based subsidy induces more installed capacity than the
output-based subsidy  in this scenarios, the capacity-based subsidy results in 3%
more installations than the output-based subsidy. But if we look at the generation,
the gap between capacity- and output-based subsidy becomes almost negligible, at
only 0.5%; this is evidence that subsidies linked to generation are more effective at
inducing installations in areas with higher generation potential, if compared with
capacity-based incentives that are undifferentiated across the country. The third
panel shows the overall amount of subsidies committed to the scheme (i.e. for all
of the 20 years for which installations are eligible for FIT support), under three
different values of the discount rate: 0, 5 and 10%, to show how the results change
depending on assumptions made on this parameter. The fourth and fifth panels
show the average cost of the policy per kW of installed capacity and for kWh of
electricity generated. These are computed net of inframarginal adoptions, the adop-
tions that would have occurred even with no incentive. Once again in line with the
theoretical results in Burr (2016), the output-based annual subsidy appear to be
more cost-effective than the capacity-based annual subsidy.
Finally, I look at the geographical distribution of residential PV systems result-
ing under each policy scenario. The null hypothesis, according to economic theory, is
that, all other things equal, output-based subsidies should result in a higher number
of installations in locations with a better generation potential  and therefore there
should be a positive correlation between the number of installations and the gener-
ation potential. The capacity-based subsidies on the contrary is indifferent between
areas with larger or smaller potential and should therefore result in no correlation
(other things equal). Looking at the empirical results, I find that the output-based
subsidy is indeed better than the capacity-based subsidy in allocating installations
according to the generation potential, but when fixed effects and other covariates
are considered, the resulting geographical distribution is more complex than what
the above hypotheses suggest. In fact, the correlation between installations induced
by output-based subsidies and the generation potential of the area is close to zero in
my data (0.085), while the correlation between the installations predicted under the
capacity-based subsidy and the generation potential becomes strongly negative (-
0.153). Interestingly, the inframarginal installations (i.e. the installations estimated
to occur even without subsidies) are also negatively correlated with the generation
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potential although much closer to zero, with a correlation coefficient of -0.079. These
results are illustrated in Figure 1.20, which shows the predicted number of instal-
lations in each area-month against the generation potential of the area, for each
scenario. The plot lines represent the fractional polynomial fit lines. The difference
is stronger when restricting the focus to the period with high subsidies  i.e. before
the 2012-reform  with correlation coefficients of 0.108 and -0.219, respectively, while
it is attenuated after the 2012-reform, when the correlation coefficients become 0.084
and -0.121 (Figure 1.21). This confirms that linking the subsidy to the actual gener-
ation or generation potential improves the cost-effectiveness of the incentive scheme
and favours a more efficient28 siting of the solar PV systems in terms of generation
per kW installed, as compared to a geographically undifferentiated subsidy.
Overall, the analysis of this Section shows that cost-effectiveness of the incentive
scheme could be improved by paying the subsidy upfront, but retaining the differenti-
ation of the subsidy according to generation potential. This combination of features
is exactly the solution adopted by California under the Expected Performance-Based
Buydown  an upfront rebate that is adjusted according to the expected generation
of the solar array, calculated taking into account the PV module type and the lo-
cation, orientation and shading of the system. In fact, Benthem et al. (2008) find
that this incentive scheme, as designed and realised in California, is very close to
the optimal solar subsidy schedule resulting from their model (when accounting for
environmental externalities and unappropriated learning-by-doing).
1.6.3 Determinants of PV siting: incentives, built-environment,
work arrangements and socio-demographic conditions
To explain why the geographical distribution of residential solar PV adoptions in-
duced by the policy is only weakly correlated to the generation potential, I look at
the role of other covariates. In fact, the results from the scenario analysis suggest
that while output-based subsidies are pushing installations towards locations with
better generation potential, other elements are operating in the opposite direction.
Even though there is no straightforward reason to expect that any of the covariates
(besides the subsidy) is directly correlated with generation potential, in practice
28In this Section I consider `efficient siting' purely in terms of maximisation of electricity gener-
ation given the investment in installed capacity in each month.
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Figure 1.20: Correlation between installations and potential generation in the area in which
they are installed, under the different subsidy scenarios (fractional polynomial fit lines).
(a) (b)
Figure 1.21: Correlation between installations and potential generation in the area in
which they are installed, under the different subsidy scenarios (fractional polynomial fit
lines) before (a) ad after (b) the policy reform of 2012.
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their distribution over the territory might be. For this reason, I obtain the partial
correlations of all the covariates with the solar generation potential, and compare
the signs of the correlation coefficients with the signs of the coefficients from the
preferred regression model to see how they explain the resulting siting distribution
of solar systems.
Results are presented in Table 1.9. As expected, subsidies are strongly correlated
with the generation potential, due to the way they are designed, and have a positive
effect on uptake. The two effects combined favour an efficient (in terms of total
generation) siting of the solar systems in locations with larger generation potential.
The same result is achieved by the installation costs, which have a negative effect on
adoption and negative correlation with generation potential. Electricity price and
electricity consumption in 2010 have a positive effect on solar PV adoptions, as they
proxy for electricity bill savings, but they have opposite effects on the siting of the
systems, as price tends to be higher in locations with larger generation potential,
but consumption tends to be lower.
As found by Graziano and Gillingham (2015), population density has a nega-
tive effect on PV adoptions, which are more abundant in rural and sparse areas.
Combined with a positive correlation with generation potential in the UK, den-
sity therefore contributes to inefficient system siting. Other covariates that have
a negative effects on residential solar PV uptake but are positively correlated with
generation potential are median house price,29 population between the age of 40 and
64, and residents in the intermediate socio-economic groups C to F (lower manage-
rial, administrative and professional occupations; intermediate occupations; small
employers and own account workers; lower supervisory and technical occupations).
On the other side, number of owner-occupied houses, residents working from home,
and residents belonging to the social-economic group of large employers and higher
managerial and administrative occupations (socio-economic group A) and to rou-
tine occupations (socio-economic group H) have a positive effect on PV adoption
but are negatively correlated with solar electricity generation. All these drivers push
installations towards locations with relatively worse generation potential.
29Note that in the UK historical houses, such as listed buildings and buildings in conservation
areas, have stringent regulation on what modifications can be made and require authorisation for
the installation of solar panels and other energy related measures (Hilber et al., 2019). Moreover,
the aesthetics of the house is an important concern in the country, and many households oppose
solar panels because they make the house look hugly or are afraid it might lower the value of the
house (Standal et al., 2020). These concerns are likely to affect higher-value houses.
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Table 1.9: Effects of covariates on solar PV uptake, partial correlation of covariates with
the generation potential of locations, and resulting effect on siting.
PV count Generation potential resulting effect
(Poisson, IV) (partial correlations) on siting
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 1.907∗∗∗ (0.022) 10.23∗∗∗ (0.101) +
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -4.182∗∗∗ (0.056) -1.580∗∗∗ (0.167) +
Electricity price (p/kWh) 0.190∗∗∗ (0.018) 8.020∗∗∗ (0.118) +
Electricity consumption in 2010 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.015∗∗∗ (0.000) −
Density -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0003∗∗∗ (0.000) −
# Owner-occupied houses 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.035∗∗∗ (0.000) −
Median house price -0.000002∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) −
Population 40-64 -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.011∗∗∗ (0.000) −
Population ≥65 0.0002∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.059∗∗∗ (0.000) +
Residents in socio-economic group A 0.0002∗ (0.000) -0.201∗∗∗ (0.002) −
Residents in socio-economic group B 0.0003∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.0187∗∗∗ (0.001) +
Residents in socio-economic group C -0.0000 (0.000) 0.049∗∗∗ (0.001) .
Residents in socio-economic group D -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.012∗∗∗ (0.001) −
Residents in socio-economic group E -0.0004∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.120∗∗∗ (0.001) −
Residents in socio-economic group F -0.0000 (0.000) 0.091∗∗∗ (0.001) .
Residents in socio-economic group G 0.0001 (0.000) 0.068∗∗∗ (0.001) .
Residents in socio-economic group H 0.0005∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.085∗∗∗ (0.001) −
Flats -0.0002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.009∗∗∗ (0.000) +
Terraced houses -0.0001∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.022∗∗∗ (0.000) +
Semi-detached houses 0.0000 (0.000) -0.039∗∗∗ (0.000) .
Detached houses 0.0003∗∗∗ (0.000) 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000) +
Work from home 0.0011∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.238∗∗∗ (0.002) −
Homemaker 0.0001 (0.000) 0.181∗∗∗ (0.001) .
Retired -0.0002∗∗∗ (0.000) -0.053∗∗∗ (0.001) +
Unemployed -0.0003∗ (0.000) -0.255∗∗∗ (0.002) +
Born in EU 0.0002∗ (0.000) 0.022∗∗∗ (0.001) +
Born in UK 0.0000 (0.000) 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000) .
N 503580 503580
R2 0.318
adj. R2 0.318
pseudo R2 0.325
F 10676.0
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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The forces that push in the opposite direction  that is towards more efficient
siting for electricity generation  due to positive coefficients for both adoption and
generation potential are population older than 65 years old, residents in higher
professional occupations (socio-economic group B) and homemakers spending time
taking care of the home, residents born in the EU and UK, as opposed to outside
of the EU, and the presence of detached houses. The same result occurs when both
coefficients are negative, as in the case of areas with large presence of apartments
(flats), terraced houses, retired residents and unemployment.
Besides the effects of these variables, the situation is likely to be further com-
plicated by unobservables (variables that are not observed in the dataset), such as
green preferences and local campaigns and initiatives, that are captured by area-
specific fixed effects and contribute to shape the distribution of solar systems around
the UK. Moreover, peer effects due to information sharing, social norms and imi-
tative behaviour, might compound these mechanisms by triggering a domino effect,
once solar PV systems start appearing in a neighbourhood.30 Understanding the
combined effects of these elements can therefore explain the puzzling distribution of
residential solar PV around England and Wales.
Therefore, the distribution of residential solar systems appears to be shaped not
only by the subsidy, but also by the counteracting effects of several other forces,
including socio-demographic composition, work arrangements and characteristics of
the built environment. Understanding the complementarities between these ele-
ments and the mechanisms behind these effects can therefore help design more ef-
fective and better targeted policies, which take into consideration the monetary and
non-monetary incentives and the different physical, technological, socio-demographic
and economic constraints at play.
1.7 Conclusion
The main contributions of this Chapter have been to estimate the responsiveness
of demand for residential PV systems to the UK output-based subsidies, to iden-
tify what other forces shape the spatial distribution of solar installations around
30Evidence that peer effects play a significant role in the diffusion of new technology, and in
particular of residential solar PV, is documented in the literature (Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012;
Richter, 2014; Graziano and Gillingham, 2015; Müller and Rode, 2013; Rode and Weber, 2016;
Baranzini et al., 2017), and suggested by the exploratory analysis presented in Appendix A.2.
This is the topic of the next Chapter.
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the country, and to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the policy design
and how it could be changed to improve cost-effectiveness and achieve a more effi-
cient siting of residential solar in terms of overall generation obtained from a given
installed capacity.
As predicted by the theory, I find a positive subsidy elasticity of demand, with
the number of installations decreasing in response to cut to the subsidies. This is
counterbalanced by the negative elasticity to the cost of installing, with the number
of installations increasing as the cost falls. Using a consistent estimator for a Poisson
model with fixed effects and endogenous regressors, I estimate that on average a 1%
cut in the annual expected subsidy results in a 4.82% drop in installations, but if the
installation costs decrease by 1% then this boost adoption by 9.31% (when taking
all variables at their mean values). These values represent partial elasticities. When
considering the cost of installations net of the present value of all future subsidies
as the main regressor  as commonly done in the literature, especially when rebate
schemes are under analysis  the estimate for the overall elasticity at the mean is
-0.87, meaning that a 1% decrease in the net costs, or equivalently a 1% increase in
the profitability of the investment, results in 0.87% more installations. This value
is comparable to estimates obtained in the literature for the US and Belgium, and
suggest that a drop of 10 GBP in the net costs (or equivalently a raise of 10 GBP in
the profitability) per kW of installed capacity would result in 140 more installations
throughout the territory.
I have then used the resulting estimates to discuss the cost-effectiveness of the
subsidy scheme and the degree of inframarginal adoptions and rent appropriation.
The additionality of the policy appears to be very large, with only few installations
predicted to have happened without any form of support, and mainly in later years,
when the cost of PV systems was lower. Nevertheless, electricity generated by
the residential PV installations appears to be more costly than other sources in the
country, and even more expensive than residential solar electricity in other countries.
I estimate a cost of the policy of 0.112-0.156 GBP per kWh generated (present value
calculated using a 10% and 5% discount rate respectively), and of approximately
224-313 GBP per metric ton of CO2-eq avoided with respect to the energy mix
in place in 2010, before the FIT scheme started (present value calculated using a
10% and 5% discount rate respectively). On one side, it should be considered that
solar PV systems are also linked to additional benefits in terms of technological
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innovation, learning-by-doing, social learning, and reduction of local pollutants and
negative externalities that are associated with other energy sources (Jaffe et al.,
2005; Benthem et al., 2008), and this would therefore justify a higher cost of solar
energy with respect to other sources.
Yet, these benefits could likely be achieved at a lower cost than what UK energy
bill payers have been paying, by providing incentives upfront, as in the case of the
California Expected Performance-Based Buydown, or other rebate schemes in the
US and around the world. In fact, I estimate that households behave `as if' they were
heavily discounting future subsidies, meaning that a large share of the subsidies end
up paying for households' `impatience', and other behavioural features that make
households undervalue future benefits from adoption (default bias, uncertainty and
risk aversion, mistakes in calculating the present value, and so on). High discount
rates are a common feature in the literature on new technology adoption, and very
similar values have been found in the context of residential solar PV systems for
Belgium and California, using more complex structural models with dynamic opti-
misation of decisions. When calculating the present value of the policy expenditures
using the estimated 21% discount rate households seem to be using, the cost drops
to 0.06 GBP per kWh generated and 135 GBP per metric ton of CO2-eq avoided,
in line with the corresponding estimates for the policy cost of upfront rebates in
California.
In terms of geographical distribution, I find that the existing output-based sub-
sidy scheme is more cost-effective than the hypothetical alternative capacity-based
subsidy considered. In fact, while capacity-based subsidies induce more installa-
tions than the standard output-based incentive, these occur in areas with worse
generation potential. This is consistent with theoretical results from Burr (2016).
Overall, retaining the differentiation of the subsidy according to generation potential
is therefore helpful to improve the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the subsidy.
Nevertheless, there appear to be other mechanisms at play that result in a distribu-
tion of systems that is only weakly correlated to the generation potential. This is
because in the UK several built environment, work arrangements and socio-economic
characteristics that are associated with solar PV adoption  such as wealthier socio-
economic groups, lower population density, more owner-occupied houses and more
people working from home  tend to be negatively correlated with locations' genera-
tion potential. This result could be leveraged to target future policies and to design
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support schemes that take into consideration a broader set of monetary and non-
monetary incentives and different physical, technological, socio-demographic and
economic constraints.
At the same time, the observable characteristics included in the dataset are likely
to be only a part of all the forces at play, as location specific fixed effects might be
absorbing other relevant mechanisms that are unobserved in this analysis, such as
green preferences, and local campaigns and initiatives. Peer effects, documented in
the literature and detected through some preliminary analysis in this paper, might
further compound the existing effect by triggering a chain reaction, once solar PV
systems start appearing in a neighbourhood. More research on these channels would
therefore be relevant.
In conclusion, the findings of this Chapter suggest that a combination of upfront
incentives differentiated so to take into consideration generation potential would
be a more cost-effective solution than both annual output-based subsidies and up-
front capacity-based rebates. California Expected Performance-Based Buydown is
an example of how such incentive could be designed, as it offers an upfront rebate
calculated according to the expected generation of the solar array, taking into con-
sideration the location, orientation and shading of the installation, and even the
efficiency of the PV module purchased.
Future extensions of the research might integrate into the analysis grid network
costs (generation, transmission, distribution, congestion, etc.), the geographical dis-
tribution of demand, and the potential solar energy generation in each location at a
higher resolution (particularly useful would be at the week and weekend level, and
by day and night time) to assess where a hypothetical central planner would have
preferred to site the solar systems, and discuss how these `optimal' distribution of
installations across the country compares with the decentralised decisions triggered
by different incentive designs.
The research questions explored in this Chapter contribute to our understand-
ing of how centralised market based incentives, such as subsidy, interact with the
behaviour of decentralised agents, that are now both consumers and producers of
energy. It also discusses practical policy alternatives to improve cost-effectiveness of
renewables subsidy, given budgetary pressure. More broadly, the paper contributes
to the literature on technology adoption and policy intervention in the case of exter-
nality, the future of electricity system regulation, load and capacity management,
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and integration of renewables.
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Chapter 2
The role of peer effects and
monetary incentives in the diffusion
of residential solar PV
2.1 Introduction
Together with externalities and non-rival and non-excludable benefits (Jaffe et al.,
2005), incomplete information and information asymmetries, on one side, and deci-
sion heuristics and behavioural factors on the other, may also contribute to inertia
and slow uptake in the diffusion of low-carbon innovations (Foster and Rosenzweig,
2010). While imperfect information is one of the causes of market failures listed in
the standard economic models, and as such it has a longer tradition in economic
literature, the discipline's focus on behavioural mechanisms is more recent. Both
channels may have effects that spill over from an individual to the other through
social interactions or simple physical proximity, therefore violating the standard as-
sumptions of causal inference and requiring more complex estimation procedures
and research designs. Moreover, the observational similarities of their effects make
separate identification difficult.
This Chapter focuses on how these two channels may explain the presence of peer
effects in the uptake of residential solar PV systems. I focus in particular on two
spillover mechanisms, social learning through information sharing  within the more
standard economic channel  and social utility derived from pressure to conform
and imitation as a decision heuristic  representing the behavioural channel. To this
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aim, I choose residential solar PV systems as the focus of the analysis because it is
a visible technology and as such knowledge of who has adopted can be transmitted
even without communication. This means that geographical proximity can be used
as proxy for the transmission of information and peer pressure rather than actual
communication networks, that would be much more difficult to obtain data on.
This technology is also of particular relevance due to its promising role in re-
ducing emissions from electricity generation and therefore in contributing to climate
change mitigation. On this account, governments around the world have been ex-
perimenting with new measures to support its deployment, with a range of monetary
incentives, informational interventions, financing mechanisms, and community ini-
tiatives. This provides a fertile setting for academic research, to understand and
learn from what has been done and inform future policy design.
Compared to the existing literature, this paper adds more theoretical background
to the analysis to suggest possible mechanisms behind peer effects in solar PV adop-
tion. A simple static model sets up the household's decision to install solar panels
given the subsidy offered, the upfront cost required to obtain the technology and the
information the household has collected. The initial baseline model is then extended
to include peer effects according to two different mechanisms. The first one is an
imitation behaviour due to the utility premium obtained from conforming with peers
and keeping up with the Joneses (the social utility channel); this utility premiums
can also be seen as savings in the cognitive costs required to make the decision,
achieved by using imitation of neighbours' behaviour as a decision heuristic. The
second mechanism consists of information sharing at the local level, with peers who
have already adopted the technology (the social learning channel). For each channel,
propositions are derived on the direction of the peer effects, how they would evolve
over time, and how the peer effects would affect the subsidy elasticity. While both
mechanisms support the hypotheses that peer effects are present and significant, in-
teract with subsidies and are not constant over time, they predict different patterns
of evolution over time. I use these insights from the model to test which mechanism
is more consistent with the results from the reduced-form regression analysis, and
therefore find evidence on which one is dominant. This paper also looks explicitly
at how peer effects and monetary incentives interact and whether they are comple-
ments or substitutes, and provides a discussion on how the result could be leveraged
in policy design.
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The research questions explored in this paper contribute to the broader re-
search question of what are the economic and non-economic determinants of low-
carbon technology adoption, at the household level, by combining more standard
micro-economic theory of consumers' decisions with the literature on innovation
spillovers, imitative behaviour, and social learning. In fact, in terms of policy impli-
cations, deployment subsidies are usually justified using environmental externalities
or `learning-by-doing' arguments, but if spillover effects are present then this may be
an additional argument to consider, as they might act as a multiplier of the learning-
by-doing effect. Any complementarity or substitutability between peer effects and
monetary incentives should therefore be factored in when calculating the optimal
level of the incentive, as well as its schedule over time.
Section 2.2 presents the main literature on peer effects and solar PV adoptions,
as well as other technologies and practices, while Section 2.3 details the model and
derive a set of propositions to be tested in the empirical part of the paper. Section 2.4
provides more information on the policy setting and the data used in the analysis, as
well as a descriptive analysis of the spatial patterns of adoptions in the UK. Section
2.5 introduces the regression analysis, discussing the challenges to identification, the
estimation strategy to address them, and how the estimators and the peer variables
are defined; and Section 2.6 presents the results, as well as a series of robustness
checks. Finally, Section 2.7 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications.
2.2 Peer effects and technology uptake
Peer effects and solar PV systems
Solar energy generation technologies have seen rapid improvements in the last decades,
as well as a steep reductions in their price, making them a promising tool to help
reduce emissions and mitigate the climate crisis. Policies that provide support to the
development and deployment of these technologies have similarly been experiment-
ing with different designs and frequent adjustments to keep up with the changing
situation. This has provided fertile terrain to assess the effectiveness of different
policy instruments and research the economic and non-economic mechanisms that
drive the uptake of these technologies.
In this context, a literature on the role of peer effects in the adoption of resi-
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dential solar PV systems and other energy efficiency technologies has developed in
the last few years. Wolske et al. (2020) provide a multi-disciplinary review of the
literature on peer effects in households' energy-related behaviours, covering stud-
ies more specifically on solar panels. Of relevance to this paper, they identify two
main channels through which peer effects operate  social norms and interpersonal
communication and persuasion  and describe different mechanisms behind each of
them. Distinguishing the effects of the two channels using quantitative empirical
analysis and observational data encounters several challenges, so that most of the
economic literature so far has focused on identifying and quantifying peer effects in
general, an already methodologically onerous task.
Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) is one of the very first papers in this literature,
studying adoption of solar PV in California. They introduce the identification strat-
egy that several subsequent papers, including this one, use. They exploit the time
lag between the decision to adopt solar and the moment in which the panels are
actually put on the roof and start producing, which is caused by administrative and
bureaucratic requirements. In fact, a household can only be affected by their peers
up to the moment in which the decision is taken. Yet, their solar panels will only
start influencing others once they are visible on the roof and the household starts
having information on their production. They conclude that peer effects are present
and are stronger the larger the peer installations are and the closer to the reference
household.
Graziano and Gillingham (2015), focus on Connecticut and extend the previous
methodologies by applying spatial analysis tools and more explicit spatial variables.
They study in particular the role of geography and the built environment and find
that rural areas and smaller towns drive the diffusion of solar panels in the State.
They confirm that peer effects are positive and significant and find that the influence
of peers' installations become weaker the further away in space they are, and the
further back in time they were installed.
To overcome the identification challenges of peer effects, Gillingham and Bollinger
(2017) exploit the Solarize campaigns as a natural field experiment to study the
uptake of solar panels, again in Connecticut. The Solarize scheme combines an in-
formational campaign led by volunteer ambassadors, with group pricing to lower
the price of installation, providing different level of price and peer interaction treat-
ments, which the paper uses to estimate the effects. They find the intervention to be
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highly cost-effective. As the intervention explicitly increases information provision
and information sharing, the main channel responsible for the effect appears to be
social learning.
Other studies in Europe were conducted by Müller and Rode (2013) and Rode
and Weber (2016) for Germany, Baranzini et al. (2017) and Carattini et al. (2018)
for Switzerland, and Palm (2017) in Sweden. In particular, Müller and Rode (2013)
focuses on only one city and use a discrete-choice framework to model the choice
on whether to install or not, given policy support and existing nearby installations,
while Rode and Weber (2016) set up an epidemic diffusion model enhanced with a
spatial component to capture spatial and temporal patterns of adoption across the
whole country. Palm (2017) uses a mix of qualitative interviews and quantitative
survey methods in Sweden, and find that, according to households self-reported
information, peer effects mainly operated through active interaction within existing
social network, rather than passively through simple visibility of the panels, and that
households rely on their peers mainly to confirm the functioning of the technology.
Carattini et al. (2018) focus instead on Switzerland, and exploit cultural barriers
and language differences within the country as a discontinuity design. They find
that language barriers hampers adoption of solar PV, suggesting once again that
social learning is a relevant mechanism at play. Baranzini et al. (2017) extends the
analysis of peer effects in residential solar adoptions to the additional categories of
businesses and farms, and to types of installation with different visibility, on the
roof as opposed to integrated on the side of a building, and concludes that better
visibility is associated with stronger effects, and that while households are influenced
by installations in all categories, farms and businesses tend to be influenced only by
installations in the same categories, that is farms and businesses respectively. All
confirm that peer effects play a relevant role in the adoption of solar technologies.
The main study on the UK, and one of the first economic studies to identify
peer effects in residential PV adoptions, is Richter (2014). While in this Chapter
I use a similar identification strategies and estimators as in her paper, the key
difference is that she uses more standard econometric techniques and does not take
into consideration the spatial dimension of the diffusion process beyond the borders
of the unit of analysis. Her analysis is also restricted to the first three years of the
FIT scheme and uses postcode-districts, a much larger unit of aggregation than the
LSOA I use in this paper  for comparison, there are 34,738 LSOAs in England
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and Wales, but only 2,269 postcode-district. Spatial analysis on the diffusion of
residential PVs in the UK is instead presented by Balta-Ozkan et al. (2015) and
Westacott and Candelise (2016), but using cross-sectional data. They therefore
provide a snap-shot of the situation in the country at one point in time, and do not
research how changes in the policy affect the diffusion at different points in time
The evolution of peer effects in the adoption of residential PV has been investi-
gated from an empirical perspective by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012), using year
dummies interacted with the lagged installed base. They find that peer effects in
California have strengthened over the years, consistently with the observed intro-
duction of marketing strategies to leverage these effects. Similar results have been
found by Graziano and Gillingham (2015) for Connecticut. Richter (2014) uses a
similar method for the UK, but with quarter dummies, and finds that peer effects
seem to be stronger in periods of policy changes, but overall decrease over time. Fi-
nally, Baranzini et al. (2017) estimate the coefficient for neighbouring installations
in Switzerland using rolling 4-year samples, and again find evidence that peer effects
in PV installations have decreased over time.
Peer effects and other `green' technologies
Expanding the analysis to other `green' technologies and spillovers from one tech-
nology to another, La Nauze (2019)'s paper on Australia studies how pro-social
motivations and virtue signalling of installing solar panels affect purchase of green
power in the neighbourhood, and find a positive spillover effect from one technology
to the other. Narayanan and Nair (2013) focuses on the adoption of electric vehi-
cles in California, using a clever identification strategy based on different brands of
hybrid cars, one that is visibly hybrid and others that are indistinguishable from
the regular fuel versions of the same car. Bollinger et al. (2019) focus instead on
the adoption of water conservation practices in gardening in California. Their iden-
tification strategy is based on an instrumental variable approach, using households
that have recently moved to a new neighbourhood.
Other studies rely on field experiments and RCTs to better control for con-
founders and endogeneity in the identification of peer effects. Alem and Dugoua
(2019) for example, conducted an RCT in India offering solar lanterns, and divided
their sample into control, unincentivised communication treatment and incentivised
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communication treatment. They find that communication strongly increases WTP.
Peer effects and agricultural and microcredit decisions
Similar research has been conducted in rural Asia and Africa to study the role
of peer effects in the adoption of agricultural technologies and practices, with a
particular focus on social learning. Bandiera and Rasul (2006) study peer effects in
the adoption of a newly introduced crop, sunflower, using data on farmers' social
networks in Mozambique. They find that while peer effects play a role, farmers
who have better knowledge and information on the new crop are less influenced by
peers. Similarly, Conley and Udry (2010) focus on peer effects in crop choices in
Ghana, using explicit data on communication networks; they find positive social
learning effects in the case of pineapples, a new crop, but no social learning in the
case of crops that are already commonly used, suggesting that information from
peers becomes redundant when individuals already have familiarity with the crop.
Finally, Di Falco et al. (2020) identify peer effects in the number and type of climate
change adaptation strategies adopted by farmers in rural Ethiopia, and construct
a placebo test in which neighbours are re-assigned at random to corroborate the
finding.
Another recent strand of research looks instead at whether different types of
peers or information sources have different effects on the outcome. Krishnan and
Patnam (2014) introduce a non-overlapping peer-of-peer IV strategy to identify so-
cial learning in the adoption of fertilizer and improved seeds in Ethiopia, and find
that the effects evolve differently over time depending on whether the informa-
tion came from neighbouring farmers or extension agents. BenYishay and Mobarak
(2019) and Banerjee et al. (2013) study the role of the identity of the injections
points of a new technology, or of information on a new technology, and use dif-
ferent definitions of social, cultural, and geographic networks to identify peers in
agriculture and microcredit respectively.
The interaction between peer effects and monetary variables
To the best of my knowledge, the interaction between peer effects and responsiveness
to subsidy has not been explored in the literature on residential PV installations.
This paper challenges the null hypothesis of no interaction between the two effects.
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The idea of an interaction effect between a monetary elasticity (usually price) and
peer effects is not entirely new to the economic literature. One of the first to put
the hypothesis forward was Leibenstein (1950). In the paper "Bandwagon, Snob
and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers' Demand", QJE, he integrates peer
effects (called bandwagon effects in the paper) in the theory of demand, and shows
how in the case of a change in price, the demand would change not only because of
the direct price effect, but also because of the changes in other people's demand, so
that the final elasticity of demand would capture both effects. Another interesting
and relevant point is that of social taboos when bandwagon effects are present, i.e.
at the beginning no one buys because no one else does, but for some price, enough
people would buy despite the taboo triggering the taboo breaking points and starting
the diffusion process. This could be relevant for the case of PV as a new technology
that is initially frown upon. Following this theoretical framework, some empirical
studies have been conducted, especially in the health economic literature, looking
at alcohol and smoking. Relevant examples are Manning et al. (1995) and Ayyagari
et al. (2013). The closest study in terms of the interaction effect considered is
a recent working paper by La Nauze (2019). She finds that solar panels have a
positive spillover effect on the purchase of green power, but the effect is smaller
when subsidies are higher, possibly because virtue signalling become confused with
profit maximisation.
Looking at the interaction between peer behaviour and subsidy is equivalent
to ask whether responsiveness to subsidy is heterogeneous depending on how many
peers are adopting. Investigating potential heterogeneity in the elasticity to subsidies
is particularly relevant for welfare analysis and has important policy implications.
In fact, it is critical to understand the impact of changes in the tariff, in terms
of who will be more affected, the externalities generated, and the resulting welfare
effects. These results could be a starting point to improve the efficiency of the
current policy, as well as its distributional effects, or even thinking about new and
more sophisticated policy mixes.
Some studies on heterogeneous price elasticity exist in the energy economics
literature, although they mainly focus on the interaction with income (Archibald and
Gillingham, 1980) or with the level of consumption (for example fuel price elasticity
and driving intensity, in Frondel et al., 2012). Another relevant work that tested
whether price elasticity changes depending on the level of information consumers
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have on the good, is Ashraf et al. (2013), in the context of a health product. They
conduct a field experiment in Zambia offering water purification products households
were not familiar with. The product was offered at different prices and coupled with
different levels of information about its use, and the authors find that demand
for the product is more elastic when information is provided, therefore suggesting
that subsidies are more effective when complemented with informational treatments.
Interestingly, they find that the informational effect in isolation does not have any
direct effect on the demand for the product.
In order to contribute to this literature, my research focuses on decisional spillovers
across space and time  whereby individuals affect each other's decisions via social
interaction or simple geographic proximity, and technological choices made in the
past provide information, as well as a reference point or `default' options that will
affect future decisions. The effect of social pressure, private and social learning, and
information accumulation in these cases is not straightforward. Agents who have
a behavioural bias towards the status quo technology (default bias) for example,
will require very high net benefits before choosing to switch to the new technology,
and may push others to do the same. Similarly, sharing information on the positive
externality of the technology and the benefits that are difficult to exclude, may give
rational agents an incentive to free-ride and the resulting diffusion of the technology
will be socially sub-optimal. On the other side, information sharing and social pres-
sure may trigger cooperative behaviours, via willingness to monitor and sanction,
social preferences, or herding and reputational effects of the early adopters.
2.3 Theoretical framework
2.3.1 Model
The model is inspired by the formalisation of the decision to purchase a financial
asset in the presence of social learning and social utility presented in Bursztyn et al.
(2014, Appendix B), and of the role of peer effects in general in the decision to
go see a movie at the theatre, in Moretti (2011). The theoretical framework used
draws further inspiration from other relevant articles that model peer effects under
social utility and/or social learning to derive hypotheses for empirical testing, in
particular Sorensen (2006) for the case of health plan choices, and Young (2009), who
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characterises the shape of aggregate uptake under different peer effect mechanisms.
Given that economic benefits are often quoted as one of the main incentives
in favour of residential PVs, and this was confirmed in qualitative interviews con-
ducted by the author around the country (Standal et al., 2020), the baseline model
formalises the decision to install or not install solar panels as a function of the sub-
sidy and the cost of the technology at a certain time and location. The model is
then extended to account for peer effects. In particular, I consider two different
mechanisms through which peer effects may operate: social utility  which provides
a premium for conforming with neighbours who have already adopted and triggers
imitative behaviour  and social learning  where households who have already in-
stalled provide an additional source of information at the local level. These two
mechanisms result in a set of hypotheses on the pattern of solar PV adoption that
are then tested in the empirical section of the paper.
It is to be noted that this model regards decisions as static, i.e. households
decide whether to install or not given present conditions, rather than when to in-
stall. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) make the same assumption, supported by
the specific context and information collected through a survey. This assumption is
also consistent with qualitative interviews conducted by the author. Nevertheless,
dynamic versions of this model could be explored in the future, as they would pro-
vide further insights into the diffusion of the technology. The framework could also
be extended introducing environmental motivations as an additional non-monetary
component of the payoff of adoption more generally. Heterogeneity of motivations
and sophistication of the households would also be interesting extensions to explore
in the future.
The model presented is intended to capture the main features of early stages of
the adoption process, when saturation of the market is not yet an issue. This is
appropriate for the UK in the period considered, as at the end of 2016 90% of the
LSOAs had a penetration of residential solar panels of less than one system for every
10 owner-occupied houses, and half of the LSOAs had less than one solar installation
for every 37 owner-occupied houses. And this is not considering houses occupied by
tenants nor any block of flats, social housing or multi-family property or any other
residential dwelling not classified as house. The potential market is therefore likely
to be even larger.
100
Baseline model, no peer effects
In the case of innovative technology, it is common to assume that there is inertia
in the diffusion process (Young, 2009; Richter, 2014). This can be included in the
model by assuming that in each period and in each location, i.e. for each combination
(l, t), only a fraction α of all the suitable households that constitute the potential
market for solar PV systems consider installing solar panels. If household i is among
those ones, they decide whether to install a solar PV system (qi,l,t = 1) or not
(qi,l,t = 0) given the conditions in that location at that time. Aggregating the
individual decisions gives Ql,t =
∑
i∈(l,t) qi, the total number of households installing
in location l at time t. In what follows, I drop the subscript l and t for ease of
exposition.
The decision set for household i is therefore qi = {0, 1}. I assume that once
a household has installed solar panels, they are out of the market. Installing the
system provides a monetary payoff x, which in the case of the UK represents the
periodic FIT payments. The payoff is risky and uncertain, and its realisation follows
a probability density function f(x), which is the same for all households within
a given location-time combination (l, t), after controlling for covariates. To see
why the payoff is risky and uncertain, consider that the FIT payments in the UK
depend on the subsidy rate in place at the time the system is registered and the
electricity generated by the system in each period. The latter depends in turns on
characteristics of the systems, tilt and direction of the rooftop, solar irradiation at
the location, but also contextual weather conditions. Moreover, once the household
decides to install solar panels, the actual installation occurs at a lag, due to the
bureaucracy involved and the time the installer needs to inspect the house, obtain
all the components of the systems, connect the wires and inverter to the electric
system, and place the solar modules on the roof. By the time the installation is
completed and the system can be registered for the FIT scheme, the subsidy rate
might have therefore been cut to a lower level. While this example is specific to
the context studied in this paper, support schemes for renewable energy and new
technologies in general tend to have similar elements of uncertainty and risks.
Household i's utility from installing is given by ui(x), so that higher payoffs
provide more utility, but at a decreasing rate (du(x)/dx > 0 and d2u(x)/dx2 < 0),
as commonly assumed in microeconomics. For simplicity, I assume that ui(x) =
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u(x) for all i within a given location and time. Each i obtains information on the
payoff they can expect given the present conditions, represented by a signal si. The
signals for all households within a given location and time come from a common
distribution, but each household has a different realisation, for example because
they look for information from different sources, or ask different questions. Signals
are informative, so that if payoff x is higher, households tend to observe higher
values of the signal si. I follow Bursztyn et al. (2014) and formalise this condition
by assuming that conditional density f(x|si) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP).
Household i will install only if the expected utility of adoption is larger than
the opportunity cost of adopting, represented by u¯. u¯ includes the upfront cost
of installing. In the baseline scenario, where households are not affected by the
decisions of their peers, this translates into:
Pr(qi = 1) = Pr(E(u(x|si)) > u¯) (2.1)
where
E(u(x|si)) =
∫
u(x) f(x|si) dx (2.2)
so increases in x and relatedly more favourable signals si increase the probability of
adoption.
As time passes, it is realistic that households across the country become generally
more familiar with the solar PV technology and the support scheme offered, and their
sophistication increases. As in Bursztyn et al. (2014), this is rendered in the model
by assuming that as time passes the distribution of the signal becomes more precise
and its variance decreases: σst2 ≤ σst1 if t2 > t1. Under continuity and differentiability
assumptions this can be written as dσs/dt ≤ 0. The precision of the signal per se
does not affect u(.), but only means that households make on average more `correct'
decisions, by installing if payoff is high with respect to the opportunity cost, and
not installing if it is low, so that ∂E(u(x|si))
∂σs
= 0. This is consistent with the finding
from Ashraf et al. (2013), reviewed above.
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Model with social utility  peer effects as imitative behaviour
When social utility is at play, household i obtains extra utility if they can keep up
with the Joneses by imitating or conforming to the behaviour of their neighbours
(or peers). In this context it is reasonable to assume that utility from adoption  or
equivalently the disutility of being the odd one out that does not have solar panels
 is therefore higher the more widespread PV systems are in the neighbourhood and
the stronger the social norm around solar panel is. Let us denote as γ the strength
of the social norm, and as Q−i the number of neighbours who have already installed
solar panels on their rooftops at the time i is making the decision on whether to
adopt. Note that Q−i can be any form of aggregation of the individual installations
already existing in the neighbourhood, for example the sum of the installations or
the cumulative share, and installations could be weighted depending for example
on the distance from i or on how far back in time they occurred. Note that a key
identifying assumption in the paper is that an installation can affect peers living in
the neighbourhood only once it has been purchased and installed on the roof, and
therefore becomes visible to others. Then if Q−i,2 > Q−i,1:
u(x|γ,Q−i,2)|q=1 − u(x|γ,Q−i,2)|q=0 ≥ u(x|γ,Q−i,1)|q=1 − u(x|γ,Q−i,1)|q=0 (2.3)
that is households who live in neighbourhoods with more installations get higher
utility from installing (or higher disutilities from not installing) than households
who live in neighbourhoods with lower penetration of the technology, given the
same payoff and the same level of social norm; and similarly, if γ2 > γ1:
u(x|γ2, Q−i)|q=1 − u(x|γ2, Q−i)|q=0 ≥ u(x|γ1, Q−i)|q=1 − u(x|γ1, Q−i)|q=0 (2.4)
that is households who install when the social norm towards solar panels is stronger
get higher utility from installing (or higher disutility from not installing) than house-
holds who install when the social norm is weaker, given the same level of penetration
of the technology in the neighbourhood and the same payoff. These results rely on
mild monotonicity assumptions on the utility function u(.).
In particular, this can be specified as household i obtaining an additional non-
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monetary payoff from installing  or social payoff  on top of the monetary payments:
xsocial = g(γ,Q−i) (2.5)
Function g(.) aggregates the number of peer adoptions and translate them into
the social payoff.1 I do not impose a specific form for the aggregate function, but
consistent with the specification commonly proposed in the literature I assume that
the social payoff g(.) increases the more peers have already installed: ∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0.
Similarly, the social payoff increases the stronger the social norm is: ∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂γ
≥ 0.
The social norm acts as a multiplier, so that when the social norm is stronger, one
extra installation in the neighbourhood has a stronger impact on i's decision, as
compared to the case with a weaker social norm. This can be formalized using the
cross derivative ∂
2g(γ,Q−i)
∂γ∂Q−i
≥ 0. As g(.) increases the total payoff, it also increases the
expected utility, so that ∂E(u(x|si))
∂g(.)
= ∂E(u(x|si))
∂x
∂x
∂g(.)
≥ 0. Utility therefore becomes a
function of the two types of payoff, monetary and social:
u = u(xmonetary, xsocial) = u(xmonetary, g(γ,Q−i)) (2.6)
with utility increasing in each of the payoff (∂u(x
mon,g(.))
∂xmon
> 0 and ∂u(x
mon,g(.))
∂g(.)
> 0).
The two payoffs may substitute each other, if keeping up with the neighbours is
perceived as equivalent to an increase in the monetary subsidy; or complement each
other, if they are perceived as complements, so that keeping up with the neighbours
provide even more utility when the monetary payoff is also large, while the utility of
conforming is not as large if the monetary payoff is low. The first case seems more
intuitive for the setting of the paper, but I will discuss how each assumption affect
the hypotheses of the model. If the two payoffs are substitute, increasing one of
them results in diminishing marginal utility for the other, so that ∂
2u(xmon,g(.))
∂xmon∂g(.)
≤ 0
[substitute case]. If the payoffs are complement the opposite occurs; ∂
2u(xmon,g(.))
∂xmon∂g(.)
≥ 0
[complement case]. Note that if g(γ,Q−i) = 0  i.e. there is no social utility  then
1Different type of aggregations have been proposed in the literature, although in general effects
are assumed to be cumulative, e.g. g(q−i) =
∑
θq−i where q−i are the decisions of each of i's peer,
and θ is some weighting parameter, representing for example some form of distance between i and
each of their peer, or the total number of peers  therefore making the peer effects determined
by the share of adoptions in the neighbourhood rather than the count. Cumulative effects can be
linear, follow a concave/convex function, therefore becoming weaker/stronger the more adopters
there are in the peer group, or act through a threshold effect, with g(q−i) = I[
∑
θq−i ≥ threshold],
so that peer adopters only affect decisions after they have reached a critical mass.
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u(xmonetary, g(.)) = u(x) and the model becomes the baseline model described above.
As in the baseline model, household i will install only if the expected utility of
adoption is larger than the opportunity cost of adopting. If social utility is present,
this translates into:
Pr(qi = 1) = Pr(E(u(x|si, γ, Q−i)) > u¯) (2.7)
where
E(u(x|si, γ, Q−i)) =
∫
u(xmonetary, g(γ,Q−i)) f(x|si) dx (2.8)
It is realistic to assume that the social norm around solar panels becomes stronger
over time (Carattini et al., 2019), as the climate emergency become more severe and
knowledge of their social benefits  such as positive externalities in the form of
support to innovation, and reduction of negative externalities, by replacing fossil
fuels in energy generation (Benthem et al., 2008)  increases. This is modeled as
γ = γ(t) such that γ(t2) > γ(t1) ∀t2 > t1. Under continuity and differentiability
assumptions this can be written as dγ/dt > 0.
Model with social learning  peer effects as information sharing
In a model with social learning, household i obtains additional information from the
actions of their neighbours. Again, the assumption is that an installation can only
affect peers living in the neighbourhood once it has been purchased and installed
on the roof, and the decision of the household therefore becomes visible to oth-
ers. Households i therefore obtains information from installations that have already
occurred and past actions or decisions of the neighbours, as the contemporaneous
decision-making process is not visible. In particular, i infers that the more neigh-
bours have adopted solar panels so far, the better the conditions in the area must
be. In fact, neighbours' decisions depend (at least partly) on their private signals,
and if they have installed solar panels it means they are likely to have received a
favourable signal, given that f(x|si) satisfies MLRP. If household i is one of the
households considering whether to install solar panels at time t, they can therefore
derive a `social signal' ssociali looking at how many solar panels have been installed in
the neighbourhood so far (as only solar panels already installed and visible can pro-
vide a signal), and this signal is more favourable the more neighbours have adopted:
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ssociali = h(Q−i) and h(Q−i,2) ≥ h(Q−i,1) ∀Q−i,2 > Q−i,1. Function h(.) aggregates
the installations in the neighbourhood in a similar way to function g(.) in the so-
cial utility case, but in this case it translates them into an informational signal,
rather than a payoff. Under continuity and differentiability assumptions, this can
be written as dh(Q−i)/dQ−i ≥ 0.
In the baseline model, i only had a private signal si = s
priv
i . Now, the total
information available to i is a combination of the private signal sprivi and the social
signal ssociali . Each signal carries more weight in the decision-making process de-
pending on its precision. As described in the baseline model, the precision of the
private signal increases with time, as households become more sophisticated. The
total information can therefore be written as:
si = φ(s
priv
i , s
soc
i ) = ω
priv sprivi + ω
soc ssoci = ω
priv sprivi + ω
soc h(Q−i) (2.9)
where φ(.) is an aggregation function  for simplicity I assume a weighted average
 and ωpriv and ωsoc are weights, representing the importance given to each type of
signal. I assume that weights depend on the precision of the signals, so that a more
precise signal carries more weight in the final decision. The weights are constrained
to be non-negative and no larger than 1, i.e. 0 ≤ ωpriv ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ωsoc ≤ 1.
As remarked in the baseline case, increased precision of either signal implies that
i is more likely to make the `correct' decision according to the payoff, and does
not affect utility directly. This means that weights actually reflect the `relative'
precision of the two signals, and if one weight increases the other must decrease.
This insures that if the two signals have the same value, a change in their precision
does not change the value of φ; intuitively, if both signals have the same values and
provide the same information, changing the weight of one or the other should not
affect the utility. I therefore impose that weights must sum to one: ωpriv + ωsoc = 1
or equivalently ωsoc = 1− ωpriv. If ωsoc = 0  i.e. there is no social learning  then
ωpriv = 1 and si = s
priv
i , and the model becomes the baseline model described above.
The aggregate information is more favourable for the installation of solar panels
the more favourable each of the signals is  all else equal  and as before, the expected
utility tend to increase on average the more favourable the aggregate information
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is, because of the MLRP of f(x|si), so that:
E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci,2 )) ≥ E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci,1 )) ∀ ssoci,2 > ssoci,1 (2.10)
As in the baseline model, household i will install only if the expected utility of
adoption is larger than the opportunity cost of adopting. If social learning is present,
this translates into:
Pr(qi = 1) = Pr(E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci ) > u¯) (2.11)
where
E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci )) =
∫
u(x) f(x|sprivi , ssoci ) dx =
=
∫
u(x) f(x|(ωpriv sprivi + (1− ωpriv) h(Q−i))) dx (2.12)
As in the baseline model, precision of the private signal increases as time passes
and households become more sophisticated, i.e. ωpriv = ωpriv(t) such that dωpriv(t)/dt ≥
0. In this case, this assumption means that the relative weights given to the pri-
vate and social signals shift, so that the private signal carries more weight in the
decision-making process, and the social signal becomes less important. In fact,
dωsoc/dt = −dωpriv/dt ≤ 0 The rationale is that as households become more so-
phisticated, they can extract more information from their private signal, so that
information from the social signal becomes more and more redundant. Consistently,
the social signal becomes less precise as time passes, because it depends on the
stock of existing solar panels and therefore captures information that was available
at different points in the past. In fact, the social signal is a synthesis of the private
signals neighbours received at the time they decided to adopt and as the time range
gets longer it becomes more and more likely that some of those pieces of information
are not relevant any more. The implicit assumption is therefore that information
obtained through private sources and through social learning are substitute.
Intuitively, the idea is that at the beginning of the period, solar panels and the
subsidy scheme are still very novel and there is not much information available on
them, so that households considering solar panels can learn a lot from neighbours
who have already done so. As time passes, information on the technology and
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the subsidy scheme becomes more easily available and accessible everywhere in the
country, thanks for example to the news or the internet, so that households can
obtain more relevant information privately rather than learning from neighbours
who have installed in the past, when the cost of solar panels, the subsidy rate and
the technology were likely different from the current one. This assumption is sensible
in the empirical setting considered, as the cost of solar panels have been decreasing
quickly thanks to competition in the international markets, and the subsidy rate was
changed on average once every three or four months between January 2012 and the
end of the FIT scheme, in April 2019. This assumption is also consistent with results
from the literature, such as Bandiera and Rasul (2006)'s study on the adoption of
a new crop among farmers in Mozambique, which found that social learning had a
weaker effect on the decision of farmers who started out with better information,
and a stronger effect on farmers who had less information. Similarly, Conley and
Udry (2010) found that peers' choices have an effect on the adoption of a new crop
in Ghana, but no effect on decisions related to an already widespread and better
known crop.
2.3.2 Predictions and hypothesis testing
The theoretical framework described above results in a series of propositions on
the adoption patterns in the presence of peer effects, the evolution of peer effects
over time, and the interaction between peer effects and subsidy responsiveness. The
propositions provide hypotheses that can be tested in the empirical analysis, to
check whether data are consistent with the presence of peer effects, and which of
the two channels  social utility or social learning  is dominant. As the empirical
section relies on a reduced form model and quasi-experimental data, the two channels
cannot be separately identified, so that if both channels are relevant, the estimated
coefficients represent the net effect.
Peer effects lead to clusters of adoption
The first proposition describes how peer effects shape the adoption patterns of res-
idential solar PV systems over space. In this case, both channels lead to the same
prediction, which can be used to test whether data are consistent with the presence
of peer effects in general:
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PROPOSITION 1: If social utility or social learning are present, household i is
more likely to adopt the more existing installations there are in the neighbourhoods,
all else equal. If there are no peer effects, then the number of existing installations
in the neighbourhood does not affect household i's decision, once all other character-
istics are conditioned for. This is equivalent to state that if peer effects are present,
then more new installations occur in areas where there is a larger installed base as
compared to areas with a smaller installed base.
Proof. (0) In the baseline case with no peer effects, i decides in isolation and the
expected utility does not depend on neighbours' decisions, so EQ−i,2(u(x|si)) =
EQ−i,1(u(x|si)) ∀ Q−i,2 > Q−i,1. Under continuity and differentiability assumptions,
and according to equations (2.1) and (2.2) and the way the elements of the model
are defined, the same result can be written as:
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂Q−i
=
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂E(u(x|si))
∂E(u(x|si))
∂Q−i
= 0
(i) In the social utility case, the more neighbours have already adopted, the larger the
non-monetary payoff is, by definition of social utility in the model, i.e. ∂g(γ, Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0.
This increases utility i, according to equation (2.6), i.e. ∂u(x
mon,g(.))
∂g(.)
∂g(γ, Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0.
In turns, this pushes up the expected utility of i by mild monotonicity assumptions,
and therefore the probability of adoption, according to equation (2.7). The overall
result can be obtained by applying the chain rule for derivation on equation (2.8):
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂Q−i
=
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂E(u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i)|si))
∂E(u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i)|si))
∂g(γ, Q−i)
∂g(γ, Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0
because each element of the expression is non-negative.
(ii) In the social learning case, the more neighbours have already adopted, the
more favourable is the social signal i receives, by definition of social learning in
the model, i.e. dh(Q−i)
dQ−i
≥ 0. Household i's aggregate signal on the profitability
of installing solar panels is therefore more favourable too, according to equation
(2.9): ∂si
∂h(Q−i)
= ωsoc ≥ 0, as the weights are constrained between zero and one.
Because f(x|si) satisfies MLRP, this increases the expected utility of installing for
i, as shown in equation (2.10). As a consequence, the probability that i adopts solar
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panels increases too, according to equation (2.11). Under stricter assumptions on
the conditional distribution function, and on continuity and differentiability of the
various elements, this result can be summarised using the chain rule for derivation
on equation (2.12):
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂Q−i
=
∂Pr(qi = 1)
∂E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci ))
∂E(u(x|sprivi , ssoci ))
∂ssoci
∂ssoci
∂h(Q−i)
∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0
because each of the derivative is positive.
Evolution of peer effects over time
Statically, both channels predict the presence of localised spillover effects that would
result in cluster of adoptions, but when time is considered, the two mechanisms lead
to different predictions on the evolution of peer effects:
PROPOSITION 2: If social utility is the dominant channel through which peer
effects operate, then the effect of a larger installed base in the neighbourhood becomes
stronger over time. Conversely, if information sharing is the dominant mechanism
through which peer effects operate, then the effect of a larger installed base in the
neighbourhood becomes weaker over time.
Proof. (i) In the social utility case, as time passes the social norm around solar panels
becomes stronger, dγ
dt
≥ 0. Because the social norm acts as a multiplier for the peer
effects, when the social norm becomes stronger the effect of one extra installation
in the neighbourhood becomes larger, i.e. it provides a larger non-monetary payoff:
∂2g(γ,Q−i)
∂t∂Q−i
=
∂ ∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
∂γ
dγ
dt
=
∂2g(γ,Q−i)
∂γ ∂Q−i
dγ
dt
≥ 0
by applying Young's theorem, and because the cross derivative is assumed to be
non-negative ∂
2g(γ,Q−i)
∂γ ∂Q−i
≥ 0, as described in the set-up of the model. Therefore as
time passes (t ↑) the effect on the social payoff of one additional installation in the
neighbourhood increases (∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
↑), and as a direct consequence, the effect of one
additional peer installation on the utility increases as well (∂u(x
mon,g(.))
∂Q−i
↑). This result
carries over to the expected utility (∂E(u(x
mon|si, γ, Q−i))
∂Q−i
↑), and by equation (2.7),
to the probability of adoption. At the same time, sophistication of the households
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increases, which in the model translates into a more precise signal. But as described
in the model, higher precision per se does not affect the payoff of i, but only decreases
the standard deviation of the distribution function f(xmon|si). In the social utility
case, neighbouring installations and signal do not interact, so changes in the precision
do not affect the strength of peer effects. Therefore the overall result is that the
strength of peer effects increases over time.
(ii) The opposite occurs in the social learning case, as there is no social payoff 
i.e. g(γ,Q−i) = 0  and therefore the social norm does not enter the model, but
peer installations do affect the signal. As described in the model, as time passes
households' sophistication increases, translating into a more precise private signal,
and therefore more weight being put on the private signal rather than on the social
signal when making a decision, i.e. dω
priv
dt
≥ 0 and dωsoc
dt
≤ 0 because ωsoc = 1−ωpriv.
Peer installations do not interact with the private signal directly, so the effect of
one additional installation in the neighbourhood always has the same effect on the
private component of the signal, which is zero. Different is the situation for the
social component of the signal, as the effects of time and additional installation are
both relevant and move in opposite direction  in fact, one additional installation
makes the social signal more favourable, therefore increasing the expected utility
from adoption, but as time passes the weight given to the social signal is lower,
therefore decreasing its effect on the final probability of adoption. This can be
written using cross-derivatives, as:
∂2si
∂t∂Q−i
=
∂((1− ωpriv(t)) h(Q−i)
∂t∂Q−i
+
∂(ωpriv(t) sprivi )
∂t∂Q−i
=
=
∂(1− ωpriv(t)) ∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
∂t
+ 0 =
=
∂(1− ωpriv(t))
∂t
∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
+ (1− ωpriv(t)) ∂
2h(Q−i)
∂t∂Q−i
=
= −dω
priv(t)
dt
∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
+ 0 =
= −dω
priv(t)
dt
∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
≤ 0
which holds because dω
priv
dt
≥ 0 and ∂h(Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0. Therefore as time passes (t ↑) one
additional installation in the neighbourhood has a smaller effect on the overall sig-
nal ( ∂si
∂Q−i
↓), which means that the effect on the expected utility  and by equation
(2.11) on the probability of adoption  will also become weaker (∂E(u|s
priv
i , s
soc
i )
∂Q−i
↓).
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Therefore, one extra installation in the neighbourhood has a smaller effect on the
probability of adoption, as time passes. This result relies on the assumption that
information obtained through private sources and through social learning are sub-
stitute and that as time passes private information is more reliable than the social
signal, because general knowledge of the topic is more widespread and sources of
information are more accessible, facilitating private learning, while information pro-
vided by neighbours who have installed solar panels in the past becomes more and
more out-dated.
Interaction between peer effects and subsidy responsiveness
Predictions with respect to the interaction between peer effects and subsidy respon-
siveness depend on more specific assumptions on how elements of the model interact,
but can still be helpful to characterise the empirical results:
PROPOSITION 3: If social utility is the dominant channel then a change in
subsidies  i.e. the monetary payoff  triggers a smaller response in areas with higher
penetration of the solar panels if the monetary and social payoff are substitute; the
opposite occurs if the two payoffs are complements. If information sharing is the
dominant mechanism then the responsiveness to a subsidy can increase, decrease
or stay the same where more neighbours have installed, depending on whether each
additional installation carries more information than the previous one (for example
because the more people install the more they prove that solar panels can be profitable
for a wide range of house types and lifestyles), less (for example because information
starts getting redundant), or the same.
Proof. (i) In the social utility case, an increase in the monetary payoff increases
utility, as does one extra installation in the neighbourhood, according to equations
(2.5) and (2.6). In the substitute case, because of diminishing marginal utility,
one extra installation in areas where the subsidy is larger has a smaller effect on i's
expected utility if compared to the effect where the subsidy is lower. Equivalently, an
increase in the subsidy has a smaller impact on i's expected utility if there are more
installation in the neighbourhood, as compared to an area with fewer installation.
The opposite occurs in the complement case, as more neighbouring installations and
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larger subsidies boost each other's effect. This can be formally shown as:
∂2u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i))
∂xmon∂Q−i
=
∂ ∂u(x
mon,g(γ,Q−i))
∂Q−i
∂xmon
=
∂
(
∂u(xmon,g(γ,Q−i))
∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
)
∂xmon
=
=
∂2u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i))
∂xmon∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
+
∂2g(γ,Q−i)
∂xmon∂Q−i
=
=
∂2u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i))
∂xmon∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
+ 0
=
∂2u(xmon, g(γ,Q−i))
∂xmpn∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
(2.13)
by applying Young's theorem and the fact that ∂
2g(γ,Q−i)
∂xmon∂Q−i
= 0 as the monetary
payoff is not a direct component of the social payoff, even though the two payoffs
interact. Given that ∂g(γ,Q−i)
∂Q−i
≥ 0, the sign of expression (2.13) is determined by
the cross-derivative of utility with respect to the two payoffs. By definition, the
latter is negative if the two payoffs are substitute, and positive if the two payoffs
are complements. If the effect on the expected utility becomes weaker/stronger, so
does the effect on the probability of adoption, by equation (2.7).
(ii) While in the social utility case Q−i only affects the total payoff, in the social
learning case Q−i only affects the signal the household receives. Both an increase in
the payoff x and in the penetration of the solar panels in the neighbourhood Q−i have
a positive effect on the expected utility, but whether the two effects complement,
substitute or are independent of each other depends on the functional form of f(x|s).
This can be seen, for example, by considering that if an area receives a relatively
lower subsidy due to worse generation potential or because of a (past) change in
the subsidy rate, this affects i, but would have also affected their neighbours in
the same direction. This can be written as Q−i = Q−i(x) with
dQ−i
dx
≥ 0. The two
variables are therefore interacting within the signal function. The interaction within
the social signal can be written as a cross-derivative of the signal with respect to
each of the two variables that are changing:
∂2ssoci
∂x∂Q−i
=
∂2h(Q−i(x))
∂x∂Q−i
=
∂
(
∂h(Q−i(x))
∂x
)
∂Q−i
=
∂
(
∂h(Q−i(x))
∂Q−i
∂Q−i(x)
∂x
)
∂Q−i
=
=
∂h(Q−i(x))
∂Q−i
∂
(
∂Q−i
∂Q−i
)
∂x
+
∂Q−i(x)
∂x
∂2h(Q−i(x))
∂Q2−i
=
=
∂Q−i(x)
∂x
∂2h(Q−i(x))
∂Q2−i
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Given that dQ−i
dx
≥ 0, the sign of the cross-derivative is the same as the sign of the
second derivative of the signal with respect to peer installations, which is undeter-
mined unless more assumptions on h(Q−i) are made. Therefore whether the effect of
a change in subsidy increases, decreases or stays the same depending on the number
of nearby installations  or equivalently, whether the influence of nearby installa-
tions is stronger, weaker or the same depending on the amount of subsidy offered
 depends on whether each additional installation provides more, less or the same
amount of information than the previous one, that is whether information travels
faster, slower or at the same rate, when there are more installations in the neigh-
bourhood. Given the general formulation of the model, the sign of the interaction
is therefore not determined without imposing further assumptions on the functional
form of f(x|s). In this model I assumed for simplicity that the private signal and
the precision of the signals do not depend on Q−i, and that the aggregate signal si is
linear in the private and social component. A different specification of the aggregate
signal could introduce another channel of interaction between x and Q−i, but the
proposition would still be inconclusive unless more assumptions on the functional
forms are made.
2.4 Background information and data
Between 2010 and 2019, the UK supported small-scale clean electricity generation
through a Feed-In Tariff (FIT) scheme, which covered solar PV, wind turbine, hy-
droelectric, micro combined heat and power (CHP), and anaerobic digestion. The
scheme provides direct economic benefits for the owner of the system through two
types of tariffs, the generation or production tariff, for generated electricity, and the
export tariff, for the electricity that is sold to the grid. For residential solar PV, the
production tariff is paid on the total amount of generated electricity, recorded by an
appropriate meter, while the export tariff is paid on the assumption that 50% of the
electricity generated is exported, as the amount effectively exported is not currently
metered. Owners obtain further indirect benefits through savings in the electricity
bills, as the generated electricity can be used for free reducing the amount of energy
that has to be bought from the utility.
The tariff rates are assigned according to the date of the installation, with differ-
ent values depending on the technology and the capacity of the system. These rates
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are then paid for 20 years (25 for solar installations in the early years of the scheme,
later shortened to 20 as for the other eligible technologies), and are progressively
adjusted for the inflation, according to the changes in the Retail Price Index over
the previous year. The budget for the scheme came from the general electricity bills
of all energy suppliers' customers - as it is the case for other energy-related schemes
in the country. The scheme was reformed various times since its inception in April
2010, and closed to new applicants in March 2019.2 The evolution of the FIT for
residential solar systems (systems ≤4kW), is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Changes in the FIT. Vertical lines represent the date the changes were imple-
mented. Own elaboration on data from Ofgem.
Quoting the sustained decrease in the price of solar PV as the main rationale,
the production tariff has been repeatedly adjusted downward, moving from almost
54 p/kWh in 2010 to 4 at the beginning of 2017.3 Major reforms to the value of
the tariff and other features of the scheme were introduced in 2012 and 2016. In
particular, an automatic quarterly degression mechanism was introduced at the end
of 2012. The degression mechanism was pegged to pre-determined deployment ob-
2Details on the various phases and reforms of the policy are provided by the Department
for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), into which the Department of Energy and
Climate Change (DECC) was merged in 2016, and the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
(Ofgem).
3Rates are adjusted every year based on the retail price index (RPI), to account for inflation.
In the Chapter the RPI-adjusted rates as they were at the time the scheme was closed in 2019 are
used.
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jectives. If these were not met and uptake was lower than the required threshold,
the degression was postponed for up to two consecutive quarters. In this way, the
tariffs could be progressively reduced in line with the reduction in costs and in-
crease in uptake without the need for government intervention, therefore reducing
uncertainty in the sector. The scheme was initially intended until 2015, triggering
a period of policy uncertainty as reforms to the system were discussed and the re-
newal of the scheme was questioned. The FIT scheme was then suspended at the
beginning of 2016, before being reformed and re-instated in February of the same
year, to run until March 2019, after which the scheme was closed to any new appli-
cant. Contrarily to the production tariff, the export tariff rate has undergone fewer
amendments, and was adjusted upward, from 3.57 p/kWh to 5.03 p/kWh in 2012.
These progressive changes to the policy provide the main source of variation over
time for the identification of the responsiveness to subsidies (see following sections).
Aggregated data and trends on adoption of small-scale PVs in the UK are pre-
sented in Figg. 2.2 and 2.3. Domestic installations of up to 4kW constitute the
vast majority of small-scale electricity generating installations in the UK, both in
terms of number and aggregated capacity. The trends in both figures present evi-
dent changes in correspondence of the major policy reforms of 2012 and 2016. In the
regression analysis I only use observations between April 2012 and December 2015,
to avoid periods of policy uncertainty and instability in the solar market, and be-
cause there were no changes in the FIT rate before 2012. On top of the quantitative
data described in the next paragraphs, the analysis and interpretation of results in
this paper is informed by qualitative evidence from in-depth interviews conducted
within the ENABLE.EU project and described in Standal et al. (2018) and Standal
et al. (2020).
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Figure 2.2: Cumulative installed capacity in the UK (kW), by month. Own calculation on
Ofgem data.
Figure 2.3: Number of installations in the UK, by month. Own calculation on Ofgem data.
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2.4.1 LSOAs and distribution of the PVs
The units of analysis for the empirical specification are the Lower Layer Super Out-
put Areas (LSOAs) as defined in the 2001 Census. The choice of LSOAs as aggrega-
tion level is driven on one side by the availability of geographic information for PV
installations which could not be obtained at a more disaggregated level, but at the
same time is preferred over post code district (the other available unit) due to the
way they are constructed. In fact, the LSOAs are statistical units purposedly built
to insure within-homogeneity and between-comparability in the context of Neigh-
bourhood Statistics and Census data collection. Each LSOA contains typically four
to six Output Areas so to be roughly comparable to the others in terms of resident
population, with a minimum of 1,000 residents and an average of 1,500 (equivalent
to 650 households). Geographic proximity and information on the prevalent type of
dwelling, tenure, etc. are also used to ensure a compact shape and socio-demographic
homogeneity4. These are all desirable properties for an areal unit in spatial analysis,
given that the exact coordinates of the installations are not available. Nevertheless,
we must be aware of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem which comes with such
aggregations, and an extension of the present work may check the robustness of the
results when other specifications are chosen (e.g. MSOAs or postcode district. See
Briant et al., 2010 for the general issue and Flowerdew, 2011 for the specific case of
UK Census data).
The final dataset consists of a panel of monthly observations for the 34,378
LSOAs in England and Wales, according to the 2001 definition.5 Some LSOAs were
merged or split in 2011, due to changes in their composition, however, only 2.5 per
cent of 2001 LSOAs were affected.
Data on residential PV installations are retrieved from the Ofgem databank
of Feed-In-Tariff recipients. Each installation record contains among other pieces of
information the LSOA and the commissioned date. I restrict the analysis to focus on
solar PV systems classified as residential and up to 4kW of declared capacity, as this
is the size that receives the highest FIT rate and does not require an authorization to
be installed and connected to the grid. As seen in the previous section, this is by far
the largest share of installations under 5MW in the country, both in terms of number
4The official definition and methodology are provided by the Neighbourhood Statistics division
of the Office for National Statistics (ONS).
5No comparable units exist for Scotland and Northern Ireland.
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and in terms of installed capacity. The total stock of PV systems in each LSOA
is presented in Figure 2.4 for 2011 and 2017. Consistent with the literature, the
installations are mainly concentrated in rural and less dense regions, while the major
cities - London in particular - display a substantially lower installed base. Although
income is often considered as a determinant of PV adoption, both directly, because
of the investment required, and indirectly, as higher-income households are more
likely to live in a house rather than in a flat and to be owners rather than tenants 
both characteristics that economic theory would predict to be linked with increased
adoption of solar PVs  there does not seem to be a visible positive correlation
between the two variables, as the wealthy South-East has a relatively low number of
adoptions, while the South-West and part of Wales have the highest installed base in
the country, despite not being rich areas. At the same time the area around Leeds is
relatively wealthy and rich in residential PVs, and the northernmost parts of Wales
and Yorkshire are neither. Solar irradiation is another potentially relevant variable,
as it is the key determinant of PV electricity yield. Again, if compared with the PV
distribution maps, it can be seen that although some areas, such as the South-West,
have a consistent positive relationship between insolation and PV adoption, the
situation in other areas is more puzzling, with the South-East showing substantial
unexploited potential for solar power, while adoption is higher at the border with
Scotland despite receiving considerably less solar radiation.
The main outcome variable considered in the paper is the count of new instal-
lations in an LSOA in a given month. To check the robustness of the results and
investigate additional hypotheses on how peer effects may work, in the regression
analysis I consider alternative specifications using the total new installed capacity
and the average size installed (both in kW) in an LSOA-month. Characteristics of
the LSOAs, including mid-year population estimates and age distribution, and the
number of houses (as opposed to apartments) inhabited by their owners are obtained
from the 2011 Census and related databases. Summary statistics are presented in
Table B.1.
2.4.2 FIT payments
To capture the effect of the monetary incentives offered for the adoption of micro-
generation technologies, I need a measure of the potential revenues that can be
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(a) 2011 (b) 2017
Figure 2.4: Geographical distribution or residential solar PV systems in England and
Wales.
expected from the production and export tariff provided by the FIT scheme. I
construct this variables in the same way as I did in the previous Chapter of this
dissertation, but using data at the LSOA level instead of the larger MSOA level.
In particular, I obtain data on the estimated annual electricity output for a
solar module of 1kW capacity situated at the population-weighted centroid of each
LSOA, for each year between 2009 and 2016. This dataset is constructed using the
Photovoltaic Geographical Information System (PVGIS) of the EU Joint Research
Centre Institute for Energy and Transport (PVGIS European Communities, 2001-
2017).6 Details on the methodology and the dataset can be found in Huld and
Amillo (2015) and Huld et al. (2012). Estimation are based on the solar irradiation
of the location and the actual climatic and meteorologic conditions of the location
during the year, assuming standard values for the tilt, azimuth and direction of the
roofs.. I average these estimates through the available years to obtain a measure
of expected generation per kW of installed capacity for each LSOA. The resulting
distribution of average or expected generation over England and Wales is presented
in Figure 2.5. I consider this to be the generation amount that households living in
the LSOA consider when making their decisions to purchase solar panels or not.
6Data were obtained from the European Commission Joint Research Centre in Ispra. Values
are based on the PVGIS SARAH database. More information on the data and methodology can
be found at https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/PVGIS/docs/methods.
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The average annual generation for each LSOA is then multiplied for the FIT rate
in force in each month, to obtain the average annual subsidy a household installing
in that LSOA and in that month can expect to receive in each of the 20 years covered
by the FIT scheme. In particular, the owner of the system is paid a production rate
for the electricity generated, and an export rate for 50% of the total generation,
which utilities assume to be the quantity exported to the grid, as the actual exports
are not metered. In this way, I obtain a panel dataset of expected or average annual
subsidy per kW of installed power that varies in both space and time. This variation
is exploited to identify how households' react to changes in subsidy.
Summary statistics are presented in Table B.1. The average subsidy varies from
more than 1200 GBP per year for an average system of 3kW at the start of the
scheme, to between 450-600 GBP after the reforms in 2012, to only around 195 GBP
after the 2016 reform. In terms of variation in space, households in LSOA with the
worst solar generation potential could expect to receive 1184 GBP per year for a
3kW system, while households in LSOA with the highest expected generation could
expect 1893 GBP per year for the same system. The range of the potential revenues
for each month are presented in Figure 2.6, together with the trend in adoptions
around the country. It is easy to see how installations drop in correspondence with
cuts in the subsidies.
2.4.3 Investment cost to adopt solar
For the cost of the system, I use data at the postcode distric per month level as
constructed in the previous Chapter of this dissertation. Namely, I requested and
obtained data on the median cost per residential installations under 4kW (the sub-
set of installation I focus on in this paper) from the Micro Certification Scheme
(MCS), a registry to which FIT-eligible micro-generation system must apply. Data
were provided per postcode area per quarter, as the most disaggregated level the
registry was willing to share. These data are provided per installation, and I con-
vert them into cost per kW using information on the median installed system in
the corresponding area in that given period. To check for consistency and obtain
monthly variation, the monthly average and median costs per kW installed for the
whole country were obtained from DECC (2017), for years between 2013 and 2017,
and from Green Business Watch (2017) for years between 2010 and 2013.
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Figure 2.5: Annual electricity generation of residential solar PV systems, kWh/year for kW
of installed power. The value is an average of estimates for 2009-2016. Own elaboration
on Photovoltaic Geographical Information System (PVGIS) data.
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The main issue to address to use this data in the analysis is the problem of
missing values, due to cases in which the cost was not reported or simply there was
no installation in the area and period considered. I therefore interpolate missing
values within each area by using observations for periods before and after the missing
observation in that same area, to fill the gaps in the time series. To convert these data
from postcode areas into MSOA, I record for each MSOA the cost of the postcode
area in which it is contained, or the average of different postcode areas if the MSOA
crosses the postcode boundaries. For areas with missing data throughout the period,
and for the months before the first recorded cost and after the last one, I impute the
cost by using the average value for the administrative region7 to which the MSOA
belongs. To support the choice of this type of imputation, I consider evidence from
several installers' websites and interviews with households who installed solar panels
that confirmed that installers have large catchment areas, and given the margin of
profits available on the service and the fact that some components need to be shipped
from other countries or storehouses anyway, are willing to carry out installations
even in areas quite far from their main location In addition to this, supermarket
chains such as Tesco and later Ikea have been offering solar systems and installation
services around the country, which should have insured a level of competition among
suppliers, making the price required of customers more homogeneous.
As a last step, to obtain monthly data I first assign to each month the observation
from the quarter it is in, and then replace it with the average over the two months
before and two months after, using a moving average approach. In this way I
smooth the trends and avoid having large changes from one quarter to the next and
no changes within each quarter. Box-plots for the resulting variable is presented in
Figure 2.7 and summary statistics are presented in Table B.1. The average costs
obtained with this methods are very close to the official data on the monthly average
for the country. Due to the measurement issues with this variable, I only use it as
a control in the analysis and not as a regressor of interest. I conduct robustness
checks dropping the cost variable and therefore implicitly assuming that the effect
of the cost is captured in the time-varying fixed-effect component, and the results
are not affected.
7England and Wales are divided into 10 administrative regions; this is therefore a higher level
of aggregation with respect to either postcode areas or MSOAs.
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Figure 2.6: Expected annual revenues for kW of installed power, according to month of
installation and location (left axis; average value highlighted), and number of residential
PV installations in each month (right axis). Own calculation on Photovoltaic Geographical
Information System (PVGIS) data and Ofgem data.
Figure 2.7: Trend in the cost of residential solar PV systems. Own elaboration on data
from MCS.
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2.4.4 Spatial patterns
Getis-Ord hot-spot analysis
To confirm the presence of clusters of installations, or `hot spots', I use the Optimised
Getis-Ord method devised by Getis and Ord (1992) and Ord and Getis (1995), where
the parameter for the threshold is determined within the system so to optimize the
balance between the observation size and the statistical significance of the method.
The results for spatial correlation of the installed base (stock variable) are presented
in the top row of Figure 2.8 for the year 2011, 2013 and 2016. Clusters in the diffusion
of PV systems appears to be pervasive throughout the period, with large hot spot
areas in the South-West of England, and in central and south Wales, and clusters
in the central-eastern part of the country that become increasingly more important
as time passes. Cold spots are also present, although in smaller quantities, and are
located in correspondence with the big cities. A possible explanation of such pattern
is that urban areas have fewer buildings which are suitable for PV installations, for
example due to shading from nearby buildings, and more tenants rather than owner-
occupied dwellings, creating a split-incentive issue that acts as a barrier to adoption.
The pattern is consistent with that identified by Graziano and Gillingham (2015) in
Connecticut, where the diffusion of residential solar appears to be driven by rural
areas, with lower population density.
I repeat the hot-spot analysis on the number of yearly adoption in different years
(flow variable) and the results are presented in the bottom row of Figure 2.8. The
hot spots now identify the areas where high adoption rates are correlated with high
adoption rates in the neighbouring areas. This time the picture changes substantially
over the years. While there is strong evidence of clustering of adoption rates in 2011,
this becomes weaker in 2013 for most of the country, with the exception of the north-
east and extreme south-west, and by 2016 there is almost no correlation left. The
evolution of cold spots is also particularly interesting, as these coincide with the
major urban centres in 2011, but disappear almost everywhere by 2016, with the
exception of London.
Moran's I and Local Moran's I
To further analyse whether there is any pattern of spatial auto-correlation and where
they are located, global and local Moran's Is are computed, following Anselin (1995)
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(a) installed base, 2011 (b) installed base, 2013 (c) installed base, 2016
(d) new installations, 2011 (e) new installations, 2013 (f) new installations, 2016
Figure 2.8: Optimised hot spot analysis, Getis-Ord Gi∗ index.
and Rey and Montouri (1999). These statistics rely on the covariances between
neighbouring adoption of PVs and identify whether the adoptions are correlated in
space rather than occurring at random locations. Spatial lags are obtained using
the contiguity weight matrix. As in the hot-spot analysis, I repeat the analysis
for different years so to check for persistence of the clusters, and apply it to both
the stock variable and to the flow in new adoption in the year (i.e. the difference
between the total installed base in one year and the total installed base in the year
before) so to remove the effects of time-invariant variables and gain more insights
on whether the clusterization can be attributed to spillover effects.
The global Moran's Is are presented in Table 2.1, where it can be immediately
seen that a strong positive spatial correlation exists in the diffusion of PVs and is
persistent in time. Focusing on the annual growth in adoption, the Moran's I is
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practically the same for the 2011-2012 period, while it becomes slightly smaller in
2014-2015.
To identify the sources of the correlation, the Local Moran's Is are computed and
mapped in Figure 2.9. The clusterization in the diffusion of PV systems appears
to be pervasive, with large clusters of High-High adoption in part of Wales and
the South-West (hot spots). Low-Low (or cold spots) are also present, although in
fewer quantities, in the London area, South Wales, and around the big cities of the
centre and north of England (Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, etc.), confirming
the results of the Getis-Ord analysis.
Focusing on the annual adoption rate, the clusterization in 2011-2012 appears to
be driven mainly by time-variant variables, as removing the fixed effects makes no
difference in the Local Moran's Is, an evidence in favour of spillover effects. Different
is instead the picture for 2014-2015, as the High-High clusters are still present but
have shrunk to few areas in the South-West and in the East. This means that
spillovers are now weaker and the underlying characteristics of the areas and of the
individuals are becoming more important.
Table 2.1: Global Moran's I statistics.
(Global) Moran's I
2012 2015 2011-12 2014-15
contiguity weights 0.464 0.521 0.442 0.359
Significance maps are also generated using Montecarlo simulations to obtain 99
random permutations from which the expected random distribution of PVs adoption
is derived so to obtain the p-values and confirm that the results are highly significant.
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(a) 2012 (b) 2012
(c) 2015 (d) 2015
(e) 2011-2012 (f) 2011-2012
(g) 2014-2015 (h) 2014-2015
Figure 2.9: Local Moran's I, contiguity weights
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Discussion
The evolution of the clusters is consistent with the hypothesis of peer effects that
change over time, and suggests in particular that the effect becomes progressively
weaker, consistent with the social learning channel described in the model.
As the technology was not widespread in the early years and households were
less familiar with its functioning and the FIT scheme, the exchange of information
between individuals may have had a leading role in the diffusion at this stage; on
the contrary, when information becomes more widely spread, localised information
sharing loses importance. Nevertheless, as time passes the subsidy is also being
reduced, so that the diminished strength of the peer effect could also be associated
to a lower subsidy, which would be consistent with both the social learning channel
with information becoming more and more redundant the larger the installed base
is, and with the social utility channel with monetary and social payoff perceived as
complements. To obtain further insights on the issue, in the next Sections I therefore
move to regression analysis.
2.5 Regression analysis
2.5.1 Identification of peer effects and estimation strategy
For the empirical estimation using regression analysis, I consider a reduced form
equation for the problem of adopting residential PVs. Following Richter (2014), I
use a linear estimation model:
Ql,t = α + βNl,t−s + γ′Xl,t + ul,t (2.14)
where the error term is specified as:
ul,t = ηl,q + l,t (2.15)
Ql,t is the outcome variable, measuring new installations in location l during month
t; Xl,t contains covariates, including the economic regressors of interest, namely
potential revenues from the adoption and the cost of the installation; and Nl,t−s
includes the neighbouring installations that have already been completed at the time
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in which the decision to adopt the new installations is made. The time lag between
the decision to adopt and the actual completion of the installation is a technology-
specific feature, due to the need to complete the purchase and the relative paperwork
and bureaucratic procedures, and to schedule and complete the physical installation
of the system on the rooftop. I assume the lag to be of three months s = 3. This
assumption is also used in Richter (2014) for installation of PVs in the UK, and
is consistent with qualitative evidence collected by the author. Peer effects are
captured by the coefficient β. The error term ul,t contains a location-quarter fixed
effect ηl,q, due to unobservable characteristics of each location, that may change over
time, although we assume that the changes are slow and therefore negligible within
each quarter, and a zero-mean i.i.d. component l,t, such that E(Nl,t−3l,t) = 0.
The identification of peer effects and the direction of causality present several
challenges. First of all, the three issues highlighted by Manski (1993) and Gib-
bons et al. (2015)  reflection, self-selection into a peer group, and the problem of
correlated unobservables  need to be addressed. Spatial sorting, also known as
homophily, occurs as agents self-select into neighbourhoods. If characteristics and
events related to the spatial sorting are also correlated with adoptions of PVs, there
is a problem of endogeneity in the model that would bias the estimator if not prop-
erly addressed. The same goes if there are correlated unobservables that affect the
rate of adoption in time  for example country-wide changes in the policy, or other
macroeconomic trends  and/or in specific places  such as local programmes or
marketing strategies. In the case of homophily and correlated unobservables, neigh-
bouring installations are correlated with the unobservable error term, violating the
exogeneity assumption required for consistent estimation of the peer effect β:
E(Nl,t−3ul,t) = E(Nl,t−3ηl,q) + E(Nl,t−3l,t) = E(Nl,t−3ηl,q) 6= 0
Hartmann et al. (2008) show how these issues can be controlled for using time and
area-specific fixed effects. To have a consistent estimate of the parameter of interest,
I therefore control for unobservables using a flexible specification of the location fixed
effect ηl,q that allows the unobservables to be location-specific and time-varying,
although I assume that they only change slowly over time, and changes are negligible
within a quarter. Finally, if the effect of a peer relationship is bi-directional and
contemporaneous, that is if agents can affect their peers and be affected at the
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same time, the simultaneity or `reflection' issue challenges the identification of the
parameter. The problem of simultaneity can be seen by thinking that the choice of
agent i is being affected by a peer j, while affecting their choice at the same time.
In this case we have that:
Qi,t = α + βNi,t + i,t with Ni,t = Qj,t
Qj,t = α + βNj,t + j,t with Nj,t = Qi,t
Taking the expected value:
E(Qi,t) = E(α + βQj,t + i,t) =
= α + βE((α + βNj,t + j,t)) =
= α + βE((α + βQi,t + j,t)) =
= (1 + β)α + β2E(Qi,t)
So that:
E(Qi,t) =
α
1− β
and the different parameters α and β cannot be separately identified. In the specific
case of solar PV adoption, there is a lag between when a household decides to
purchase, and when the panels are actually installed on the roof, therefore becoming
visible to others and starting generating electricity. I assume that households may
only be affected by peer installations up to the moment they make their choice, but
they only start affecting others once their panels are installed, i.e. once they are
visible and the household has some experience and information to share, so that
simultaneity is not a problem. This is the key identifying assumption used in the
estimation strategy, which follows Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). According to
qualitative evidence collected by the author, this assumption appears to be realistic
for the case of residential PVs in the UK.
In addition to these identification challenges, using the installed base to identify
peer effects might incur in the Nickell's bias if the parameters are estimated using
the usual fixed effect within-group estimator. In fact, as the installed base effec-
tively consists of the lags of the outcome variable, the de-meaned installed base is
correlated with the de-meaned error term (Nickell, 1981). The within-group estima-
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tor is therefore inconsistent, as the strict exogeneity assumption does not hold, as
shown by Narayanan and Nair (2013). A similar issue applies to the random-effect
estimator, as the random effect and the installed base are correlated by construction
as they share the same random component, therefore violating the orthogonality as-
sumption and resulting in inconsistent estimators. Bollinger and Gillingham (2012)
and Richter (2014) provide proof that under some conditions on the order of auto-
correlation of the errors, consistent estimates for the linear model specified above
can be achieved using an adjusted first-difference estimator and a within-group es-
timator where the mean is defined at the area-quarter level. These estimators are
presented in the next paragraph.
A final issue to consider is the incidental parameter problem, as location-specific
fixed effects cannot be used in non-linear models such as the negative binomial,
which might be a better fit for count data with several zeros and over-dispersion,
such as those used to describe the uptake of a technology. To avoid this problem
I only use linear models, while acknowledging the limitations of this specification
when used with count data.
2.5.2 Estimators
As suggested by Gibbons and Overman (2012), the applied regression analysis of
this Chapter is based on a quasi-experimental framework, which uses purposedly
constructed first-difference and within-group estimators to identify the parameters
of interests, and is used to test the propositions derived from a theoretical model
based on the sign of coefficients, rather than trying to achieve model fit. The
sources of exogenous variation in the regressors that are exploited for identification
are changes in the subsidy decided by the government, differences in solar generation
potential among locations due to geography, weather and climatic conditions, and
changes in the cost of purchasing and installing solar panels, determined by the
international market.
To test the hypotheses formulated in the previous sections, I adapt the estimation
procedure presented by Richter (2014), using the identification strategy introduced
by Bollinger and Gillingham (2012). The equation for the model is the one described
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in the previous section:
Ql,t = α + βNl,t−3 + γ′Xl,t + ul,t where ul,t = ηl,q + l,t (2.16)
As previously mentioned, the model includes LSOA-quarter unobservable fixed ef-
fects ηi,q to control for self-selection of peers (homophily, or spatial sorting) and
correlated unobservables. The main identification problem to address is the fact
that the number of existing installations in the neighbourhood might be correlated
with the fixed effect, and therefore with the error term of the model ul,t. This hap-
pens if E(Nl,t−3ul,t) 6= 0, which might be the case if installations included in Nl,t−3
occurred in the same location and in the same quarter as the outcome variable, so
that they share the same fixed-effect ηl,q.
To address this issue, I use two different estimators constructed following Richter
(2014). Both of them are used in the regression analysis, to check robustness of the
results. The first estimator is a within-group estimator (WG) , where each term of
the model in (2.16) is de-meaned using the average over the corresponding LSOA-
quarter. As the unobservable fixed-effect is constant within each quarter, it cancels
out. Because of the 3 months window considered in constructing the reference peer
group, Nl,t−3 only includes installations up to the previous quarter, and is therefore
not correlated with the error term ul,t , which refers to the current quarter only.
Ql,t − Q¯l,q = β(Nl,t−3 − N¯l,q−1) + γ′(Xl,t − X¯l,q) + (l,t − ¯l,q) (2.17)
with
t ∈ q and t− 3 ∈ q − 1
This model can then be estimated as a pooled OLS.
The second estimator is an adjusted first-difference estimator (FD). After taking
the difference of each term with its first lag, observations for the first month of
each quarter are dropped and the model is estimated only for the remaining sample.
In this way the LSOA-quarter fixed effect ηl,q cancels out, and the first-differenced
model can again be estimated as a pooled OLS:
Ql,t −Ql,t−1 = β(Nl,t−3 −Nl,t−4) + γ′(Xl,t −Xl,t−1) + (l,t − l,t−1) (2.18)
133
with
t, t− 1 ∈ q and t− 3, t− 4 ∈ q − 1
Richter (2014) and Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) provide a proof for the con-
sistency of these estimators under certain conditions. The key requirement is that
the order of autocorrelation must be less than 1 plus the number of months in the
time window between the choice to adopt and the moment when the the adoption
starts affecting others, which in this paper is set to be 3 months. As discussed by
Richter (2014), the first-difference estimator is consistent under weaker assumptions
than the within-group estimator, so the former will be my preferred estimator.
An important difference with respect to the empirical approach used by Richter
(2014), is that the reference peer group is not defined simply as the installed base of
the LSOA, but rather by constructing different types of buffers that are not restricted
to the area's borders. The construction of the buffers and of the peer installation
variable is presented in more detail in the next paragraph. Moreover, peer installa-
tions include all the solar systems classified as residential, as well as commercial and
industrial systems up to 10kW of installed capacity, while the outcome variable is
restricted to residential systems below 4kW, as these are the systems that receive the
highest FIT rate and do not require previous authorisations for installation. Differ-
ent model specifications and definitions of the outcome and neighbour variables are
considered to investigate further features of the effects of interest and as robustness
checks.
2.5.3 Definition of neighbourhood and measures of peers' in-
stallations
The main definition of `neighbourhood' I use in this paper is based on a proportional
buffer. For each LSOA, I obtain data on the surface area and calculate the radius
that would generate a circle of the same area. I then construct a buffer of radius three
times the reference radius, centred on the LSOA's population-weighted centroid. For
example, the buffer of the average LSOA (surface area 4.4 km2) is constructed using
a radius of 3.55 km, while the buffer of the median LSOA (surface area 0.48 km2) has
a radius of 1.17 km. For each LSOA-month combination, all systems in the LSOAs
with population-weighted centroids within the buffer are considered as belonging to
the `neighbourhood'. Those systems registered more than three months prior to the
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reference month are then summed together and constitute the peer group Nl,t−3.
This definition of neighbourhood constructed using a proportional radius has the
advantage of taking into consideration larger buffers for areas that are sparse and
less densely populated, where residents are therefore more likely to travel further
away in their daily routines, and smaller buffers for urban and dense areas, where
residents can access most service nearby and are less likely to own a car or travel
further away.
While the outcome variable only considers residential systems with capacity up
to 4kW  as these are the ones receiving the highest tariff rate, do not require an
authorization and are the most commonly used by households  the peer group
also includes commercial and industrial systems up to 10kW, as a household who is
considering solar panels might not necessarily be able to distinguish those systems
from a residential one, and even if they can they might still be affected and obtain
information from them, as they are still small scale and very similar to the one they
are likely to be considering.8
Graziano and Gillingham (2015) and Baranzini et al. (2017) find evidence that
peer effects are stronger not only the closer in space peer systems are, but also the
more recently the installation occurred. To test the latter, in a set of specifications of
the regression model I use the registration dates of systems in the neighbourhood to
classify them into whether they had been purchased within the previous 6 months
(N<6−monthl,t−3 ), between 6 and 12 months prior (N
6−12−month
l,t−3 ), and over 12 months
prior (N>12−monthl,t−3 ). As in all the other specifications, only installations purchased
at least 3 months prior are considered  as this is key to the identification of the
model. In another specification, I split the buffer into three concentric rings of
radius 1.5, 2, and 3 times the reference radius. The innermost ring represents
the immediate neighbourhood, while the second and third rings are used to check
how far the influence of neighbours extend, in case the inner circle is too small to
capture the full effect. All installations that occurred in an LSOA whose population-
weighted centroid lies within a ring are assigned to that ring. For each observation,
all installations older than three months prior to the reference month and assigned
to one of the three rings are summed into the peer installation variable N ring1l,t−3 , N
ring2
l,t−3
and N ring3l,t−3 . For reference, the buffers for the average LSOA (surface area 4.4 km
2)
8The share of systems between 4 and 10kW is nonetheless quite small compared to those up to
4 kW, as shown in the previous section.
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have radius of 1.78, 2.37 and 3.55 km; for the median LSOA (surface area 0.48 km2)
the radii are 0.59, 0.78 and 1.17 km.
In the main analysis, I use the number of solar PV systems as unit of measure for
the outcome variable and peers' installations. Results are presented in Section 2.6.
To investigate whether larger installations produce larger spillover effects, another
specification uses the installed capacity (in kw) rather than the count, as in Bollinger
and Gillingham (2012) and Baranzini et al. (2017). This specification is nonetheless
unable on its own to distinguish between a large number of small installations and
a small number of large installation. To further investigate the effect of size, I
therefore estimate yet another specification with the average newly installed capacity
(obtained as newly installed capacity over the number of newly installed systems)
as dependent variable, and the average installed capacity in the neighbourhood as
regressor. Results using total capacity and average size are presented in Section
2.6.3.
Given the lack of information on the exact location of PVs within each LSOA, and
given how the LSOAs are constructed to ensure within-homogeneity and between-
comparability, the proportional buffer specification is preferred to a fixed-radius one.
Nonetheless, I investigate two variants of the neighbourhood specification among
the various robustness checks performed. First, I re-define the neighbourhoods as
circular buffers of fixed radius 2km, around the population-weighted centroid of each
LSOA (N<2kml,t−3 ). Again, given the lack of information on the exact location of solar
PVs within each LSOA, the number of peer installations are calculated by including
the total number of installations of each LSOA whose population-weighted centroid
lies in the buffer.
To make sure that the results are robust to the simplifying assumption that
all solar panels are concentrated in the centroid, I re-calculate the value of the
spatial lag N<2kml,t−3 , assuming that the PV systems are uniformly distributed over
the LSOA. The new peer group is then constructed as the `expected number' of
completed installations in the buffer, that is a weighted sum of the number of nearby
installations, where the weight is given by the probability that each installation
belongs to the section of the LSOA that intersects the buffer:
Nunif distrl,t−3 =
J∑
j
(wlj ·
t−3∑
τ
Qj,τ )
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where Qj,τ are the installations in LSOA j registered up to month t− 3, and wlj is
the weight. Under the hypothesis that the PVs are uniformly distributed over the
LSOA, the probability that each system lies in the intersection between the LSOA
and the buffer is nothing else than the surface area of the intersection, over the area
of the LSOA:
wij =
area(i ∩ j)
areaj
Due to the computation intensity of constructing these variables, these alterna-
tive measures of the reference group are obtained for a randomly extracted sample of
10% of the total LSOAs, that is 3,438 locations, rather than for the total population
of LSOAs. The total population of observations is still used to calculate how many
installations there are in each buffer, but the buffers are only constructed around
the sampled LSOAs. Results using these alternative definitions of neighbourhood
are presented in Section 2.6.3.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Peer effects and their interaction with monetary incen-
tives
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the results of different model specifications using a within-
group and first-difference estimator, respectively. The outcome variable Ql,t is de-
fined as the count of newly installed residential solar PV systems in each LSOA-
month (PV count), and the nearby installations Nl,t−3 as the count of small-scale
systems in the neighbourhood with registration date before the 3-month window
period. The `neighbourhood' is identified using the proportional-radius buffer def-
inition. Results from the two estimators are very close for the coefficients of the
economic variables and almost identical for peer effects. Note that sample sizes are
different as the first month of every quarter is excluded when using the first-difference
estimator, to insure consistency.
Model (1) only includes the economic variables  the expected annual subsidy
and the cost of purchasing and installing the system. The signs are as expected,
positive for the subsidy and negative for the cost. Model (2), on the contrary,
only includes the number of installations in the neighbourhood; the sign is positive,
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suggesting peer effects are present and operating as a bandwagon effect, with more
existing installations triggering more new installations. Model (3) includes both the
economic variables and peers' installations, and suggests that the coefficients of the
economic variables are slightly underestimated in the first model, where peer effects
are not taken into consideration. Similarly, peer effects appear to be underestimated
in the second model, where the monetary dimension is not accounted for.
According to the estimates, a cut in the FIT rate that results in a reduction
of 1 GBP per year per kW installed,9 would lead to 0.008 fewer new installation
per LSOA, equivalent to 275 fewer installations throughout England and Wales.
As reference, consider that the expected annual subsidy decreased by almost 50
GBP/year/kW on average when the FIT was reduced in August 2012  the largest
cut in the time frame considered  and by around 4 GBP/year/kW on average when
the FIT was cut in January 2014  the smallest cut for the period under analysis. On
the other side, a reduction of 10 GBP in the upfront cost of purchasing and installing
the system,10 would result in about 0.002 additional installations per LSOA, or 82
for all of England and Wales.
The coefficient of existing installations in the neighbourhood indicates that one
additional system in the peer group is associated with 0.004 new adoptions in the
reference LSOA. According to the coefficients of the economic variables just pre-
sented, the peer influence of one additional installation is therefore equivalent to a
0.5 GBP increase in the annual subsidy per kW installed  that is 1.75 GBP per
year for the median system of 3.5kW  and a 17 GBP reduction in the upfront
cost per kW installed  or 60 GBP for the median system. The effect is therefore
economically significant, and is consistent with peer effects being a relevant driver
of adoptions, but does not say anything with respect to the mechanism. A placebo
test and robustness checks presented in Section 2.6.3 confirm this result. Having
rejected the null hypothesis of no or negative effect, I can then move on to test the
remaining two hypotheses and look for evidence on the dominant channel through
which peer effects operate.
Model (4) extends the previous specification by including the squared term of
existing nearby installations. The coefficient of Nl,t−3 is now larger than in the
9The average subsidy in the period under analysis is around 200 GBP per year per kW of
capacity (Table B.1).
10The average cost of purchasing and installing a system in the period under analysis is around
1,850 GBP per kW of capacity (Table B.1)
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Table 2.2: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, within-group estimator.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
within-group estimator PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.783∗∗∗ 0.799∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.267∗∗∗ -0.237∗∗∗ -0.234∗∗∗ -0.265∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
N 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N squared -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
subsidy X N 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 1546605 1546605 1546605 1546605 1546605
F 7888.632 527.229 5661.044 4345.467 4402.957
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables (here peer installations and subsidy).
Table 2.3: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, first-difference estimator.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
first-difference estimator PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.812∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗ 0.823∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.268∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
N 0.003∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N squared -0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
subsidy X N 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 1031070 1031070 1031070 1031070 1031070
F 4188.325 240.258 2957.656 2250.623 2323.075
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables (here peer installations and subsidy).
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previous specification, while the coefficient for (Nl,t−3)2 is negative. This suggests
that the influence of one additional system has a diminishing effect on the outcome
the more systems there already are in the neighbourhood. That is to say, peer
influence is concave in the number of existing installations, and have diminishing
marginal effect. The magnitude of the coefficients is nonetheless very small, so that
the effect decreases only slowly. The sign is consistent with the literature on the UK,
as Richter (2014) finds a decreasing effect of the installed base, which she interprets
as potential evidence of satiation within post-code districts. Conversely, Bollinger
and Gillingham (2012) find that the effect of the installed base in California is
increasing in the number of installations, i.e. peer effects become stronger as more
peers adopt the technology.
Finally, model (5), extends the specification in (3) by including an interaction
term between the number of nearby installations and the level of expected annual
subsidy. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive, meaning that peer effects
are stronger when the subsidy level is higher; or equivalently, households are more
responsive to changes in the subsidy if there are more installations nearby. In fact,
the positive effect of nearby installations appears to be mainly driven by this inter-
action effect, as the coefficient for the remaining Nl,t−3 term is negative, meaning
that when the subsidy is low, peer influence tends to die out or even have an overall
negative effect on new installations. Given that the FIT is being progressively cut,
a positive coefficient for the interaction term suggests that adoptions in areas with
a larger installed base drop faster after a cut in the subsidy than areas with lower
installed base. Taken together, these results help explain the finding from the hot-
spot analysis conducted above that adoption rates are progressively less correlated
in space. On one side, the increase in peer installations pushes new adoptions up,
but at the same time periodic cuts in the subsidies push adoptions in the areas with
larger installed capacity further down than in other areas, so that the two effects
counter-balance each other.
This specification allows me to test the second proposition of the model, and
I reject the null hypothesis of no interaction between adoption in the peer group
and subsidy level. In particular, I find that this interaction is positive. This result
does not provide evidence on which is the dominant channel, as it is consistent with
both the social utility channel when the social payoff and the monetary payoff are
complements (although this case is less intuitive in the setting under analysis than
140
the substitute case, as discussed in the model Section), and with the social learning
channel in the case in which more peer installations mean that information travel
faster.
2.6.2 The evolution of peer effects
Finally, I investigate whether and how peer effects change over time, to test the
last hypothesis of the model. To do this, I estimate the magnitude of peer effects
separately by year, using the specification in model (3) in the previous Tables, in
which peer effects enter linearly and subsidy and cost are controlled for. Estimating
the model year by year has the advantage of allowing the responsiveness to subsidies
and cost to change over time as well, and is therefore more flexible than interacting
peer effects with a year dummy within the same model. For this analysis, I use data
from January 2011 to December 2016.
The coefficients are obtained using the first-difference estimator. The results
provide evidence against the null hypothesis that peer effects are constant over time.
In particular, peer influence becomes weaker over time (Figure 2.10), as previously
found by Richter (2014) for the UK, and Baranzini et al. (2017) for Switzerland.
Peer effects appear to be strongest in 2011, then decrease steadily in the following
two years, and plateau in the years 2013-2015 (coefficients for the three years are not
statistically different from each other at 1% significance level), to then drop again
in 2016. The coefficient for the latter year is not significantly different from 0 (point
estimate of 0.00026, with a standard error of 0.00026).
This pattern is consistent with the information-sharing channel described in the
model, in which peer effects weaken over time as households build-up their stock
of private information that becomes more easily accessible over the years, and do
not need to rely on localised social learning. This channel would also explain why
peer effects drop to zero in the last year, as the the FIT policy was suspended at
the end of 2015 and then a heavily reformed FIT scheme with a new queue system
was re-instated in 2016, so that information from peers who installed before this
date are less relevant to understand the new system. The social utility channel
predicts instead the opposite result. Social learning through information-sharing
appears therefore to be the dominant channel through which peer effects influence
residential solar PV adoption.
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Figure 2.10: Year by year estimates of the peer effect coefficient. Bars represent the 95%
confidence interval.
2.6.3 Robustness checks and further analysis
Placebo test with random assignment of neighbours
To further corroborate the finding of positive and statistically significant peer ef-
fects, a placebo test is performed. The placebo test is constructed by randomly
re-assigning `neighbourhoods', and is therefore similar in spirit to the placebo test
in Di Falco et al. (2020). In particular, I randomly re-assign the number of neigh-
bouring PV installations (Nl,t−3) or their first difference to the different LSOAs,
and the model is then re-estimated using the first-difference estimator. The same
procedure is repeated 100 times, obtaining 100 estimates of `placebo' coefficients.
The distribution of the resulting estimates is shown in Figure 2.11, together
with the original estimate of the coefficient (red line). In the top histogram, the
random re-assignment was conducted through the entire sample, so that the first
difference of each Nl,t−3 could end up being matched with the first difference in new
installations of any LSOA and any month in the sample. The middle and bottom
histograms are instead obtained by constraining the re-assignment within the same
month, for a stronger test. In this case, the number of Nl,t−3 (bottom graph) or their
first difference (middle graph) could be matched with any LSOA, but would always
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refer to month t. Randomly re-assigning within the same month means that the
country-wide change in the number of solar PV installed is preserved at each point
in time, therefore preserving any country-wide time trend in the rate of installation,
such as seasonal effects, changes in the national policy, and macroeconomic events.
In the first version of the test (top graph), the first difference is re-assigned
throughout the sample and the placebo coefficients are distributed almost sym-
metrically around a zero mean, and their values are well below the value of the
estimated coefficient. In the second version (middle graph), the first difference is
re-assigned within the same month and the placebo coefficients are positive and
of larger magnitudes than in the previous case, but still substantially lower than
the peer effect coefficient, providing further evidence of `contagion' at the localised
level. At the same time, the fact that the placebo coefficients are positive and
significantly different from zero might suggest the existence of a more generalised
and country-wide effect, where the increase in the number of installations anywhere
in the country contribute to boost new adoptions even in regions that are further
away. Several mechanisms could explain this effect. A larger installed base might
contribute to construct and reinforce the social norm around residential solar PV
systems throughout the country, as well as generate useful information that can be
accessed and shared through the national media, social media, online forums and
other types of networks that are not constrained by physical proximity. While this
test still supports a positive and significant localised peer effect, it would suggests
that its magnitude might be over-estimated.
The same test was then repeated by re-assigning the number of neighbouring
PVs rather than the first differences, both throughout the sample (not presented)
and constrained to the same month (bottom graph). Results are the same as in the
top graph, with a distribution of the placebo coefficients around zero and orders of
magnitude smaller than the peer effect estimate. The placebo tests overall reinforce
the conclusion that peer effects are a significant driver of new adoptions.
Distance in time and space
In this paragraphs I present further analysis to corroborate the results obtained so
far and test other hypotheses advanced in the literature. Tables with results for
these analyses are included in Appendix B.
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Figure 2.11: Distribution of coefficients estimated in the placebo tests, as compared to
the original coefficient estimate (red line). First-difference of N is re-assigned at random
throughout the sample (top) and within each month (middle); level of N is re-assigned at
random within each month (bottom).
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Graziano and Gillingham (2015) and Baranzini et al. (2017) find evidence that
peer effects are stronger the closest in time the installations are. To investigate this
hypothesis, in Table B.2 the peer variable is divided into three temporal intervals:
systems completed within the past 6 months, between the past 6 and 12 months, and
over 12 months prior. As in all the other specifications, only installations completed
at least 3 months prior are considered  as this is key to the identification of the
model. Estimates provided by the two estimators are very close, and the coefficients
for the subsidy and PV cost are robust to this different specification. The coefficients
for N<6−monthl,t−3 , N
6−12−month
l,t−3 , and N
>12−month
l,t−3 are not statistically different from each
other in specification (1). The same holds when the interaction term is included, in
specification (2). This suggest that one additional installation in the neighbourhood
has on average the same effects on the number of new adoptions, whether it was
completed recently or more than one year prior. This could be the result of two
forces pushing in opposite direction and therefore counteracting each other; on one
hand, more recently installed system should be linked to more relevant information
and therefore have a stronger effect, but older systems are more likely to have been
noticed, as they have been around for longer and there is therefore a higher chance
that the household passed by them even if they are not in their routine path.
In Table B.3 the neighbourhood is instead divided into three concentric rings,
as detailed in Section 2.5.3, to investigate how far peer influence extends. Results
from the two estimators are almost identical for peer effects, and the coefficients for
subsidy and cost of purchasing and installing the system are close to the estimates
in the previous Tables. Peer effects decrease when moving from the inner ring to
the outer ones, confirming that influence becomes weaker when peers are further
away. The coefficients for the outer rings are still positive and significant, and of
economically relevant magnitude. This confirms that peer influence extends further
away than the borders of the LSOA, and possibly even of the contiguous LSOAs.
This is consistent with the fact that households are likely to communicate and be
aware of adoptions by family, colleagues and friends that may not be their immediate
neighbours but still live nearby, and that they might be affected by systems seen
during their daily commute to work, which in England is on average 15 km (Le Vine
et al., 2017).
The fact that the third ring's coefficient appears to be larger than that of the
second one is counter-intuitive and might be due to the simplifying assumption used
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to construct the buffers  namely, that all installations in a LSOA are concentrated in
the population-weighted centroid, and are therefore assigned to a ring if the centroid
is within it. This means that some installations that are actually further away from
the reference point might end up being classified as closer than they really are, and
vice versa. This is a downside of the data, as the exact coordinates of the systems
are not available.
To test for the robustness of results without this assumption, in one of the next
paragraphs I use a different measure of peers' installations obtained by assuming that
the installations are uniformly distributed in the LSOA, rather than concentrated
in the centroid, and results are not only confirmed, but peer effects appear to be
even stronger. Overall, the fact that peer effects appear to be significant through
the three rings suggests that their influence extend outside the border of the LSOA,
and possibly even further than the contiguous LSOAs. As the buffers used here
are based on a radius whose length depends on the surface area of the LSOA of
reference, one of the next paragraphs presents results using fixed-radius buffers for
more insights into this issue.
Results for the installed capacity
To check the robustness of the results discussed so far and investigate additional hy-
potheses on how peer effects may work, the model was re-estimated using different
definitions of the outcome and peer installation variable  namely using the installed
capacity and the average size of the systems, in place of the count. As before, each
specification is estimated using the within-group estimator and the first-difference
estimator. Using capacity measures allows me to investigate whether larger instal-
lations produce larger spillover effects, as in Bollinger and Gillingham (2012) and
Baranzini et al. (2017). Moreover, capacity has the advantage of making the out-
come variable continuous, providing additional support for the choice of a linear
model specification. While the outcome is still bounded at zero, a limitation that
needs to be taken into account, the linear model has several advantages in terms of
controlling for unobservables and correlated effects, and the properties of the two
estimators used in this analysis are not easy to replicate in a non-linear model. With
this caveat in mind, Table B.4 in Appendix B presents the results for each estimator.
Again, the estimated coefficients are very close in the two cases, a good sign for the
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robustness of the results.
Column (1) and (2) use the total newly installed capacity in a LSOA-month as
the outcome variable, and overall installed capacity in the neighbourhood (up to the
previous quarter) as the peer variable. The main results from the previous Tables
are replicated, as the more installed capacity there is in the neighbourhood the more
new capacity is likely to be installed in the LSOA. The interaction effects estimated
in column (2) are still positive, confirming the finding that households in areas with
a larger installed base are more reactive to changes in the subsidies.
The effects of the economic variables have the expected sign in both specifica-
tions, but the coefficients are about three times larger in magnitudes than in the
specification using the count of installations, consistent with the fact that the av-
erage size of installation is 3.25 kW. The coefficients of the peer variable are also
slightly larger than in the count model. One additional kW installed in the neigh-
bourhood leads to 0.006 new kW being installed; while one additional installation
leads to 0.004 new installations. This suggests that larger peer installations have
a slightly stronger effect on the newly installed capacity, although this specifica-
tion is unable to distinguish whether this effect leads to larger installations or more
installations.
To further investigate the effect of size, model (1) and (2) of Tables B.5 use the
average newly installed capacity as dependent variable, and the average installed
capacity in the neighbourhood as regressor. These are measures of the average size
of the systems being installed, and are calculated as installed capacity over the
number of systems when the number is positive. The dataset is therefore restricted
to LSOA-month observations with a positive number of new installations and at least
one nearby installation, to see whether new installations tend to follow the average
size of installations in the neighbourhood. The coefficients for peer installations in
model (3) and of both the peer installations and the interaction terms in model (4)
are not significantly different from zero, with the only exception of the coefficient
in the first specification estimated by within-group estimator, which is nonetheless
only marginally significant.
These results suggest that when installations do occur, the size chosen is not
affected by peers. This is consistent with qualitative evidence collected through
interviews, as households did mention that their decision to adopt was affected by
neighbours, family and friends who already had solar panels, but that the size of
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the system is mainly constrained by the available space on the roof, and by the 4kW
threshold to obtain the highest FIT rate and avoid having to request authorisation
for the installation and connection to the grid.
Larger subsidy per kW installed and a lower cost per kW installed appear in-
stead to drive households to install larger systems. As the size of the annual subsidy
depends on the generation potential of the area, this suggests that households living
in area with better solar irradiation and a climate more favourable for solar gen-
eration tend to install larger systems. On the other side, the fact that lower cost
per kW results in larger installations might suggest that households have liquidity
constraints or a mental cap on the total amount they want to spend for solar panels,
even after controlling for the returns they can get on their investment. In fact, the
interviewed households stressed that they decided to install solar panels because
they had available liquidity, and many explicitly mentioned that they did not want
to take a loan to finance the installation. Overall, comparing the results from the
count and capacity specifications, suggest that larger installations in the neighbour-
hood trigger more adoption rather than larger installations, as the size of the new
adoptions is not affected by the average size of peers' installations.
Alternative `neighbourhood' definitions
As a further robustness check, Table B.6 and Table B.7 in Appendix B use the
two estimators to re-estimate the model using the count, capacity and average size
of the installations, but with different definitions of the reference neighbourhoods,
constructed using a 2km buffer for all the LSOAs, rather than buffers proportional
to each LSOA size as in the previous models. Models (1), (3), and (5) impute
systems to a neighbourhood assuming they are all concentrated in the population-
weighted centroid of their LSOA. Models (2), (4) and (6) remove this assumption
and instead consider that systems are uniformly distributed over the LSOA. Details
on how the buffer and the variables are constructed were provided in Section 2.5.3.
As specified in the same Section, this analysis is restricted to a random sample of
the total LSOAs, due to computational reasons.
Results are again very similar to each other whether they are estimated with
the within-group estimator (Table B.6) or the first-difference estimator (Table B.7).
Estimated coefficients for subsidy and cost are almost identical to the ones obtained
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in the previous Tables, suggesting that restricting the analysis to a random sample
is not affecting the final results. The general results on the existence of peer effects
found in the previous Tables are confirmed, with peer effects being positive and
significant. The estimated coefficient for peers' installations is even larger when
estimated assuming that peer installations are uniformly distributed within their
LSOA. As before, for households who adopt in areas where there is already at least
one installation in the neighbourhood, the average size of the existing systems does
not appear to have a significant effect on the size chosen for the new systems.
2.7 Conclusion
The present work contributes to the literature on the diffusion of residential solar
PV systems, and the role peer effects play in it. While the literature on the topic has
grown considerably in the last years, this paper adds more theoretical background
to the analysis, to investigate the dominant mechanisms behind peer effects. As
well as confirming that peer effects play a role in the diffusion of the technology, in
this Chapter I also investigated how peer effects interact with monetary incentives
and how peer effects evolve over time, and modelled the channels that may explain
these patterns, a question that has not been investigated in depth in the literature,
yet. Finally, I tested findings from existing papers based on different locations 
mainly the US and Switzerland  in the case of the UK, which has a different policy
to support residential solar PV systems.
The theoretical framework set up in the paper provides the motivation for the
empirical analysis. In the baseline, a simple static model is set up to formalise how
households are affected by economic variables on which policy makers have a lever-
age, namely monetary incentives for the adoption of micro-generation technologies,
and the cost of investing in these technologies. The model is then extended to in-
clude peer effects triggered by existing solar panels in the neighbourhood. This is
achieved by modelling the two main mechanisms through which this influence may
arise: the social utility channel, in which households obtain a non-monetary `social
payoff' from conforming with the neighbours and keeping up with the Joneses; and
the social learning channel, in which households obtain information from neighbours
who have already installed, through localised information-sharing.
This model provides a set of hypotheses on how peer effects should affect the pat-
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terns of adoption over the country, how they interact with the elasticity to monetary
incentives, and how their strength evolve over time, depending on what mechanism
is dominant. In particular, both channels are consistent with peer effects that are
positive and significant, are not constant over time, and interact with the monetary
incentive, although they predict different patterns of evolution over time. These hy-
potheses are then compared with patterns identified in the data using a optimised
hot-spot analysis with the Getis-Ord Gi* statistics, spatial correlation analysis using
global and local Moran's I statistics, and regression analysis.
To overcome the different challenges of identifying peer effects, I have adapted the
identification strategies and estimators presented by Richter (2014) and Bollinger
and Gillingham (2012), and constructed different definitions of peer installations
and neighbourhoods to check robustness of the results. The results of the empirical
analysis robustly point towards the existence of positive and significant peer effects,
with evidence that the influence of peers' decisions to adopt solar panels extends
further than the boundaries of the LSOAs. Peer effects also appear to interact
positively with the level of annual subsidy a household can expect to receive. This
means that when the FIT rate is cut, areas with larger installed base experience
larger drops in the number of new installations if compared to areas with lower
installed base.
Finally, I find evidence that the strength of peer effects is not constant, but
decreases over the years. This result suggests that information-sharing at the local
level is the dominant channel through which the adoptions of peers tend to affect
new installations in the neighbourhood. Taken together with results for the other
hypotheses, this would suggest that information regarding cuts to the FIT rate
spreads faster the more existing installations there are in the area, resulting in
fewer installations than it would be the case in areas with a smaller installed base.
Nevertheless, the effect of peers' decisions appears to fade out with time, possibly
because households can obtain more and more up-to-date information from other
sources so that localised social learning loses importance.
This is an important result in terms of policy implication, as it provides an addi-
tional motivation for subsidising residential solar panels and avoiding unpredictable
and drastic cuts, especially in the early years of the scheme, as well as an addi-
tional element to take into consideration when setting the level and schedule of the
subsidy. In fact, subsidies in the early years can `buy' the boosting effect of peer
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influence and trigger a domino's effect in adoption, but when the subsidy is cut,
the interaction effects between this variable and peer effects pushes in the opposite
direction, slowing down new adoptions.
Another implication that can be derived for policy design is the importance of
providing accessible information on the new technologies and the existing support
schemes for their adoption, as well as visible and possibly trialable examples of them.
In fact, if information-sharing is a relevant mechanism for peer effects, then areas in
which social learning is not possible  because of the lack of peers who have already
adopted  would experience a sub-optimal pattern of adoption than it would be the
case in absence of imperfect and missing information. Given the strong evidence
in the literature that inertia, default bias, and risk and uncertainty aversion make
adoption of lower-carbon energy technologies slower than it would be optimal, this
paper suggests that informational interventions and peer effects could be effective
tools to help remove these barriers.
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Chapter 3
Demand for `improved' cookstoves or
demand for improvements? Evidence
from refugee settlements in
Sub-Saharan Africa
3.1 Introduction
With almost 69 million individuals (UNHCR, 2016), if the forcibly displaced were
a country, they would be the 21st largest country in the world by population, and
one of the top countries for population growth. In fact, political and economic
instability, wars, extreme climate events and changing environmental conditions
continue to fuel displacement and migratory processes, adding to the victims of
economic and political crises, new tides of climate and environmental refugees. Sub-
Saharan Africa, where the refugee settlements studied in this Chapter are situated,
is particularly hit by these trends, as the number of forcibly displaced people and the
duration of the crises have kept growing in the last decades (Verwimp and Maystadt,
2015; Adepoju, 2019). In this context, actors involved in humanitarian responses are
coming to the realisation that sustainable and clean energy provision is essential not
only for the administration of the settlements, but above all to ensure the welfare
of their inhabitants (Lahn and Grafham, 2015; Huber and Mach, 2019).
In fact, fuel efficiency and indoor air pollution are critical issues in developing
countries, and are intimately related to the broader issues of poverty alleviation, en-
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vironmental protection, and sustainable development. Cooking, in particular, is one
of the main energy-consuming activities in households' everyday life, and can take
up a substantial share of time and resources in developing countries. In refugee set-
tlements, the problems linked to traditional forms of cooking are further exacerbated
by the difficulties of humanitarian emergencies and displacement, in particular with
respect to resource scarcity, potentially hostile host communities, high population
density, and a large number of vulnerable individuals, such as children, women, the
elderly and the infirm, and improvements are therefore even more urgent. Cook-
stoves are mentioned among the main energy challenges and solutions for refugee
settlements in Lyytinen (2009).
At the same time, refugee settlements can provide interesting opportunities to
introduce and develop new technological and organisational solutions (see for exam-
ple Bellanca, 2014; Gunning, 2014; Lahn and Grafham, 2015; Grafham et al., 2016;
Lehne et al., 2016; Vianello, 2016, for a review of cooking solutions and pilot pro-
grammes for refugee settlements and humanitarian settings). The benefits of these
programmes could even spill over to the host communities and to family members
in the countries of origin, triggering broader transition processes in both the receiv-
ing and sending countries (Alix-Garcia et al., 2018; Maystadt and Duranton, 2018).
Moreover, refugee settlements are contexts where the provision and allocation of
very scarce resources are a crucial issue and where central management and policy
interventions are pervasive, making it an interesting setting for economic analysis
and program evaluation.
Yet, economic and energy issues in these contexts are still under-researched 
especially from a quantitative perspective  due to the difficulties in accessing the
settlements to collect data and because the settlements are understood as temporary
arrangements (Lahn and Grafham, 2015). To overcome the first hurdle, I rely on
the effort of the recently formed Moving Energy Initiative (MEI)  a consortium
of governmental and non-governmental organisations active in the energy and hu-
manitarian spectrum  to close this knowledge gap. To this purpose a survey has
been administered to representative samples in the Goudoubo settlement, in Burkina
Faso, and in the Kakuma sub-camp one, a sector of the bigger Kakuma settlement,
in Kenya, focusing on the current status of energy access and management, as well
as the needs and priorities of households, enterprises and facilities on the ground.
This survey provides the main information and data for the analyses in this Chap-
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ter. As for the temporary nature of the settlements, this is often more of a political
label than a description of the actual situation. In fact, evidence cited by Vianello
(2016) suggests that displaced people spend an average of 17 years as refugees, and
UNHCR (2016) reports that the average duration of the 32 protracted refugee sit-
uations at the end of 2015 is estimated at about 26 years. Consistently, the median
arrival date in Kakuma for respondents in my sample is 2004, with several house-
holds having lived in the camp since the early 1990s, when the settlement was first
established. The Goudoubo camp was opened in 2012; more than half of my sample
reported living in the settlements since that year, suggesting that they might have
already been living as refugees in the country before the camp was established. At
the same time, about 5% of respondents in each settlement had arrived less than a
year before the survey was conducted, evidence that the situations in the countries
of origin had not yet been resolved  and in fact are still ongoing at the time of
writing.
Despite evidence that there is much to be gained in improving cooking condi-
tions for households in least developed contexts, the willingness to pay (WTP) for
non-traditional stoves appear to be low, both in absolute and in relative terms (Mo-
barak et al., 2012; Whittington, 2010), and so is the take-up even when offered for
free (Hanna et al., 2016). This result seems to be robust in rural and urban areas,
although this has not been studied in the context of refugee settlements, yet. To
understand the reasons behind this results, in the first part of this Chapter I in-
vestigate whether low WTP for non-traditional cookstoves1 found in the data and
more broadly in the literature, might be linked to the failure of these systems to live
up to expectations, and more specifically to a mismatch between the performance
of the stove and the features the user is interested in, such as fuel savings, smoke
reductions, or compliance with traditions and habits. Using characteristic-demand
theory I test two competing interpretations:
1. Households have low WTP for (i.e. low valuation of) the improved features
(referred to as the `characteristics' of the stoves, in the rest of the Chapter).
1For the purpose of this Chapter I refer to non-traditional stoves to indicate stoves that are
different from the traditional three-stone fire. Whether a non-traditional cookstove constitute an
improvement with respect to the traditional one, and what kind of improvements they provide,
is an empirical question. For a similar argument, see Mobarak et al. (2012). I use the acronym
biomass ICS (improved cookstoves) to indicate non-traditional cookstoves using solid fuels, such
as firewood or charcoal, as this is the common name used to indicate these types of stoves.
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2. Households value the improved features but do not think that non-traditional
stoves provide them.
To do this, I use stated preferences for a set of seven different non-traditional cooking
technology  basic solid-fuel ICS, enhanced firewood-ICS, enhanced charcoal-ICS,
solar cookers, biogas stoves, LPG stoves, and electric stoves  and information on
respondents' perceptions (or expectations) in terms of the characteristics of each
cooking technology. I fact, different respondents have different perceptions of the
characteristics of each type of cooking technology  for example because of hetero-
geneity of the stoves, or asymmetric information  and in the analysis I attempt
to disentangle the premium respondents are willing to pay for each characteristics,
from the technology-specific premium.
As a further refinement, I control for heterogeneity in priorities regarding the
features of a cooking system. To see why this is important, consider for example that
according to World Health Organization (2015) significant health improvements can
only be achieved by moving away from solid fuel and switching to clean fuel such as
LPG, biogas, and electric cooking. Respondents concerned with health issues might
thus be expected to have a low valuation for solid-fuel non-traditional cookstoves, as
they do not match with the respondents' priorities. Information is also obtained on
whether the respondent has any previous experience with each technology. Given the
setting and the technologies considered, this is often determined by participation in
pilot schemes or donation programmes, rather than being the results of respondents'
purchases in the private market.
In the second part of the Chapter, I use the same dataset to look at whether
moving away from three-stone fires has delivered any significant improvements in
each of four different dimensions of welfare - fuel efficiency, health and safety, time
use, and the workload burden on women and children. The setting can be considered
as a quasi-experiment, as non-traditional cookstoves have been mainly introduced
in the camp through donation programs, and are not easily found in the local mar-
kets (neither within the settlement nor in the nearest towns). Finally, I conclude
by bridging the results from the two analysis looking at the correlation between
the predicted benefits provided by non-traditional cooking systems and the stated
preferences. To do this I use household-specific estimates of the effect of using a
non-traditional cookstove on different outcomes, and interact it with the gender of
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the respondent. The latter is used to see whether men or women are relatively
better at factoring the gains into their valuation, and whether that depends on the
outcome considered. In fact, it could be the case that the valuation increases more if
the respondent is appropriating the benefits directly  which in the case of cooking
means that women may be more responsive than men to improvements in health
and safety and time savings, as they are the ones mainly affected.
The novelty of this research is two-fold. First, for its effort to bridge valuation
of hypothetical products and improvements with estimates of actual improvements
from the non-traditional cookstoves distributed in the camps. This is made possible
thanks to the extensive scope of the survey data collected by the Moving Energy Ini-
tiative in terms of current level of access, multi-dimensional well-being information
and valuation modules. Answering these questions with the same dataset provides
interesting insights on whether a mismatch exists between the improvements sup-
plied by the cookstoves actually deployed on the ground, and the improvements
demanded by the users. To my knowledge, only one other study has focused explic-
itly on this connection so far, namely Berkouwer and Dean (2019)'s RCT in Nairobi,
Kenya.
The second contribution, and key difference with respect to the above-mentioned
work, is the focus on refugee settlements in developing countries. These are highly
managed settings in which centralised interventions are pervasive and improvements
in service provision are particularly urgent. Lessons can therefore be derived from
past and current efforts, and be used as input in the design of future programmes,
contributing to improve the life of a particularly vulnerable segment of the world
population.
The questions investigated in this Chapter are meant to inform the more general
question of whether low willingness to pay for non-traditional cookstoves found in
the data and more broadly in the literature2, might be linked to the failure of these
systems to live up to expectations - consistent with the results by Mueller et al.
(2011), Yu (2011), Hanna et al. (2016), and with the World Health Organization
(2015) guidelines, stating that significant health improvements can only be achieved
by moving away from solid fuel and switching to clean fuel such as LPG, biogas,
and electric cooking.
This Chapter also contribute to the broader issue of economic and behavioural
2See for example (Mobarak et al., 2012; Beltramo et al., 2015).
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drivers of adoption of low-carbon energy technologies in developing regions, and
of the welfare effects that the low-carbon energy transition entails. At the same
time, they are meant to shed light on the energy situation, needs, and demand of
households in refugee settlements, as well as on energy-related welfare aspects of the
everyday life of refugees. Both these topics are still under-researched  especially
from a quantitative perspective. For this reason, while I acknowledge the limitation
of cross-sectional survey data, I believe this is an important first step to start a
conversation and inform future research on the topic.
3.2 Background and literature review
3.2.1 Willingness to pay and technology adoption
Low rate of adoptions and low WTP for technologies that are supposed to provide
high returns and substantial improvements in the quality of life, are a puzzling result
in the literature on energy efficiency and clean energy, in low and middle-income
countries as well as in high-income countries. These results are especially robust
in the case of biomass-fuelled non-traditional cookstoves, and has been found both
in rural and urban contexts  see for example Mobarak et al. (2012); Whittington
(2010); Beltramo et al. (2015).
Berkouwer and Dean (2019) conducted a randomised field experiment in Nairobi,
Kenya's capital, in which they first confirm that the energy efficient cookstove being
offered does in fact result in substantial fuel savings. Despite the high returns, they
observe under-adoption and low WTP for the technology, and test for inattention
to future savings and for credit constraints as potential explanations. While the
former does not appear to be an important channel, the WTP is more than doubled
when households have access to credit and the possibility to convert a large upfront
payment into smaller instalments.
While low ability to pay is one of the key barriers to adoption, priorities and at-
titudes, experience, and expectations are other relevant factors. In the literature on
determinants of WTP for clean energy and low-carbon technologies in general, Guo
et al. (2014) find significant effects of knowledge and attitudes towards renewable en-
ergy in China, while Batley et al. (2000) document the effect of experience on WTP
for renewable energy in the UK, and Claudy et al. (2011) shows how subjective
157
consumer perception of product characteristics affects WTP for electricity micro-
generation technologies in Ireland. Compliance with habits, traditions and cultural
norms is another relevant factor that has been found to affect technology uptake
in the global South, especially in the case of cookstove. Convenience of use, food
taste and traditional food preparation have been cited as barriers to switch to non-
traditional cookstoves (Sesan, 2012; Jeuland and Pattanayak, 2012), and efforts are
now being put to design culturally appropriate and context-specific non-traditional
stoves (Bensch et al., 2013).
Moreover, not all non-traditional cookstoves are created equal, and huge hetero-
geneity exists in terms of what type of improvement each stove provides, and whether
they provide any improvement at all. If Berkouwer and Dean (2019) found that their
cookstove effectively reduced charcoal use, Mueller et al. (2011), Yu (2011), Hanna
et al. (2016) provide further evidence of interventions in China  the former two 
and India  the latter  in which non-traditional cookstoves have failed to deliver
on their promises of substantial health and fuel savings effects.
Hanna et al. (2016) is especially interesting, as they analyse an RCT conducted
in rural Odisha, India, where the construction of a fixed non-traditional cookstove
was offered at a highly subsidised cost, so to be almost free for the household. The
stove was similar to the traditional one, in terms of materials and general design,
but included a base for the fuel, so that it would burn more efficiently and contain
the smoke into the fuel chamber, and a chimney to disperse the smoke away from
the user. While some health improvements were found in the first year of use,
the benefits faded away in the following period, due to lack of maintenance and
correct utilisation. They also found that uptake was far from universal, even though
the stove was offered for less than one dollar, and households often kept using their
traditional stove side-by-side the new one  a practice known as stove or fuel stacking
 and even abandoned the latter completely as time passed.
While non-traditional cookstoves have the potential to deliver important social
benefits, especially in terms of environmental conservation, pollution and health,
as discussed below, Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) illustrate how the net effects
of non-traditional cookstoves are far from certain, especially when focusing on the
private and appropriable benefits and costs.
The problems of returns' uncertainty are compounded when quality of the prod-
uct is not easily observable, and sub-standard or counterfeit models are present in
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the market, as Bensch et al. (2015) found in the case of non-traditional cookstoves in
Burkina Faso, where a labelling scheme has been introduced for quality certification.
This makes it more difficult for households to experiment and learn about the new
technology and might even result in a generalised lack of trust in the product and
its suppliers, as discussed by Bold et al. (2017) in the case of fertilizer and hybrid
seeds.
Finally, even if non-traditional cookstoves effectively deliver improvements, these
might be in areas users are less interested in, as a mismatch has often been re-
ported between the solutions development organisations offer, and the priorities of
the households they are targeting (Sesan, 2012). A similar mismatch might exist
within the household, between the decision-making members and the members that
are most likely to benefit from improved cooking conditions. In fact, in patriarchal
societies women may lack the power or resources to make purchasing decisions, es-
pecially for durables and more expensive item, and men may overlook the health
gains and time savings of non-traditional cookstoves as they are not the ones directly
appropriating those benefits, as documented by Miller and Mobarak (2013).
3.2.2 Welfare improvements
Non-traditional cookstoves may be designed to achieve improved performance on a
variety of dimensions, such as fuel efficiency and/or reduction in smoke emissions.3
For the purpose of this Chapter I refer to non-traditional or `improved' stoves as
stoves that are different from the three-stone fires traditionally used in the regions
under analysis. Fuel efficiency and indoor air pollution are especially relevant issues
in developing countries, and are intimately related to the broader issues of poverty
alleviation, environmental protection, and sustainable development. At the same
time, cooking is one of the key activities in households' everyday life, and one that
might take up a substantial share of time and resources  especially women's  in
least developed contexts, and even more so in refugee settlements. As a consequence,
various authors have studied the welfare effects of different cooking technologies in
rural and urban settings in developing countries, but less research has been done
3Consider for example (Vianello, 2016) definition:  `improved' denotes positive changes in the
efficiency, emissions, safety, durability, user acceptance, cost, fuel sustainability or other beneficial
attributes that a new cooking system can offer. An `improved cooking system' may use any type of
fuel and may include options that meet internationally agreed standards for emissions and safety,
as well as options that offer measurable benefits relative to traditional forms of cooking but do not
necessarily meet internationally defined benchmarks.
159
on refugee settlements. I am specifically interested in the effects over the following
dimensions: (i) fuel efficiency and environmental issues such as deforestation and
environmental degradation, (ii) health and safety, (iii) time use, and (iv) gender
issues.
Health and safety
Indoor (or household) air pollution (IAP) is at the moment one of the leading
environmental causes of death, estimated to kill every year around 2 million people
 roughly as many people as malaria and tuberculosis combined (World Health
Organization, 2009; Martin et al., 2011). Medical studies have shown links between
IAP and several health conditions, from acute respiratory infections and chronic
lung disfunctions, to asthma, tuberculosis and several types of cancer. Most of the
literature on the welfare effects of non-traditional stoves comes in fact from medical
and health studies, some relevant examples being Diaz et al. (2007); Pennise et al.
(2009); Gordon et al. (2014); Bruce et al. (2000). More recent literature focuses
on health measurements conducted within randomised controlled trial (RCT), to
minimise the effects of confounders.
In the flagship RESPIRE study, in Guatemala, for example, non-traditional
cookstoves were provided to a random sample of households, and carbon monox-
ide exposure and health indices between the treated and untreated groups were
compared. The results showed reduction in pollution exposure, linked to improve-
ments in terms of eye issues, headaches and back pain (Diaz et al., 2007), women
and children's respiratory issues (Smith-Sivertsen et al., 2009; Smith et al., 2011), as
well as in a number of other health dimensions, although not always to a significant
level. Duflo et al. (2008), Pattanayak et al. (2018) and Jeuland et al. (2015b) bridge
the literature on air pollution and health effects with economics and development
policies, through a survey of the evidence from the literature.
In absence of experimental data, as in the setting analysed in this Chapter, a
few studies have applied quasi-experimental methods or statistical matching with
observational survey data to evaluate the impact of non-traditional cookstoves in de-
veloping countries, but as far as I know, none in the context of refugee settlements.
Importantly, Mueller et al. (2011) focus on the bias in health impact evaluation due
to lack of control for health-relevant covariates (age, wealth, kitchen ventilation),
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which may affect who receives non-traditional stoves and who does not, as well as the
outcome. Using Chinese data, they show that while simple difference-in-means esti-
mators show no health improvements for the households with non-traditional stoves
compared to those without, a positive effect is found when propensity score match-
ing on health-relevant variables is used. In fact, households who use non-traditional
cookstoves appear to be poorer and with worse kitchen ventilation, factors which
bias the health effects if not adequately controlled for. Mueller et al. (2013) focus
on bias caused by lack of controls for the heterogeneity between households who get
the treatment - either through a donation or by purchasing non-traditional stoves
themselves - and those who do not, using Chinese household survey data.
Yu (2011) uses data from various indoor air pollution reduction programs in rural
China to evaluate the effects of stove improvements and behavioural interventions
on children respiratory health, concluding that behavioural interventions are more
cost effective, and no significant marginal benefits from the use of non-traditional
cookstoves are found. In this case the assignment to different treatment was ran-
domised and data were collected before and after treatment. The treatment groups
consisted of subsidised stove and behavioural intervention, behavioural intervention
only (stoves are available for purchase at full price, and in fact almost half of the
households in this treatment group undertook some form of stove or ventilation
improvement), and control. Nevertheless randomisation was not entirely successful
in balancing pre-intervention differences (e.g. households in treatment group are
poorer, larger, and in poorer health), and matching was therefore use to correct for
this problem. Quansah et al. (2017) provide a meta-analysis of studies on the effects
of traditional and non-traditional cooking systems on health and pollution exposure.
Further health and safety concerns are linked to firewood collection, as accidents
are common, for example due to exhaustion and dehydration, attacks from wild
animals, gender-based violence, and conflicts with neighbours, just to mention some.
These issues are further exacerbated in refugee settlements, as refugees are less
familiar with the surrounding environment, relations with the host communities are
often tense, and camps are often located in resource-poor areas. Crisp (2000) for
example mentions violence linked to firewood collection in the Dadaab and Kakuma
refugee settlements in Kenya, where the host population increasingly attempts to
prevent the refugees from accessing lands and forests outside the settlements, and
Mulumba (2011) reports similar issues for refugee, especially women, in Uganda.
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The refugee population also tends to comprise more vulnerable people, such as
women, children, the elderly and individual with health conditions, making health
and safety an even higher priority.
Context is relevant. In the sample, almost no accidents with the cookstoves
were reported in Goudoubo and smoke is reported as a less severe issue, as almost
all the households cook outside and exposure to air pollution is therefore lower, as
documented by Langbein et al. (2017). Smoke and accidents are instead widely
reported in Kakuma, where more than half of the respondents cook indoor.
Energy efficiency and fuel savings
The issue of fuel use, has attracted the interest of environmental economists and con-
servationists, as collection of firewood for cooking is leading to unsustainable forest
exploitation and deforestation in some areas of the globe. On this matter, I cite
Wallmo and Jacobson (1998) on fuel efficiency and conservation in Uganda, Tucker
(1999) on solar cooking, and Bensch and Peters (2013) on reduction of deforesta-
tion in Senegal, thanks to charcoal savings induced by non-traditional cookstoves.
This topic has also become popular - together with the health perspective - with
international organizations and development banks (World Bank, 2011).
Adkins et al. (2010) conducted tests with different models of improved cookstoves
in rural Uganda and rural Tanzania, and find that the non-traditional cookstoves
have lower fuel requirements for the preparation of a standardised dish, in compar-
ison with the traditional cookstove. Bluffstone et al. (2017) found similar results in
Ethiopia, and attribute them mainly to the engineering of the stoves, as the results
were not affected by the level of experience the cook had with the new stove.
The link between efficiency and fuel savings is nevertheless less straightforward
than it might initially seem. Even when non-traditional cookstove are indeed more
efficient than the traditional ones, this might not necessarily translate in an over-
all reduction of fuel used. In fact, as the more efficient cookstove uses less fuel to
cook the same meal, it lowers the marginal cost of cooking, so that the new optimal
level of cooking increases. In the new optimum, the household may end up consum-
ing as much or even more fuel overall than they did with the traditional stove, a
phenomenon known as `rebound effect'. Evidence of this effect has been found for
fuel-efficient cars and other appliances and energy services.
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In the case of cookstove, evidence of rebound effect has been documented for
example by Bensch and Peters (2013), using data on day-to-day cooking behaviours
in urban Senegal, to verify whether the fuel savings obtained under laboratory con-
ditions are replicated in a real world context. Their result is 25% charcoal savings
thanks to ICS, less than in laboratory testing (where the savings were estimated to
be around 40%). Following the same analytical design, Bensch et al. (2013) conduct
an impact evaluation of a non-traditional stove designed to improve fuel efficiency
(not designed to curb smoke emissions) in Burkina Faso. They rely on a cross-
sectional dataset of survey data, and use propensity score matching and propensity
score weighting to estimate the effect of ownership of a non-traditional cookstove.
Energy efficiency and fuel savings are particularly relevant issues for refugee
camps in developing countries, as these are often set up in areas with very scarce
resources or access to the local resources might be opposed by the host communities.
The two settlements analysed in this Chapter are good examples of these issues.
Goudoubo is situated in the dry and arid Sahel region, and lack of forested areas is
a big problem for the host community as well as for the residents of the settlement,
so much so that the firewood distributed to refugee households by humanitarian
agencies is actually sourced from regions over 100km away from the settlement.4 Fuel
efficiency has become an even more urgent priority since free firewood distribution
was discontinued at the beginning of 2017 (Vianello and Corbyn, 2018). Although
resource availability is less dire in the area around Kakuma, the size of the refugee
population and conflicts with the host communities over access to lands and forests
outside the camp make the needs for fuel savings equally urgent (Crisp, 2000).
Scarce supply of fuel suggests that binding availability constraint might be an
issue in the camps  simply improving the efficiency of the stoves might not change
the amount of firewood consumed, because households may use all the fuel they have
access to and still be short of the quantity they consider optimal given their utility
function and budget constraints. In support of this hypothesis, insufficiency of fuel to
cover the households' basic cooking needs is one of the main complaint by residents
of both camps, and in both camps at least some respondents reported having to
exchange foods to obtain fuel. Importantly, a large share of the food available in the
camp cannot be consumed raw and require cooking, such as dry beans and grains. In
Kakuma households receive 10kg of firewood for every member  equivalent to 60kg
4This was reported during key informant interviews in Goudoubo.
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for the average 6-person household  every two months, while in Goudoubo the same
amount is distributed every month (Vianello and Corbyn, 2018); according to focus
groups and informants' interviews, this supply rarely lasts for the intended time
and often only for half of it. Focus group participants in Kakuma, where charcoal
is also commonly used (although firewood is still predominant), stressed that this
fuel is subject to seasonal availability and price might even double when there are
shortages. These circumstances make the refugee settings particularly interesting
and important to look at.
Time use
On the importance of time saving and how freed-up time can be re-allocated to
productive or leisure activities, I refer to Devoto et al. (2012). This aspect of the
problem as related to cooking more specifically, has been investigated by Tinker
(1987), focusing on time use of women. The use of non-traditional cookstoves may
free up time by reducing cooking time itself, or by reducing the amount of fuel
needed and therefore the time spent collecting it.
Referring again to Adkins et al. (2010) tests, the authors found the overall cook-
ing time for a standardised dish tended to be longer for the non-traditional cook-
stoves when compared with the traditional one. Bluffstone et al. (2017) found similar
results when the cooks were not familiar with the new stoves, but they report lower
cooking time after the cook has gained more experience. On the second aspect,
Lewis et al. (2016) document a reduction in time spent collecting firewood linked to
the use of non-traditional cookstoves in rural India.
The effect on fuel purchase and fuel preparation time is even more ambiguous,
as non-traditional cookstoves often require purposedly prepared fuel and/or fuel
different from firewood that cannot simply be harvested and prepared by household
members but has to be purchased. For example wood sticks might need to be cut
and chipped into a smaller size, transformed into charcoal, or processed into pellets
and briquettes. In this case households using non-traditional cookstove would have
to dedicate more time to these activities.
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Intra-household distribution of workload
Finally, it is to be noted that the consequences of unsustainable and unhealthy
cooking practices, are likely not to affect every member of the household in the same
way. In fact, women and children spend disproportionately more time indoor and in
the vicinity of the stoves, and it is mainly on their shoulder that the responsibilities
of firewood collection rest (Ryan, 2014; Batliwala and Reddy, 2003; Shailaja, 2000).
Dankelman and Davidson (2013) provide a broader perspective on this topic as
related to development, environment, and gender issues. A relevant issue in this
context is the `genderisation' of fuels and the gendered division of labour in the
household (Matinga et al., 2016; Munro et al., 2017). Qualitative research in Sub-
Saharan Africa has documented how firewood tend to be associated with women,
and therefore activities related to it are perceived as being women's responsibilities.
Charcoal and other modern fuel such as LPG tend instead to be perceived as more
neutral or even associated with men (Troconis, 2017). Moreover, the introduction
of a new technology in the household might trigger a process of re-negotiation and
re-definition of gender division of tasks (Standal et al., 2020).
3.2.3 Context and dataset
Survey data collected by the Moving Energy Initiative provide the main dataset for
the analyses in this Chapter. The surveys were conducted between the end of 2016
and the beginning of 2017 in the refugee settlements of Goudoubo, in Burkina Faso,
and Kakuma sub-camp one, in Kenya. Goudoubo is situated in the Sahel region of
northern Burkina Faso, in West Africa. The refugee settlement was established in
2012 to host Tuareg and other refugees from Mali that were previously hosted in the
camps of Fererio, Gandafabou and Deou and had to be relocated further away from
the Malian border to comply with international regulation (UNHCR, 2013). As the
situation in Mali has not been resolved yet, new inflows of refugees have kept arriving
in the camp since then. Kakuma is instead located in East Africa, in Turkana
County, north west Kenya. Settlement of refugees started in 1992, to host forcibly
displaced people from Sudan, and grew to assist refugees fleeing from conflicts and
persecutions in various neighbouring countries, including the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the Central African Republic, and the new country of South Sudan. The
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two settlements are among the largest5 and most important in the respective country,
and have a population of around 11,000 and over 190,000 (considering all of Kakuma
camp and Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement), respectively. Participants have been
selected at random trying to ensure that the sample is representative, following
a stratification procedure based on socio-economic clusters and housing blocks in
the settlements. The sample size of completed questionnaires is 129 households in
Goudoubo and 231 in Kakuma. In 70% of the cases, the questionnaire was answered
by the head of the household.6 Background information about the questionnaires
and the data can be found in Vianello and Corbyn (2018).
These data are of particular interest for several reasons. Firstly, they come from
two settlements that span different political, social and economic conditions, both
in terms of the refugee and the host communities, allowing for comparisons and
consistency checks of the results of the analyses. Secondly, the data are particu-
larly relevant due to the specific focus on energy access and demand. The dataset
compiled from the survey has a very rich set of variables on the current and desired
energy situation of the participants, on their needs and priorities in terms of energy
services, and their attitudes and experience with cooking technologies. Micro-data
from refugee settlements are generally rare, and even more so micro-data on en-
ergy consumption, so that energy needs and energy preferences end up being often
overlooked in the context of humanitarian interventions (Lahn and Grafham, 2015;
Beogo et al., 2018). Lastly, the survey includes modules to elicit respondents' stated
preferences in the form of ranking and willingness to pay for a large set of energy
technologies for electricity access and for cooking. This Chapter focuses on the lat-
ter domain, where 10 different cooking options were considered  basic ICS (with
and without fuel), enhanced ICS using wood (with and without fuel), enhanced ICS
using charcoal (with and without fuel), solar cooker, biogas stove, LPG stove, and
electric cooker. The ranking exercise includes the traditional three-stone fire as ad-
ditional option  WTP for this cooking system was not asked, as it is effectively
available for free.
5∼ 1.26km2 Goudoubo; ∼ 4.17km2 Kakuma sub-camp 1, and 15km2 for the entire Kakuma
complex.
6Note that several households identify one woman and one man as joint heads of the households.
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Use of traditional and non-traditional cookstoves in the camps
People living in the refugee settlements under study rely on a mix of traditional
and non-traditional cookstoves to meet their cooking needs. In both settlements,
most of the non-traditional cookstoves have been received as donations, with only
a small share being purchased by the households themselves. Three-stone fires are
built by household members themselves, as no particular skills or materials are
required. Table C.1 shows the penetration of traditional three-stone fires, biomass-
based non-traditional cookstoves, and cleaner solar and LPG stoves. Summary
statistics are also reported on whether the household cooks indoor and whether
they use a chimney, the type of fuel used, fuel consumption, and reference prices
for the basic biomass ICS used in the settlements. Photos of three-stone fires and
the most common non-traditional cookstoves used in the camps are included in
Appendix C.1.
As it is often the case in rural areas of developing countries, fuel and stove stack-
ing are pervasive  households may use wood or charcoal depending on the type
of food they are preparing, and often continue to use a traditional three-stone fire
side by side a non-traditional cookstove. For instance, Malian refugees in Goudoubo
use primarily firewood to prepare food, but switch to charcoal to make the tradi-
tional tea. At the time of the survey, 80% of the respondents in Goudoubo used a
non-traditional stove, mostly some version of biomass-fuelled ICS, with only about
5% having LPG and 5% having a solar cooker (Blazing Tube, see Figure C.5 in
Appendix C.1). The latter were introduced in refugee camps in Burkina Faso as a
trial programme, but did not prove particularly successful, as they are very large
and impractical to use, tend to break easily, and make it difficult to regulate the
temperature and cook the food according to the household's habits and tastes 
refugee women even reported receiving divorce threats from their spouses because
of this issue (Troconis, 2017). The share of households using a three-stone fire as
primary or secondary system is nevertheless still high, at 40%. Notably, almost none
of the respondents cook indoor.
The share of households using biomass ICS in Kakuma is similarly 80%, but the
level of stove stacking is lower  although still relevant  and only 28% of households
still use a three-stone fire. No LPG or solar cookers were reported in the sample.
The use of charcoal as main cooking fuel is more common in Kakuma than it is in
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Goudoubo, as it is the use of chimneys or hoods to remove smoke from the cooking
space. This is linked to the fact that over half of the households cook indoors (either
in their dwelling or in a separate building), to avoid the strong winds of the region.
These trends regarding the prevalence of outdoor and indoor cooking are con-
sistent with the general cooking habits of Burkina Faso and Kenya, as documented
by Langbein et al. (2017). As measured by the same author, indoor cooking is
linked with higher exposure to smoke and air pollution. Consistently, almost 70%
of respondents from Kakuma reported experiencing smoke problems and more than
60% reported accidents, while the corresponding share are only 29% and 4% in
Goudoubo. Information on these variables, as well as other characteristics of the
households and their cooking habits and priorities are presented in Table C.2.
3.3 Part 1: WTP for non-traditional stoves and
their characteristics
3.3.1 Theoretical framework: From the WTP for a product
to the characteristics' premiums
Individual demand
To analyse the choices of the households, I use the characteristic-space framework,
introduced by Lancaster (1966) and used for example in hedonic pricing models
(Rosen, 1974). According to this theory, each product can be represented as a bundle
of characteristics, and the utility of the agents depends on those characteristics,
rather than on the product per se. I therefore define households' utility as a function
of the `improved' cooking service and of z, denoting any other good or service. The
price of z is normalised to be 1 (pz = 1). Each household decides how much of
their income (M) to allocate to gain access to the cooking service, and how much
to all the other goods and services. The `improved' cooking service can be accessed
by purchasing one of J different stoves, or not accessed at all - i.e. households
can always choose to use a traditional three-stone fire which can be put together
for free. Following the set up of the questionnaire used to produce the dataset I
will use in the next Sections, I assume that only one of the J stoves will be made
available. The choice of the household therefore simplifies to whether they want to
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buy stove j or not, if that is the only non-traditional stove available, rather than
choosing which one to buy, i.e. xj = {0, 1} with j = 1, ..., J , where 0 means not
buying, and 1 means buying. Each stove j can then be represented by a vector of K
different characteristics, such as improved safety, convenience of use, reliability, etc:
xj = x(cj1...cjK). Again following the set up of the questionnaire, the characteristics
are introduced as dummies, i.e. they are either present or not present cjk = {0, 1},
with k = 1, ..., K. The consumer choice problem for each i is to choose xj, so to
maximise their utility:
U = U(x(cj1...cjK), z) = U(cj1...cjK , z)
subject to the budget constraint:
pjxj + z ≤M
The usual axiomatic characterisation of consumer's preferences is assumed, namely
completeness, transitivity, monotonicity, and convexity of the indifference curves.
Consistently, the utility function is non-decreasing in its arguments (U(xj = 1) ≥
U(xj = 0); ∂U∂z ≥ 0). Given the local non-satiation assumption, in the optimum the
agents will allocate the entire budget, so that the constraint becomes an equation,
and I can rearrange it as:
z = M − pjxj(cj1, ..., cjK)
Note that the quantity of stove purchased is either 0 or 1, so that the above translates
into z = M − pj if the stove is purchased, and z = M if not. Define the utility in
the latter case as the outside option, or reference point U¯ :
U(0,M) = U¯
The demand for cookstove j in the optimum can therefore be written as:
x∗j =
1 if U(cj1...cjK ,M − pj) ≥ U¯0 if U(cj1...cjK ,M − pj) < U¯
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That is, the consumer will buy the product as long as the utility they can get is no
less than the utility obtained by spending that portion of the income on the other
available goods and services. In this context, the WTP for product j is therefore
nothing else that the price at which household i is indifferent between buying product
j or spending the income on other things, that is they will buy the product as long
as the price is lower or equal their maximum WTP, and will not buy if the price is
higher:
maxWTP j = {pj : U(cj1...cjK ,M − pj) = U¯}
So that I can re-write the demand for the product in a more familiar form, as a
function of price :
x∗j(pj) =
1 if pj ≤ maxWTP j0 if pj > maxWTP j
Aggregate demand
Once the consumer choice problem for household i has been set up, it is easy to
repeat the same process for each household and obtain the aggregate demand curve
as the horizontal summation of each individual demand curve. When I extend the
consumer problem to more than one household, I allow households to differ in the
`perception' of each stove's characteristics, and in their priorities with respect to
the cooking experience. These elements allow to control for relevant household
heterogeneity, together with observed households' characteristics such as income.
The `perceived' or `expected' characteristics of each stove vary by households xij =
x(cij1, ..., cijK); this variation is what allows the identification of the premiums the
households are willing to pay for each characteristic, that is the quantity of interest.
Finally, households have heterogeneous priorities in  or attitude towards  cooking,
which I define to be represented by a vector ωi so that Ui(.) = U(ωi). These
priorities are captured in the questionnaire by asking respondents Which attributes
of a cooking system are most important to you?.
Characteristics' premiums
Given that households' utility depends on the bundle of characteristics they can
gain access to through the purchase of j, I am interested in the premium consumers
attribute to each characteristic, i.e. whether and how the presence or absence of each
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characteristic affects the valuation of the cookstove in which they are embedded, all
else equal. To do this, I start by setting up the conditional indirect utility function,
or the highest utility level that can be achieved given the budget constraint. Starting
with one consumer only:
U¯i = U(cij1...cijK ,Mi −maxWTP ij) ∀i, j
where maxWTP ij represents the highest amount consumer i is willing to bid to
obtain product j with characteristics cij1...cijK in order to keep their utility at least
at level U¯ . Each characteristic affects the utility level, which means that consumers
might be willing to pay more or less for a cookstove if they believe characteristic ck
to be present, as opposed to missing. I define this additional amount as the premium
associated with characteristic ck. This is similar to the concept of indifference curve
(but for a discrete 0-1 good), as it represents the trade-off between money and
characteristic ck, that maintains the utility at a given level. Inverting the utility
function, holding all characteristics constant but ck, I can write:
maxWTP ij = f(cij,k,Mi | cij,−k, U¯i) ∀i, j
where−k means all the characteristics other than k. The premium for characteristics
k is:
premiumijk = f(1,Mi | cij,−k, U¯i)− f(0,Mi | cij,−k, U¯i)
= maxWTP ij|cij,k=1 −maxWTP ij|cijk=0 ∀i, j, k (3.1)
For estimation purposes, I assume a functional form for f(.) that allows each charac-
teristic to increase the WTP incrementally, more specifically I consider the following
linear model:
maxWTP ij = β0 +
∑
k
βkcijk + µi(Mi) + ηj + ij (3.2)
Given that each household provides a stated WTP and expectations on the charac-
teristics for each product, I can rely on a within-subject framework for the analysis.
The data for each household-product combinations are stacked, so to create a panel
dataset over the two dimensions of households (indexed i) and products (indexed
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j). When considering multiple individuals, the willingness to pay for each prod-
uct (maxWTP ij), as well as the `perceived' characteristics (cijk), are household- as
well as product-specific. Differences in households characteristics (both observable
and unobservable) are captured by the household fixed-effects µi. These characteris-
tics are household-specific and do not change depending on the product. Cookstoves
fixed-effects (or alternative-specific constants) ηj are also introduced to capture char-
acteristics of the products that are not already accounted for in the model, assuming
that they are the same for every household. Observed households' priorities regard-
ing cooking, ωi, are captured by the household fixed-effects, if we assume that every
cookstove satisfy each priority in the same way. Alternatively, priorities can be in-
teracted with the cookstoves or with specific characteristics, generating the variable
ωij, so that households with different priorities are allowed to value cookstoves and
relevant characteristics differently. As an example, households who consider compli-
ance with habits and traditions as a priority, might value cookstoves that are more
similar to the traditional one (such as biomass-fuelled cookstoves) more than house-
holds who do not consider this to be a priority. Similarly, households who consider
safety or smoke reduction as a priority, might be willing to pay a higher premium
for the characteristic health and safety. In some specifications I further distinguish
the alternative-specific constant according to whether the household has had pre-
vious experience with that particular technology. ij is the error component of the
model, and assumptions on its distribution are made to ensure the consistency of the
estimators for the various βk which constitute the estimates of interest, according
to the model specification used. The average premium for each characteristic ck can
therefore be obtained as:
premiumk = maxWTP ij(cijk = 1|...)−maxWTP ij(cijk = 0|...) = βk (3.3)
3.3.2 Data: WTP elicitation and descriptive statistics
Together with information on the current cooking situation, the questionnaire elicited
the stated willingness to pay for different cooking technologies, using open-ended
contingent valuation. Note that this Chapter uses secondary data and the survey was
designed with the needs of the NGOs involved in mind, namely to gauge respondents'
interest for a wide range of energy-access options, in the two domains of cooking, and
172
electricity access and lighting.7 In this respect, the open-ended contingent valuation
has an advantage over auction-types elicitation methods recommended in the liter-
ature on valuation of private goods, such as the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM)
auction, in terms of time and resource requirements and logistics. With respect
to dichotomous choice questions, another methodology commonly recommended in
the literature, there is evidence that for the valuation of a private good providing a
service respondents are familiar with (such as cooking) the open-ended contingent
valuation can perform as well, if not better (Loomis, 1990; Kealy and Turner, 1993;
Frew et al., 2003; Whynes et al., 2005; Vossler and Holladay, 2018). The open-ended
questions were designed following recommendations and best-practice from the lit-
erature, as described in this Section and further discussed in Section 3.3.3. In the
latter I discuss the validity of the responses through a scope test comparing the
stated WTP for cookstoves offered with and without the fuel, and through com-
parisons between the stated WTP and households' expenditures, stated WTP and
estimates market price for the stoves, and between stated WTP in the two camps.
In terms of questionnaire design, the WTP module starts with a presentation
of the scenario and the payment vehicle, and includes `cheap talk' to reduce hy-
pothetical bias. To allow for comparisons between stoves that use different fuels,
respondents were asked to state a WTP for an all-inclusive service, including in-
stalments to repay the cookstove and periodic supply of the necessary fuel. The
payment vehicle used is explained carefully and with examples. A per day charge is
used, as periodic payments tend to be preferable over upfront payments for people in
poor and liquidity constrained situations. Moreover, in both camps under analysis,
buying at credit to then repay periodically is common. Collecting or buying fuel
periodically, often daily, is also common. The payment vehicle is therefore chosen to
be consistent with payment arrangements and a temporal interval respondents are
already familiar with. For each technology, an information card was first presented
and respondents were encouraged to ask questions and clarifications. They were
then asked what they liked and disliked about it, to make sure they were focusing
on that specific stove. A reminder of the scenario, payment vehicle and `cheap talk'
7In this case, 17 different WTP questions were asked, consisting of 10 different cooking options
 basic ICS (with and without fuel), enhanced ICS using wood (with and without fuel), enhanced
ICS using charcoal (with and without fuel), solar cooker, biogas stove, LPG stove, electric cooker
 as well as six different electricity access options  basic solar lantern, system with multiple
solar lanterns and connections, solar home system, and basic, medium, and high quality minigrid
connections  and WTP for public street lighting.
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were then repeated in the actual WTP question:
Assume that this technology is the only one that is made available.
Given the benefits that this option would bring to your household, what
is the highest price you would be willing to pay for it per day? Please
think carefully and give an honest and realistic answer.
The possible options provided were I would pay nothing for it and therefore not
receive it, or, if the respondent was interested in the technology, an open-ended
space to enter the monetary amount in local currency.8 The option I don't know
was also allowed. Responses have then been converted in USD per month for the
present analysis. Given the peculiarity of refugee settlements, the valuation of non-
traditional stoves in these settings has some commonalities with the valuation of
non-market goods. In particular, there is hardly any supply chain and therefore
market for most of the non-traditional stoves I consider in this analysis (in partic-
ular enhanced ICS, LPG, biogas systems, electric cookers, or solar cookers). For
this reason, this Chapter focuses on stated preferences. While I acknowledge the
limitations of this type of data as far as the cardinal values are concerned, what I
am really interested in are the ordering and the trade-offs between different types of
cooking technology and between attributes. Section 3.3.3 provides a discussion on
the validity of the elicitation method in this specific context.
Regression analysis using the stated WTP is presented in Section 3.3.4. As
a robustness check, and to gain further insights into respondents preferences, in
Section 3.3.5 I apply regression analysis to the responses in the ranking exercise,
conducted after the WTP elicitation module. Respondents were asked If all these
forms of energy access were available in what order of preference would you rank
them?, and the alternatives to be ranked included the seven technologies for which
WTP was elicited plus the traditional three-stone fire.9 The ranking variable is
therefore constructed so that the solution ranked as top has the highest score (i.e.
8), while the solution ranked last has a score of 1. Some households did not rank all
the solutions, possibly because they had no interest in those they chose to leave out.
These are given a score of 0 and considered as the least preferred options.10 The
8West African CFA Franc in Goudoubo, and Kenyan Shilling in Kakuma.
9The three-stone fire can be assembled for free by members of the household, so WTP for this
technology would not asked.
10I check the robustness of the results to this assumption, by repeating the test treating those
observations as missing, and I find no significant differences in the results.
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main difference between the scenarios presented in the willingness to pay module
and in the ranking module is that in the former respondents were asked to answer
considering a scenario in which the technology offered was the only type of stove
available; in the latter they are asked to rank the options if all of them were available
at the same time. The questionnaire also asked which stoves they would actually
buy, if all were available. This question has a large share of missing values and
respondents saying yes to all or none to all, so I do not use it as an outcome variable,
but I use it to do consistency checks with the answers to the ranking question, as
both are elicited with the same scenario. Answers to this latter question were used
to construct a dummy for each solution, which takes the value 1 if the respondent
chose that option among those they would buy, and zero otherwise. I then perform
a t-test on the mean difference of the ranking position between households who are
interested in buying the technology and those who are not. The mean ranking of
households interested in buying the solution is always significantly higher than the
mean ranking for those who would not buy it, with the exception of the basic non-
traditional cookstove, where there is no significant difference in the ranking between
the two groups. I checked the two settlements separately, and the results for this
technology do not change. Possible explanations for this are that some households
might be able to build this type of stove by themselves, and would therefore not
be willing to buy one, even if they rank it high - or alternatively, that they already
have a basic non-traditional cookstove, or are used to it being donated rather than
purchased.
To avoid outliers skewing the results of the analysis, WTP responses for each
technology are winsorised at 5% and 95%, that is values below the 5th percentile and
above the 95th percentile are replaced with the value at the 5th and 95th percentile
respectively. This is a common practice to deal with outlier in stated preferences
studies (see for example Kahneman and Ritov, 1994; Halasa et al., 2014; Kirwan
and Roberts, 2016; Moon and Nelson, 2019). This process only affects the top part
of the distribution, as the values at and below the 5th percentile are zero for all
technology, so no replacement occurs in this case. Summary statistics for the stated
WTP are presented in Table 3.1. Reassuringly, the data do not show any apparent
inconsistency. Willingness to pay for biomass-fuelled stoves is always greater when
the fuel is included as compared to the case where only the stove is offered (a formal
test is conducted in Section 3.3.3). In both settlements, the willingness to pay for
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a biomass stove including fuel averages around 5-6 USD per month, with charcoal
being valued slightly more in both settlements. The respondents who are interested
in more modern form of cooking such as biogas and LPG, appear to be willing to
pay a 50-100% higher price for them. Electric cooking is valued even higher in
Kakuma, while it attracts almost no interest in Goudoubo. Finally, the willingness
to pay for solar cookers is rather low in both settlements, but it should be considered
that this is potentially a very cheap technology, especially when the fuel is taken
into consideration. More interesting in this regard is the share of respondents who
show some interest in the technology. This is very low in Goudoubo, while it is
comparable to the other non-biomass technology in Kakuma.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the observations with a positive willingness to pay for
different cooking technologies in the two settlements (USD/month). WTP observations
for each technology are winsorised at the 5th and 95th percentiles.
WTP for cookstoves in Goudoubo (USD/month)
WTP > 0 Mean SD p25 p50 p75
basic ICS (stove only) 50% 3.52 4.06 1.27 2.54 4.45
basic ICS (with fuel) 41% 5.36 4.23 2.54 5.08 5.08
enhanced ICS, wood (stove only) 46% 4.43 4.15 1.53 2.54 5.08
enhanced ICS, wood (with fuel) 42% 6.21 5.00 2.54 5.08 7.63
enhanced ICS, charcoal (stove only) 52% 3.91 3.45 1.27 2.54 5.08
enhanced ICS, charcoal (with fuel) 45% 6.00 4.56 2.54 5.08 7.63
solar 8% 5.26 3.76 1.27 5.08 7.63
biogas 20% 14.8 9.97 7.63 10.2 25.4
LPG stove 47% 18.1 23.9 5.08 7.63 25.4
electric stove 6% 10.9 12.4 3.18 6.36 16.5
WTP for cookstoves in Kakuma (USD/month)
WTP > 0 Mean SD p25 p50 p75
basic ICS (stove only) 52% 4.13 5.62 0.45 3 4.50
basic ICS (with fuel) 44% 7.93 7.30 3 4.50 10.5
enhanced ICS, wood (stove only) 42% 5.57 6.10 3 3.60 5.40
enhanced ICS, wood (with fuel) 40% 8.11 7.77 3 5.10 10.5
enhanced ICS, charcoal (stove only) 47% 4.82 5.83 1.80 3 4.50
enhanced ICS, charcoal (with fuel) 42% 8.76 7.66 3 6 11.1
solar 37% 4.15 4.00 2.10 3 6
biogas 31% 11.0 11.2 3 6 22.5
LPG stove 42% 35.1 37.8 3 15 63
electric stove 40% 25.3 23.7 3 15 58.5
Figure 3.1 shows a comparison of the aggregate demand curves for the different
technologies, separately by settlement. Aggregate demand curves have been plot-
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ted so that the x axis shows the share of the respondents willing to pay at least a
certain price. In both settlements, the demand curve for LPG is dominant, while
solar cookers attracts very low willingness to pay. The demand curves for biogas
and biomass stoves are somewhere in between, with biogas eliciting higher will-
ingness to pay from a smaller group of household in comparison with the biomass
non-traditional-cookstoves. The demand curves for the two type of biomass non-
traditional-cookstoves, wood-fuelled and charcoal-fuelled, follow each other very
closely in both settlements. The biggest difference between the two settlements is in
the demand for electric cookers, which is the lowest demand curve in Goudoubo on
a par with solar cookers, and one of the highest demand curve in Kakuma, following
closely the demand curve for LPG.
Figure 3.1: Aggregate demand curves for each technology.
As discussed in more details in Section 3.3.3, for a large share of respondents
the willingness to pay is much lower than the cost of the technologies. But even
more alarming is the finding that many are not interested in the non-traditional
technologies no matter the price. This would not only predict a low take-up of the
new systems if they were ever to be offered at market prices, but possibly a far
from universal take-up even if they were to be distributed for free. As it has been
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frequently noted in the literature and in direct experiences on the ground, cultural
acceptability and habits might be forces as strong as budget constraints in preventing
the transition to cleaner cooking solutions. Another possible explanation, though,
is that households do not believe the supposedly `improved' systems actually deliver
the promised improvements, or at least not to a level that would justify the high
premium required for their purchase - as well as the cognitive effort of adopting
them. In a similar vein, there might be a mismatch between the improvements the
new stove provides, and the improvements the users are looking for.
To investigate these hypotheses, I look at the characteristics that respondents ex-
pect to find in each product. For each cookstove type households were asked What
do you like about this option? and could choose more than one answer among the
following list: System capacity: which pots can be used, Duration of energy sup-
ply, Reliability, Robustness, Health and safety, Convenience, or the outside
option No opinion. The list of characteristics was designed from responses from
previous questionnaires administered by the same NGO in refugee camps and rural
communities in different Asian and African countries, in which the question was left
open-ended. As can be seen from Table 3.2, there is substantial heterogeneity in the
perceived characteristics of each technology, providing the variation to estimate each
characteristic's premium according to the characteristic-space framework developed
in the previous section.
In fact, if households derive their utility from the characteristics of the product,
rather than directly from the product itself, they will be willing to pay a differ-
ent price depending on whether they believe the product to provide or not provide
those characteristics. It is to be noted that characteristics of the cookstoves are
self-reported perceptions, rather than exogenously controlled as in a discrete-choice
experiment; endogeneity of perceptions might therefore be an issue and all results
are to be interpreted as partial correlation. A similar caveat applies for whether
respondents have previous experience with the technology, as in a normal situation
this would be the result of households' deliberate decisions, and experienced and
inexperienced households might therefore be different in some unobservable charac-
teristics that might also affect the dependent variable. Nevertheless, in the refugee
settlements under analysis previous experience is more often determined by partic-
ipation in pilot schemes or donation programmes, rather than being the results of
respondents' purchases in the private market, as the technologies considered are not
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easily found in the local markets, nor in the country of origins, especially if refugees
come from rural areas. Despite these limitations of the data, the main purpose of
this Chapter is to provide a first analysis of the situation in refugee settlements to
better pinpoint the most relevant issues and knowledge gaps, and encourage further
research and data collection efforts.
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Table 3.2: Share of respondents who perceive the characteristics to be present in the technology.
Goudoubo
(ics basic) (ics wood) (ics char) (solar) (biogas) (LPG) (electr)
convenience 45% 55% 53% 15% 22% 50% 9%
duration 2% 3% 2% 0% 4% 12% 1%
health 14% 16% 15% 2% 10% 19% 2%
reliability 4% 2% 5% 0% 11% 14% 2%
robustness 4% 9% 5% 1% 11% 23% 2%
capacity 12% 10% 8% 3% 11% 18% 6%
N 129 129 129 129 129 129 129
Kakuma
(ics basic) (ics wood) (ics char) (solar) (biogas) (LPG) (electr)
convenience 35% 32% 32% 35% 23% 25% 26%
duration 23% 23% 23% 23% 21% 32% 30%
health 34% 34% 31% 41% 28% 35% 34%
reliability 42% 48% 49% 37% 33% 45% 39%
robustness 17% 14% 16% 10% 13% 18% 18%
capacity 8% 8% 9% 7% 7% 14% 20%
N 231 231 231 231 231 231 231
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Finally, I include in the analysis the priorities expressed by the respondents in the
multiple-answer question Which attributes of a cooking system are most important
to you? Rank at least three. Looking at the attributes ranked as top priority, the
two settlements show different distributions. In Goudoubo, the greatest concern is
to save fuel (21% of the respondents ranked it first), followed by fast preparation
of food (13%), suits our cooking habits (11%), stove is locally available (10%),
less smoke (9%), easy to handle (7%), stove is easily transportable and can
be used with different pot sizes (6%), safe to use (4%), traditional and familiar
stove, good taste of food and comfortable size of the stove (3%), affordable
price and easy to repair (2%). In Kakuma, the greatest concern is to have a stove
that produces less smoke (18% of the respondents ranked it first), followed by save
fuel and fast preparation of food (12%), traditional and familiar stove (10%),
safe to use (9%), affordable price and stove is locally available (7%), easy to
handle (6%), comfortable size of the stove (5%), easy to repair and can be used
with different pot sizes (4%), suits our cooking habits (3%), good taste of food
(2%), and stove is easily transportable (1%).
In both settlements, energy efficiency is in high demand - in line with the result
from Mobarak et al. (2012), where most of the respondents listed reduced fuel cost
and cooking time as the most valued characteristics  but health and safety concerns
are not too far behind, especially in Kakuma, where indoor cooking increases the
exposure to smoke and the risk of burns and other accidents. Compliance with habits
and traditions, considered to include the two options suits our cooking habits and
traditional and familiar stove, appears also to be important for a share of the
population, while less so the affordability of the stove. A possible explanation for
the latter is that respondents value the quality of the stove and are therefore willing
to pay more for a better service - but this could also be linked to the hope of receiving
the stove for free or at a subsidised price, as it is common practice in the settlements.
In the regression analysis I consider more specifically the respondents' priorities with
respect to safety, reduced smoke emissions, reduced fuel use, cheap cooking, fast
cooking, as these represent the type of improvements non-traditional cookstoves are
designed to deliver. I also include compliance with habits and traditions, as this
might be a barrier to adoption and might lead respondents to prefer biomass-fuelled
stoves, that use the traditional fuels, rather than more modern and clean options.
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3.3.3 Validity
The use of open-ended contingent valuation to elicit WTP for cookstoves
This section discusses the validity of stated preferences to infer information on
households valuation of the cookstoves and their likely behaviour if they were to
be provided for real, as well as the use of open-ended contingent valuation as a valid
elicitation mechanism for stated preference.
On the first question, Griffin et al. (1995)'s study on piped water connections
in India, compare stated preferences elicited from contingent valuation with actual
behaviour once the service was provided, and find that the hypothetical responses
are reliable predictors. Whittington (2010) similarly remarks that, although the
literature is still scarce and mainly focused on industrialized countries, there is
evidence that stated and revealed preference estimates for WTP tent to be similar.
Divergence between the two has mainly been reported when voluntary contri-
butions are used as payment vehicle, which is mainly related to public goods, and
in the case of laboratory experiments, as questions tend to be purely hypothetical
and consequentiality is less credible. Neither of these concerns apply to my con-
text. He further discusses how familiarity with the good or service being offered and
cheap talk have been shown to reduce hypothetical bias, while dichotomous take-
it-or-leave-it questions tend to result in overstated values because of a yes-saying
bias. Moreover, in developing countries and for poorer segments of the population,
liquidity constraints and low disposable income make large upfront payments less
preferable, and this should be taken in consideration when choosing the payment
vehicle for the valuation.
This provides further support for the validity of the valuation responses used
in my analysis, which were obtained using open-ended questions rather than di-
chotomous choices, included cheap talk11, focused on a familiar and salient aspect
of refugees' everyday life, cooking, and used a periodic fee  presented as install-
ment payments or repayments on a loans, which the respondents are familiar with
 rather than a one-off price. The payment vehicle in particular is explained care-
fully and with examples, and respondents are reminded that they are asked for their
11`Cheap talk' is used in the presentation of the scenario, as respondents are asked to please, try
to think carefully and give an honest and realistic answer. Honest answers are really valuable and
important for us, and then again every time the willingness to pay question is asked, reminding
to please think carefully and give an honest and realistic answer.
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willingness to pay as a daily charge in every question. In the specific contexts under
analysis, buying at credit to then repay periodically is common, consistent with
the presence of liquidity constraint and lack of disposable income. Collecting and
buying fuel periodically, often daily, is also common.
On the use of open-ended contingent valuation, Vossler and Holladay (2018) find
that this format tends to result in lower estimates than the more widely recom-
mended single binary-choice referendum, and this seems to be because respondents
are less likely to view the open-ended questions as consequential. The two tend to
converge if consequentiality is made more credible, and their findings support the
claim that open-ended contingent valuation do not require as large samples as other
valuation methods.
The authors also identify four conditions under which open-ended questions are
incentive compatible. First, the good or service offered need to be relevant and of
interest to the respondents  which is the case with cooking technologies in refugee
settlements, as households spend a substantial share of their resources and time to
collect, purchase and prepare fuel, and to cook meals. Before providing their will-
ingness to pay, respondents are asked what they like and dislike about the option
offered, encouraged to ask questions and clarifications, and shown an information
card with a photograph of the cookstove, and asked to think of the benefits that that
particular cookstove would have for their household. This is to increase the con-
creteness and saliency of the good being offered, and to make respondents consider
the costs and benefits of the offer.
Second, the payment must be credibly enforceable  households in the settle-
ments are used to see non-traditional cookstoves as a market good (as opposed to
the traditional three-stone fire, which is mostly built in-house) and to pay for any
purchase they make, in kind if not using money; in both settlements, buying at
credit and then repaying over time is also a common practice. A concern in the
context of refugee settlements might be the expectation of receiving the cookstoves
or the fuel as donations and free handouts, but in both camps and in the humani-
tarian sector more generally, the tendency is now to provide vouchers, rations and
periodic allowances instead, so that residents can make decisions on what they want
to purchase and in what quantity, theoretically improving the feeling of ownership
and self-sufficiency over that of dependence.
Consequentiality is a further condition, that is respondents should believe that
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the proposed service is more or less likely to be implemented depending on how
much interest it attracts, or in other words, they should believe that their answers
matter in whether the project is realised or not.
The final condition, is that the answers should only affect whether the proposal
is implemented or not, but not the price the respondent would have to pay, which
should be communicated as being still uncertain but eventually determined by the
actual cost of the implementation  and therefore exogenous to the valuation ex-
ercise. This is crucial to avoid strategic bias in responses, and can be effectively
achieved using a BDM auction. This option was not feasible in the survey used for
this Chapter, but as non-traditional cookstoves are a market good and would there-
fore be sold in the market, it is reasonable to believe that their price would indeed
depend on the actual costs of providing the good, as it is the case for any market
good, and not affected by the value stated in the valuation questions. To reinforce
this view, organisations in the camps tend to support the creation of supply chains
and help local businesses supply products rather than being directly involved in the
sales, consistent with the approach to humanitarian intervention described above.
In line with these two final conditions, the valuation scenario was introduced as:
Discussions are being made on which energy sources could be of interest
for people in the camp. We would therefore like to know, if each of these
energy sources could be made available in the camp, whether you would
be willing to pay something to have it, and how much you would be
willing to pay
stressing that the aim of the questions are to gauge the interest in the different
technologies, rather than establishing a price for them.
Carson and Hanemann (2005) recognise that simple open-ended questions are the
easiest to explain to respondents and provide more precise and readily interpretable
information than dichotomous choice formats. Most of the critiques they review
for this type of elicitation apply to the valuation of public goods, and are less of a
concern for private goods.
A relevant downside of open-ended contingent valuation is the large rate of non-
responses and zero answers. Large non-response rates are nevertheless less likely to
occur with private goods and payment vehicles respondents are familiar with and
that have tangible and salient costs and benefits for the respondents, as in the case
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of cookstoves. Moreover, in the survey in case of an I do not know answer, the
respondents were then asked two or three dichotomous take-it-or-leave-it questions
using a reasonable estimate of what the cookstove price might be in the camp, to
be able to still gain some information on their willingness to pay. The large share of
zero answers is consistent with the evidence that open-ended contingent valuation
tend to produce lower estimates compared to other elicitation methods, although
this would counteract the tendency to provide over-inflated estimates due to the
hypothetical bias, as remarked by Whynes et al. (2005).
One issue that affects specifically private goods, is the incentive to behave strate-
gically rather than reveal the true willingness to pay. If the respondents believe their
answers would make it more or less likely than the good is produced and offered
in the market, they might have an incentive to over-state their interest just to get
the good as a further option in the market, and they can then decide whether they
are indeed willing to pay its price or not once it is actually offered. Conversely, if
they believe the aim of the survey is to determine the price of the good, then the
incentive is to under-state the real willingness to pay, to try and make it cheaper.
Nevertheless, this concern affects mainly the credibility of the cardinal WTP,
but the ordinal values between technologies and the trade-off between the differ-
ent stoves and the different characteristics should not be affected  which is what
matters for this Chapter's analysis. Strategic behaviour should moreover be atten-
uated by the `cheap talk' used in the questionnaire. Additional discussion on the
credibility of the cardinal values elicited in the survey is presented in the following
paragraphs. Other concerns raised by the authors regard incentive-compatibility,
consequentiality, plausibility and saliency of the good offered, and payment vehicle
 already addressed above  and the use of dichotomous rather than open-ended
questions.
On this latter issue, Kealy and Turner (1993) compare open-ended and closed-
ended contingent valuation for a private and a public good, and find no difference
in results for the private good. They remark that incentives for strategic behaviour
are less of a concern for private goods, and that valuation is more likely to be stable
across elicitation methods the more familiarity and previous experience the respon-
dent has with the good and the payment vehicle, and the more tangible and salient
the good is  characteristics that apply to the cookstoves and the refugee settle-
ments considered in this Chapter. Similar results on the reliability and convergence
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of values from open-ended and dichotomous choice questions have been obtained by
Loomis (1990) using a test-retest procedure for the valuation of water quality in a
lake.
Tests comparing different valuation methods have also been conducted in the
health literature. Frew et al. (2003) show that open-ended valuation questions and
payment scale questions result in similar answers, while valuations using dichoto-
mous choices are significantly higher, possibly because of yes-saying and anchoring
bias in the latter method. Whynes et al. (2005) compare valuation answers and the
resulting demand curves elicited using open-ended contingent valuation, short and
long payment scales, and dichotomous choice questions. They find that the different
methods provide different results, with the answers to open-ended questions being
the most conservative. As hypothetical bias would induce overstated WTP, and
decision-makers tend to be risk averse, they choose the more conservative valua-
tion from open-ended questions as their preferred one. Onwujekwe and Uzochukwu
(2004) elicit WTP using binary with follow-up elicitation and open-ended ques-
tions, and compare them to respondents' actual behaviour once the payment is due.
Again, they conclude that open-ended contingent valuation performs better than
dichotomous choice, based on construct and criterion validity.
Scope test: WTP for stove only v. fuel included
To gather evidence in support of the validity of the answers, I compare the stated
WTP when only the cookstove was offered, with the WTP for that same cookstove
when a supply of fuel was also included. Each respondent was asked for their WTP
in both of these scenario for the three different types of biomass cookstoves - basic
ICS, enhanced ICS using wood, and enhanced ICS using charcoal. Firewood is
sometimes framed as a `free' fuel, as households can collect it from the surrounding
of the settlement without paying any monetary price. A similar narrative applies
to charcoal, as some households make their own using the firewood collected. Free
distributions of firewood for cooking also occur periodically in the camps. At the
same time, harvesting firewood can be a time consuming and dangerous activity,
as vegetation around the camps becomes increasingly scarce - especially in the arid
Sahel region, where Goudoubo camp is located - and accidents are common, for
example due to exhaustion and dehydration, attacks from wild animals, gender-
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based violence, and conflicts with the host community, just to mention some. These
questions were therefore added to gain insights on whether respondents see firewood
and charcoal as `free' resources, but can also be used to perform a scope test, to make
sure that the `larger' bundles - the cookstoves plus fuel supply - elicit a valuation
higher or at least as high as the `smaller' bundles - the cookstove alone. A t-test on
the difference in mean for each technology, under the two different scenarios, confirms
that the scope test has been passed, as the null hypothesis that the larger bundle is
on average valued the same or less than the smaller bundle is always rejected with
a confidence level of at least 90%. The results are reported in Table 3.3. Figure 3.2
plot the difference between the WTP under the cookstove plus fuel and cookstove
only scenario for each respondent that expressed interest in that cookstove (that
is, that was willing to pay at least something for it). All the respondents with the
exception of a handful, reported a WTP for the cookstove plus fuel bundle that is
at least as high as that for the cookstove only.
Table 3.3: T-test for the difference in mean between the WTP for cookstove with fuel
supply, as opposed to cookstove only. The WTP for the two scenarios was only elicited for
biomass cookstoves. All other cookstoves were presented as including fuel.
Goudoubo
Mean w fuel Mean w/o fuel Diff.
(USD/month) (USD/month) (USD/month)
WTP for basic ICS 3.23 2.23 +1.00**
WTP for enhanced ICS, wood 3.73 2.72 +1.00*
WTP for enhanced ICS, charcoal 3.91 2.62 +1.29**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-value based on one-sided test
Kakuma
Mean w fuel Mean w/o fuel Diff.
(USD/month) (USD/month) (USD/month)
WTP for basic ICS 4.99 2.79 +2.20***
WTP for enhanced ICS, wood 4.96 3.52 +1.44**
WTP for enhanced ICS, charcoal 5.29 3.07 +2.22***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; p-value based on one-sided test
Comparison between WTP and current expenditures
As additional evidence that the WTP values elicited are reasonable, Figure 3.3 com-
pares the stated WTP per month with the reported total monthly expenditures for
the household. In Goudoubo the valuations provided are all well below the house-
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of the difference between each respondent's WTP for cookstove
plus fuel, as opposed to cookstove only. Positive values mean that the respondent is willing
to pay more when the fuel is included. Only respondents interested in buying the stove
(i.e. with positive WTP) are included in this figure.
hold expenditures, used as proxy for the disposable income. Summary statistics for
the WTP for each cookstove as a ratio of the total reported household expenditures
are presented in Table 3.4. These statistics only include observations with positive
WTP and expenditures. The current expenditures in energy for cooking  calculated
as the sum of spending in firewood, charcoal, briquettes, LPG  as a ratio of total
expenditures is also included for comparisons. Most ratios in Goudoubo are less
than 10%, and comparable with what households currently spend in cooking fuels.
Ratios for LPG and biogas are higher, but still within the household disposable
income  this is consistent with the fact that those cookstoves and LPG refills are
more expensive, and at the same time much cleaner than biomass cookstoves. In
Goudoubo the median WTP for biomass cookstoves not including fuel is between
2.6 and 5% of the total monthly expenditures, rising to 6 to 7.6% for the same
cookstoves including fuel, solar cookers, and electric cookers. The median WTP for
biogas and LPG cookstoves is higher, at 18 and 12% respectively. In Kakuma this is
not true for the whole sample, but it is to be noted that NGOs working in the camp
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remarked that the income and expenditures values reported by our respondents in
Kakuma are much lower than expected. This is confirmed by other reports and
surveys conducted in Kakuma in the last few years, which report a median income
per household of between 30 and 50 USD per month, and a mean household income
of between 50 and 70 USD per month (Guyatt et al., 2016; Samuel Hall, 2016; Betts
et al., 2018; World Bank, 2018). Guyatt et al. (2016), who report specifically on
expenditures in Kakuma sub-camp one, found a median expenditure of 20 USD per
month, and a mean of 45 USD per month. This is compared to a median of 10
and mean of 35 for the same variable in my sample. As further evidence that the
WTP values are within a reasonable range, but the total household expenditures
in Kakuma are under-reported, the WTP to total expenditures ratios presented in
Table 3.4 are mostly comparable with what households currently spend in cooking
fuels, with the only exception of the cleaner and more expensive LPG and electric
cookers, which elicit a higher WTP. Comparing the stated WTP with the current
expenditures in cooking fuels in absolute terms in each camp (Table 3.5), it can
be seen that the WTP for biomass cookstoves tend to be even lower than what
households already spend for cooking. This is additional evidence that the stated
WTP values are reasonable and within the respondents' ability to pay, and may
even underestimate the actual demand  at least for the biomass cookstoves.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics of the WTP as share of total reported expenditures, for
observations with a positive WTP.
WTP as share of total reported expenditures, Goudoubo
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
basic ICS (stove only) 62 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.10
enhanced ICS, wood (stove only) 57 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.09
enhanced ICS, charcoal (stove only) 64 0.06 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.08
basic ICS (with fuel) 53 0.11 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.12
enhanced ICS, wood (with fuel) 54 0.10 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.13
enhanced ICS, charcoal (with fuel) 58 0.10 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.13
solar 10 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.09
biogas 26 0.24 0.17 0.10 0.18 0.38
LPG stove 60 0.24 0.39 0.04 0.12 0.32
electric stove 8 0.09 0.07 0.03 0.06 0.15
current expend. in cooking fuels 105 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.10 0.17
WTP as share of total reported expenditures1, Kakuma
N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
basic ICS (stove only) 45 0.34 0.66 0.06 0.09 0.30
enhanced ICS, wood (stove only) 43 0.48 0.75 0.05 0.14 0.68
enhanced ICS, charcoal (stove only) 47 0.44 0.75 0.04 0.14 0.54
basic ICS (with fuel) 44 0.59 0.77 0.11 0.23 0.91
enhanced ICS, wood (with fuel) 44 0.77 1.22 0.09 0.24 0.93
enhanced ICS, charcoal (with fuel) 46 0.84 1.45 0.07 0.23 1.00
solar 29 0.57 0.94 0.04 0.11 0.56
biogas 32 0.91 1.19 0.03 0.26 1.58
LPG stove 41 3.69 5.61 0.24 0.63 5.17
electric stove 39 2.56 3.55 0.08 0.60 4.88
current expend. in cooking fuels 64 0.59 0.76 0.11 0.26 0.78
1Note: reported expenditures in Kakuma appears to be understated according to
NGOs working in the camps, reports and other surveys.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.3: Comparison between WTP for cookstoves and current expenditures. Note:
current expenditures are likely to be under-reported in Kakuma, according to other reports,
surveys, and personnel working in the area.
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Comparison between reported WTP and estimated market price
Vianello and Corbyn (2018) provide estimates for the levelised cost of energy (LCOE)
of different cooking technologies, that is the monthly cost of cooking based on the
price of the stove spread over its lifespan, and the price of the fuel required to
obtain a given amount of energy. Actual market prices for fuels, materials, etc.
in the two settlements and nearest towns are used for the estimates. Table 3.5
compares those estimates with the respondents' stated WTP. The authors note that
the average price of wood and charcoal is similar across the two camps, although
it is subject to seasonal variations, and can change depending on the quantity and
quality purchased. The market price of LPG is instead very different, as at the time
of the study the fuel is subsidised in Burkina Faso, but not in Kenya. The LCOE
takes into account the fuel efficiency of the different technologies and types of fuel to
make the alternatives comparable despite the differences in upfront costs, fuel costs,
and amount of fuel required. For this reason, the three-stone fire is one of the most
expensive alternative, even though the upfront cost for the stove is basically zero.
Most of the stated WTP are too low to cover the full cost of purchasing and operating
any of the cookstove  with the exception of solar cookers, which are relatively cheap
due to the basically null cost of fuel (although not many respondents are interested
in this technology, no matter the price). Even the relatively high WTP for LPG
cookstoves are low in absolute terms if compared to the technology's LCOE  only
the top quartile of the interested respondents state a sufficient WTP.
Another source of reference market prices for non-traditional cookstoves and fuels
in Sub-Saharan Africa, is Kammila et al. (2014). They estimate:
 Traditional three-stone fire: basically no upfront cost, but over 20 USD/month
in operating costs;
 Basic ICS: range of 510 USD in upfront capital cost, plus 1217 USD/month
in operating costs;
 More enhanced ICS: range of 2045 USD in upfront capital cost, plus 812
USD/month in operating costs;
 LPG: around 50 USD upfront capital cost, plus 17 USD/month in operating
costs;
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Table 3.5: Levelised cost of energy (LCOE) estimates and stated WTP.
LCOE and WTP Goudoubo (USD/month)
LCOE(a) Stated WTP
Mean SD p25 p50 p75
three-stone fire 27 - - - - -
basic ICS 9 5.36 4.23 2.54 5.08 5.08
enhanced ICS, wood 10.5 6.21 5.00 2.54 5.08 7.63
enhanced ICS, charcoal 9 6.00 4.56 2.54 5.08 7.63
solar 3 5.26 3.76 1.27 5.08 7.63
biogas - 14.8 9.97 7.63 10.2 25.4
LPG stove 24(b) 18.1 23.9 5.08 7.63 25.4
electric stove - 10.9 12.4 3.18 6.36 16.5
current expend. in cooking fuels 8.02 5.79 3.69 6.86 11.10
LCOE and WTP in Kakuma (USD/month)
LCOE(a) Stated WTP
Mean SD p25 p50 p75
three-stone fire 27 - - - - -
basic ICS 9 7.93 7.30 3 4.50 10.5
enhanced ICS, wood 10.5 8.11 7.77 3 5.10 10.5
enhanced ICS, charcoal 10.5 8.76 7.66 3 6 11.1
solar 3 4.15 4.00 2.10 3 6
biogas - 11.0 11.2 3 6 22.5
LPG stove 60(b) 35.1 37.8 3 15 63
electric stove - 25.3 23.7 3 15 58.5
current expend. in cooking fueld 7.84 5.00 4.50 7.00 10.00
(a)LCOE estimates from Vianello and Corbyn (2018).
(b)LPG is subsidised in Burkina Faso, but not in Kenya.
 Electric cooking: around 30 USD upfront capital cost, plus 25 USD/month,
although this is highly variable depending on the cost and quality of electricity
in the specific context.
These estimates remark once again that the stated WTP are generally low compared
to the market prices, and a large share of the values are even below the operating
costs, suggesting that respondents might be unable or unwilling to consistently use
the cookstoves even if the cookstoves themselves were provided for free.
Comparison of answers between camps
Figure 3.4 compares the demand of each technology in the two settlements. In-
terestingly, the demand for biomass non-traditional cookstoves and biogas stoves 
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the technologies with which the respondents are more familiar  are very similar
in the two settlements, despite the differences in context (East versus West Africa,
heterogeneity versus homogeneity of countries of origin and ethnicity, size of the set-
tlements, geography, etc.). As for LPG, Kakuma appears to have a smaller share of
respondents willing to pay higher prices with respect to Goudoubo, where instead a
higher share is willing to pay at least something. The demand for solar cooking and
electric cooking in Goudoubo are much lower than in Kakuma. A possible explana-
tion is that Goudoubo hosted some not very successful trials with solar cooking that
have made the technology unpopular in the settlement, while the low demand for
electric cooking might be attributed to the nomadic lifestyle of a large part of the
population in Goudoubo, meaning that they might be less likely to have had past
experience with electric cooking or might consider it as not fitting with a nomadic
lifestyle.
Figure 3.4: Comparison of WTP answers between camps.
194
3.3.4 Regression analysis
Estimation strategy
Exploiting the within-subject design of the WTP module, in which each respondent
is asked the same question for each cooking technology, I stack each respondent's
answers to create a panel dataset over the two dimensions of households (indexed i)
and cooking technologies (indexed j). Each observation in the dataset is therefore a
household-cookstove combination. The dependent variable is the (winsorised) stated
WTP, and is therefore continuous, which allows me to use the linear fixed-effect
model.
Following eq. 3.2, I estimate the coefficients of interest βk using a linear fixed-
effect within group estimator, with robust standard errors. Using a linear specifi-
cation allows me to use technology fixed-effects (or alternative-specific constants,
ASC) and household fixed-effects to control for `objective' product characteristics
that are the same for every household and are not explicitly captured by the `per-
ceived' characteristics, and for characteristics of the households that do not change
with the cookstove considered (income, household size, etc.). Results are presented
in Table 3.6 for Goudoubo and Table 3.8 for Kakuma.
One criticism towards the use of a linear model on the whole dataset could
nonetheless be advanced, as the dependent variable is bounded at zero and there
is a relevant share of zero answers (already presented in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1),
that is respondents who state they are not interested in the technology and would
pay nothing for it. A first concern is that the outcome variable is not continuous
but rather censored at zero, as negative responses are not allowed, although they
could still represent valid preferences, for example in the case of respondents that
would accept a stove they dislike in exchange for a monetary incentive  in fact,
programmes that provide monetary incentive to switch to cleaner cookstoves are
not hard to imagine (see for example Atkinson et al., 2004; Hanley et al., 2009, for
the case of environmental amenities and disamenities). In fact, the distribution of
the responses is not only strictly non-negative, but also skewed towards lower values,
with a spike at zero.
A second criticism is that zeros in the dataset may be the results of a different
data-generating process than the rest of the responses, as respondents may first
decide whether they are interested in the technology or not, and only in the former
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case specify how much they are willing to pay for it (Martínez-Espiñeira, 2006). Zero
answers might also include a mixture of respondents who have a `true' zero valuation
for the stove or respondents who have very low valuation, and `protest' respondents
who reject some element of the valuation process (Meyerhoff and Liebe, 2010 and
Fonta et al., 2010 provide a review of the issue of protest zero in environmental
valuation and healthcare valuation, respectively; Atkinson et al., 2012 discusses
how to address the issue in the design of the questionnaire).12
To address these issues and provide a robustness check on the results of the
linear model, I re-run the analysis using non-linear model specifications and two-
stage models as suggested in the literature; the complication in this case is to select
or adapt models so that they can still exploit the panel structure of the dataset
and take into consideration the correlation between answers provided by the same
respondent while avoiding the incidental parameter problem (Colin Cameron and
Trivedi, 2010; Silva et al., 2015; Drukker, 2017). For this reason, I implement a
random-effects tobit model, a fixed-effects Poisson model (quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator), a zero-inflated Poisson model, and a double-hurdle regression model
(bootstrap estimator).13
The random-effects tobit model extends the cross-sectional tobit model to ac-
count for the panel structure of the data through a respondent-specific random
stochastic component in the error term, while addressing the fact that the outcome
variable is left-censored at zero. The model considers the observed outcome vari-
able as a censored version of the true but latent WTP of the respondents, that is
observed above the censoring threshold, and unobserved below it. The tobit model
still allows for only one type of zero observations, so does not address the problem
of protest zeros.
The fixed-effects Poisson model estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood es-
timator and robust standard error is becoming an increasingly popular option for
modelling non-negative skewed outcome instead of using a logarithmic transforma-
tion of the dependent variable, as common in the past. While both approaches
constrain the outcome to be non-negative and account for a skewed distribution
towards smaller values, the first obvious advantage of a Poisson model over the use
12Note that the likelihood of this possibility should be smaller, as respondents could select I
don't know as an answer instead of providing a specific amount.
13These regression models are implemented in Stata 15 using the commands xttobit, xtpoisson,
zip and bootdhreg written by Engel and Moffatt (2014).
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of a logarithmic transformation is that the latter does not admit zero responses,
as the logarithm of zero is not defined. This application of the Poisson model to
continuous censored data is encouraged for example by Silva and Tenreyro (2006);
as specified by Nichols (2010) the model is equivalent to a generalised linear model
using a logarithmic link and a Poisson-family distribution, and no assumptions are
needed on the variance of the distribution.
In fact, an important advantage of the Poisson specification is that it requires rel-
atively weak assumptions to ensures consistency and can accommodate fixed-effects
without incurring in the incidental parameter problem, contrarily to other non-linear
and two-stage models such as the hurdle or zero-inflated Poisson (Colin Cameron
and Trivedi, 2010). Similar to the tobit specification, this model considers only
one data-generating process and one type of zeros. One additional disadvantage
of this model is that households who have a zero valuation for all the technologies
are dropped from the sample (this explains the lower sample size for this model
specification in the Tables).
To address this issue, the zero inflated Poisson (ZIP) model considers two stages
in the decision-making process. First, each observation is considered to have a
probability p of being zero (i.e. the probability of WTP = 0), and a probability
of 1 − p of coming from a Poisson distribution. In the latter case, the response is
constrained to be non-negative, but can still be a zero. This specification therefore
allows for two type of zeros, distinguishing between the uninterested respondents
and the low valuation respondents. Different regressors can be specified for the
two parts of the models, one set to explain the probability p of being a zero-type,
and one set to explain the realisation of the Poisson random variable. For the
first component, I include a household wealth index, the size of the household,
the respondent age, whether the respondent is a woman, household priority cooking
concerns, and whether any of the stove the household has was received as a donation.
As mentioned above, fixed-effects or random-effects cannot be included in this model,
as the incidental parameter problem would make the estimator inconsistent. I cluster
the standard error at the respondent level to capture correlation between choices
made by the same person, although this does not eliminate the limitation of this
estimator when applied to a panel dataset.
Finally, the double-hurdle specification was introduced by Cragg (1971) mod-
els the decision-making problem in two steps. The first hurdle distinguish between
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respondents who are uninterested and would therefore not pay for any of the cook-
stoves (zero-type respondents), and respondents who are interested and therefore
potentially willing to pay. Conditional on being in the latter group, the second hur-
dle determines how much the respondent is willing to pay for a specific technology
or not. Again, the result of the second hurdle can be a zero, but with a different
meaning than the zeros resulting from the first hurdle. The first hurdle is modelled
as a probit on whetherWTP = 0 or not; the second hurdle is modelled as a tobit, to
account for the censoring at zero. Different set of covariates can be used to explain
the outcome of each hurdle; I use the same as described for ZIP model. To adapt
the estimator to the panel structure of the data, standard errors are estimated as
standard deviation of bootstrapped coefficients, considering respondents as clusters
and sampling a set of responses from each of them, therefore allowing for correlation
between choices made by the same respondents. Bootstrap is performed with re-
placement and allows to estimate the model non-parametrically and therefore with
fewer assumptions on the structure of the error term (Engel and Moffatt, 2014).
Results for these four non-linear estimators are presented in Table 3.7 for Goudoubo
and Table 3.9 for Kakuma. Comparing the estimates of the different models specifi-
cations provide an indication of which results are sensitive to different assumptions
on the data-generating process and which ones are robust. Overall, I consider the
linear within group estimator the preferred one for my analysis, due to its small-
sample properties, better control over respondent-specific fixed-effects and ease of
interpretation of the resulting estimates.
Detailed results for the models are presented below, while Section 3.3.5 intro-
duces the analysis and results from the ranking exercise, and broader patterns and
implications from the WTP and ranking analyses are discussed in Section 3.3.6.
Results
Goudoubo
After illustrating the estimation strategy, I now discuss the results for each camp
in more details. Starting with Goudoubo, Table 3.6 presents the results from the
linear fixed-effects within estimator. The specification in column (1) includes only
the alternative-specific constants  that is the technology-specific fixed effects 
and their interaction with the gender of the respondent, as well as the respondent-
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specific fixed effects. The baseline technology is the basic biomass ICS. Column
(2) extends the first specification including interactions between technologies and
level of experience (note that there are some technologies for which fewer than two
respondents have experience; interactions are therefore not included for these cook-
stove types). Column (3) excludes the experience interaction and includes instead
the perceived characteristics of each cookstove, together with an interaction between
whether the household's top priority is smoke reduction14 and the cookstove is per-
ceived as having health-improving characteristics (healthXtop1lesssmoke) and an
interaction between whether habits and tradition compliance is the top priority and
the cookstove considered is a non-biomass cookstove (top1tradXnon−biomasstech).
Further interactions between priorities and technologies are included as controls. Fi-
nally, column (4) includes the experience interaction as well.
The estimates suggest that households are willing to pay an average premium
of about 10 USD/month for a LPG stove (including fuel supply), and this is robust
through all the different specifications. While solar and electric cookers seem to
attract a negative premiums when characteristics are not controlled for, this result
disappears once the latter are introduced, suggesting that respondents do not dislike
these technologies per se but rather have a negative perception of their character-
istics. In fact, once characteristics are controlled for, women appear to be willing
to pay a positive premium for this technology (consistent with qualitative evidence
that men are the main opponents to this technology). There are no other significant
differences between men and women respondents in terms of technology-specific pre-
miums. The coefficient for biogas is also positive once characteristics are accounted
for. Households who have previous experience with charcoal ICS appear to be will-
ing to pay a premium for this cookstove, although this result disappears once the
perceived characteristics are controlled for, in the last column; again, this suggests
that having experience with charcoal improves the perception of the characteristics
of the stove, rather than creating a favouritism for the technology per se. With
respect to characteristics, convenience and capacity appears to be the most relevant
ones, each associated with a premium of ∼5 USD/month. Health attracts a similar
premium of about 6 USD/month, but only among households whose top priority is
smoke reduction (this result is only marginally significant though). The remaining
14Whether safety is a priority is not included in the specification for Goudoubo as only very few
respondents chose it.
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characteristics have positive coefficients, as predicted by the theory, but the null
hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero cannot be rejected at conventional
significance levels. Finally, as predicted, households who consider habits and tra-
dition compliance as the top priority have lower WTP for non-biomass technology
compared to households who have different priorities.
As a robustness check, I compare these results with estimates from the non-linear
regression models for Goudoubo, presented in Table 3.7. Note that the magnitude
of coefficients from the Poisson models (fixed-effects and zero-inflated) cannot be
directly compared to the estimates in the linear model, as they have a different
meaning, but the sign still give the average direction of the effect; Tobit model and
the second-hurdle of the double-hurdle model can instead be directly interpreted as
premiums, in the same way as the linear model. Overall, the results from the linear
model are confirmed. I find once again a strong premium for LPG, here estimated at
around 6-8 USD/month, quite close to the estimate in the linear model. The results
also provide further evidence for the presence of a negative premium for electric
cooking and, only among male respondents, for solar.
The two Poisson models detect a large negative premium for solar among re-
spondents who have previous experience with the technology  the sign of this effect
is consistent throughout all the linear and non-linear specifications15 although not
significant in any of the others. As in the previous table, all the characteristics
have positive coefficients, and convenience and capacity have the strongest effects,
all else equal, followed by reliability. Again, there is some evidence that households
whose top priority is smoke reduction value stoves perceived to be healthy and safe
more than the rest of the sample, on average, although the coefficient is not always
significant.
Kakuma
The specifications included in Table 3.8 for Kakuma are the same as previously de-
scribed for Goudoubo, with the only differences being the addition of an interaction
between whether the household's top priority is safety and the cookstove is perceived
as having health-improving characteristics (healthXtop1safe). A very limited num-
15The interaction terms experienceXsolarcooker, experienceXLPG and
healthXtop1lesssmoke are dropped in the double-hurdle model as convergence could not
be achieved when they were included.
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Table 3.6: Regression table, fixed-effects model. Outcome is (winsorized) WTP. Goudoubo
camp.
Goudoubo (1) Goudoubo (2) Goudoubo (3) Goudoubo (4)
linear,fe linear,fe linear,fe linear,fe
2.tech (wood ics) -0.28 -0.27 -0.24 -0.19
(0.593) (0.593) (0.950) (0.893)
" X female respond 1.76 1.75 1.81 1.77
(1.255) (1.259) (1.192) (1.171)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 0.19 -1.97 -0.47 -0.43
(0.558) (1.347) (0.739) (1.065)
" X female respond 0.98 1.01 1.77 1.62
(1.072) (1.092) (1.172) (1.111)
4.tech (solar) -3.01∗∗∗ -3.83∗∗∗ -0.45 -0.41
(0.651) (1.063) (1.184) (1.243)
" X female respond 0.26 -0.12 2.72∗ 2.46∗
(0.972) (1.065) (1.049) (1.071)
5.tech (biogas) 0.53 -0.30 2.91∗ 2.53∗
(1.143) (1.260) (1.212) (1.269)
" X female respond 0.97 0.64 -0.22 -0.13
(1.817) (1.869) (1.364) (1.305)
6.tech (LPG) 10.17∗∗ 9.42∗∗ 10.50∗ 10.62∗
(3.275) (2.893) (4.820) (4.398)
" X female respond -1.68 -1.61 -0.07 -0.05
(5.185) (5.521) (4.115) (4.432)
7.tech (electric) -2.86∗∗∗ -3.69∗∗∗ 0.03 -0.37
(0.601) (0.982) (1.288) (1.292)
" X female respond 0.01 -0.32 0.55 0.69
(0.943) (1.004) (1.096) (1.113)
experience X non-charcoal ics -1.66 -0.13
(1.486) (0.985)
experience X charcoal ics 3.05∗∗ 0.00
(1.140) (1.057)
experience X solar cooker -0.09 -1.58
(1.846) (1.743)
experience X LPG -4.67 -3.47
(4.316) (5.126)
convenience 5.05∗∗ 5.05∗∗
(1.835) (1.855)
duration 4.05 4.25
(3.344) (3.428)
reliability 4.49 4.70+
(2.713) (2.695)
robustness 1.67 1.56
(2.187) (2.197)
capacity 5.79∗ 5.67∗
(2.875) (2.837)
health -0.20 -0.19
(1.953) (1.961)
" X top1 less smoke 6.16+ 5.78
(3.632) (3.704)
top1 trad. X non-biomass tech -3.18+ -2.95+
(1.617) (1.504)
Other cooking priorities X tech No No Yes Yes
N 624 624 624 624
R2 0.163 0.168 0.355 0.354
adj. R2 0.146 0.147 0.299 0.300
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.7: Regression table, non-linear models. Outcome is (winsorized) WTP. Goudoubo
camp.
Goudoubo (1) Goudoubo (2) Goudoubo(3) Goudoubo (4)
xttobit xtpoisson zip double-hurdle
2.tech (wood ics) -1.49 -0.19 0.01 0.51
(2.958) (0.212) (0.140) (2.656)
" X female respond 5.48 0.54+ 0.27 0.65
(4.631) (0.293) (0.215) (3.907)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 1.16 0.19 0.41 4.04
(3.694) (0.394) (0.270) (3.245)
" X female respond 2.04 0.35 0.59∗∗ -3.41
(4.721) (0.276) (0.224) (4.135)
4.tech (solar) -12.79∗∗ -1.96∗∗ -1.34 -9.42∗
(4.652) (0.609) (1.386) (3.982)
" X female respond 14.02∗ 2.05∗∗ 1.29 7.46
(6.523) (0.708) (1.434) (5.564)
5.tech (biogas) -3.02 -0.19 1.10∗∗∗ 1.05
(3.813) (0.472) (0.260) (3.195)
" X female respond 2.94 0.80+ 0.14 -7.93
(5.320) (0.446) (0.286) (5.042)
6.tech (LPG) 7.24∗ 0.58 1.43∗∗∗ 6.43∗
(3.272) (0.398) (0.324) (2.859)
" X female respond 2.03 0.37 0.22 -8.46∗
(4.776) (0.411) (0.383) (4.221)
7.tech (electric) -12.03∗ -1.83∗∗ -1.79+ -5.94
(4.708) (0.618) (0.992) (3.891)
" X female respond 6.03 1.09 0.94 -5.93
(6.835) (0.769) (1.505) (6.702)
experience X non-charcoal ics 1.94 0.14 0.56∗ 3.67+
(2.811) (0.316) (0.233) (2.226)
experience X charcoal ics 0.36 -0.24 -0.18 0.04
(3.392) (0.217) (0.178) (3.059)
experience X solar cooker -50.78 -13.05∗∗∗ -15.28∗∗∗
(1287.478) (0.617) (1.050)
experience X lpg -4.32 0.44 -1.07∗∗
(7.102) (0.467) (0.347)
convenience 16.75∗∗∗ 1.82∗∗∗ -0.33 11.20∗∗∗
(2.032) (0.313) (0.221) (1.530)
duration 2.69 0.05 0.03 1.23
(3.134) (0.240) (0.232) (2.612)
reliability 9.12∗∗∗ 0.30 0.21 13.97∗∗∗
(2.471) (0.199) (0.262) (2.272)
robustness 4.09+ 0.19 0.05 3.33+
(2.249) (0.165) (0.171) (1.935)
capacity 11.57∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗ 9.42∗∗∗
(2.419) (0.349) (0.199) (1.829)
health 3.49 0.47∗ -0.31+ 2.25
(2.162) (0.227) (0.189) (1.621)
" X top1 less smoke 14.23 1.25 0.97∗∗∗
(10.558) (1.238) (0.280)
top1 trad. X non-biomass 0.22 -0.08 0.21 -0.64
(3.117) (0.343) (0.147) (2.631)
N 624 607 624 569
AIC 2425.20 2007.32 3440.29 1934.08
BIC 2549.41 2113.12 3604.43 2086.12
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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bers of respondents had previous experience with any of the non-biomass stoves, so
only interactions between experience and biomass ICS are included.
Again, households appear to be willing to pay an average premium of 8 USD/month
for a LPG stove (including fuel supply), and have instead a negative WTP for solar
cookers of 3 USD/month. Both are robust through all the different specifications.
In the first two specifications biogas appears to be associated with a negative pre-
mium, which disappears when characteristics are considered. The opposite occurs
for electric cookstoves, which are associated with a positive premium only in the last
two columns. This suggests that households do not perceive these two technologies
to have many positive characteristics, but when the characteristics are held constant
the valuation for these technologies increases. There are no significant differences be-
tween men and women respondents in terms of technology-specific premiums, while
households who already have experience with charcoal are willing to pay a premium
of about 2 USD/month on average for this technology.
In terms of characteristics, health attracts the highest premium, at 4.5 USD/month,
and this becomes three times larger for households whose top priority is safety;
households whose top priority is smoke reduction do not appear to have a higher
valuation for the health characteristics than the rest of the respondents. The pre-
mium for capacity is also positive and significant, at about 4 USD/month, as are the
premiums for robustness, reliability and convenient, at about 2 USD/month. Re-
spondents who prioritise habits and tradition in cooking tend to value non-biomass
stoves 2-3 USD/month less than the rest of the sample, although the coefficients are
not significantly different from zero even at 10% significance level.
Comparing these results with the coefficients estimates in Table 3.9 confirm the
findings from the linear model. The non-linear regression models confirm the pres-
ence of a strong positive premium for LPG, estimated here at 12-14 USD/month and
not significantly different from the estimates in the linear model. The estimates for
the negative premium for solar and the positive premium for electricity are also very
close to the linear model, although only significant in the two Poisson specifications.
Similarly, biogas does not appear to suffer any negative premium if characteristics
are controlled for. As in the previous model, I find that the alternative-specific
constants are no significantly different between men and women, while respondents
who are familiar with charcoal ICS are willing to pay a positive premium for it,
and households who prioritise habits and traditions have a lower valuation for non-
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Table 3.8: Regression table, fixed-effects model. Outcome is (winsorized) WTP. Kakuma
camp.
Kakuma (1) Kakuma (2) Kakuma (3) Kakuma (4)
linear,fe linear,fe linear,fe linear,fe
2.tech (wood ics) 0.78 0.77 0.81 0.82
(0.556) (0.556) (0.833) (0.837)
" X female respond 0.26 0.27 -0.80 -0.80
(0.810) (0.807) (0.943) (0.946)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 1.13 0.56 1.28 0.66
(0.815) (0.769) (0.999) (0.985)
" X female respond 0.35 0.40 0.26 0.36
(0.986) (0.997) (1.026) (1.036)
4.tech (solar) -3.12∗∗ -2.99∗∗ -3.69∗ -3.49∗
(0.962) (1.034) (1.462) (1.386)
" X female respond 1.07 1.06 1.35 1.32
(1.184) (1.194) (1.246) (1.244)
5.tech (biogas) -2.41+ -2.28+ 0.85 1.08
(1.349) (1.359) (1.507) (1.366)
" X female respond -0.96 -0.96 -1.28 -1.30
(1.625) (1.626) (1.342) (1.339)
6.tech (LPG) 8.78∗∗ 8.92∗∗∗ 8.23∗ 8.48∗∗
(2.737) (2.636) (3.246) (3.078)
" X female respond -1.01 -1.03 -0.54 -0.57
(3.363) (3.369) (3.154) (3.149)
7.tech (electric) 1.73 1.86 4.42+ 4.66∗
(1.743) (1.703) (2.411) (2.294)
" X female respond 0.42 0.41 0.35 0.33
(2.201) (2.204) (2.147) (2.141)
experience X non-charcoal ics 0.25 0.36
(1.070) (1.043)
experience X charcoal ics 1.75 2.27∗
(1.154) (1.047)
convenience 2.28∗ 2.41∗
(1.088) (1.087)
duration 1.20 1.24
(0.965) (0.972)
reliability 2.52∗∗ 2.50∗∗
(0.804) (0.817)
robustness 2.14+ 2.17∗
(1.097) (1.099)
capacity 4.34∗ 4.34∗
(1.839) (1.841)
health 4.52∗∗ 4.50∗∗
(1.557) (1.555)
" X top1 safe 11.80+ 11.88+
(6.299) (6.336)
" X top1 less smoke -0.41 -0.31
(2.590) (2.580)
top1 trad. X non-biomass tech -2.49 -2.60
(1.866) (1.831)
Other cooking priorities X tech No No Yes Yes
N 1155 1155 1155 1155
R2 0.139 0.140 0.252 0.254
adj. R2 0.130 0.129 0.218 0.218
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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biomass stove, although the latter is only significant in some specifications.
In terms of characteristics, health is again one of the most-valued ones, and the
Tobit and double-hurdle models confirm that respondents who prioritise safety have
an even larger valuation for this characteristics; this latter result is not replicated
in the two Poisson models. Results for the other characteristics are also broadly
confirmed, with capacity being among the most valued, followed by robustness,
reliability and convenience.
3.3.5 Ranking exercise
To analyse the responses to the ranking exercise, I use a rank-ordered logistic (ROL)
regression model (also known as the Plackett-Luce model or the exploded logit
model) and estimate the coefficients using the maximum likelihood estimator intro-
duced by Beggs et al. (1981).16 This model can be seen as an extension of McFadden
(1981) conditional logit model, where the characteristics of each alternative on offer
explain the decision of which alternative is selected as the preferred one, but rather
than using the preferred option as outcome it uses the position in the preference
ranking. As in the conditional logit model, an idiosyncratic additive random effect
is included to capture preference heterogeneity between individuals. The ranking
position of each cookstove is therefore a function of its characteristics, for simplicity
assumed to be linear (similar to the way the maximum WTP was defined in eq. 3.2)
and the stochastic random term ij:
rij =
K∑
k=1
βkcijk + ij
where rij is the ranking position of technology j according to respondent i. Following
the set-up of the conditional logit, if ij are independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) following a type 1 extreme value distribution, then the probability that
alternative j is ranked higher than any other can be expressed using the conditional
logistic function:
Pr[rij = 1] =
exp(
∑K
k=1 βkcijk)∑J
l=1 exp(
∑K
k=1 βkcilk)
16I perform the rank-ordered logistic regression in Stata 15, using command rologit. See Fok
et al. (2012) for an example of application of the technique.
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Table 3.9: Regression table, non-linear models. Outcome is (winsorized) WTP. Kakuma
camp.
Kakuma (1) Kakuma (2) Kakuma (3) Kakuma (4)
xttobit xtpoisson zip double-hurdle
2.tech (wood ics) 2.37 0.21 0.03 0.39
(2.911) (0.129) (0.145) (3.726)
" X female respond -1.81 -0.07 0.04 0.08
(3.492) (0.156) (0.171) (4.789)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 1.77 0.14 -0.05 -0.89
(3.214) (0.158) (0.164) (4.252)
" X female respond -0.31 0.04 0.21 -0.18
(3.477) (0.188) (0.160) (4.794)
4.tech (solar) -3.77 -0.80∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗ -1.42
(3.132) (0.213) (0.206) (3.959)
" X female respond -0.29 0.17 0.32+ -3.43
(3.506) (0.226) (0.192) (4.804)
5.tech (biogas) -2.10 -0.00 0.25 -0.46
(3.287) (0.183) (0.210) (4.142)
" X female respond -2.68 -0.23 0.14 1.18
(3.701) (0.206) (0.210) (4.859)
6.tech (LPG) 14.03∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 1.34∗∗∗ 12.20∗∗
(3.027) (0.222) (0.245) (3.896)
" X female respond -3.04 -0.05 0.06 10.10∗
(3.364) (0.250) (0.251) (4.551)
7.tech (electric) 4.93 0.55∗ 1.12∗∗∗ 4.47
(3.095) (0.218) (0.200) (3.983)
" X female respond -2.89 -0.10 -0.09 6.05
(3.481) (0.252) (0.225) (4.700)
experience X non-charcoal ics 2.37 0.19 0.08 3.12
(1.926) (0.172) (0.184) (2.403)
experience X charcoal ics 5.72∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.19 6.13+
(2.544) (0.168) (0.175) (3.479)
convenience 5.14∗∗∗ 0.20∗ -0.30∗ 5.67∗∗∗
(1.338) (0.102) (0.142) (1.357)
duration 3.34∗∗ -0.03 0.01 3.33∗
(1.267) (0.074) (0.108) (1.380)
reliability 6.82∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.20 9.01∗∗∗
(1.188) (0.086) (0.124) (1.300)
robustness 6.06∗∗∗ 0.19+ 0.49∗∗∗ 11.86∗∗∗
(1.605) (0.106) (0.130) (1.687)
capacity 8.14∗∗∗ 0.14 0.63∗∗∗ 24.12∗∗∗
(1.805) (0.114) (0.121) (2.105)
health 7.43∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 2.11
(1.587) (0.147) (0.141) (1.500)
" X top1 safe 14.09∗∗ -0.21 -0.11 17.66∗∗
(4.921) (0.191) (0.168) (5.883)
" X top1 less smoke 2.31 -0.03 0.09 7.29∗
(4.124) (0.183) (0.180) (3.420)
top1 trad. X non-biomass -3.11 -0.21 -0.41∗ -5.60∗
(2.287) (0.198) (0.207) (2.565)
N 1155 855 1155 1249
AIC 5793.61 4409.65 10515.46 7229.29
BIC 5930.01 4518.92 10702.38 7429.36
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
206
After the top-ranked cookstove has been selected, the second-ranked stove is nothing
else than the preferred among the remaining options, and so on in a sequential
way. The probability of observing a given ranking sequence is therefore the product
of the probability of each rank position, that is the product of conditional logit
probabilities17:
Pr[{ri1, ...riJ}] =
J−1∏
j=1
exp(
∑K
k=1 βkcirijk)∑J
l=j exp(
∑K
k=1 βkcirilk)
(3.4)
The coefficients of interest β1...βK can then be estimated using maximum likelihood.
Results are presented in Table 3.10 for Goudoubo, and Table 3.11 for Kakuma.
As remarked in the data Section above, the three-stone fire is now included among
the cookstove alternatives household are asked to rank.
Column (1) of each table estimate the model including the traditional three-
stone fire. This specification does not include perceived cookstove characteristics
as these were not asked for the traditional stove, but introduces an additional in-
teraction term between whether the alternative is a traditional three-stone fire and
whether the respondent selected tradition and habits compliance as their top prior-
ity (top1tradXtradstove). Column (2) excludes the three-stone fire and includes the
perceived cookstove characteristics and the interaction between the health charac-
teristic and dummies identifying whether the household chose less smoke and safety
as their top priority.
Both models include alternative-specific constants (ASCs), interactions between
ASCs and the gender of the respondent, and between ASCs and the experience level,
and the interaction on whether the alternative being considered is a non-biomass
cookstove and the respondent selected tradition and habits compliance as their top
priority. According to the model specification, only regressors and interaction terms
that vary by cookstove enter the model, while respondent's specific characteristics
that are constant over the different alternatives are dropped.
Goudoubo
Results for Goudoubo (Table 3.10) show that enhanced firewood ICS tend to be
the preferred cookstove type, followed by the enhanced charcoal ICS, and basic
ICS (reference technology). The higher preference for charcoal with respect to the
17Notation is adapted from Fok et al. (2012).
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basic ICS becomes close to zero for women respondents, confirming that charcoal
is a fuel that attracts men preferences, as documented by qualitative research on
genderisation of fuel.
The only clean technology that has an average ranking as high as the basic
ICS is LPG, while all the other clean technologies have higher probabilities to be
ranked below the biomass cookstoves. In particular, electric cookers and biogas are
associated with the lowest ranking positions, while solar performs slightly better,
especially once the perceived characteristics of the stoves are controlled for.
Interestingly, the traditional three-stone fire tends to be ranked below the biomass
ICS and LPG, but still above the rest of the options, and women tend to rank it
lower than men. This supports the finding of studies on intra-household preferences
and decision-making such as Miller and Mobarak (2013) that women tend to be
more interested in non-traditional stoves than men, but they may lack the agency
to make decisions for the household and resources to purchase the new cookstove.
In terms of previous experience, respondents who are familiar with non-charcoal
ICS tend to rank these technologies lower, while those who have experience with
charcoal ICS rank it higher. The coefficients for the interaction between experience
and solar cookers, and experience and LPG are similarly positive, but not significant.
Consistently with what would be expected, perceived positive characteristics
are on average positively (or at most insignificantly) associated with an improved
ranking of a cooking solution. The strongest effect is achieved when stoves are
perceived to be `convenient' to use  interestingly, this was the characteristic with
the largest coefficient in the WTP analysis, as well.
As for priorities, respondents who want smoke reduction do not seem to rank
stoves they perceive to deliver health and safety higher than other respondents 
the sign of the coefficient is even negative in this case. Respondents whose priority
is habits and tradition compliance do not appear to rank biomass and non-biomass
technologies differently from other respondents.
Kakuma
Table 3.11 presents the results for Kakuma. Again, enhanced firewood ICS is associ-
ated with higher ranks, followed by enhanced charcoal ICS, the basic ICS (reference
technology), solar cookers and LPG, with no significant difference in average rank-
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Table 3.10: Regression table, rank-ordered logit. Outcome is ranking position of each
cooking technology. Goudoubo camp.
Goudoubo (1) Goudoubo (2)
rank-ordered logit rank-ordered logit
2.tech (wood ics) 1.14∗∗∗ (0.178) 1.32∗∗∗ (0.212)
" X female respond 0.02 (0.260) -0.14 (0.315)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 0.73∗∗ (0.232) 0.82∗∗ (0.262)
" X female respond -0.55∗ (0.276) -0.70∗ (0.321)
4.tech (solar) -1.48∗∗∗ (0.334) -0.92∗∗ (0.336)
" X female respond -0.58 (0.410) -0.62 (0.435)
5.tech (biogas) -1.77∗∗∗ (0.321) -1.31∗∗∗ (0.312)
" X female respond 0.57 (0.437) 0.37 (0.434)
6.tech (LPG) -0.17 (0.272) -0.17 (0.293)
" X female respond -0.47 (0.313) -0.54 (0.358)
7.tech (electric) -1.81∗∗∗ (0.308) -1.29∗∗∗ (0.331)
" X female respond -0.43 (0.464) -0.59 (0.512)
8.tech (traditional) -1.09∗∗∗ (0.232)
" X female respond -0.55+ (0.298)
experience X non-charcoal ics -0.39+ (0.202) -0.47∗ (0.228)
experience X charcoal ics 0.56+ (0.324) 0.59∗ (0.293)
experience X solar cooker 0.25 (0.451) 0.11 (0.462)
experience X LPG 1.23 (0.837) 1.07 (1.047)
convenience 1.05∗∗∗ (0.197)
duration 0.85+ (0.504)
reliability 0.59+ (0.338)
robustness 0.15 (0.271)
capacity 0.51 (0.331)
health 0.02 (0.256)
" X top1 less smoke -0.85∗ (0.380)
top1 trad. X non-biomass tech 0.34 (0.395) 0.02 (0.353)
top1 trad. X trad stove 0.14 (0.397)
N 1032 903
pseudo R2 0.205 0.269
AIC 1890.73 1444.56
BIC 1989.51 1559.90
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
X in the name of a regressor indicates interactions between variables.
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ing among these technologies. As before, the alternative-specific constant for the
traditional three-stone fire is negative, indicating that this stove tends to be ranked
below the basic ICS and the other stoves mentioned above, and women tend to rank
this stove lower than men, although the difference in this case is not significantly
different from zero at conventional significance level. Biogas and electric stoves tend
to have the lowest ranking.
Households who have previous experience with non-charcoal biomass ICS tend
to rank these technology lower than households who have no experience, suggesting
that experience has not been satisfactory and might have created skepticism towards
this type of cookstoves.
In terms of characteristics, all the coefficients are positive and significant, with
the strongest being convenience and reliability, followed by health, robustness and
capacity, and duration of energy supply. Results on the significance of the different
characteristics confirm the results from the valuation analysis. Contrarily to the
valuation analysis though, in the ranking exercise households who prioritise safety
and smoke reduction do not rank stove perceived to match these characteristics any
higher than households with different priorities. Finally, consistent with expecta-
tions, households whose priority is habits and tradition compliance tend to rank the
three-stone fire higher and the non-biomass clean cookstoves lower than households
with different priorities.
3.3.6 Discussion of results
Overall, these results confirm the same qualitative pattern as the valuation anal-
ysis, with several similarities between the two camps. My findings point towards
a preference for good quality enhanced biomass-ICS, that can be used with the
fuel households are familiar with, but also for LPG, that emerges as a technology
households value and are interested in in all the analyses. Nevertheless, it might
be more difficult to trigger the switch to cleaner cookstoves and fuels in households
who value habits and traditions, as this appear to have a significant negative effect
on households preferences for non-traditional stoves.
Despite the evidence for a certain willingness to pay a premium for LPG in the
previous section, here I found no statistically significant difference in the ranking for
LPG stoves if compared to basic ICS. The two facts can be reconciled by looking at
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Table 3.11: Regression table, rank-ordered logit. Outcome is ranking position of each
cooking technology. Kakuma camp.
Kakuma (1) Kakuma (2)
rank-ordered logit rank-ordered logit
2.tech (wood ics) 0.37∗∗∗ (0.108) 0.44∗∗∗ (0.128)
" X female respond 0.02 (0.134) -0.01 (0.158)
3.tech (charcoal ics) 0.35+ (0.178) 0.32 (0.221)
" X female respond 0.03 (0.173) -0.08 (0.204)
4.tech (solar) -0.25 (0.196) -0.34 (0.240)
" X female respond -0.06 (0.219) -0.03 (0.254)
5.tech (biogas) -1.38∗∗∗ (0.299) -1.28∗∗∗ (0.336)
" X female respond -0.43 (0.368) -0.44 (0.397)
6.tech (LPG) -0.42 (0.282) -0.50 (0.313)
" X female respond -0.03 (0.318) 0.06 (0.337)
7.tech (electric) -1.18∗∗∗ (0.305) -1.11∗∗ (0.342)
" X female respond 0.02 (0.355) -0.08 (0.376)
8.tech (traditional) -0.78∗∗∗ (0.173)
" X female respond -0.08 (0.182)
experience X non-charcoal ics -0.24 (0.148) -0.61∗∗ (0.198)
experience X charcoal ics -0.07 (0.138) -0.17 (0.170)
convenience 0.71∗∗∗ (0.105)
duration 0.38∗∗ (0.126)
reliability 0.63∗∗∗ (0.106)
robustness 0.49∗∗∗ (0.140)
capacity 0.48∗∗ (0.164)
health 0.48∗∗∗ (0.125)
" X top1 safe -0.01 (0.475)
" X top1 less smoke 0.17 (0.340)
top1 trad. X non-biomass tech -0.61∗ (0.239) -0.79∗∗ (0.270)
top1 trad. X trad stove 1.01∗∗ (0.350)
N 1800 1575
pseudo R2 0.095 0.134
AIC 3826.99 3004.54
BIC 3925.91 3127.87
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
X in the name of a regressor indicates interactions between variables.
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the different scenarios they refer to and at the practice of stove stacking. In fact,
households appear on average to be willing to pay a premium for LPG when this is
the only technology available, but if they are asked to consider a scenario in which
all the products are available, they tend to rank LPG below the enhanced biomass
ICS.
Yet, stove stacking, as well as fuel stacking, are a common practice in the set-
tlements (in Goudoubo, more than 30% of the respondents have used at least one
secondary stove in the past year, while this is slightly less than 20% in Kakuma), as
well as in the global South in general, so that households preferred solution might
well be to have both a biomass and an LPG stove, especially if supply of LPG is
unreliable.
Another possibility is that this difference between the two analysis is the result of
a trade-off between higher-value but more expensive stoves, such as LPG, and more
affordable biomass ICS that deliver less improvements. The WTP analysis confirm
that households recognise and value the benefits of LPG stoves, but the ranking
exercise suggests that if they have the choice they might opt for more affordable and
more familiar options instead, highlighting how lack of resources and purchasing
power might be a strong issue.
A possible explanation for the strong LPG premium in both camps is that there
are other characteristics associated with LPG stoves that raise their values and are
not controlled for in the model - for example LPG might be considered as a `status'
or aspirational good, as in Lee et al. (2016), following Veblen's theory of conspicuous
consumption, or it could be the result of the use of dummies variable to define the
characteristics rather than a continuous measure.
The striking difference in the importance of health between the two settings can
instead be explained looking at the specific context of the two settlements, as well
as to the perceptions of respondents about the urgency of the health consequences
of cooking  households in Kakuma cooking indoor and reporting more issues with
smoke and accidents, while households in Goudoubo tend to cook outdoor and report
fewer problems.
Overall, respondents appear to value perceived characteristics and low valuation
for a stove is explained by the perceived absence of those characteristics. I found
no significant differences between men and women in their preferences for specific
technology type, with the exception of men appearing to like charcoal ICS and
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traditional three-stone fire slightly more than women in Goudoubo.
In both camps, households with experience with firewood ICS tend to rank them
lower than households who have no experience. This might suggest that cookstove
models introduced in the camp have failed to meet household expectations and
needs, and have created skepticism towards this technology among the households
who have used them. There are evidence that the opposite occurred for charcoal ICS,
as households with experience value them more. To investigate this latter evidence
in more details, in the next part of the Chapter I assess the performance of the
non-traditional cookstoves already used in the camps over the different dimensions
of fuel savings, health and safety, time use, and women and children workload.
3.4 Part 2: Benefits of non-traditional cookstoves
3.4.1 The promised land: hypotheses on the benefits of non-
traditional cookstoves
In the second part of the Chapter, I look for evidence that the non-traditional
cookstoves in use in the camps are effectively associated with improvements in the
lives of their users, with respect to the traditional (and free) alternative of the three-
stone fire. Information on the cookstoves used by respondents in the sample have
been provided in Section 3.2.3, Table C.1 and photographs in Appendix C.1. Most
of the non-traditional stoves used by respondents in the sample are basic ICS models
which can accommodate both charcoal and firewood, although the latter tend to be
by far the most popular fuel for cooking meals in both camps. Following the main
research questions explored in the literature on cookstove benefits, I consider four
dimensions of welfare  namely, energy efficiency and environmental gains, health
and safety, time use, and the workload burden on women and children. As informed
by the existing literature on the topic, I formulate the following sets of hypotheses:
HP1: Energy efficiency Do households who use non-traditional stoves con-
sume less firewood? Given that almost all of the stoves in the sample are biomass-
fuelled, this question is really related to whether the non-traditional cookstoves
use the fuel more efficiently. In addressing this question I take into consideration
two issues. On one side, the main complaint by residents of both settlements is
the insufficiency of firewood to cover for their basic needs, meaning that binding
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availability-constraints might be an issue. There may be no difference in quantity
consumed by households using different stoves, simply because households may con-
sume all the fuel they have access to and still be short of the amount they would
consider optimal, given their utility and budget. On the other side, more efficient
stoves would make cooking cheaper at the margin, and may push households to use
the stove for longer hours and cook more, triggering a `rebound effect'. To account
for these possibilities, I test two hypotheses: (i) households who use non-traditional
stoves consume less firewood overall, and (ii) consume less firewood per hour of use
of the stove. Evidence on the rebound effect is further investigated under the time
use hypothesis.
HP2: Health and safety Are households who use non-traditional stoves less
exposed to health and safety hazard? In particular, I check whether these households
are less likely to report accidents related to stove use and problems with smoke than
households who use a three-stone fire.
HP3: Time use Do households who use non-traditional stoves spend less time
in cooking-related activities (cooking, and fuel collection, purchase and prepara-
tion)? As mentioned in the literature review, a few issues should be accounted for
in this case. On one side, improved energy efficiency could make the actual cooking
of a meal faster, and therefore reduce the number of hours a stove is used. Yet, if a
rebound effect were present, the sign of the relationship might be reverted, as house-
holds might decide to cook more food or cook for longer in the new optimum. At
the extreme, if the rebound effect results in even more fuel being used than before,
households might need to spend more time finding firewood to collect or purchase.
Longer times might also result from the need to prepare the fuel in specific ways (for
example making wood chips and cutting the wood at the appropriate size for the
stove, or make charcoal out of wood) or procure fuel that is more difficult to find
in the local markets (such as briquettes and pellets, or charcoal), depending on the
cookstoves requirements. Moreover, in some cases longer times have been reported
to cook the same meal with a non-traditional stove, as documented for example by
Adkins et al. (2010).
HP4: Gender and children workloadWomen and children are the ones most
affected by efficiency and health gains, as they are the ones who traditionally spend
more time carrying out cooking-related activities and firewood collection. A part
from the efficiency and health channels, the introduction of a technological innova-
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tion such as a non-traditional stove, may shift the gender balance of cooking-related
activities. For example, preparing and purchasing the fuel for non-traditional stoves
may be perceived as activities that require a different set of skills, and may there-
fore entice a greater involvement of men than it would be the case with traditional
stoves and traditional fuel. The `genderisation' of fuel, with firewood associated with
women, and charcoal and LPG being more neutral or even associated with men, is
documented in the literature.
3.4.2 Estimation strategies
To investigate these hypotheses, I refer to the potential outcome framework and
Rubin's Causal Model (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986). Following the notation and
terminology of Angrist et al. (1996), I define the exclusive use of non-traditional
cookstoves as my treatment indicator (Di), and various indicators for energy effi-
ciency, health and safety, time use, and women and children workload as the realised
and observed outcome (Yi). Every observation unit can then be thought of as having
two potential outcomes, Y0i and Y1i, indicating respectively the outcome if the unit
were not subject to the treatment, and the outcome if they were. In this case, Y0i
represents the outcome if the household were using a non-traditional cookstove and
Y1i as the outcome if the same household were instead using the traditional three-
stone fire. The effect of the treatment on that household can then be obtained as
the difference in potential outcomes:
αi = Y1i − Y0i. (3.5)
Of course, for each household only one of the potential outcomes can be observed,
i.e. the realised outcome Yi, and the problem of estimating the effects of the treat-
ment becomes one of correcting for these `missing' or unobservable counterfactual
observations - the `fundamental problem of causal inference'. Under specific iden-
tification assumptions, I can still estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) by
comparing the outcomes of treated and untreated units:
αATE = E[Y1 − Y0]. (3.6)
The gold standard for this type of causal inference analysis is to conduct a
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Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs), in which treatment is assigned at random:
(Y1, Y0) ⊥ D
Random assignment (i.e. independence of assignments) may then be used as an iden-
tification assumption to prove that the ATE can be estimated as a simple difference
in means between the treated and untreated groups:
E[Y |D = 1]− E[Y |D = 0] = αATE. (3.7)
and a simple OLS estimator can be used:
Yi = β0 + βDDi + i
When RCT-like studies are unfeasible and only observational data are available
 as in my case  the identification assumption is likely to be violated and a differ-
ence in means may result in biased estimates. The main threat to identification is
sample-selection, as households that decide to purchase a non-traditional cookstove
are effectively self-selecting themselves into the treatment sample, and some of the
characteristics that make them want to have a non-traditional cookstove might then
affect the outcome as well.
As an example, households concerned with health issues or who already suffer
from respiratory problems might be more interested in purchasing a non-traditional
cookstove, but they might also use the cookstove more carefully or adopt other
behavioural adjustments to reduce smoke exposure and accidents no matter what
the stove is, and therefore affect the outcome. In this case, the results of a simple
OLS, unconditional and conditional on covariates, should be interpreted as simple
correlations, unless it can sensibly be argued that the allocation of traditional and
non-traditional cookstoves among the households in the settlement is as good as
random - or only determined by characteristics that are orthogonal to the outcome.
This might not be the case in the context under analysis, as the type of stove used by
a household (D) is the result of purchase decisions, product availability, households'
preferences and characteristics, and budget constraints. This means that treated
and untreated households are not directly comparable groups.
I therefore have a problem of endogeneity and sample-selection, and the main
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task of this Section is to present ways to address this problem and how ignoring it
would lead to misleading conclusions for the analysis. A number of methodologies
have been proposed in the literature to achieve this purpose, and Greenstone and
Gayer (2009) and Mueller et al. (2011) in particular present a survey of the most
relevant ones in the fields of environmental economics  the former  and health
benefits linked to stove use  the latter.
Given that my dataset consists of cross-sectional survey data, I am not able to
track households over time nor to use pre- and post-intervention observations for
the same households. I therefore cannot use panel data analysis and the difference-
in-difference methodology to control for unobservables confounders such as the id-
iosyncratic characteristics of each households, but I have to rely mainly on selection
on observables to indirectly control for them. To do this, I rely on a wide set of
relevant socio-demographic and economic characteristics and household-specific in-
formation on cooking-related activities to make the treated and untreated groups
more comparable, at least with respect to their observable characteristics. I also use
free cookstove distribution programs that happened in the past and information on
whether the stoves were received as a donation, possibly at random, as instrument
to predict the treatment and correct for sample-selection, following an instrumental
variable (IV) approach.
Nevertheless, I acknowledge the limitation of the dataset to identify causal effects
and results should therefore be considered as exploratory. I believe that given the
rarity of datasets on energy-related issues in refugee settlements, this analysis can
still provide interesting insights in an understudied context, but I encourage further
research on the topic and hope that future data collection efforts in refugee camps
will adopt a design better suited to perform causal inference.
With this caveat in mind, I now show how an instrumental variable approach
and treatment-effects estimators based on observation re-weighting can address the
issue of sample-selection, and what assumptions need to hold.
Instrumental variable approach using cookstove distribution programmes
as instrument
Even though the purchase of non-traditional cookstoves is hardly random, receiv-
ing one as part of a distribution program in the context of refugee settlements
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might be as good as random, if every household has the same likelihood of receiving
one. Receiving a non-traditional cookstove as donation18 could therefore be used as
the exogenous instrument in an IV regression model. Following the notation and
methodology in Angrist et al. (1996), I define the instrumental variable as Z or `en-
couragement', and define Dz as the potential treatment status given the realisation
of the encouragement, i.e. D0 if the household does not have a donated stove, and
D1 if they have. I estimate this model using a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator
and using the indices versions of the treatment variable, as described in the data
section. A continuous treatment is better suited for this type of models as the both
stages in a 2SLS are estimated using linear models.
The validity of the instrumental variable approach relies on three assumptions:
the exclusion restriction, or independence assumption; the first-stage or relevant-
instrument assumption; and the monotonicity assumption (Angrist et al., 1996).
The assumption that donations are as good as random and all households are as
likely to receive one corresponds to the independence of the instrument, or `ignor-
ability' assumption required for identification of the estimator. The assumption
of independence of the instrument implies `exclusion restriction', i.e. the excluded
instrument Z can have no effect on Y except through D, which is to say that do-
nations of a cleaner stove can only affect the welfare outcome Y through the actual
utilization of the stove, which - although untestable - is clearly a sensible assumption
to make. As a consequence, any correlation between stove donations (Z) and the
welfare outcome (Y ) can be attributed to the use of the stove (the actual treatment,
D):
(Y0, Y1, D0, D1) ⊥ Z
The first stage or relevance of the instrument assumption require that the instrument
must induce variation in the treatment:
0 < P (Z = 1) < 1 and P (D1 = 1) 6= P (D0 = 1)
Monotonicity implies absence of `defiers', individuals that would not use a cleaner
stove if donated one, but would use it if they were not donated one (D0 = 1 and
18In practice, I use data on whether the household has a primary or secondary stove that was
donated. I acknowledge that this is not ideal, as this indicator does not include households who
received a stove donation but are not using it for whatever reason. Unfortunately, I have no data
on the latter.
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D1 = 0, thereforeD1 < D0). Although not testable, this seems a sensible assumption
in this setting:
D1 ≥ D0
The first-stage assumption can be tested by regressing the treatment on the
instruments. Nevertheless, even if the excluded instrument is significantly correlated
with the treatment, the instrument might be weak, i.e. the instrument might explain
only a small proportion of the variation in the treatment. This might indeed be the
case in the setting considered in this Chapter as many NGOs and agencies active
in the settlements have moved from donation-based to market-based interventions,
and as a consequence donations might not be a dominant driver of the adoption of
non-traditional cookstoves.
As a rule of thumb, this problem can be diagnosed if the F-statistic of the
excluded instrument obtained in the first stage of a 2SLS estimator is less than 10
(Stock et al., 2002). If the instrument is weak the confidence intervals for the IV
estimator might then be unreliable and the variance too large. To address this issue,
I test the null hypothesis that the treatment coefficient is not significantly different
from zero using Anderson-Rubin (AR) test statistic (robust to weak instruments,
see Finlay and Magnusson, 2009), and report the corresponding p-value19 (indicated
as weak IV - robust p-value) below the p-value of the Wald test.
The exclusion restriction requires that donations of a cleaner stove can only affect
the welfare outcomes through the actual utilization of the stove, which - although
untestable - seems a sensible assumption to make. Nevertheless the exclusion re-
striction may be violated if households who received the donated stove were also
provided with health and safety information, and other type of training or educa-
tion which might affect the outcome independently from the stove used. If so, it
would be impossible to attribute the welfare effects to the phasing out of three-stone
stoves rather than to these additional features. This assumption is not testable.
The independence of the instrument may also not hold if donations are not
random, for instance if they are targeted on characteristics that might affect the
outcome as well. In this case, endogeneity would bias the estimator.
19The AR test is conducted in Stata 15 using the command weakiv written by Finlay et al.
(2013) and based on Finlay and Magnusson (2009).
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Double-robust treatment-effects estimators
Without more detailed information on the donation programmes, I cannot exclude
that donations were targeted, for example by giving priorities to households with a
female head, or with higher dependency ratio, or larger household size. To control
for these possibilities, I estimate the average treatment effect using two `double-
robust' treatment-effects estimators for observational data: the inverse-probability
weighting regression-adjusted (IPWRA) estimator, introduced by Wooldridge (2007,
2010) and the augmented inverse-probability weighting (AIPW) estimator, based on
Robins et al. (1995). Treatment-effects estimators are designed for binary, or at most
categorical, treatment variables.
These estimators combine two models, one to predict the treatment status of
each household and one to predict the potential outcome under the treatment and
under the control scenario for each household. A convenient property of IPWRA
and AIPW estimators is that they are `doubly robust', meaning that they provide
correct estimates of the treatment effect as long as at least one of the two models
is correctly specified. Or equivalently, they are robust to misspecification in one of
the two models (as long as the other one is correct).
Estimation of the ATE follows a three-step approach. First, the treatment model
is estimated using a a logistic regression and the predicted probability of being in the
treatment group (or propensity score) is used to construct the inverse-probability
weights. The following steps include estimating the regression model for the poten-
tial outcomes in each treatment status, conditioned on covariates, and then com-
paring the mean predicted outcome under treatment with the mean under control
to obtain the ATE. These two steps are different depending on the estimator used
(StataCorp, 2014).
The inverse-probability weighting component of both estimators helps address
the endogeneity issue introduced by the problem of sample selection of households
into the treatment. The intuition is that after conditioning on covariates in both
models, the treatment and the potential outcomes should be independent from each
other, the assumption required for identification of the ATE. It is effective as long
as participation in the programme is induced by `observable' characteristics of the
households, such as in the example of donations targeted to large households, and
as far as the observables considered in the analysis can control or proxy for relevant
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unobservable confounders (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002).
Similar to matching estimators, the main identification assumptions for the iden-
tification of the ATE rely on conditional independence or selection on observables:
(Y1, Y0) ⊥ D|X
and on the common-support, or overlap assumption, stating that every household
has a positive probability of being selected in the treatment group, or in the control
group:
0 < Pr(D = 1|X) < 1 for (almost all) X
To select the covariates and the functional form for the treatment model, I use
a Bayesian information criterion (BIC) minimisation procedure, as suggested by
Cattaneo et al. (2013) in the context of treatment-effects estimators. I consider
polynomials including different combinations of covariates and interaction terms up
to the second order, and use the one with the minimum BIC as preferred specification
for the treatment model. I specify the treatment model as a logit, and the outcome
model as a linear, logit or fractional logit specifications depending on whether the
outcome is continuous, binary or fractional. The overall model is estimated using
moment conditions on estimating equations and a GMM estimator, and a robust
sandwich estimator for the standard errors, corrected for the three-step procedure.
As a diagnostic tool for the overlap assumption, I plot the densities of the esti-
mated probability of being in the treatment or control group, as estimated in the
treatment model component of the regression. The resulting plots are shown in
Figure 3.5 and do not raise concerns against the validity of the overlap assump-
tion. To confirm that the inverse-probability weighting is successful in balancing
the distribution of the covariates between the treatment and control group, I run
the overidentification test for covariance balance, introduced by Imai and Ratkovic
(2014).
Endogenous treatment-effects estimator
As a further robustness check, I use an endogenous treatment-effects estimator that
accounts for the endogeneity of the treatment using a control-function approach
(Wooldridge, 2010). Similar to the other estimators described in this Section, this
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estimator consists of a treatment model to estimate the likelihood of belonging to the
treatment group, using a probit model; and an outcome model to explain the final
outcome under treatment and control condition, estimated using a linear, probit
or fractional regression depending on whether the outcome is continuous, binary, or
fractional. Applying the control-function approach, the residuals from the treatment
model are included in the outcome model as additional regressors. In this way the
model controls for the correlation between unobservables included in the error term
of the treatment model and the unobservables included in the error term of the
outcome model. This correlation is what causes the endogeneity problem discussed
above.
Under the control-function approach, an endogeneity test can be performed by
checking if the correlation between the unobservables in the two models  estimated
as an auxiliary parameter in the regression  is significant.20 The null hypothesis
is that the correlation is not significant, and there is therefore no endogeneity. In
this case, the results from the double-robust treatment-effects estimators are to be
preferred. The χ2 statistics and the p-value of the endogeneity test are included in
the Tables presented below.
Adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing
Because I test the effect of using a non-traditional cookstove on multiple outcomes,
significant effects may be found simply due to chance; for example, at a 10% signif-
icance level, I can expect to mistakenly reject one null-hypothesis21 out of every ten
hypotheses I test. To address this issue, I correct the p-values of my tests to control
for the false discovery rate (FDR). Compared with other type of adjustments, such
as the Bonferroni correction, FDR-corrections do not reduce dramatically the power
of the test, which is important in my setting, due to the small sample size.
More specifically, I follow Anderson (2008) and Baird et al. (2019) and use the
two-stage q-values introduced by Benjamini et al. (2006). The procedure is a sharp-
ened version of the FDR correction in Benjamini and Hochberg (1995), and is
implemented using the code provided by Michael Anderson, as used in Anderson
(2008). The sharpened q-value is included in the Tables with estimates of the ATE,
20The endogenous treatment-effects estimator and the endogeneity test are implemented in Stata
15 using the command eteffects and the corresponding post-estimation options.
21The null hypothesis is that the treatment has no effect on the outcome.
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below the p-value.
3.4.3 Data: outcomes, `treatment' and covariates
To test the hypotheses listed in the previous section, I construct a set of outcome
indicators, twof for each welfare dimension considered: total quantity of firewood
consumed per month and quantity of firewood consumed per hour of use of the stove
for energy efficiency; whether smoke problems were reported and whether cooking-
related accidents were reported22 to explore health and safety benefits; how many
hours per day the stove is on and the total time spent in cooking-related activities
by all the members of the household (including cooking and fuel collection, purchase
and preparation) to investigate time savings; and finally the share of the total time
that is contributed by female members of the household, and whether children are
involved in firewood collection for the last dimension.
The main treatment (treatment) is an indicator of whether the respondent reports
their cookstove to be different from the three-stone fire. For households that use a
secondary stove, the treatment is an indicator of whether both stoves are different
from the three-stone fire. Due to the heterogeneity of the stoves and fuels used in
the camp, and the difficulty of identifying the quality tier of the products from just
one question, I use further information on the material of the stove and how it was
produced, the fuel used, whether the household cooks indoor and whether a chimney
is used, to construct three other versions of the treatment, and use them to assess
the robustness of the results. More specifically, I construct another binary indicator
that reassigns stoves of lower quality (for example artisanal and self-built) to the
control group (treatment adjusted), and two continuous indices, the first one as a
summative index that assigns a +1 score for characteristics associated with higher
quality and -1 for indicators of lower quality (treatment index ), and the second one
as a weighted average of the quality scores determined using factor analysis and
extracting the first factor using the Bartlett method (treatment pca)
To account for sample-selection into the treatment group using an instrumental
variable approach, I use whether the cookstove was received as a donation as instru-
ment. Detailed definitions of the treatment and outcome variables and how they
are constructed are provided in Appendix C.3, while summary statistics for these
22Almost no accidents were reported in Goudoubo, so this outcome is only analysed for Kakuma.
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variables and other characteristics of the sample are presented in Table C.2.
Several covariates representing households' characteristics such as wealth, demo-
graphics, decision-power and priority concerns around cooking, are used as controls
to model either the outcome or selection into the treatment. Due to the small sam-
ple size, I use factor analysis to synthesize information on the economic situation of
the household, and on the level of female empowerment, into indices.
The female empowerment index is constructed using information on whether
the head of the household is a woman, whether women in the household go out at
night, work outside the house, are studying, or their main activity is housekeeping,
whether large purchase decisions are responsibility of the woman or the man, whether
everyday purchases are responsibility of the woman or the man, and the gender-ratio
in the household.
The wealth index is constructed using information on the natural logarithm of
the per capita income of the household23, share of adults in the household who are
working, whether the household has a radio, tv, and lighting, how many mobile
phones per capita they have, whether they have a solar lamp or solar-home system
they purchased themselves (not received as donations).
The variables used for these indices are a mix of continuous and categorical
variables, so a matrix of polychoric correlation is constructed before running factor
analysis. After applying factor analysis, the first factor for each group of variables is
extracted using the Bartlett method. The wealth and female empowerment indices
are then constructed as weighted sums of the original variables, according to the
loading factors obtained.
3.4.4 Estimations of the average treatment effects
In this Section I present the results of the estimations of ATEs (average treatment
effects) using the estimation strategies presented in Section 3.4.2. Consistent with
the design of the different estimators, I use the binary versions of the treatment with
the IPWRA, AIPW and endogenous treatment-effects estimator, and the continuous
indices in the IV and OLS specifications, the latter presented for comparison. I
use the different definitions of the treatment defined above as robustness checks.
Estimated ATEs and potential outcome under no treatment, obtained with the
23The income is only used in Goudoubo, as the variable has many missing values in Kakuma
and has been found to be under-reported.
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treatment-effects estimators, are presented in Tables 3.12 to 3.15 for Goudoubo and
3.16 to 3.19 for Kakuma, including both the regular p-value and the sharpened
q-value adjusted for multiple-hypotheses testing in brackets.
The Chi square statistics and p-value for the endogeneity test when using the
endogenous treatment-effects estimator are also included in the Table. I fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the treatment is not endogenous at 10% significance level
in all cases, and in all but one case at the 5% significance level. The IPWRA and
AIPW are therefore my preferred estimators and I discuss those results in more
details for each camp; for all outcomes, results estimated with the IPWRA and the
AIPW estimators are very close. Figure 3.5 shows the overlap plots as a diagnostics
in favour of the validity of the overlap assumption.
Finally, Tables C.3 and C.8 show results for the first stage of the 2SLS used for
the IV specification, for Goudoubo and Kakuma respectively, while Tables C.4 to C.7
present the results of the second stage (only the coefficient for treatment index) for
Goudoubo and C.9 to C.12 for Kakuma, including also results from an OLS model
for comparison. Although the first-stage regressions support the relevance of the
instrument (stove donation is a positive and significant predictor of the treatment
index), the F-statistics for the excluded instruments is small and less than 10 in both
camps, suggesting that the 2SLS estimates suffer from a weak instrument problem.
The result Tables therefore include a weak-instrument-robust p-value obtained from
the Anderson-Rubin (AR) test, and the sharpened q-values are calculated based
on these values rather than the Wald-test p-values. Due to the weak instrument
problem, these results are presented as a robustness check, and the IPWRA and
AIPW are confirmed as the preferred specifications for the analysis.
Goudoubo
In Goudoubo, the use of non-traditional cookstoves appears to be associated with
significant improvements in energy efficiency, both in terms of total firewood use, and
of firewood per hour of use of the cookstove. Results estimated with the IPWRA and
the AIPW estimators are very close, and they are significant even after correcting for
multiple-hypothesis testing with the sharpened q-values. Households who still cook
on a traditional cookstove are estimated to use on average around 130 kg of firewood
per month and around 0.8 kg per hour when the stove is in use, while households who
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Figure 3.5: Plots of the estimated density of the probability of belonging to the treatment
group and to the control group.
only use non-traditional cookstoves save on average 48 kg of firewood per month, and
0.25 kg per hour of stove use (Table 3.12). The savings are even larger when only
higher quality non-traditional stoves are considered as treatment (the treatment,
adjusted variable). These savings are equivalent to a 30-40% reduction in fuel use;
this is still shorter than the 40-60% decrease24 that the most common metallic
biomass ICS introduced in the camp was supposed to deliver.
In terms of health and safety, I only test the effect of the treatment on the like-
lihood of reporting smoke problems, as almost no accidents were reported in the
survey, and using non-traditional stoves is again significantly associated with im-
provements in this dimension, with a sharpened q-value smaller than 0.01 (Table
3.13). Households cooking with a traditional cookstove are estimated to have on
average a 50% chance to have reported smoke problems, while this is only 20% on
average for households using non-traditional cookstoves. Again, the benefits are esti-
24According to key informant interviews conducted by the Moving Energy Initiative.
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Table 3.12: Estimated ATE on energy efficiency, Goudoubo.
ipwra aipw eteffects
tot firewood qty treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -47.92∗ -63.81∗∗ -47.61∗ -60.72∗ -9.30 -21.23
(20.889) (20.885) (24.002) (24.237) (73.550) (58.421)
p-value [0.022] [0.002] [0.047] [0.012] [0.899] [0.716]
sharp.d q-value [0.038] [0.004] [0.086] [0.016] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 129.99∗∗∗ 135.57∗∗∗ 124.92∗∗∗ 127.47∗∗∗ 131.79∗ 107.68∗
(18.557) (19.229) (20.357) (21.557) (58.958) (48.673)
N 104 104 104 104 104 104
endog. chi2 [p-value] 1.17 [0.56] 0.88 [0.64]
ipwra aipw eteffects
firewood per hour treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.26∗ -0.43∗∗ -0.25+ -0.40∗ 0.11 -0.05
(0.120) (0.151) (0.137) (0.156) (0.455) (0.333)
p-value [0.031] [0.005] [0.068] [0.010] [0.805] [0.884]
sharp.d q-value [0.041] [0.006] [0.093] [0.016] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.76∗∗∗ 0.84∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.72∗ 0.58∗
(0.082) (0.137) (0.096) (0.137) (0.311) (0.263)
N 104 104 104 104 104 104
endog. chi2 [p-value] 1.38 [0.50] 1.36 [0.51]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
mated to be even larger when only higher-quality stoves are considered as treatment,
and results are almost identical between the IPWRA and AIPW estimator.
Table 3.13: Estimated ATE on health and safety, Goudoubo.
ipwra aipw eteffects
smoke problems treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.31∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗ -0.33∗∗∗ -0.26 -0.26
(0.075) (0.061) (0.067) (0.065) (0.203) (0.204)
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.198] [0.194]
sharp.d q-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.495] [0.830]
POmean (t=0) 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.46∗ 0.37+
(0.064) (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.193) (0.195)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
endog. chi2 [p-value] 0.07 [0.97] 0.44 [0.80]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The results are less encouraging with respect to time savings and share of the
workload shouldered by women, while further benefits appear in terms of children
involvement in firewood collection (Tables 3.14 and 3.15). The estimators detect a
reduction of a little more than 1 hour in the number of hours per day the stove is in
use, from an estimated baseline of almost 7 hours per day for traditional cookstoves,
but the difference is only marginally significant (p-values and sharpened q-values
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are all close to or slightly above 0.1). Differences in the tot amount of time spent
in cooking-related activities are not statistically significant, although the sign of the
ATE is again negative, consistent with time savings; the total amount of time spent
by all household members in these activities is estimated to be 50 hours per week.
Results in the following Table confirm that this workload is not shared equally
among the members, as on average 75% of these hours are inputted by female
members  note that on average 52% of the household members are female, and
the median household has exactly the same number of female and male members.
This outcome does not appear to change depending on the type of stove used. The
likelihood that children participate in firewood collection is instead significantly
lower in households that use non-traditional cookstoves (sharpened q-values < 0.5),
possibly related to the fuel savings found above. For households using traditional
stoves there is a 40% probability that children are involved in firewood collection;
this is less than 20% in households using non-traditional cookstoves. Again, the
benefits are slightly larger when considering the adjusted treatment.
Table 3.14: Estimated ATE on time use, Goudoubo.
ipwra aipw eteffects
hours of stove use treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -1.19+ -1.16+ -1.46 -1.51 2.95+ 2.43
(0.668) (0.665) (0.913) (0.965) (1.721) (1.544)
p-value [0.075] [0.080] [0.109] [0.118] [0.086] [0.115]
sharp.d q-value [0.058] [0.051] [0.123] [0.076] [0.431] [0.830]
POmean (t=0) 6.61∗∗∗ 6.58∗∗∗ 6.84∗∗∗ 6.86∗∗∗ 2.16 2.58+
(0.571) (0.569) (0.832) (0.887) (1.684) (1.480)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
endog. chi2 [p-value] 4.51 [0.11] 4.24 [0.12]
ipwra aipw eteffects
tot time treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE
r1vs0.treat -1.99 -4.35 -1.38 -4.19 15.55 14.40
(5.983) (5.900) (6.265) (6.311) (14.718) (15.080)
p-value [0.739] [0.461] [0.825] [0.507] [0.291] [0.340]
sharp.d q-value [0.268] [0.152] [0.309] [0.197] [0.571] [0.830]
POmean (t=0) 49.71∗∗∗ 50.80∗∗∗ 48.65∗∗∗ 50.04∗∗∗ 32.14∗∗ 31.00∗
(5.516) (5.393) (5.684) (5.567) (12.268) (12.444)
N 125 125 125 125 125 125
endog. chi2 [p-value] 1.55 [0.46] 2.06 [0.36]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
None of the estimated ATE is significant when using the endogenous treatment-
effects estimator, but given that the endogeneity test in this model fails to reject
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Table 3.15: Estimated ATE on women and children workload, Goudoubo.
ipwra aipw eteffects
female share of work treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.15+ -0.12
(0.045) (0.044) (0.058) (0.056) (0.082) (0.085)
p-value [0.300] [0.234] [0.482] [0.314] [0.062] [0.145]
sharp.d q-value [0.118] [0.127] [0.192] [0.187] [0.431] [0.830]
POmean (t=0) 0.75∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.035) (0.052) (0.049) (0.040) (0.042)
N 124 124 124 124 124 124
endog. chi2 [p-value] 4.49 [0.11] 4.63 [0.10]
ipwra aipw eteffects
children involv. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.22∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗ -0.29∗∗ 0.02 -0.01
(0.073) (0.072) (0.091) (0.095) (0.225) (0.214)
p-value [0.003] [0.000] [0.007] [0.002] [0.937] [0.956]
sharp.d q-value [0.010] [0.001] [0.023] [0.007] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.18 0.16
(0.067) (0.067) (0.088) (0.093) (0.202) (0.188)
N 126 126 126 126 126 126
endog. chi2 [p-value] 0.84 [0.66] 1.44 [0.49]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
the null hypothesis of non-endogeneity of the treatment, I consider the IPWRA and
AIPW as preferred estimators. As a robustness check, I compare these results with
estimates from a simple OLS model and a 2SLS model for IV using the indices
representing the quality of the cooking system. The magnitude of the estimates are
not directly comparable with the results in the previous tables, as the treatment
here is a continuous index and not a binary indicator, but I can compare the sign
and significance of the results. The general results obtained in the previous analysis
are confirmed by both the OLS and the 2SLS estimators, but none of the treatment
coefficients in the IV models is significant, especially after correcting for multiple-
hypothesis testing with the sharpened q-values (Table C.4-C.7).
Kakuma
The average firewood consumption in Kakuma is much lower than in the other camp,
with household cooking on a traditional three-stone fire estimated to use around 40
kg of firewood per month and 0.20 kg per hour of use of the cookstove (Table 3.16).
This difference is possibly due to a larger use of charcoal in Kakuma.
Contrary to the results in Goudoubo, in Kakuma I find no significant differences
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in terms of the total firewood consumed in a month, and even find an increase of
about 100 grams in the amount of firewood needed to fuel the stove for one hour,
although the latter is only marginally significant, especially when considering the
sharpened q-values.
As discussed in the hypothesis Section, these results do not necessarily mean lack
of improvement in energy efficiency, although this is certainly one of the potential
explanation. In fact, households already consume much smaller amounts of firewood
compared to the other camp (although this is partly due to the larger use of charcoal
in Kakuma) and given the large number of reported accidents and smoke problems in
Kakuma, camp administrators might have prioritised the introduction of cooksoves
that improve health and safety issues rather than fuel efficiency.
Another possible explanation is that there are constraints to the availability of
firewood and households optimal choice would be to consume more if there was
more available; in this case, even if the non-traditional stoves are more efficient, the
households would still consume all the fuel they can get access to, and there would be
no difference in the total amount of fuel used. In support of this explanation, focus
group participants have been very vocal in complaining that firewood distributed
in the camp is insufficient to cover basic needs, and that the host community is
preventing firewood collection in the local forests.25
The increase in firewood used per hour may be reconciled with the lack of dif-
ferences in the overall amount of firewood used if the non-traditional stoves cook
faster than the traditional ones and are therefore used for fewer hours. At the same
time, if there are binding availability constraint and the non-traditional cookstoves
burn the fuel faster, then the households have no choice but to use the stoves for
a shorter time. Without further information on the amount of food cooked and
whether households cannot purchase more fuel even if they want to, I cannot draw
any conclusion on energy efficiency.26
In terms of health and safety, non-traditional cookstoves are associated with a
smaller probability of smoke problems  from about 70-80% for households using a
three-stone fire to 60% for households in the treatment group  but no significant
differences in the probability of accidents  around 60-70% for all the households
(Table 3.17).
25From focus group discussions conducted by the Moving Energy Initiative.
26The fact that charcoal is often used instead of firewood adds an additional nuance to the issue,
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Table 3.16: Estimated ATE on energy efficiency, Kakuma.
ipwra aipw eteffects
tot firewood qty treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -2.95 1.68 -4.80 3.58 -38.16 1.97
(7.261) (5.727) (7.683) (7.298) (28.079) (16.526)
p-value [0.684] [0.769] [0.532] [0.624] [0.174] [0.905]
sharp.d q-value [0.416] [0.478] [0.438] [0.368] [0.685] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 42.07∗∗∗ 36.86∗∗∗ 43.87∗∗∗ 35.51∗∗∗ 84.21∗∗ 50.27∗∗∗
(6.289) (3.990) (6.617) (5.679) (27.322) (14.359)
N 175 175 175 175 175 175
endog. chi2 [p-value] 3.40 [0.18] 3.71 [0.16]
ipwra aipw eteffects
firewood per hour treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE 0.12∗ 0.13∗ 0.09 0.12+ -0.14 -0.01
(0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.066) (0.258) (0.151)
p-value [0.029] [0.023] [0.115] [0.058] [0.584] [0.949]
sharp.d q-value [0.038] [0.074] [0.168] [0.133] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.49+ 0.33∗∗
(0.041) (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) (0.248) (0.110)
N 175 175 175 175 175 175
endog. chi2 [p-value] 1.73 [0.42] 1.80 [0.41]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.17: Estimated ATE on health and safety, Kakuma.
ipwra aipw eteffects
smoke problems treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.19∗∗ -0.03 -0.19∗∗ -0.01 -0.04 -0.14
(0.071) (0.068) (0.072) (0.081) (0.191) (0.174)
p-value [0.007] [0.652] [0.010] [0.859] [0.854] [0.435]
sharp.d q-value [0.015] [0.478] [0.021] [0.476] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.83∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.051) (0.060) (0.065) (0.194) (0.138)
N 213 213 213 213 213 213
endog. chi2 [p-value] 3.22 [0.20] 1.97 [0.37]
ipwra aipw eteffects
accidents treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.08 0.09 -0.07 0.11 -0.17 -0.19
(0.065) (0.070) (0.075) (0.081) (0.127) (0.134)
p-value [0.231] [0.202] [0.366] [0.168] [0.171] [0.165]
sharp.d q-value [0.182] [0.193] [0.355] [0.202] [0.685] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.70∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.051) (0.057) (0.063) (0.067) (0.105) (0.071)
N 213 213 213 213 213 213
endog. chi2 [p-value] 0.44 [0.80] 3.11 [0.21]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Estimates of the ATEs for the time use outcome, in Table 3.18 confirm that
non-traditional cookstoves are indeed used for shorter time: around 9 hours per day
against the 10-14 hours per day of the traditional stoves. The difference is smaller
and only marginally significant when using the adjusted treatment, suggesting that
the cookstoves that have been re-assigned to the control group in this treatment
definition might actually be of good quality.
In terms of overall time spent in cooking-related activities, the sign of the es-
timated ATE is negative, but the effects are not significant, and much smaller in
magnitude than would be predicted by the reduction in hours of stove use found
above. To further investigate the issue I repeat the analysis for each cooking-related
activity separately  cooking, firewood collection, fuel purchase and fuel prepara-
tion  and find that while cooking time decreases slightly, fuel purchase and fuel
preparation for non-traditional cookstoves take up more time if the household uses
a non-traditional cookstove (tables not presented due to space constraints). This
is consistent with the fact that some non-traditional cookstoves use charcoal or
specially-prepared firewood.
Table 3.18: Estimated ATE on time use, Kakuma.
ipwra aipw eteffects
hours of stove use treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -4.96∗∗∗ -1.75+ -4.78∗∗∗ -1.64 -2.97 -2.95
(0.969) (0.978) (1.056) (1.019) (4.431) (2.673)
p-value [0.000] [0.073] [0.000] [0.108] [0.503] [0.269]
sharp.d q-value [0.001] [0.102] [0.001] [0.185] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 13.66∗∗∗ 10.50∗∗∗ 13.53∗∗∗ 10.37∗∗∗ 11.73∗∗ 12.31∗∗∗
(0.840) (0.813) (0.936) (0.834) (4.201) (2.164)
N 213 213 213 213 213 213
endog. chi2 [p-value] 0.20 [0.91] 1.02 [0.60]
ipwra aipw eteffects
tot time treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -1.28 -1.48 -2.60 -5.90 -0.17 3.76
(5.112) (3.719) (5.213) (5.127) (20.671) (12.695)
p-value [0.803] [0.690] [0.619] [0.250] [0.993] [0.767]
sharp.d q-value [0.431] [0.478] [0.448] [0.263] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 24.27∗∗∗ 25.42∗∗∗ 25.52∗∗∗ 29.63∗∗∗ 31.68 27.29∗∗
(4.721) (3.121) (4.840) (4.729) (19.381) (10.419)
N 200 200 200 200 200 200
endog. chi2 [p-value] 3.07 [0.22] 1.62 [0.44]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The share of the total time shouldered by women is again 70-80%, although in
which I do not explore in this Chapter.
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Kakuma as well as in Goudoubo the median household has exactly the same number
of female and male members, and on average women and girls represent 52% of the
household members; when using the adjusted treatment, there are some evidence
that men contribute more in households with non-traditional cookstoves, but this is
only marginally significant when considering the sharpened q-value. Significant and
robust improvements are instead found in terms of children involvement in firewood
collection  from a 50% probability of participating in households using three-stone
fires, to 20-25% in households with non-traditional cookstoves (Table 3.19).
Table 3.19: Estimated ATE on women and children workload, Kakuma.
ipwra aipw eteffects
female share of work treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE 0.09 -0.08∗ 0.06 -0.09∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.13
(0.059) (0.039) (0.067) (0.039) (0.154) (0.106)
p-value [0.131] [0.030] [0.392] [0.023] [0.004] [0.212]
sharp.d q-value [0.118] [0.074] [0.355] [0.086] [0.030] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.66∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.29+ 0.65∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.033) (0.063) (0.034) (0.149) (0.102)
N 192 192 192 192 192 192
endog. chi2 [p-value] 2.48 [0.29] 5.19 [0.07]
ipwra aipw eteffects
children involv. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj. treat. tr. adj.
ATE -0.29∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -0.06 -0.02
(0.065) (0.057) (0.071) (0.064) (0.202) (0.151)
p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.757] [0.891]
sharp.d q-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [1.000] [1.000]
POmean (t=0) 0.50∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.31+ 0.28∗
(0.054) (0.043) (0.060) (0.049) (0.183) (0.116)
N 213 213 213 213 213 213
endog. chi2 [p-value] 0.89 [0.64] 2.75 [0.25]
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Again, none of the estimated ATEs is significant when using the endogenous
treatment-effects estimator, but the endogeneity test in this model fails to reject
the null hypothesis of non-endogeneity of the treatment, supporting the use of the
IPWRA and AIPW as preferred estimators. Similarly, none of the estimated treat-
ment coefficients is significant when using an IV model in Tables C.9-C.12 (the only
exception is for the children outcome, but becomes insignificant too when correcting
for multiple-hypothesis testing). The OLS model confirms that non-traditional cook-
stoves are associated with significantly fewer hours of stove use, smaller probability
of children participation in firewood collection, and less smoke problems (the latter
only marginally significant) but finds no significant effects on the other outcomes
233
(using the sharpened q-values as reference for significance).
3.5 Part 3: Linking stated preferences and predicted
benefits
In this last Section, I bridge the results on the predicted benefits  or lack thereof
 of using non-traditional cookstoves with the stated preferences for hypothetical
improvements. To do this, I use the estimates from Wooldridge's double-robust
IPWRA estimator to predict the treatment effect for each household in the various
outcomes. The distributions of the benefits across the two samples are plotted in
Figure 3.6. Notably, there is some variation in whether transitioning to the non-
traditional cookstoves results in gains or losses.
I then test whether respondents from households who are predicted to have the
most to gain from moving away from the three-stone fires are also the ones who
have higher willingness to pay for non-traditional cookstoves. I limit the analysis
to the WTP for biomass-fuelled ICS (basic; enhanced using wood; enhanced using
charcoal) as these represent the non-traditional cookstoves on which the treatment
effects estimates are based. To obtain the partial correlation coefficients, I use an
OLS regression with WTP as the dependent variable and the predicted outcomes
as regressors. Given that the total quantity of firewood used in a month and the
amount of firewood per hour of stove use are highly correlated, I only use the lat-
ter to avoid collinearity problems. For the same reason, I only use the predicted
effect on total time use and exclude the number of hours the stove is used for. The
predicted outcomes are interacted with the gender of the respondent, to investigate
whether men or women are better at factoring the predicted gains into their val-
uation, especially considering that some outcomes affect each gender differently 
women would benefits more directly from reduction in smoke exposure and cooking
time, while men may benefits more directly from reductions in fuel expenditures. As
additional controls, the regressions include the wealth index, the size of the house-
hold in adult-equivalent term (with children weighted as 0.5 adults and the elderly
as 0.8), the respondent's age and gender, an interaction between whether the respon-
dents is a woman and the female empowerment index, and the cooking priorities of
the household.
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Figure 3.6: Distribution of the predicted gains for households in each camp.
In Goudoubo (Table 3.20) women's WTP for each stove tend to be higher when
there are larger predicted reductions in firewood use, probability of smoke prob-
lems and time spent in cooking-related activities, although these coefficients are
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ony significant for the enhanced firewood-ICS. The coefficients for smoke problems
and time use even switch sign for men, suggesting that they are less successful at
predicting the improvements and factoring them in their valuation. Similarly, in
Kakuma (Table 3.21) women's WTP for all three cookstoves are significantly cor-
related with predicted reductions in firewood use, smoke problems, and accidents
(the latter only marginally significant). Again, the sign of the same coefficients are
switched for men.
3.6 Conclusion
While cultural acceptability and budget constraints have often be mentioned in the
literature as the main hurdles to transition towards cleaner energy solutions, low
expectations regarding the performances of the new systems contribute to explain
low willingness to pay and low take-up. On one side, the innovations currently
marketed might not actually deliver the improvements they promise, or at least
not to a level that would justify the high premium required for their purchase  as
well as the cognitive effort of adjusting habits and behaviours. On the other side,
even if they do deliver on their promises, the improvements and features of the new
technologies might not match households' priorities and preferences.
In this Chapter, I investigate these issues in a context where resources are par-
ticularly scarce, and transitioning to a cleaner energy system is especially urgent,
namely refugee camps in Sub-Saharan Africa. Given the substantial amount of time
and resources refugees spend on cooking, the essential services cooking provide to
everyday life, and the range of negative impacts linked to the use of three-stone
fires and biomass-fuelled cookstoves, the technological innovations I focus on are
non-traditional cookstoves. To this purpose, I use a novel dataset based on a sur-
vey administered in Goudoubo camp (Burkina Faso) and Kakuma camp (Kenya),
which includes modules to elicit respondents' stated preferences for a range of non-
traditional cooking systems: LPG, biogas, solar cooker, electric cooker, and different
types of biomass-based ICS.
Analysing respondents' valuation of these technologies, I find a strong interest
for LPG in both camps, while any favouritism or dislike for the other technologies
tend to fade away once the perceived characteristics of the system are accounted for.
I further find that priority heterogeneity affects the valuation of specific technologies
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Table 3.20: Partial correlations between predicted benefits and (winsorized) WTP for non-
traditional biomass cookstoves (OLS model). Goudoubo.
Goudoubo (1) Goudoubo (2) Goudoubo (3)
Basic ICS Enhanced ICS, wood Enhanced ICS, coal
pred. effect on wood per hour -7.53 -1.91 1.21
(5.364) (3.828) (1.977)
" X female respond -4.05 -1.59 -1.81
(3.884) (2.018) (2.666)
pred. effect on smoke 0.47 5.80∗ 0.88
(1.527) (2.760) (1.480)
" X female respond -0.48 -6.75∗ -2.08
(2.853) (3.193) (2.656)
pred. effect on tot time 0.16 0.08 0.10
(0.110) (0.091) (0.070)
" X female respond -0.13 -0.35∗ -0.05
(0.119) (0.153) (0.109)
pred. effect on children involv. 13.02 4.71 -5.64
(14.230) (10.457) (5.671)
" X female respond 6.49 13.02∗ 3.33
(8.664) (6.412) (7.084)
pred. effect on fem. share of work -1.59 3.19 -3.65
(4.369) (4.194) (2.195)
" X female respond 4.97 0.21 3.60
(4.440) (5.256) (4.360)
wealth index -0.83 -0.96 0.37
(1.536) (1.369) (1.125)
adult-equiv size 1.32+ -0.22 0.01
(0.757) (0.751) (0.355)
respondent's age -0.12 -0.08 0.01
(0.084) (0.057) (0.033)
female respondent -0.30 -5.79 0.78
(2.860) (4.092) (2.076)
" X fem empower index 15.97 9.47 -0.31
(12.958) (8.352) (7.321)
top safe -2.11 -2.84 0.90
(1.828) (2.208) (1.671)
top less smoke 0.91 -0.80 1.59+
(1.215) (1.189) (0.919)
top cook fast 0.44 3.89 -2.53
(3.108) (3.124) (1.643)
top traditions & habits -0.32 1.35 0.05
(0.923) (0.923) (1.006)
top less fuel -10.47∗ 0.85 -0.72
(5.175) (4.534) (2.908)
N 101 96 100
r2 0.25 0.30 0.14
r2_a 0.06 0.11 -0.08
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 3.21: Partial correlations between predicted benefits and (winsorized) WTP for non-
traditional biomass cookstoves (OLS model). Kakuma.
Kakuma (1) Kakuma (2) Kakuma (3)
Basic ICS Enhanced ICS, wood Enhanced ICS, coal
pred. effect on wood per hour 5.91 6.71 6.56
(7.290) (7.174) (6.885)
" X female respond -15.52∗∗ -18.01∗∗ -16.08∗
(5.677) (6.131) (6.235)
pred. effect on smoke 16.36∗ 21.12∗∗∗ 19.12∗∗
(6.335) (5.827) (5.937)
" X female respond -11.91∗ -12.76∗ -10.77∗
(4.610) (5.059) (4.876)
pred. effect on accidents -0.94 1.61 -0.09
(2.375) (2.535) (2.536)
" X female respond -0.38 -4.44+ -2.79
(2.310) (2.601) (2.495)
pred. effect on tot time -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
(0.064) (0.078) (0.077)
" X female respond 0.06 0.07 0.08
(0.077) (0.095) (0.092)
pred. effect on children involv. -0.89 -0.12 -0.91
(4.682) (5.117) (4.575)
" X female respond 0.09 -0.81 -0.95
(4.622) (5.153) (4.580)
pred. effect on fem. share of work 13.53∗∗ 16.03∗∗∗ 14.34∗∗
(4.710) (4.340) (4.382)
" X female respond -7.34 -4.76 -3.75
(5.197) (5.870) (5.714)
wealth index -0.29 -0.11 1.15
(2.176) (2.267) (2.177)
adult-equiv size 1.73∗ 2.32∗∗∗ 1.94∗∗
(0.730) (0.657) (0.713)
respondent's age -0.07+ -0.13∗∗ -0.10∗
(0.042) (0.047) (0.042)
female respondent -5.31+ -5.91∗ -5.45+
(3.168) (2.970) (2.998)
" X fem empower index 8.16∗ 10.00∗∗ 8.11∗
(3.335) (3.758) (3.646)
top safe 1.42 2.52 1.63
(2.529) (2.269) (2.401)
top less smoke 5.07∗ 8.23∗∗∗ 7.39∗∗
(2.385) (2.114) (2.343)
top cook fast 0.91 1.34 0.67
(1.834) (1.910) (1.933)
top traditions & habits 2.27∗ 3.33∗∗ 2.37∗
(0.981) (1.118) (1.012)
top less fuel -3.87∗ -4.32∗ -4.12∗
(1.697) (1.906) (1.902)
N 174 150 166
r2 0.27 0.39 0.34
r2_a 0.17 0.29 0.24
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
238
and characteristics, with households prioritising smoke reductions and safety having
higher valuation for related characteristics, and households prioritising habits and
traditions having lower valuation for non-biomass cookstoves than the rest of the
sample. This also holds in terms of broader priorities of the two settings, with house-
holds in Kakuma displaying a stronger interest for health and safety improvements
than households in Goudoubo, consistent with the difference between the two camps
in terms of indoor cooking and prevalence of smoke problems and cooking-related
accidents. Previous experience with a technology is not necessarily associated with
higher valuation, and the coefficient is even negative for some technologies, suggest-
ing that unsuccessful trials and the introduction of cookstoves that do not perform
as expected might have deleterious effects and induce even more skepticism towards
related products.
In the second part, I then estimate how the supposedly `improved' cooking sys-
tems currently used in the two locations perform compared to the traditional three-
stone fires in terms of energy efficiency, health and safety, household time use, and
women and children workload. I find that the use of (mostly biomass-fuelled) non-
traditional cookstoves in Goudoubo is associated with lower firewood use, lower
incidence of smoke problems and smaller likelihood of children participating in fire-
wood collection. In Kakuma I find some improvements in terms of smoke problems,
shorter use of the cookstove, and less involvement of children in firewood collec-
tion for households using non-traditional cookstoves, but no evidence of fuel savings
or smaller incidence of accidents, and possibly even an increase in the time spent
preparing and procuring fuel.
In the last part of the Chapter, I link the results on the estimated benefits of
using non-traditional cookstoves with the stated preferences for hypothetical im-
provements, and look at whether the households who are predicted to have more to
gain from the non-traditional stoves introduced in the camps are also the ones who
value them higher. I find that women seem to be on average better than men at fac-
toring the benefits into their valuation. This is especially true for smoke reduction
and time savings for women in Goudoubo, and smoke and accident reductions and
fuel savings for women in Kakuma. This is consistent with the fact that women are
the one shouldering most of the responsibilities of cooking and fuel collection and
that their time use and health are impacted more directly.
While this research provides some initial insights on the energy situation, needs
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and preferences in humanitarian settings, I acknowledge the limitation of the data
available to draw any general conclusion. To better understand these issues, more
research is needed on preferences and performances of non-traditional stoves in the
field, especially in understudied but vulnerable settings such as refugee camps, as
well as more rigorous evaluation of the interventions being trialled. With this caveat
in mind, in terms of policy implications the results of this Chapter point towards
a need for better quality controls, information, and hand-on experience with non-
traditional stoves, to fight skepticism towards the new technologies; but also towards
the importance of considering heterogeneity in individual preferences and priorities.
On the latter aspect, it should be acknowledged that mismatches often exist between
who has the resources and decision-making power  often men and adults of the
family  and who suffers more directly from the use of traditional cookstoves  often
women and the younger members, whose preferences may remain unrevealed and
unsatisfied.
A more participatory approach to the design and provision of new technological
solutions would therefore make sure that the products that reach the households
and the local markets are compatible with the local circumstances and offer vari-
ety rather than a one-size-fits-all solution. At the same time, access to information
and first-hand trialling of the stoves would help make informed decisions, but in
contexts where resources and purchasing power are extremely tight, as it is often
the case among refugees, financial arrangements and subsidies would still be needed
if households are even to consider switching to modern cookstoves and fuels, es-
pecially for systems that generate positive externalities such as the more modern
and cleaner non-biomass stoves. Finally, more and more evidence is being found
that intra-household dynamics are an important dimension of the low-carbon en-
ergy transition, and that negotiation, decision-making power and financial resource
access for the members who are suffering the most from the use of traditional and
biomass cookstoves are crucial to make sure their voices are heard and they have the
means to choose according to their needs and priorities. Ultimately, these comple-
mentary steps might prove key to make sure that non-traditional technologies are
accepted, understood and used correctly, and that sustained welfare improvements
are therefore achieved.
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Chapter 4
Preferences for cooking with biogas
in rural India: the role of positive
and negative experience
4.1 Introduction1
Burning fuelwood and other solid biomass, such as dung or crop residues, in in-
efficient stoves with no ventilation systems is still a common practice worldwide,
especially among rural populations in lower income countries. This persistent and
pernicious trend has negative consequences on several dimensions, from the health
and safety of the household members (Gordon et al., 2014; Jeuland et al., 2015b;
Lewis et al., 2016), and the expending of scarce time and resources to find fuel
(Tinker, 1987; Lewis et al., 2016), to negative environmental externalities such as
deforestation (Bensch and Peters, 2013), local pollution and climate change (Jeuland
and Pattanayak, 2012; Pant et al., 2014). Policy interventions and campaigns to en-
courage households to adopt cleaner cookstoves and correct negative externalities
through subsidies are therefore underway in several countries. India, as one of the
world hot-spot for biomass burning and persistent use of traditional and inefficient
1The research presented in this Chapter is the result of a collaboration with Subhrendu K. Pat-
tanayak and Ipsita Das (Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, United States), Jessica
Lewis (World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland), and Ashok Kumar Singha (CTRAN
Consulting, Bhubaneswar, India), with support from SANDEE (the South Asian Network for
Development and Environmental Economics). My contribution consisted of specifying the re-
search question together with Subhrendu Pattanayak, analysing the data and writing the paper.
Subhrendu Pattanayak, Ipsita Das, Jessica Lewis, and Ashok Kumar Singha contributed to define
the broader research project of which this study is part (together with Somnath et al., 2014 and
Lewis et al., 2016) and led the data collection.
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cookstoves, has long been at the forefront of action, with the national and local
governments and several NGOs and international organisations providing generous
incentives for cleaner fuels such as LPG, kerosene, and biogas, as well as information
and awareness campaigns.
Yet, improvements often fail to materialise, both in terms of uptake of the cleaner
technologies, and in terms of results once they enter the house (Whittington, 2010;
Mobarak et al., 2012; Jeuland and Pattanayak, 2012). On the latter issue, recent
studies have highlighted how households tend to keep using the traditional cook-
stoves side by side the new ones rather than switching completely, a practice defined
as fuel-stacking (Jeuland et al., 2015a). In some cases the use of the cleaner cook-
stove has even been seen to decline over time, often due to loss of functionality
because of lack of proper maintenance or repair services, supply-constraints on the
fuel, or just loss of interest and negative perception of the taste of food cooked with
the new systems (Hanna et al., 2016).
The continuous use of inefficient and polluting cookstoves and solid biomass fuel,
even if only for a share of total cooking, is still enough to generate harmful indoor
air pollution, and consequent health problems (World Health Organization, 2015).
In fact, indoor air pollution is currently one of the main health problems in the
developing world (World Health Organization, 2009).
On the issue of low uptake and low willingness to pay (WTP) for non-traditional
cookstoves, studies have pointed towards affordability and credit constraints, lack of
awareness of the negative impacts of traditional cooking, supply-side constraints and
therefore unavailability of clean fuels and clean cookstoves, as well as the fact that
some of the technologies offered are not appropriate for the context in which they are
introduced, for example in terms of households' needs and size, cultural background,
and type of food cooked (Beltramo et al., 2015; Bensch et al., 2015; Miller and
Mobarak, 2015). Another understudied issue that compounds these challenges, is
that households have heterogeneous preferences for cooking and cookstoves, even
within relatively homogeneous population such as that of a village. So one-size-fits-
all solutions are unlikely to exist and care must be used to understand the specific
needs, tastes and situations on the ground (Pant et al., 2014).
In this study, we focus in particular on heterogeneity in terms of previous positive
and negative experience (or no experience) with the cooking technology offered,
risk aversion, time preferences and perceived credit constrains. Relevant studies in
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this respect are Atmadja et al. (2017), who analyse the relationship between time
discount and the adoption of environmental and health-related behaviours, including
fuel choice, and Jeuland et al. (2015a) and Jeuland et al. (2019), who compare stated
and revealed preferences for different types of improved cookstoves, looking at the
role played by risk aversion, time preferences, gender, and other socio-economic
characteristics of the respondents; all these studies use data from India.
The main contribution of this Chapter is twofold. First, we use a stratified ran-
dom sample to classify households according to the type of experience they already
have with the technology of interest, biogas for cooking. In particular, we look at
households who have had a positive experience, as their system has never broken
down, households who have had a negative experience, in the form of malfunctions
and failures, and finally households who have no experience with the technology. We
then look at how the different levels of experience correlate with the valuation of the
technology, and how the level of experience interacts with risk aversion, impatience
and perceived credit constraints, to test whether familiarity with the technology
attenuates the negative impact of these variables. While this interaction has been
suggested in other studies, we are not aware of any that test it explicitly. The asym-
metric role of positive and negative past experience is similarly an understudied
topic, and complements the literature on asymmetries in the effect of positive and
negative information derived from peer adopters, as studied by Miller and Mobarak
(2015).
Second, while most of the literature on clean cookstoves tend to focus on im-
proved fuelwood-fired cookstoves and LPG, we focus on household biogas for cooking
(household `self-produced' biogas), a technology with the potential to deliver impor-
tant co-benefits and positive externalities. Biogas digesters are used to transform
livestock manure and other agricultural waste into gas for cooking, which can then
be used in the same way as LPG and burnt without producing smoke emissions.
Biogas has been shown to deliver substantial benefits in rural contexts with a hot
and humid climate, such as many parts of India, not only in terms of reduced smoke
emissions from cooking, cheaper energy and reduction in the use of fuelwood, but
also in terms of waste disposal (and therefore sanitation) and high-quality fertiliser
for agriculture as a byproduct of the anaerobic digestion (Brown, 2006; Chen et al.,
2010; Somnath et al., 2014; Insam et al., 2015; Lewis et al., 2016). An important
advantage with respect to LPG is that biogas does not use fossil fuel, and is therefore
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not affected by the price of oil nor its supply chains, and can instead contribute to
mitigate climate change.
Relevant studies on the benefits of the use of biogas for cooking, and variables
associated with its adoption are Pant et al. (2014), Somanathan and Bluffstone
(2015), and Meeks et al. (2019), all with a focus on Nepal. Bond and Templeton
(2011) provide an overview on the use of domestic biogas plants in the developing
world, with details on the case of India and China and the policies introduced by
the respective governments to support their uptake. Yet, the existing studies on
biogas tend to pay limited attention to household preferences for specific attributes
of the biogas systems, and even less to how those preferences might vary even within
seemingly homogeneous populations, as remarked above for the cookstove literature
in general.
To address these gaps in the literature, we use stated preferences elicited via
a discrete choice experiment (DCE), using a similar design as in Jeuland et al.
(2015a) and Jeuland et al. (2019). The DCE consisted of a series of choice cards, in
which respondents were presented with three alternative options: a biogas plant for
cooking, an improved firewood cookstove, and a traditional Chulha as the outside
option. Each alternative came with a specified price, and level of maintenance
assistance, smoke emissions, and fuel requirements, which varied in each choice card.
On this basis, respondents were asked to select their preferred option in each set
presented. The DCE was conducted with 503 households in rural Odisha in India
(more information on the survey and the context are presented in Somnath et al.,
2014), and used sample stratification to obtain information from households with
different types of experience.
The Chapter develops as follows: Section 4.2 presents the theoretical framework
for the analysis and details on the estimation models used; Section 4.3 provides
information on the study area, the sample stratification, the design of the DCE and
the modules to elicit risk aversion and time preferences; while Section 4.4 provides
a descriptive analysis of what factors and characteristics are associated with type of
experience with biogas, and ownership and use of cookstoves. Section 4.5 discusses
the results of the regression analysis for the DCE, and translate them into willingness
to pay (WTP) for different attributes of the cookstove, and for biogas in particular,
for different `types' of households. Section 4.6 concludes with the main takeaways
from the Chapter and practical implications of the results.
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4.2 Theoretical framework
4.2.1 Research question
The research question we investigate in this Chapter is how preferences for clean
cooking varies (i) depending on the attributes the cookstove has, in particular in
terms of price, maintenance assistance, smoke emissions, and fuel requirements; (ii)
according to the type of technology offered, i.e. traditional, improved fuelwood
cookstove (ICS) or biogas; and (iii) by the level of experience the respondent has
with the technology, namely positive, negative or no experience2.
We also formulate the hypothesis that familiarity with a technology mitigates
uncertainty concerning its value, and test it by examining how valuation of a tech-
nology is affected by risk aversion, impatience, and perceived credit constraints,
separately by level of experience. Finally, we test whether the price paid for a bio-
gas plant (in the case of households who already have one) has an `anchoring' effect
on valuation, making biogas more or less likely to be chosen in the DCE depending
on whether the price attribute presented is below or above this reference point.
4.2.2 The random utility model
The design of the experiment follows Jeuland et al. (2015a) and Jeuland et al. (2019),
who conducted a DCE to elicit preferences for fuelwood ICS in Northern India, with
the key differences being the introduction of biogas as an alternative, and the use
of maintenance assistance as an attribute in place of number of burners. In fact,
while focus groups conducted for those two studies suggested that maintenance is
not among the major determinants of fuelwood cookstove choice, in our case focus
groups' discussions highlighted the importance of conducting proper maintenance
and having repair services for biogas plants. The analysis is similarly based on
Jeuland et al. (2015a), as well as on the literature on best practices for DCE in
general (Hauber et al., 2016; Johnston et al., 2017; Lancsar et al., 2017).
The theoretical framework of reference is a random utility model (Manski, 1977),
where household i's utility can be decomposed into a non-stochastic indirect utility
component Vi(.), and a stochastic term εi that captures how the idiosyncratic tastes
2Heterogeneity in terms of experience level is only analysed in the case of biogas, as less than
1% of the sample own a fuelwood improved ICS, and no information on previous experience or
perception of the technology was collected.
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of each i differ from the average household.3 We then consider the good to be
valuated as a bundle of attributes, each of which contributes to the household utility,
following Lancaster (1966):
Uijt = V (Xjt, βi) + εijt (4.1)
In particular, we assume that the indirect utility of each stove offered (jt, that
is technology j in choice-card t) is a function of observable characteristics of the
stove  in this case the price, the level of the other attributes included in the card
(maintenance, smoke emissions, and fuel requirements) and the type of technology
(biogas, fuelwood ICS, and traditional cookstove)  included in vector Xjt, and βi,
the vector of parameters to be estimated, representing the marginal utility of each
attribute and the alternative-specific premiums.
4.2.3 Estimation models: conditional logit and random pa-
rameter logit
McFadden (1981) shows that when the stochastic term follows an i.i.d. type 1
extreme-value error distribution and households choose the alternative that max-
imises their utility in each choice-task, the probability that alternative k is chosen
among all the J alternatives in a given choice-task t is given by the conditional logit
model (CL):
Pr(choice j = k by i in task t) = Pr(Uikt > Uijt ∀j 6= k) = e
V (Xikt,β)∑J
j=1 e
V (Xijt,β)
(4.2)
i.e. the probability of choosing an alternative over the others is a function of the
characteristics of the alternative itself, but also of the characteristics of all the other
available alternatives. In this case, j = {biogas, fuelwoodICS, traditionalstove}.
This model can be estimated using maximum likelihood.
While the conditional logit has important advantages in terms of ease of inter-
pretation and estimation, it relies on two particularly restrictive assumptions: i.i.d.
error terms, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The latter has of-
ten been found to be violated when tested in real-life decision-making situations,
while the former is especially unrealistic when the same respondent makes repeated
3Notation is largely based on Hole et al. (2013).
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choices, as in the DCE analysed in this Chapter, and decisions are therefore likely
to be correlated (Lancsar et al., 2017). For this reason, we relax these assumptions
and use a random parameter logit (RPL, also called mixed logit, introduced by
Revelt and Train, 1998) model instead, as common in the analysis of DCE data,
such as Greene and Hensher (2003) in the field of transportation, Hole (2008) in
health economics, and MacKerron et al. (2009) in payments for carbon offsets in
environmental economics.
In this model, different households are allowed to have different preferences by
modelling β as random parameters with density function f(β|θ), rather than as
fixed parameters. To obtain an expression for the probability of each choice, the
previous expression needs to be integrated over the distribution of the unknown
random parameter:
Pr(choice j by i in task t) =
∫
eV (Xijt , β)∑J
j=1 e
V (Xijt,β)
f(β|θ) dβ (4.3)
This expression cannot be solved analytically to obtain an explicit likelihood function
to maximise. We use maximum simulated likelihood, as detailed in Train (2009).4
This model is better suited to capture heterogeneity of preferences across respon-
dents, as parameters (either some or all) are allowed to be randomly distributed
across households according to a given continuous distribution (in our case we as-
sume a normal distribution), rather than being constrained into a single value, as
in the CL model. The model can also take into account the panel structure of the
data, by considering the probability that an individual makes a sequence of choices,
rather than the probability of a single choice:
Si =
∫ T∏
t=1
J∏
j=1
[
eV (Xijt , β)∑J
j=1 e
V (Xijt,β)
]Iijt(k=j)
f(β|θ) dβ (4.4)
where Iijt(k = j) is an indicator function that equals 1 if household i selected
alternative k = j in choice task t, and 0 otherwise. Note that in the CL model,
error terms are assumed to be independent and the parameters are fixed, so that
there would be no need to integrate over the distribution of β and the probability
of a sequence of choices would simply be equal to the product of the probability
4All the models in the Chapter are estimated in Stata. RPL models are estimated using the
mixlogit package developed by Hole (2007).
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of each choice. This means that the likelihood function for repeated choices by the
same respondents would be the same as for independent single choices by different
respondents, and the resulting estimate is therefore not taking into consideration
the panel structure of the data.
In the empirical analysis, we start by comparing two basic specification of CL
models and RPL models, to assess their differences. Standard errors for the CL
models are calculated clustering at the household-level; in the RPL models, stan-
dard errors are clustered at the village-level, as the model acknowledges the panel
structure of the data and already takes into consideration the correlation between
decisions made by the same respondent. The regression models estimated are all
linear in the parameters (Lancsar et al., 2017). Under this assumption, the coeffi-
cients of the attributes represent their marginal utility, and provide a measure of
how much the utility of the respondents changes (on average) for a one-unit increase
in the value of the attribute.
The coefficients can then be translated into a monetary measure of the marginal
willingness to pay (WTP) for the attribute by dividing them for the coefficient of the
price (i.e. the marginal utility of money). Standard errors are computed using the
delta method. The same can be done for the alternative-specific constants (ASC),
to obtain the premium respondents are (on average) willing to pay for the specific
technology (as opposed to the outside option), when the attributes offered by all
the alternatives are the same. In the RPL specifications, when the coefficients of
the attributes or the ASCs are modelled as random and normally distributed, the
mean marginal WTP is obtained by using the mean of the parameter estimate. The
price coefficient is modelled as a fixed parameter unless otherwise specified, for ease
of interpretations and of deriving the WTP.5
4.3 Background and data
4.3.1 Dataset and data collection
Data for this Chapter come from a survey administered in 42 villages in 8 different
districts of Odisha, in eastern India. The survey was conducted between Novem-
5Robustness checks are conducted assuming the price coefficient to be a random parameter with
a normal and log-normal distribution of the negative of the price  the latter to insure that the
sign of the marginal utility of the price is always negative. Results are robust to these changes in
the specification.
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ber 2011 and February 2012. The household sample was stratified in four groups,
according to the type of stoves the household has: group 1 and 2 include house-
holds with working and broken biogas plants respectively; households in group 3 use
clean stoves different from biogas; and group 4 represents households who only have
traditional cookstoves. The enumerators were asked to interview 3 households for
each group in each village, although this was not always possible. The final sample
includes 503 households, of which 133 in group 1 (working biogas plant), 120 in
group 2 (broken biogas plant), 121 in group 3 (other clean stoves) and 129 in group
4 (traditional stoves). Whenever possible, the interview was conducted with the
head of the household. The survey, stratification and sampling strategy, and sample
characteristics are described in more details in Somnath et al. (2014).
The part of the dataset used for this research project contains information on
socio-economic characteristics of the households  including assets, land and live-
stock ownership, community engagement, and access to credit  and details on their
energy use and cooking habits, especially the different types of biomass and cleaner
fuel used, the types of cookstoves owned and how often and for how long they are
used, where in the house is the cooking done, ventilation systems (including simply
opening windows while cooking), and the amount of expenditures and subsidies re-
ceived for cookstoves and cooking fuel. Households in sample group 1 and 2 (i.e.
with working or broken biogas plant) are asked detailed information about their bio-
gas plant and the reasons they considered when deciding to install it. Households in
sample group 3 and 4 are asked whether they are planning to install a biogas plant
(variable plan biogas). A description of the characteristics of the households and of
the biogas plants is provided in Appendix D.2, highlighting the main elements of
interest for the Chapter; descriptive statistics are presented in Tables D.1, D.2 and
D.3, in Appendix D.2.6
4.3.2 Time preference and risk aversion elicitation
The data also include the results from a risk aversion and a time preference elicitation
exercise, using two hypothetical dichotomous choices for each module. In both
modules, a scenario is presented and the respondent is asked to imagine someone
is offering them a gift in the form of an amount of money, remarking that there
6Tests of difference-in-means (t-tests and tests of proportions) between the stratification groups
are available from the authors upon request.
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are no right or wrong answers but it is only a matter of personal preferences. In
the time preference module, the respondent is first asked to choose whether they
would prefer a smaller amount of money (1,000 INR, equivalent to about 19 USD
at the time of the survey7) tomorrow or wait for 12 months to receive double that
amount (2,000 INR, or 38 USD). For reference, consider that the median monthly
expenditures excluding food, a proxy for the household disposable income, is 1,350
INR (26 USD), so the amount offered is substantial. If they choose the smaller
amount tomorrow, they are asked the question again increasing the amount after
12 months to 2,500 INR (48 USD). If they choose to wait in the first question, they
are asked the question again, but decreasing the amount to be received after 12
months to 1,500 INR (29 USD). Using the responses, I create an impatience index
with value 1 if the respondent chooses to wait in both questions (low impatience); 2
if they choose to wait in the first question but prefer to receive the money sooner in
the second question; 3 if they choose the smaller amount sooner in the first question,
but would rather wait in the second question; and 4 if they prefer the smaller amount
sooner in both questions (high level of impatience).
The risk aversion module first asks the respondent to choose between a smaller
but certain amount now (500 INR, or 9.6 USD), or to flip a coin and receive a larger
amount (1,200 INR, or 23 USD) if it is head and nothing at all if it is tail (the
expected value of this option is therefore 600 INR, or 11.5 USD), again to be paid
out immediately. If they prefer the safer option, they are then asked the question
with the option to have again 500 INR (9.6 USD) as a certain amount, or to flip
the coin to receive 1,250 INR (24 USD) if it is head or only 250 INR (5 USD) if it
is tail (the expected value is 750 INR, or 14 USD). If they instead prefer the riskier
option in the first question, they are then asked to choose between the certain 500
INR (9.6 USD), or to flip a coin for a 1,000 INR (19 USD) if head, and nothing
at all if tail (the expected value is 500 INR, the same as the certain amount). The
responses were then used to create a risk averse index, in the same way detailed in
the previous case. Households were also asked to self-assess their risk aversion and
impatience before the elicitation modules, and robustness checks for the analyses in
the following sections are conducted using these self-reported measures in place of
the elicited ones.
7The conversion rate used in the Chapter is 52 INR for 1 USD, the approximate rate in effect
during the study period November 2011 and February 2012.
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4.3.3 The discrete choice experiment
Finally, and the core component of this Chapter, the dataset includes responses from
a discrete choice experiment (DCE) to assess households' preferences for different
cookstoves' attributes and technologies. The technologies we were interested to test
are the biogas plant and a biomass-fuelled improved cookstove (ICS), while the most
commonly used traditional cookstove (biomass-fuelled) was used as outside option.
Before the survey, focus groups on the key obstacles to biogas adoption and use
were conducted in the study area (Somnath et al., 2014). The main issues stressed
by participants concerned the lack of quality assurance and the lack of adequate
repair and maintenance services; affordability, as the upfront construction costs are
still too high for the lower income households, even after factoring in the available
subsidies; alternative uses of dung as fertiliser or dung-cake to be burnt for energy,
which although less efficient than a biogas digester, require less time and upfront
expenses to make; and finally the fact that the biogas plants commonly used in the
area and the amount of dung available to a household are usually insufficient to
cover the cooking energy needs of the family, so that households usually continue
to use traditional stoves as well. Information from the focus groups were used to
design the DCE.
The DCE consisted of 5 hypothetical decision scenarios, each presented through
a choice-card. The 3 alternatives in each choice-card are `labelled' using the names of
the most common cookstove available in the sample area for each type: Rocket Stove
(biomass-fuelled ICS), Gobar Gas (biogas plant), and the outside-option Chulha
(traditional biomass cookstove). Each alternative is presented with a picture of
the stove, followed by its price as a number and in pictures, and pictures for the
maintenance assistance, smoke emissions, and fuel requirement (4 attributes). Each
stove and each attribute is explained in details using information cards complete
with pictures, before the DCE module is started.
The attributes for the traditional stove (Chulha) are fixed for all the decisions and
are set to low maintenance, high smoke emissions, medium fuel requirements and a
price of 100 INR (1.9 USD). The attributes and attribute levels used are summarised
in Table 4.1, while the script and choice-cards used in the DCE are included in the
Appendix D.1 (in both English and Odia). A total of 25 combinations of attributes
for the ICS (Rocket Stove) and biogas plant (Gobar Gas) are obtained using an
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efficient fractional factorial design. The 25 choice cards are grouped into 5 sets of
5 cards each, and respondents in each stratification group are randomised into a
choice set. The final dataset consists of 503 respondents, each presented with 5
choice cards, resulting in 2,515 choices.
Table 4.1: Attributes and attribute levels used in the discrete choice experiment (DCE).
Attributes Levels for biogas/ICS Reference level (traditional stove)
Price 4,000 / 7,000 / 10,000 INR 100 INR
(77 / 135 / 192 USD) (1.92 USD)
Maintenance Low / High Low
Smoke Low / High High
Fuel requirement Low / Medium / High Medium
In the empirical analysis, attributes are dummy-coded as being lower or higher
than the baseline attributes of the traditional stove (i.e. alternative 3: low mainte-
nance, high smoke, medium fuel use), which are fixed across all questions. Price is
considered a continuous variable.8
The outcome variable is the alternative chosen among the Gobar Biogas, the
Rocket Stove, or the traditional Chulha. After the respondent selects their pre-
ferred alternative for a choice card, they are asked to confirm whether they would
indeed purchase that cookstove at the proposed price9, and in 73% of the cases the
respondent answers affirmatively. Most of the no answers are in cases in which the
respondent selected the biogas plant but already has a working one, or when the
selected option is the Rocket stove. As a robustness check, the analysis is repeated
including the intention to purchase. In particular, we repeat the analysis excluding
the choices for which intention to purchase is not confirmed, and results are robust
in terms of coefficients and WTP for the biogas stoves, while WTP for attributes
are between 20-40% lower. Tables available on request.
4.3.4 Levels of experience
We use the sample stratification together with information from the survey to classify
households in three different levels of experience with biogas. Households who have
8As a robustness check, we run additional regressions using price as a categorical variable, as
suggested by Lancsar et al. (2017), and find that the coefficients respond close to linearly. For this
reason, in the main specifications presented in the Chapter price enters the models linearly and as
a continuous variable.
9Would you purchase the alternative you have chosen at the given price?.
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experienced malfunctions in the biogas plant  i.e. all the households in group
2, whose biogas plant is currently broken, plus the households in group 1 that
experienced malfunctions in the past  are classified as bad experience, while the
remaining households in group 1, who have a biogas plant that has never broken
down, are considered as good experience. Households in group 3 and 4 are classified
as having no experience; in some specifications and robustness checks this sample is
further divided by sample group (no experience, group 3; and no experience, group
4), or by intentions to install biogas in the future (no experience, plan to install; no
experience, no plan to install).
4.4 Cookstoves' ownership and use, experience with
biogas, and intention to adopt
This section provides a descriptive analysis of what factors and characteristics are
associated with the type of experience a household has with biogas. In particular,
we look at the type of cookstove owned and their use, fuel-stacking behaviour, plans
to install a biogas plant (for the households who do not already have one), and
functionality of the existing biogas plants (for the households who already have
one). The insights obtained provide helpful guidance to interpret the results of the
DCE analysis.
4.4.1 Factors associated with types of cookstove owned and
their use
Type of stove used
To parse out the role of each characteristic when considered together with the others,
I use multivariate regression analysis. In all the regressions that follow, errors are
clustered at the village level. First of all, I use a multinomial logit regression to
assess which observable characteristics are associated with the likelihood of having
a biogas plant (sample group 1 and 2) as opposed to other types of clean stove
(group 3) or traditional stove only (group 4). This is a categorical outcome variable
with three categories; having a biogas plant is used as the baseline. Model (1) in
Table D.4, Appendix D.3, reports the results of this analysis.
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The main variables correlated with the type of cooking system owned are wealth
and income, and the count of large animals. Predictably, the more large animals
the household has, the more likely it is to have a biogas plant as opposed to other
clean cookstoves, and as opposed to traditional cookstoves only. This makes sense,
as large animals provide the `fuel' needed to feed the biogas plant and are therefore
a de facto prerequisite for adoption. In fact, dung availability is cited as one the
leading motivations for adoptions among households using biogas.
A larger disposable income, measured by the natural log of non-food expenditures
in a year, is positively correlated with the odds of having other clean cookstoves
rather than having biogas. Smaller wealth, as measured by the asset ownership
index, is an indication that the household is more likely to only have traditional
cookstoves, as opposed to biogas. This suggests that biogas is more likely to be used
by households in the lower and middle part of the income and wealth distribution,
while higher income households tend to use LPG, kerosene and electric cookstoves.
Results are robust to using self-assessed risk aversion and impatience instead of the
elicited index  the coefficients of these variables are not significant in either case.
Fuel-stacking
Next, I investigate fuel-stacking behaviour in the sample, looking at what charac-
teristics are associated with the likelihood of having only one type of cookstove, two
different types, or three or more. Note that cookstove types correspond to different
fuels, namely fuelwood, biogas, kerosene, LPG and electricity. I first consider the
outcome as categorical and use a multinomial logit regression, where having one type
of cookstove is the baseline. The odds of having two stove types rather than one
and the odds of having three or more rather than one are both strongly associated
with the asset ownership index and the index for the quality of housing materials.
The magnitude of the coefficients for these variables are double when comparing
one stove to three or more, than they are when comparing one stove to two. For
this reason, I choose to use an ordinal logit as the preferred specification for the
analysis, as it is more efficient and should not sacrifice on insights on the dynamics
of fuel stacking, given the results from the multinomial logit. Results are presented
as Model (2) in Table D.4, Appendix D.3. Wealthier households appear to be more
likely to stack different types of stove, as indicated by the positive coefficient of
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the asset ownership index, and negative coefficient for low quality housing material.
Households who live closer to the village centre are also more likely to engage in
stove (and fuel) stacking, possibly because proximity to the market provides better
access to different stoves and fuels. These results could suggest that households
who do not engage in stove and fuel stacking do so because they are constrained by
affordability and access to different options.
For further insights on this hypothesis, I investigate fuel stacking behaviour
in households who have at least one clean cookstove. To do this, I estimate the
multinomial logit model excluding households in sample group 4 (households who
only have a traditional cookstove), and find that the probability of using only one
type of cookstove rather than two is strongly associated with having difficulty in
accessing credit, while the probability of having three or more types of cookstoves
rather than two is again positively associated with asset ownership and negatively
associated with low quality housing material and distance to the village center.10
This is consistent with the above hypothesis.
Intention to install biogas
Model (3) in Table D.5, Appendix D.3, only considers the sample of households
without a biogas plant (group 3 and group 4) and shows what characteristics of
the households are associated with the likelihood that the household is planning to
install a biogas plant, using a logistic regression. In general, none of the variables
is significant at the 1% significance level, so the households are quite similar along
the observable characteristics considered. Households that are planning to adopt
biogas appear to be less credit-constrained than those who are not, and to be less
impatient (although the latter is only significant when using a 5% significance level).
Robustness checks are conducted using self-assessed risk aversion and impatience
instead of the elicited variables, ownership of each type of cookstove, and number
of stove types owned, and results are robust to the different specifications.
Time stoves are used
Finally, Table D.6, Appendix D.3, show the results of regressions for the total time
of use (in minutes per day) of all the stoves for the entire sample (4a), for time of use
10Table not reported, but available from the authors upon request.
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disaggregated by clean stoves (4b) and biomass stoves (4c), and for the share of time
clean stoves are used rather than biomass stoves (4d). The size of the households
(more exactly the number of people to be cooked for everyday, adjusted so that
children count for half a adult) only affects the amount of time biomass stoves are
used (and through that channel, the time of use of all stoves, which is the sum of
biomass and clean stoves), while it has no effect on the use of clean stoves.
This suggests that biomass stoves are used as `residual' cookstoves, to comple-
ment clean stoves when they are insufficient to cover the entire energy demand of
the household. The use of clean stoves therefore appear to be determined by con-
straints, possibly the availability of fuel, as it was highlighted by focus groups in the
case of biogas. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that having a traditional
biomass cookstove per se does not affect the amount of time clean cookstoves are
used, while on the other side having clean cookstoves substantially decreases the
amount of time traditional stoves are used.
The fact that economic variables do not seem to be substantially correlated with
the time or the share of use of clean stoves, once the cookstove types are controlled
for, further suggests that in this case constrained fuel availability might play a larger
role than fuel affordability in the decision of what cookstoves to use and for how
long. This would also provide an explanation for fuel stacking. The other covariates
associated with the outcomes are of course the type of cookstoves the household has,
represented by ownership of cookstoves types and by the sample group (because of
the way stratification was conducted).
4.4.2 Factors associated with biogas functionality
In model (5a) of Table D.7, Appendix D.3, I restrict the sample to households who
already have a biogas plant and use a logistic regression for the probability that
the plant is broken. I include the same characteristics of the households as in the
previous models, and add variables on the characteristics of the plant, its use, and
the motivations for installing.
The main variable associated with a working biogas plant are a more recent
installation year, larger plant size, more time spent feeding the dung into the plant
and cleaning the plant, and less time spent collecting the dung. If the model is run
using the overall time spent in the three activities as one aggregated variable, this
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is not significant any more (results not reported), suggesting that while households
spend on average the same overall time in activities related to the plant, those who
now have a broken biogas plant tended to spend relatively more time collecting dung
and less in actually operating and maintaining the plant.
The price paid by the household and the amount of subsidy are not significant,
once the other covariates are controlled for; while having a higher livestock counts,
mainly small animals, are positively correlated with having a working plant. A
higher disposable income (as measured by the natural log of yearly expenditures in
non-food items) and smaller distance to the village centre are also associated with
a working biogas plant, which might suggest that it is easier for these households to
have the plant repaired or serviced, or it might be an indication of higher quality
of the plant, as better materials and better installers might have been hired for the
same price.
Although lack of data on servicing, other type of maintenance and direct mea-
sures of the quality of the plant prevents looking at these channels in more details,
further investigations go against the hypothesis that income and proximity to the vil-
lage centre are associated with the likelihood of having the system repaired rather
than experiencing malfunctions in the first place. Firstly, column (5b) looks at
whether the biogas plant ever broke down, rather than whether it is not working
at the moment. The results are substantially unchanged, possibly because only 8
households in the sample ever experienced a break down and repaired it, with the
exception of the coefficient of the time spent cleaning the plant, which is now signif-
icantly larger in magnitude, suggesting that proper maintenance is the main driver
of plant functionality.
I then restrict the sample to the households whose biogas plant has ever been
broken and regress whether it has been repaired or not on the log of the expen-
ditures and distance to the village (alone and with covariates). The former has a
positive correlation with the likelihood of the system being repaired, while the latter
a negative one, but none of the coefficient is significant at conventional significance
level (results not reported); these results should be taken with caution due to the
very small number of cases of repaired plants.
Overall, the households with a broken biogas plant and households with a func-
tioning one appear to be quite similar along the observable characteristics consid-
ered, and the age of the plant and the time spent cleaning it seem to be the main
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driver of malfunctions. These are the only variables that are still significant at the
more conservative significance level of 0.1%. It should be noted that all the results
in this section are correlations, rather than causal effects, as data are observational.
They nonetheless provide interesting insights on the issue, and could be a start-
ing point for designing an experimental or quasi-experimental investigation on the
causal effects at play.
4.5 Preferences for biogas, biomass-ICS and tradi-
tional cookstoves: results from a discrete choice
experiment
4.5.1 Results
This Section presents results on the DCE analysis, using random parameter logit
models (RPL). Conditional logit (CL) specifications are presented for comparisons.
The estimated coefficients are then translated into WTP amount for each attribute
and technology, by different `types' of households, in the following Section.
Valuation of attributes and stove-specific premiums: strong interest in
lower emissions, fuel savings, and biogas
Table 4.2 compares estimates from conditional logit (CL) models (1 and 3) and
random parameter logit (RPL) models (2 and 4). The RPL specifications model
the alternative-specific constants (ASC) and the coefficients of the attributes, with
the exception of price, as random normally distributed parameters; for the random
parameters, both the mean of the coefficient and the standard deviation are pre-
sented. The likelihood ratio chi-square test comparing the log-likelihood value of
the CL model with that of the `empty' model without covariates (ll(0)) rejects the
null hypothesis that the two models are not significantly different. This holds for
all the specifications. Comparing the log-likelihood of the CL with that of the RPL
model with the same regressors, further suggests that the latter is to be preferred
(Greene and Hensher, 2003).
The first specification (columns 1 and 2) looks at how different values of the at-
tributes affect the likelihood of choosing a cookstove over the other two alternatives,
258
while the alternative-specific constants (ASC) represent cookstove-specific tastes,
after controlling for the attributes. In the second specification (columns 3 and 4)
each attribute is interacted with whether the cookstove chosen is the biogas plant,
to investigate whether households are willing to pay a larger or smaller premium for
each attribute, depending on the fuel (i.e. biogas as opposed to fuelwood, used in
the ICS Rocket Stove and in the traditional stove).
The signs of the attribute coefficients are as expected, negative for higher prices
and higher fuel requirements, and positive for maintenance service, lower smoke
emissions, and lower fuel consumption. There is nonetheless heterogeneity in the
valuation of each attribute, as indicated by significant estimates for the standard de-
viations. The distributions of the coefficients in model (2), estimated using Epanech-
nikov kernel density, are plotted in Figure 4.1  for the attributes. The ASC for the
Rocket stove is significantly negative, suggesting that the traditional stove (baseline)
is strongly preferred to the fuelwood ICS. Biogas on the contrary, attracts a strong
positive valuation. Again, there is substantial heterogeneity in tastes regarding the
different technologies, as indicated by the the standard deviation of the coefficient
on the ASC.
In the second specification (3 and 4) households are willing to pay extra for main-
tenance services only in the case of biogas, as only the coefficient for the interaction
term is significant. In fact, other DCEs and preparatory focus groups conducted
in India suggests that maintenance is not strongly relevant to respondents, at least
in the case of fuelwood stoves (e.g. Jeuland et al., 2015a), while focus groups in
our study area highlighted that maintenance is a key factor for biogas. None of the
other interactions is significant, suggesting that smoke emissions and fuel savings
are valued independently from the specific stove.
Negative experience corresponds to less enthusiastic preferences for bio-
gas; households who intend to install a biogas plant have similar prefer-
ences to households with positive experience
We next investigate whether previous experience with biogas, either positive or
negative, contribute to explain households' preferences for biogas. In Table 4.3 the
attributes' coefficients and stove-specific constants are estimated separately depend-
ing on whether the alternative chosen is the biogas stove or not, and when it is the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4.1: Distributions of the estimated parameters for the maintenance (a), smoke (b)
and fuel (c, d) attributes, estimated in the random parameter logit.
biogas stove it is further interacted with the type of experience with biogas the
household has had: positive, negative, or no experience. The model in column (2)
extends this specification by splitting the households in the no experience group
according to whether they plan to install a biogas plant or not, while in column (3)
they are further distinguished by stratification group, that is whether they have a
clean cookstove or only traditional ones.
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Table 4.2: Regression table for the DCE. Baseline specifications, with attributes and ASCs.
Conditional logit (1 and 3) and random parameters logit (2 and 4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
outcome outcome outcome outcome
outcome Mean SD outcome Mean SD
price_thousands -0.13∗∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
maint_higher 0.23∗∗∗ 0.32∗ 1.35∗∗∗ 0.02 0.01 1.40∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.15) (0.22) (0.11) (0.20) (0.25)
" Xbiogas 0.33∗ 0.59∗ 1.61∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.25) (0.26)
smoke_lower 0.90∗∗∗ 1.70∗∗∗ 1.72∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.17) (0.23) (0.12) (0.28) (0.21)
" Xbiogas -0.21 -0.02 -0.15
(0.15) (0.25) (0.22)
fuel_lower 1.00∗∗∗ 1.92∗∗∗ 1.13∗∗∗ 0.93∗∗∗ 1.64∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.14) (0.19) (0.12) (0.26) (0.23)
" Xbiogas 0.13 0.53 -0.28
(0.15) (0.35) (0.31)
fuel_higher -0.30∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗∗ -0.28∗ -0.45∗ 0.91∗∗
(0.08) (0.17) (0.25) (0.14) (0.21) (0.31)
" Xbiogas -0.03 -0.18 0.05
(0.16) (0.26) (0.20)
ICS ASC -0.71∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ 2.04∗∗∗ -0.67∗∗∗ -0.98∗ 1.77∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.30) (0.27) (0.17) (0.44) (0.36)
biogas ASC 0.51∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗
(0.13) (0.27) (0.26) (0.14) (0.27) (0.26)
N 2515 2515 2515 2515
r2_p 0.18 0.18
ll -2274.49 -1998.91 -2270.53 -2001.33
ll_0 -2763.01 -2763.01
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
aic 4562.99 4023.83 4563.06 4044.67
bic 4611.49 4113.90 4639.27 4190.17
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: " Xbiogas means the attribute in the previous row has been interacted with the
biogas dummy, representing whether the alternative from the choice card is labelled as
a biogas stove.
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Table 4.3: Regression table for the DCE. Interactions with prior experience. Random parameters logit.
(1) (2) (3)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
price_thousands -0.27∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.26∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.26∗∗∗ (0.03)
maint_higher 0.04 (0.19) 1.21∗∗∗ (0.29) 0.03 (0.16) 1.18∗∗∗ (0.20) 0.05 (0.20) 1.30∗∗∗ (0.21)
" XbiogasXgoodexper 0.69∗ (0.35) 0.71 (0.45) 0.61 (0.37) 1.03 (0.65) 0.64 (0.33)
" XbiogasXbadexper 1.11∗∗ (0.36) 1.02 (0.52) 1.05∗∗ (0.34) 1.56∗ (0.67) 0.98∗∗ (0.33)
" XbiogasXnoexper 0.27 (0.38) 1.40 (0.80) 0.52 (0.33) 1.27∗∗ (0.46) 0.35 (0.32)
smoke_lower 1.58∗∗∗ (0.22) 1.45∗∗∗ (0.35) 1.38∗∗∗ (0.18) 1.67∗∗∗ (0.26) 1.72∗∗∗ (0.27) 1.17∗∗∗ (0.21)
" XbiogasXgoodexper 0.23 (0.39) 0.75 (0.46) 0.64 (0.47) 1.05 (0.81) -0.15 (0.36)
" XbiogasXbadexper 0.20 (0.39) -0.12 (0.47) 0.25 (0.34) -0.81∗ (0.41) -0.17 (0.38)
" XbiogasXnoexper 0.18 (0.29) 0.41 (0.75) 0.55∗ (0.27) -0.53 (0.43) 0.03 (0.28)
fuel_lower 1.54∗∗∗ (0.32) 1.63∗∗∗ (0.20) 1.40 (.) 1.44∗∗∗ (0.20) 1.44∗∗∗ (0.25) -1.34∗∗∗ (0.29)
" XbiogasXgoodexper 0.81 (0.44) -0.37 (0.29) 0.90∗ (0.41) -0.71 (0.43) 0.64 (0.43)
" XbiogasXbadexper 1.44∗∗ (0.49) -0.70 (0.38) 1.50∗∗ (0.46) 0.37 (0.39) 1.24∗∗ (0.41)
" XbiogasXnoexper 0.28 (0.44) -0.24 (0.29) 0.56 (0.36) 0.85∗ (0.36) 0.14 (0.35)
fuel_higher -0.41 (0.22) -0.61∗∗ (0.21) -0.33 (0.24) -0.83∗∗ (0.29) -0.49∗ (0.22) 1.13∗ (0.45)
" XbiogasXgoodexpe -0.15 (0.39) -0.52 (0.43) -0.19 (0.32) -0.87∗ (0.41) 0.09 (0.30)
" XbiogasXbadexper -0.23 (0.46) 0.26 (0.77) -0.26 (0.46) -0.45 (0.80) -0.04 (0.41)
" XbiogasXnoexper -0.35 (0.28) -0.44 (0.30) -0.45 (0.29) 0.16 (0.26) -0.33 (0.29)
ICS ASC -0.60 (0.42) -1.63∗∗∗ (0.31) -0.25 (0.31) -0.83∗ (0.38) 1.82∗∗∗ (0.34)
biogas ASC 1.66∗∗∗ (0.37) 1.96∗∗∗ (0.52) 1.51∗∗∗ (0.40) 1.69∗∗∗ (0.26) 1.66∗∗∗ (0.40) 1.38∗∗∗ (0.29)
" Xbadexper -1.03∗ (0.52) -0.14 (0.24) -0.96 (0.53) 0.06 (0.54) -1.01∗ (0.50) 0.35 (0.44)
" Xnoexper -1.20 (0.64) 0.77 (1.77)
" Xplanbg -0.22 (0.37) 1.52∗∗∗ (0.37)
" Xotherclean 0.44 (0.41) -1.18∗ (0.55)
" Xtradonly -0.42 (0.47) -1.06∗∗ (0.34)
" Xnoplanbg -2.74∗∗∗ (0.62) 1.83∗∗∗ (0.39)
" Xotherclean -1.69∗∗∗ (0.50) -1.62∗∗∗ (0.44)
" Xtradonly -3.19∗∗∗ (0.69) -1.20∗ (0.51)
N 2515 2515 2515
aic 4002.76 4019.16 3933.52
bic 4286.83 4303.23 4176.02
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Note: " X[dummy] : variable in previous row is interacted with [dummy].
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While the interactions between attributes and experience are not significant for
the smoke and higher fuel requirement attributes (and their valuation is similar
to the estimates in the previous table), they provide interesting insights regarding
the preferences for maintenance services and fuel savings. Households who already
have experience with the biogas plant are willing to pay more for maintenance of
the biogas stove, and the amount is even larger for households who had a negative
experience, suggesting that households who own a biogas plant realise how important
careful and frequent maintenance is for the correct functioning of the plant. In
the case of the biogas stove for households who have no experience with biogas
the valuation of maintenance is still positive, but not as high as for experienced
respondents, while in the case of the fuelwood stoves (the baseline category) the
valuation of the maintenance attribute is very close to zero.
Households who have experience with biogas also have larger coefficients for
fuel savings from a biogas plant, compared to the other categories, with negative
experience playing once again a larger role than positive experience.
Finally, negative experience with the technology appears to be associated with
less enthusiastic preferences for biogas, compared to households with positive ex-
perience (the baseline category). In fact, in model (1) households who have not
experienced malfunctions are willing to pay a larger premium for the technology, as
compared to households with negative experience or no experience at all.
Model (2) and (3) shows that this result is nonetheless more nuanced, as house-
holds who have no experience with biogas but are planning to adopt it are willing
to pay a premium for biogas almost as large as households who have it and have
had a positive experience. Among the former, this result is driven in particular by
households who have a clean cookstove different from biogas, rather than house-
holds who are currently only using traditional stoves. Yet, all the households who
have no experience but are planning to install biogas, independently of what stoves
they currently use, have more enthusiastic preferences for biogas than households
who experienced malfunctions. Finally, households who have no experience and no
intentions to install have the lowest willingness to pay for a biogas-specific premium,
with the valuation for households who have other clean stoves close to zero, and the
valuation for households who are only using traditional stoves even reverting the
sign to negative.
This set of results suggests that in general households who are cooking with
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clean cookstoves (biogas or other) have a stronger dislike for the traditional stove
(the outside option), and are willing to pay more to avoid choosing that option
 consistent with their revealed preferences. Yet, the intention to install is more
strongly associated with stated preferences for biogas than it is whether households
have a clean cookstove different from biogas or are only using traditional stoves at
the time of the survey. This finding is corroborated by a robustness check in which
the model is first estimated splitting the households with no experience according
to their stratification group.11
Across the specifications, it is a robust result that households who have no experi-
ence but are planning to adopt display similar preferences to those who have already
adopted and had no malfunctions, while households who experienced malfunctions
have less enthusiastic preferences than either of them. This finding suggests that
negative and positive experience  as defined in this Chapter  might have asymmet-
ric effects on the preferences for biogas. Or similarly, households who are planning to
install might be optimistic about the technology, so that a smooth experience largely
confirms their expectations, while a negative experience leads them to update their
preferences downward. This explanation is consistent and complements results from
the field experiment on improved cookstoves in rural Bangladesh by Miller and Mo-
barak (2015), who find that households are asymmetrically affected by the positive
and negative information received from their social network, with only the latter
playing a significant role. It is to be noted that, due to the nature of the data, our
results are partial correlations rather than causal effects, and we cannot rule out
that households who experienced plants malfunctions had systematically different
preferences for biogas to start with, or that a more pessimistic opinion about the
technology is what led to the malfunctions in the first place. More research is needed
to understand the direction of causality between these variables.
Experience (positive and negative) counteracts risk aversion, impatience
and concerns on access to credit
In Table 4.4 we investigate the role of risk aversion, time preference, and perceived
credit constraints on households' stated preferences, as very little evidence exists
in the literature on these regards. To do this, we interact the attributes and each
cookstove-specific constant with a risk aversion dummy (column 1), an impatience
11Results from this specification not shown.
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dummy (column 2), and a perceived credit constraint dummy (column 3). Risk
aversion and time preference elicitation are described in Section 4.3. The credit
constraint dummy is based on a self-assessment of how difficult it would be for the
respondent to obtain a 5,000 Rupees loan through formal channels, that is excluding
borrowing from family or friends: If you have to borrow Rs. 5000 (from a money
lender or micro-finance groups, not from the family member and friends) for one
month, would this be possible?, with possible answers (1) yes, quite easy, (2) yes,
but not easy, (3) may be not sure, (4) not possible; 2 is the average and median
response in the sample. We classify households who answered 3 or 4 as credit-
constrained. To delve deeper in the role of experience, the biogas-specific constant
is further interacted with the type of experience, in all three models.
The results from model (1), (2) and (3) suggest that while risk aversion, im-
patience and concerns regarding access to credit are all negatively correlated with
preferences for biogas, experience of any kind counterbalances these effects. The
result is even stronger for positive experience, which reduces the difference to very
close to zero. In fact, in model (1) the biogas-specific constant is lower but not signif-
icantly different from zero for more risk averse respondents in the case of households
who have had positive experience and in the case of households who have had neg-
ative experience, while risk averse households who have had no experience have a
substantially lower biogas-specific constant than their less risk averse counterparts
with no experience. The same occurs when considering impatience in model (2),
and perceived credit constraints in model (3); these characteristics are all associated
with a smaller biogas premium, but the effect is much larger and significant (at 5%
significance level) only in the case of households with no experience.
Finally, more impatient households have on average a stronger dislike for the
Rocket stove than those who are more patient, and the same occurs for more risk
averse households and for households who have more concerns with credit access,
although the differences in these cases are smaller and not significantly different
from zero, at conventional levels. None of the interactions with the attribute are
significant at the 5% significance level in any of the three models.
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Table 4.4: Regression table for the DCE. Interactions with risk aversion, impatience and perceived credit constraints. Random parameters logit.
(1) (2) (3)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
price_thousands -0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) -0.17∗∗∗ (0.02) -0.18∗∗∗ (0.02)
maint_higher 0.24 (0.15) 0.70∗ (0.30) 0.08 (0.14) 0.50 (0.29) 0.32∗ (0.14) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.27)
" Xriskaverse 0.02 (0.18) 1.03∗∗ (0.34)
" Ximpatient 0.28 (0.17) 1.19∗∗∗ (0.22)
" Xcreditconstr -0.11 (0.23) 0.95∗ (0.40)
smoke_lower 1.17∗∗∗ (0.14) 0.86∗∗ (0.27) 1.08∗∗∗ (0.10) 0.80∗∗ (0.26) 1.06∗∗∗ (0.14) 1.28∗∗∗ (0.13)
" Xriskaverse -0.02 (0.22) 1.26∗∗ (0.42)
" Ximpatient 0.16 (0.19) 1.35∗∗∗ (0.35)
" Xcreditconstr -0.10 (0.35) 1.64∗∗∗ (0.27)
fuel_lower 1.29∗∗∗ (0.19) 0.99∗∗∗ (0.20) 1.30∗∗∗ (0.21) 0.86∗∗∗ (0.24) 1.39∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.30∗∗∗ (0.14)
" Xriskaverse 0.18 (0.25) 0.98∗ (0.43)
" Ximpatient 0.13 (0.25) 1.16∗∗∗ (0.33)
" Xcreditconstr -0.45 (0.23) 0.41 (0.52)
fuel_higher -0.47∗∗ (0.18) 0.92∗∗∗ (0.24) -0.68∗∗∗ (0.20) 1.06∗∗∗ (0.26) -0.46∗∗ (0.14) 1.07∗∗∗ (0.19)
" Xriskaverse 0.04 (0.22) -0.90∗∗ (0.30)
" Ximpatient 0.35 (0.21) -0.63 (0.37)
" Xcreditconstr -0.43 (0.33) -1.35 (0.82)
ICS ASC -0.51 (0.30) -0.21 (0.27) -0.39 (0.37)
" Xriskaverse -0.37 (0.36)
" Ximpatient -0.88∗∗ (0.34)
" Xcreditconstr -0.16 (0.35)
biogas ASC X goodexpe 1.50∗∗∗ (0.24) 1.45∗∗∗ (0.33) 1.51∗∗∗ (0.27)
" Xriskaverse -0.08 (0.29)
" Ximpatient -0.04 (0.39)
" Xcreditconstr -0.02 (0.37)
biogas ASC X badexper 1.09∗∗∗ (0.27) 1.28∗∗∗ (0.29) 1.05∗∗∗ (0.22)
" Xriskaverse -0.22 (0.28)
" Ximpatient -0.56 (0.31)
" Xcreditconstr -0.12 (0.37)
biogas ASC X noexp 0.77∗∗ (0.26) 0.91∗∗ (0.31) 0.90∗∗∗ (0.24)
" Xriskaverse -0.49∗ (0.25)
" Ximpatient -0.73∗ (0.34)
" Xcreditconstr -1.22∗∗∗ (0.31)
N 2515 2515 2515
aic 4308.75 4296.76 4239.57
bic 4481.97 4469.97 4412.78
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 Note: " X[dummy] : variable in previous row is interacted with [dummy].
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No evidence of `anchoring' valuation to the price of existing biogas plant
In our final specifications, we test whether for households who already have a biogas
plant the price they paid for their plant has an anchoring effect (or reference-
dependent effect) on their choices in the DCE, and therefore on their valuation of
biogas.12 In particular, we test whether the biogas alternative is less likely to be
selected in the DCE when the price presented is above the price the household paid
for their own biogas plant, after controlling for the general effect of price (as higher
prices already have a negative effect on the probability of choosing an alternative).
To do this, the baseline model specification with attributes and ASCs is modified
as follows. The biogas ASC is interacted with the type of experience, and for house-
holds with positive and negative experience it is further interacted with whether the
price attribute is above the price the household paid for their existing plant. The
same is done for the price attribute, after interacting it with whether the alternative
is biogas. In this specification, the coefficient for price is modelled as a random
parameter to allow for unobserved heterogeneity. Results are presented in Table 4.5
 model (1) uses the price actually paid by the household (pricepaid) as reference,
while model (2) uses the price inclusive of subsidies (pricetot) as reference.
Whether the price in the choice-card is above or below the price originally paid
appears to be insignificant, when controlling for the general price effect, the rest of
the attributes, and experience level. The result is robust if only the price interactions
are introduced in the model or if only the interactions with the biogas ASC are
included (results not shown). We therefore find no evidence that the price of the
household's own biogas plant anchor the valuation of biogas in the DCE.
12See Maniadis et al. (2014); Fudenberg et al. (2012) for a review on anchoring effect and
reference-dependent preferences, and recent results from testing anchoring effect in stated pref-
erences experiments.
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Table 4.5: Regression table for the DCE. Testing for price `anchoring', using the price paid as reference (1) and the total price  price paid plus subsidies
 as reference (2). Random parameters logit.
(1) (2)
Mean SD Mean SD
price_thousands -0.25∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.24∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.25∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.26∗∗∗ (0.03)
" Xifbiogas Xgoodexper -0.46 (0.29) 0.22∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.02 (0.26) 0.14 (0.10)
" Xabovepricepaid 0.54 (0.28) 0.09∗ (0.04)
" Xabovpricetot -0.07 (0.13) 0.14∗ (0.06)
" Xifbiogas Xbadexper 0.10 (0.38) 0.04 (0.02) 0.10 (0.15) 0.07 (0.04)
" Xabovepricepaid -0.11 (0.38) -0.05 (0.03)
" Xabovpricetot -0.10 (0.10) -0.02 (0.03)
" Xifbiogas Xnoexper -0.00 (0.06) 0.09∗∗ (0.03) -0.02 (0.07) 0.10 (0.06)
maint_higher 0.37∗∗ (0.14) 0.69∗ (0.31) 0.38∗∗ (0.14) -0.72 (0.47)
smoke_lower 1.58∗∗∗ (0.16) 1.15∗∗∗ (0.19) 1.55∗∗∗ (0.15) 1.18∗∗∗ (0.21)
fuel_lower 1.76∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.10 (0.34) 1.77∗∗∗ (0.13) 0.01 (0.72)
fuel_higher -0.50∗∗∗ (0.14) -1.02∗∗ (0.35) -0.56∗∗∗ (0.15) -1.19∗∗∗ (0.28)
ICS ASC -0.82∗ (0.38) 1.20∗∗∗ (0.29) -0.77∗ (0.38) 1.05∗∗∗ (0.26)
biogas ASC Xgoodexper 4.29∗∗ (1.31) -0.87∗∗ (0.27) 1.87∗ (0.89) -1.21∗∗ (0.45)
" Xabovepricepaid -3.10∗ (1.31) -0.04 (0.37)
" Xabovepricetot 0.49 (1.05) -1.73 (0.98)
biogas ASC Xbadexper 1.09 (1.67) 0.61∗ (0.30) 1.19∗ (0.48) 0.66 (0.38)
" Xabovepricepaid 0.11 (1.75) 0.06 (0.16)
" Xabovepricetot -0.26 (0.36) -0.40 (0.53)
biogas ASC Xnoexper Xplanbg 1.52∗∗∗ (0.41) 1.52∗∗∗ (0.29) 1.63∗∗∗ (0.45) 1.49∗∗∗ (0.38)
biogas ASC Xnoexper Xnoplanbg -0.53 (0.39) -1.58∗∗∗ (0.33) -0.63 (0.40) -1.65∗∗∗ (0.31)
N 2515 2515
aic 3933.30 3933.44
bic 4168.88 4169.01
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: " X[dummy] : variable in previous row is interacted with [dummy].
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4.5.2 Estimates of the WTP for changes in the attributes and
technology-specific premiums
To understand the magnitude of the estimates and convert them into monetary
measures, we calculate the WTP for a one-unit change in each attribute, and for
moving from the traditional cookstove to each of the non-traditional technology.
When the coefficient of references are modelled as random, the measure provided is
the mean WTP. Results are reported in Tables 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, in 1,000 Rupees.
Note that when conducting the robustness check and excluding the observations for
which the choice was not validated in the follow-up question on whether they would
indeed purchase that cookstove at that price (28% of the cases), the estimated WTP
for the attributes tend to be between 20% and 40% lower than the estimates for the
whole sample, while estimates for the biogas-specific premiums are more similar,
mostly within a +/-10% interval. Except for this difference, the general results
discussed in this and the previous section are robust.
Households appear to be willing to pay for more frequent maintenance services
only for the biogas stove, in the amount of 2,300 Rupees, on average (column (4)
in Table 4.6). As can be seen in the models with interaction terms with experience
level (Table 4.7), this result is mainly driven by households who already have expe-
rience with the technology, and in particular those who experienced malfunctions 
the latter are willing to pay 4,200 Rupees on average for the more frequent service.
This suggests that households who are not familiar with the technology might un-
derestimate the level of work required for operating and maintaining a biogas plant.
In terms of respondents' characteristics, maintenance service tend to be of interest
to more impatient and less credit-constrained households (Table 4.8).
WTP for smoke reduction is even larger, at 6,250 Rupees, and is less dependent
on the type of fuel, level of experience, risk aversion, time preference, or perceived
credit constraints. As seen in the previous section, there is nonetheless unobserved
heterogeneity in the estimate, although not along the lines analysed in this Chapter.
As an extension, estimates for this attribute could be obtained by health status of
the household, in particular in terms of respiratory issues, and by households' beliefs
of how harmful indoor pollution is, as in Jeuland et al. (2015a, 2019).
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Table 4.6: WTP estimates (in 1,000 Rupees, ∼19 USD) for the models in Table 4.2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
maintXhigher 1.84∗∗∗ 1.17∗
(0.55) (0.55)
mainthigherXwood 0.14 0.02
(0.85) (0.77)
mainthigherXbiogas 2.70∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗
(0.68) (0.74)
smokeXlower 7.07∗∗∗ 6.25∗∗∗
(0.98) (0.96)
smokelowerXwood 8.28∗∗∗ 6.58∗∗∗
(1.30) (1.46)
smokelowerXbiogas 6.63∗∗∗ 6.49∗∗∗
(1.02) (1.07)
fuelXlower 7.87∗∗∗ 7.06∗∗∗
(1.05) (0.85)
fuellowerXwood 7.28∗∗∗ 6.40∗∗∗
(1.31) (1.30)
fuellowerXbiogas 8.31∗∗∗ 8.47∗∗∗
(1.12) (1.15)
fuelXhigher -2.39∗∗∗ -2.41∗∗∗
(0.68) (0.66)
fuelhigherXwood -2.17∗ -1.76∗
(1.07) (0.86)
fuelhigherXbiogas -2.43∗∗ -2.45∗∗
(0.78) (0.80)
ICS ASC -5.60∗∗∗ -4.37∗∗ -5.29∗∗ -3.82
(1.60) (1.48) (1.76) (2.01)
biogas ASC 3.97∗∗∗ 4.03∗∗∗ 3.62∗∗∗ 3.18∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.70) (0.88) (0.84)
N 2515 2515 2515 2515
Standard errors in parenthese; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.7: WTP estimates (in 1,000 Rupees, ∼19 USD) for the models in Table 4.3.
(1) (2) (3)
outcome outcome outcome
mainthigherXwood 0.16 (0.72) 0.12 (0.63) 0.18 (0.77)
mainthigherXbiogasXgoodexper 2.70∗ (1.25) 2.46 (1.34) 2.64∗ (1.29)
mainthigherXbiogasXbadexper 4.27∗∗∗ (1.20) 4.17∗∗∗ (1.22) 3.96∗∗ (1.20)
mainthigherXbiogasXnoexper 1.15 (1.17) 2.13 (1.10) 1.55 (1.05)
smokelowerXwood 5.87∗∗∗ (1.21) 5.34∗∗∗ (1.00) 6.66∗∗∗ (1.30)
smokelowerXbiogasXgoodexper 6.71∗∗∗ (1.73) 7.82∗∗∗ (2.30) 6.07∗∗∗ (1.43)
smokelowerXbiogasXbadexper 6.61∗∗∗ (1.62) 6.32∗∗∗ (1.58) 6.02∗∗∗ (1.43)
smokelowerXbiogasXnoexper 6.55∗∗∗ (1.14) 7.46∗∗∗ (1.26) 6.78∗∗∗ (1.17)
fuellowerXwood 5.69∗∗∗ (1.34) 5.41∗∗∗ (0.64) 5.56∗∗∗ (1.12)
fuellowerXbiogasXgoodexper 8.67∗∗∗ (1.04) 8.90∗∗∗ (1.57) 8.04∗∗∗ (1.29)
fuellowerXbiogasXbadexper 11.02∗∗∗ (1.89) 11.21∗∗∗ (2.02) 10.38∗∗∗ (1.48)
fuellowerXbiogasXnoexper 6.72∗∗∗ (1.19) 7.58∗∗∗ (1.58) 6.12∗∗∗ (1.22)
fuelhigherXwood -1.51 (0.86) -1.29 (0.94) -1.90∗ (0.87)
fuelhigherXbiogasXgoodexper -2.08 (1.27) -2.02 (1.14) -1.54 (1.00)
fuelhigherXbiogasXbadexper -2.35 (1.46) -2.28 (1.52) -2.04 (1.43)
fuelhigherXbiogasXnoexper -2.81∗∗ (1.02) -3.05∗∗ (1.11) -3.16∗∗ (0.99)
ICS ASC -2.22 (1.71) -0.99 (1.28) -3.23 (1.69)
biogas ASC X goodexperience 6.16∗∗∗ (1.29) 5.84∗∗∗ (1.36) 6.42∗∗∗ (1.30)
biogas ASC X badexperience 2.35 (1.53) 2.14 (1.59) 2.49 (1.45)
biogas ASC X noexperience 1.71 (1.84)
biogas ASC X noexp X planbg 5.00∗∗∗ (1.25)
biogas ASC X noexp X planbg X otherclean 8.14∗∗∗ (1.70)
biogas ASC X noexp X planbg X tradonly 4.80∗∗ (1.69)
biogas ASC X noexp X noplanbg -4.75∗ (1.91)
biogas ASC X noexp X noplanbg X otherclean -0.12 (1.96)
biogas ASC X noexp X noplanbg X tradonly -5.91∗∗ (2.20)
N 2515 2515 2515
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.8: WTP estimates (in 1,000 Rupees, ∼19 USD) for the models in Table 4.4.
(1) (2) (3)
mainthigherXlessriskaverse 1.40 (0.81)
mainthigherXriskaverse 1.50 (0.81)
mainthigherXpatient 0.45 (0.78)
mainthigherXimpatient 2.06∗∗ (0.77)
mainthigherXunconstrain 1.73∗ (0.69)
mainthigherXcreditconstr 1.14 (1.04)
smokelowerXlessriskaverse 6.74∗∗∗ (1.08)
smokelowerXriskaverse 6.61∗∗∗ (1.46)
smokelowerXpatient 6.24∗∗∗ (0.94)
smokelowerXimpatient 7.17∗∗∗ (1.56)
smokelowerXunconstrain 6.42∗∗∗ (1.08)
smokelowerXcreditconstr 5.87∗∗ (2.09)
fuellowerXlessriskaverse 7.39∗∗∗ (1.27)
fuellowerXriskaverse 8.40∗∗∗ (1.37)
fuellowerXpatient 7.57∗∗∗ (1.51)
fuellowerXimpatient 8.34∗∗∗ (1.26)
fuellowerXunconstrain 8.29∗∗∗ (1.13)
fuellowerXcreditconstr 5.84∗∗∗ (1.29)
fuelhigherXlessriskaverse -2.71∗ (1.12)
fuelhigherXriskaverse -2.47∗∗ (0.91)
fuelhigherXpatient -3.93∗∗ (1.33)
fuelhigherXimpatient -1.92∗ (0.87)
fuelhigherXunconstrain -1.99∗ (0.88)
fuelhigherXcreditconstr -4.31∗∗ (1.45)
ICS ASC Xlessriskaverse -2.92 (1.83)
ICS ASC Xriskaverse -5.03∗∗ (1.93)
ICS ASC Xpatient -1.20 (1.59)
ICS ASC Ximpatient -6.32∗∗ (2.14)
ICS ASC Xunconstrain -3.38∗ (1.50)
ICS ASC Xcreditconstr -4.23 (2.20)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXlessriskaverse 8.60∗∗∗ (1.53)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXriskav 8.12∗∗∗ (1.44)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXpatient 8.39∗∗∗ (1.98)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXimpatient 8.19∗∗∗ (1.46)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXunconstr 8.24∗∗∗ (1.36)
biogas ASC XgoodexpXcreditcstr 8.14∗∗∗ (1.57)
biogas ASC XbadexpXlessriskaverse 6.24∗∗∗ (1.46)
biogas ASC XbadexpXriskav 4.99∗∗∗ (1.14)
biogas ASC XbadexpXpatient 7.45∗∗∗ (1.63)
biogas ASC XbadexpXimpatient 4.22∗∗∗ (1.15)
biogas ASC XbadexpXunconstr 5.71∗∗∗ (1.06)
biogas ASC XbadexpXcreditcstr 5.05∗∗ (1.87)
biogas ASC XnoexpXlessriskaverse 4.45∗∗∗ (1.30)
biogas ASC XnoexpXriskav 1.66 (1.14)
biogas ASC XnoexpXpatient 5.27∗∗ (1.68)
biogas ASC XnoexpXimpatient 1.05 (1.17)
biogas ASC XnoexpXunconstr 4.90∗∗∗ (1.04)
biogas ASC XnoexpXcreditcstr -1.77 (1.37)
N 2515 2515 2515
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
272
In terms of fuel savings, the WTP appears to change non-linearly, as a reduction
in fuel requirements elicit a much larger coefficient than an increase in the attribute
(in absolute value). In the former case, the average household is willing to pay
around 7,000 Rupees on average for a one-unit decrease in fuel (equivalent to a
33% reduction in the total), while the mean negative WTP for a one-unit increase
is only 2,400 Rupees (Table 4.6). Again, as noted in the previous section results
are not significantly different by fuel, level of experience or any of the respondents'
characteristics considered, with the exception of households who had a negative
experience with biogas, who are willing to pay 50% more for a reduction in fuel
requirements. An interpretation for this result is that households might consider it
an indicator of higher efficiency of the stove and therefore higher quality.
Finally, in terms of technology-premiums, households' dislike for the fuelwood
ICS translates into a negative WTP of between 0 and -6,000 Rupees to be convinced
to move from a traditional cookstove to the ICS, with the more negative values
associated with more risk averse and more impatient households (Table 4.8). Lack
of interest for fuelwood ICS, especially when compared to cleaner fuel stoves such
as LPG or electric, has emerged in several studies using either stated or revealed
preferences, especially in India (Hanna et al., 2016; Jeuland et al., 2019, 2015a).
As highlighted by the estimates for the standard deviations, presented in the
previous section, there is substantial unobserved heterogeneity in the taste for ICS.
Given the results we obtained regarding the importance of experience in the val-
uation of biogas plants, it would be interesting to see if the same applies to ICS.
Unfortunately, we could not explore this hypothesis in the present work as less than
1% of the sample households had a fuelwood ICS at the time of the survey and no
information was collected on previous experience with the technology.
Although, interest appears to be much higher for biogas, this result actually
masks substantial heterogeneity. Households who have had a smooth experience
with their biogas plant have an estimated WTP of 6,000 Rupees more, on average,
than for the traditional cookstove, after controlling for attributes (Table 4.7). A
slightly lower value of 5,000 Rupees is elicited for the households who have no expe-
rience with biogas but plan to install it. The WTP goes down to 2,000 Rupees for
households who have had a negative experience (although a valuation of 0 is within
the confidence interval at 5% significance level), and becomes strongly negative for
households with no experience and no intention to adopt the technology.
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This suggests that households with experience and households with no experience
but a pre-existing interest in the technology are aware of the additional co-benefits of
biogas that are not captured by the attributes presented in the DCE, such as waste
disposal and fertiliser as a by-product of gasification  although the fact that only a
small share of the households with biogas actively use the slurry as fertiliser suggests
that these co-benefits might still be not fully utilised and therefore undervalued. This
positive effect appears to be counteracted by the negative effect of malfunctions and
failures of the systems, suggesting that it is very important to insure that the plants
are of good quality and that repair and maintenance services are available, in order to
avoid discontent and abandonment of the technology. In fact, 16% of the households
who have experienced malfunctions stated that they have no interest in repairing
the plant.
Further heterogeneity in the taste for biogas exists at the level of household
characteristics. Larger risk aversion, impatience and perceived credit constraints
are associated with lower WTP (Table 4.8). Nevertheless, this difference appears
to be significant only in the case of households with no experience, suggesting that
familiarity with the technology, even when malfunctions occur, mitigates the scep-
ticism associated with these variables.
4.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we use a discrete choice experiment to understand household pref-
erences for `clean' cookstoves. On average, respondents' WTP for a biogas-premium
is quite high, depending on the group considered, showing that there is substantial
interest in the technology and appreciation for the co-benefits it brings. Although
some heterogeneity exists, interest in rocket stoves (an alternative promoted by the
private sector) is instead much lower, with households tending to prefer the tra-
ditional stove. In terms of attributes, households appear to assign a high value
to smoke reduction and fuel savings, two dimensions on which biogas can deliver
substantial improvements.
Nevertheless, these general results hide substantial heterogeneity in the taste for
specific technologies, especially with respect to the type of experience the household
has had with the stove. Households who are planning to build biogas appear to
have a valuation of the technology that is almost as high as the households who
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already have a plant (this is in contrast with those who do not have nor plan to
have biogas). However, already having clean cookstoves rather than only using
traditional stoves is not correlated with the outcome of the choice experiment, once
intentions to install are controlled for. This suggests that households who only
have traditional cookstoves, do not have a idiosyncratic preference for those types
of stoves, or fuelwood-based stoves in general, once the attributes  and especially
the price  are controlled for, but might be instead constrained by availability, and
budget and credit constraints, as emerges from the analysis in Section 4.4.
Preference for biogas is substantially lower for households who experienced mal-
functions (all other attributes held constant). This result suggests that a negative
experience is reducing the interest in the technology. In fact, negative experience
might even lead to abandonment, as several respondents stated they have no inter-
est in repairing their broken plant. Households who have had a smooth experience,
on the contrary, have a more favourable opinion of the technology with respect to
households with no experience, although the difference with households who are
planning to adopt is less marked.
The asymmetric effect of positive and negative information is consistent with
results from other works in the cookstove literature, especially on social learning
and marketing messages, and in general with prospect theory and loss aversion
in behavioural economics. This suggests that it is very important to insure that
the plants are of good quality, that they are appropriate for the context and the
household-specific needs, and that repair and maintenance services are available,
in order to avoid discontent with the technology, and ultimately abandonment and
lower uptake if negative opinions spread.
Finally, experience of any kind, either good or bad, appears to counterbalance
the negative effects of risk aversion, impatience and concerns regarding access to
credit on preferences for biogas. These results suggest that monetary incentives for
adoption of biogas could be successfully complemented with information schemes to
raise awareness on the co-benefits of the technology and schemes that allow house-
holds to gain experience with the technology and trial it before committing.
Regarding the existing situation on the ground, the type of cookstove owned
appear to be driven mainly by economic characteristics such as disposable income,
wealth and credit constraints; plus, in the case of biogas, having cattle. Fuel stack-
ing is pervasive, and there is evidence to suggest that clean cookstoves and clean
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fuels available, including biogas, are not sufficient to cover the full energy need of
the households, so that the vast majority of households continue to use traditional
cookstoves for at least some of the cooking. Malfunctions of the biogas plants seem
to be linked to age and quality of the plant and less time spent maintaining them.
Overall, the Chapter contributes to the literature on cookstove adoption and use,
providing insights on preferences for biogas and on the role of previous positive and
negative experience with the technology being offered, two elements on which not
much research has been done. While the results presented are mainly correlational,
they provide an important first step for designing causal studies and formulating
hypotheses to test.
Biogas has the potential to deliver important benefits in rural contexts with a
hot and humid climate, which often tend to be the hotspot for biomass burning,
especially in India. The main takeaway of the Chapter is that while interest in
such a technology is significant in the study area, its penetration could be improved
by complementing the existing subsidy schemes with information campaigns and
above all trials of the technology, as experience appears to mitigate risk aversion,
present-oriented time preferences, and concerns regarding access to credit. Yet,
these are unlikely to substitute for monetary incentives, as the elicited WTP are still
often short of the total cost of installing a biogas plant, and the upfront payment
is likely to be too burdensome for many households. The results of our analysis
further suggest that attention should be paid to ensure positive experiences with
the technology if its use is to be sustained, as malfunctions and failures might cause
discontent and abandonment. In particular, good quality of the biogas systems,
detailed instructions on how to operate and maintain it, and accessible and affordable
repair services, are key elements in this direction.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Robustness checks
Table A.1: Regression table, Tobit and Tobit with IV.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tobit Tobit Tobit,IV Tobit,IV
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.305∗∗∗ 2.222∗∗∗ 5.245∗∗∗ 5.461∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0428) (0.150) (0.148)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -0.410∗∗∗ -0.0713∗ -6.227∗∗∗ -8.412∗∗∗
(0.0468) (0.0378) (0.213) (0.277)
Covariates Short Long Short Long
Local authority No No No No
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month of the year Yes Yes Yes Yes
Var. instrumented Subsidy Subsidy
Install. cost Install. cost
N 503580 503580 503580 503580
F 168.1 127.0
Impl.discount rate 10.2% 14.3%
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A.2: Regression table, models for fractional outcome variable.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FracLogit FracProbit FracProbit,HET FracLogit FracProbit FracProbit,HET ZeroInflBeta ZeroInflBeta
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 0.000272∗∗∗ 0.000286∗∗∗ 0.000303∗∗∗ 0.000238∗∗∗ 0.000263∗∗∗ 0.000142∗∗∗ 0.000233∗∗∗ 0.000347∗∗∗
(0.00000265) (0.00000294) (0.00000330) (0.00000529) (0.00000573) (0.00000640) (0.00000152) (0.00000310)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -0.000404∗∗∗ -0.000431∗∗∗ -0.000461∗∗∗ 0.00000466 0.00000006 -0.0000169∗∗ -0.000432∗∗∗ -0.00000480
(0.00000407) (0.00000452) (0.00000508) (0.00000517) (0.00000562) (0.00000674) (0.00000289) (0.00000355)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Local authority No No No No No No No No
Year No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Month of the year No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes
N 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580
mean values:
Fraction of houses installing PV 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052 0.00052
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53 2.53
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23 2.23
partial elasticities:
Subs.elasticity 1.466∗∗∗ 1.541∗∗∗ 1.623∗∗∗ 1.750∗∗∗ 1.894∗∗∗ 1.165∗∗∗ 1.163∗∗∗ 1.982∗∗∗
(0.0136) (0.0152) (0.0171) (0.0443) (0.0470) (0.0515) (0.00762) (0.0177)
Cost elasticity -1.919∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗∗ -2.173∗∗∗ 0.0302 0.000393 -0.122∗∗ -1.902∗∗∗ -0.0241
(0.0210) (0.0233) (0.0258) (0.0336) (0.0357) (0.0484) (0.0130) (0.0178)
Impl.discount rate 13.7% 13.9% 14.1% 17.8%
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The coefficients represent the average marginal effects calculated at the mean. Elasticities are calculated at the mean.
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Table A.3: Robustness checks on choice of instruments.
(1) (2) (3)
first stage second stage first stage second stage first stage second stage
Subsidy Install. cost PV count Subsidy Install. cost PV count Subsidy Install. cost PV count
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 1.962∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.004) (0.010)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) -4.194∗∗∗ -4.031∗∗∗ -4.110∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
FIT production rate, 1-5MW -0.0355∗∗∗ -0.00519∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
FIT production rate, 0-4kW 0.0725∗∗∗ 0.00378∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
2010 Pre-announced FIT rate, 0-4kW 0.351∗∗∗ -0.00223
(0.000) (0.001)
Wind production FIT rate, 0-2kW 0.00179∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.00255∗∗∗ -0.0179∗∗∗ -0.00346∗∗∗ -0.0173∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Latitude -0.191∗∗∗ -0.0483∗ -0.192∗∗∗ -0.0484∗ -0.191∗∗∗ -0.0483∗
(0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024) (0.014) (0.024)
Longitude 0.0250∗ 0.0185 0.0248∗ 0.0185 0.0250∗ 0.0185
(0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.017)
Chinese PV price index 2.157∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗ 0.524∗∗∗ 1.830∗∗∗ 0.536∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.008)
Wage electric sector (residuals) -0.0594∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ -0.0599∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ -0.0595∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.009)
N 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580 503580
R2 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.95 0.86
adj. R2 0.94 0.86 1.00 0.86 0.95 0.86
pseudo R2 0.33 0.33 0.33
χ2 605517.9 605732.1 604741.0
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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A.2 Heterogeneous effects
In this section, I investigate the possibility that responsiveness to changes in the
subsidy and costs of installing PV systems is heterogeneous over time, as found by
Hughes and Podolefsky (2015), or depends on the existing installed base due to
the presence of peer effects, which have been detected by Bollinger and Gillingham
(2012); Richter (2014); Müller and Rode (2013); Graziano and Gillingham (2015);
Rode and Weber (2016); Baranzini et al. (2017). I formulate and test the following
hypotheses regarding how responsiveness to economic incentives and costs changes
over time, and how they interact with peer effects. These effects and the underlying
mechanisms are investigated in more details in the next Chapter, addressing concerns
of endogeneity and spatial correlation.
Heterogeneous effects over time:
[H0] The responsiveness parameters are constant over time, all else equal;
[H1] Responsiveness to subsidy and/or system costs changes over time, all else
equal.
Heterogeneous effects depending on the neighbourhood's installed base:
[H0] No interaction between responsiveness to incentives and costs, and the existing
installed base;
[H1] Responsiveness to changes in the subsidy and/or responsiveness to changes in
the costs are heterogeneous depending on the number of previous installations
in the neighbourhood.
Results are presented in Table A.4 and A.5. To investigate the first hypothesis, I
construct an indicator for three different time periods, so that each period contains
four reforms to the FIT production rate, and the time between consecutive rate
changes that belong to different time periods are evenly split between the two. This
results in the following subdivision: period 1, from April 2010 to February 2013;
period 2, from March 2013 to February 2015; and period 3, from March 2015 to
January 2016. I then interact the time period indicator with the subsidy and with
the cost and run the regression analysis using a Poisson model with the main set of
fixed effects, to see whether the responsiveness coefficients are stable over the three
periods (model (1) in Table A.4).
303
Hughes and Podolefsky (2015) find that responsiveness to rebate rates in Califor-
nia decreases over time. Similarly, I found that the coefficient for the annual subsidy
decreases substantially from period 1 to period 2, but there are no significant dif-
ferences between the coefficients for period 2 and 3. The opposite occurs for the
cost coefficient, which is smaller and not significantly different from zero in the first
and second period, and becomes larger and significantly negative in the last period.
This result does not depend on the fact that subsidies and costs were much smaller
in later time and so were changes in their absolute levels; in fact, the same result
emerges when calculating the elasticities at the mean for each time period (model
(1) in Table A.5). This suggests that subsidies were the main driving force behind
adoption in the early time of the policy, while in the later stages costs reductions
and subsidies were both important.
To investigate the second hypothesis, I first check for evidence that peer effects
are at play. For every observation, i.e. for every MSOA-month combination, I
calculate how many PV systems had been installed up to that point and use this as an
additional regressor in the equation. 1 Consistent with the literature on peer effects
in the adoption of residential solar PV, in column (2) I find that the existing installed
base has a positive coefficient. I therefore construct a new indicator for whether each
MSOA at the end of 2011  before any change in the FIT rate had occurred  had
more or fewer installations than the median area. The indicator is interacted with
the subsidy and the installation cost in the regression model presented in column
(3). I find that responsiveness to the subsidy is higher in areas with higher existing
installed base, while the opposite happens for costs, as responsiveness is higher in
areas with lower existing installed base and is not statistically different from zero in
areas with higher installed base. This suggests that peer effects help move the focus
from the upfront cost to the future benefits provided by the subsidies.
1This analysis is only exploratory, as I am not addressing endogeneity and spatial correlation
issues (see for example Manski, 1993; Bollinger and Gillingham, 2012; Richter, 2014), which are
discussed in the next Chapter.
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Table A.4: Heterogeneous effects over time and by installed base (as a measure for peer
effects). Poisson model, no IVs.
(1) (2) (3)
PV count Poisson Poisson Poisson
Subsidy (100GBP/kW), 0.735∗∗∗
 period1 (0.008)
Subsidy (100GBP/kW), 0.372∗∗∗
 period2 (0.045)
Subsidy (100GBP/kW), 0.358∗∗∗
 period3 (0.057)
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 0.721∗∗∗
(0.007)
Subsidy (100GBP/kW), 0.651∗∗∗
 low installed base (0.014)
Subsidy (100GBP/kW), 0.711∗∗∗
 high installed base (0.008)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW), -0.0266
 period1 (0.014)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW), -0.0384
 period2 (0.034)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW), -0.286∗∗∗
 period3 (0.044)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) 0.0177
(0.015)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW), -0.145∗∗∗
 low installed base (0.021)
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW), -0.0246
 high installed base (0.013)
Existing installed base 0.00604∗∗∗
(0.000)
N 503580 503580 503580
pseudo R2 0.31 0.33 0.32
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A.5: Heterogeneous effects over time and by installed base (as a measure for peer
effects). Poisson model, no IVs. Estimates of the partial elasticities at the mean.
(1) (2) (3)
PV count Poisson Poisson Poisson
mean values:
PV count 1.01 1.01 1.01
Subsidy (100GBP/kW) 2.53 2.53 2.53
Install. cost (1,000GBP/kW) 2.23 2.23 2.23
partial elasticities:
Subs.elasticity, period 1 2.59∗∗∗
(0.027)
Subs.elasticity, period 2 0.61∗∗∗
(0.733)
Subs.elasticity, period 3 0.53∗∗∗
(0.084)
Subs.elasticity 1.82∗∗∗
(0.019)
Subs.elasticity, low installed base 1.63∗∗∗
(0.034)
Subs.elasticity, high installed base 1.81∗∗∗
(0.019)
Cost elasticity, period 1 -0.07
(0.039)
Cost elasticity, period 2 -0.07
(0.063)
Cost elasticity, period 3 -0.47∗∗∗
(0.071)
Cost elasticity 0.04
(0.032)
Cost elasticity, low installed base -0.33∗∗∗
(0.048)
Cost elasticity, high installed base -0.05
(0.030)
Installed base elasticity 0.23∗∗∗
(0.007)
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Elasticities are calculated at the mean.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.1: Summary statistics, LSOA-level.
mean sd median (p50)
number of new PV/LSOA/month 0.19 0.69 0
new capacity installed kW/LSOA/month 0.60 2.01 0.00
average capacity of installations kW 3.25 0.76 3.50
system cost GBP/kW 1,852 289 1,820
subsidy GBP/kW/year 206 75 187
existing installed base in the LSOA 0.70 4.01 0
owner occupied houses 401 165 414
LSOA surface area km2 4.40 14.82 0.48
population 1631 383 1565
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Table B.2: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, within-group (WG) and first-
difference (FD) estimator. Peer installations are divided according to how recently they
had been installed.
(1,WG) (2,WG) (1,FD) (2,FD)
PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.798∗∗∗ 0.565∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.581∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.231∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
N_<6m_ring 0.004∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
N_6-12m_ring 0.004∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
N_>12m_ring 0.004∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
subsidyXN_<6m_ring 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
subsidyXN_6-12m_ring 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
subsidyXN_>12m_ring 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
N 1546605 1546605 1031070 1031070
F 3501.763 2299.088 1833.013 1206.502
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
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Table B.3: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, within-group (WG) and first-
difference (FD) estimator. Peer installations are divided in three concentric rings.
(1,WG) (2,WG) (1,FD) (2,FD)
PVcount PVcount PVcount PVcount
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.800∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.822∗∗∗ 0.560∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.237∗∗∗ -0.268∗∗∗ -0.238∗∗∗ -0.271∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)
N_ring1 0.005∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.020∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N_ring2 0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗ 0.003∗∗∗ -0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
N_ring3 0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ -0.006∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
subsidyXN_ring1 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
subsidyXN_ring2 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
subsidyXN_ring3 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.000)
N 1546605 1546605 1031070 1031070
F 3401.468 2217.043 1777.633 1169.755
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
Table B.4: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, within-group (WG) and first-
difference (FD) estimator. Installations are measured in kW rather than count.
(1,WG) (2,WG) (1,FD) (2,FD)
PVtot_kw PVtot_kw PVtot_kw PVtot_kw
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 2.647∗∗∗ 1.794∗∗∗ 2.716∗∗∗ 1.848∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.027) (0.030) (0.040)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.834∗∗∗ -0.945∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗∗ -0.956∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.054) (0.054)
N_ring 0.005∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ -0.010∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
subsidyXN_ring 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
N 1546605 1546605 1031070 1031070
F 5668.853 4492.498 2930.601 2347.854
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
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Table B.5: Regression table, proportional-area buffers, within-group (WG) and first-
difference (FD) estimator. Installations are measured in average kW installed rather than
count, to investigate the effect of size.
(1,WG) (2,WG) (1,FD) (2,FD)
PVav_kw PVav_kw PVav_kw PVav_kw
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.070∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.013) (0.091) (0.173)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.190∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.847∗∗∗ -0.843∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.217) (0.217)
N_ring 0.008∗ 0.006 -0.076 0.074
(0.004) (0.010) (0.069) (0.126)
subsidyXN_ring 0.001 -0.065
(0.004) (0.043)
N 200970 200970 28303 28303
F 52.667 39.552 25.686 19.337
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
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Table B.6: Regression table, fixed-radius buffers, withing-group (WG) estimator. Different specifications of the installations measures (count, total kW
and average kW) and different assumptions on distribution of systems in neighbourhood. Analysis is conducted on a random sample of total observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
within-group estimator PVcount PVcount PVtot_kw PVtot_kw PVav_kw PVav_kw
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.824∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 2.739∗∗∗ 2.834∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.068) (0.069) (0.021) (0.021)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.254∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.823∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.101 -0.080
(0.033) (0.033) (0.108) (0.109) (0.082) (0.082)
N_<2km 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007)
N_<2km_unifdistr 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.270
(0.001) (0.001) (0.138)
N 154710 154710 154710 154710 20381 20381
F 597.421 711.772 596.163 677.681 10.933 11.624
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
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Table B.7: Regression table, fixed-radius buffers, first-difference (FD) estimator. Different specifications of the installations measures (count, total kW and
average kW) and different assumptions on distribution of systems in neighbourhood. Analysis is conducted on a random sample of total observations.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
first-difference estimator PVcount PVcount PVtot_kw PVtot_kw PVav_kw PVav_kw
subsidy (100GBP/kW/year) 0.854∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 2.825∗∗∗ 2.885∗∗∗ 0.832∗ 0.870∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.097) (0.097) (0.259) (0.261)
pvcost (1000GBP/kW) -0.259∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗ -0.845∗∗∗ -0.661∗∗∗ -0.681 -0.602
(0.052) (0.053) (0.174) (0.175) (0.670) (0.674)
N_<2km 0.004∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.053
(0.001) (0.001) (0.122)
N_2km_unifdistr 0.020∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.715
(0.002) (0.002) (0.646)
N 103140 103140 103140 103140 1357 2960
F 314.847 348.845 307.946 324.379 3.697 4.051
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.007
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Note: X represents an interaction between variables.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Examples of stoves from the settlements
Figure C.1: Example of a three-stone stove (in the background) and a portable metallic
improved cookstove (ICS) in the forefront. Source: Practical Action, Moving Energy
Initiative.
313
Figure C.2: Example of fixed outdoor cookstove, self-built by a refugee household in
Goudoubo. Source: Practical Action, Moving Energy Initiative.
Figure C.3: Example of metallic portable improved cookstove (ICS) fuelled with firewood,
manufactured by blacksmiths in Goudoubo. Source: Practical Action, Moving Energy
Initiative.
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Figure C.4: Example of portable improved cookstove (ICS) fuelled with firewood, Kakuma.
Source: Practical Action, Moving Energy Initiative.
Figure C.5: Example of Blazing Tube (solar cooker) trialled in Saag-Nioniogo
Camp, Burkina Faso. The same model was also trialled in Goudoubo. Source:
UNHCR via Clean Cooking Alliance; accessed on February 10, 2020 at the
link: https://www.cleancookingalliance.org/about/news/10-20-2015-blazing-tube-solar-
cookers-in-burkina-faso-refugee-camps.html.
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C.2 Willingness to pay and valuation
Table C.1: Summary statistics of cooking-related variables. Prices, consumption quantities
and expenditures statistics are calculated only for households reporting positive and non-
missing values.
Goudoubo
count mean sd p25 p50 p75
has a three-stone (0/1) 126 0.38 . . . .
has a biomass ICS (fixed) (0/1) 126 0.18 . . . .
has a biomass ICS (portable) (0/1) 126 0.61 . . . .
has a solar cooker (0/1) 126 0.05 . . . .
has a LPG stove (0/1) 126 0.05 . . . .
has a purchased stove (0/1) 126 0.15 . . . .
has a donated stove (0/1) 126 0.71 . . . .
uses firewood (0/1) 126 0.94 . . . .
uses charcoal (0/1) 126 0.08 . . . .
cooks indoor (0/1) 126 0.03 . . . .
uses chimney (0/1) 126 0.01 . . . .
firewood used (kg/month) 91 89.71 115.04 23.00 39.50 150.00
charcoal used (kg/month) 27 34.70 33.40 10.00 25.00 30.00
firewood expenditures (USD/month) 99 7.79 7.69 4.24 6.78 8.47
charcoal expenditures (USD/month) 39 3.70 2.09 1.69 3.39 5.08
briquettes expenditures (USD/month) 38 0.50 0.41 0.17 0.34 0.85
tot. expend. in cooking fuels (USD/month) 112 8.02 5.79 3.69 6.86 11.10
basic ICS's price (USD) 16 5.30 2.33 3.39 4.24 8.47
tot. household expend. (USD/month) 120 91.20 66.00 42.40 72.00 123.70
Kakuma
count mean sd p25 p50 p75
has a three-stone (0/1) 223 0.28 . . . .
has a biomass ICS (fixed) (0/1) 223 0.05 . . . .
has a biomass ICS (portable) (0/1) 223 0.75 . . . .
has a purchased stove (0/1) 223 0.20 . . . .
has a donated stove (0/1) 223 0.70 . . . .
uses firewood (0/1) 223 0.80 . . . .
uses charcoal (0/1) 223 0.32 . . . .
cooks indoor (0/1) 223 0.56 . . . .
uses chimney (0/1) 223 0.16 . . . .
firewood used (kg/month) 159 46.60 45.50 10.00 25.00 80.00
charcoal used (kg/month) 71 33.80 26.20 2.00 45.00 50.00
firewood expenditures (USD/month) 38 3.94 3.55 2.00 2.75 5.00
charcoal expenditures (USD/month) 78 7.25 3.94 5.00 7.00 9.50
tot. expend. in cooking fuels (USD/month) 93 7.84 5.00 4.50 7.00 10.00
basic ICS's price (USD) 36 4.10 2.25 3.00 4.00 5.00
tot. household expend. (USD/month)∗ 94 40.70 54.40 7.00 18.50 49.00
∗ Note: Household expenditures in Kakuma are likely under-reported according to other data sources, reports,
and private conversation with personnel in the field.
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C.3 Effects of stove use
Treatment
 treatment - dummy that takes the value 1 if only non-traditional cookstoves are
used, and 0 if three-stone fire is used for cooking (either as primary or secondary
cooking system, or both).
 treatment adjusted - same as above, but cookstoves that are artisanal or self-built
are reclassified as traditional three-stone fires.
 treatment index - summative index constructed by assigning a score of +1 for each
characteristic associated with an improved cooking system (any of the primary or
secondary stove is a fixed ICS, a portable ICS, a non-biomass stove, manufactured,
branded, purchased, the household uses charcoal as a cooking fuel, cooks outdoor,
uses a chimney to remove smoke), and -1 for each characteristic associated with tra-
ditional cookstoves and indoor pollution (any of the primary or secondary stove is a
three-stone fire, is artisanal, is self-built, the household uses firewood as a cooking
fuel, cooks indoor). The index can therefore take values from -5 to +9.
 treatment pca - index constructed by using factor analysis on the same dummies
used for treatment index and extracting the first factor using the Bartlett method.
Instrument
 stove donated - whether the primary or secondary cookstove was received as a
donation.
Outcome variables
Energy efficiency:
 firewood(kg/month) - quantity of firewood consumed per month, using responses
to the question How much does your household consume in a typical month on
the following fuels for the cookstoves? FIREWOOD. The question distinguishes
between the amount purchased, donated, and collected, and the three have been
aggregated for the purpose of this analysis.
 firewood(kg/hour of cooking) - quantity of firewood consumed per hour, com-
puted as the ratio between the quantity of firewood consumed per month divided by
30 to obtain the average daily consumption, over the number of hours the primary
and secondary stove are lit per day. This measure allows to investigate the fuel ef-
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ficiency of the stoves without being affected by binding availability constraints and
the rebound effect. Nevertheless, this measure misses some aspects of fuel efficiency
such as shorter time required to warm up the stove. Some information on the latter
can be obtained by looking at the time use outcomes.
Health and safety:
 smoke problems (dummy) - dummy that takes the value 1 if any smoke issue was
reported related to any of the primary or secondary stove (stove caused a lot of
smoke) or to the fuel used for cooking (chest infections/lung disease, due to indoor
air pollution and eye infections, smoke-related).
 accidents (dummy) - dummy that takes the value 1 if any accident was reported
related to any of the primary or secondary stove (stove caused unintended fire,
damaged home, caused burns, caused permanent physical damage to any person
in the household) or to the fuel used for cooking (burns).
Time use:
 hours/day of stove use - number of hours the primary cookstove is lit per day,
plus the hours the secondary cookstove is lit per day (using responses to the question
In the last 7 days, how many hours per day on average was the primary/secondary
cookstove lit?).
 total time (hours/week) - sum of the time spent by all the members of the
household in all cooking-related activities (In a normal week, how many hours does
each household member spend cooking (food, tea, boiling water) / collecting or
gathering fuel / purchasing fuel - including travel time / producing and preparing
fuel?, hours for all the members are summed).
Workload burden on women and children:
 children involved - dummy that takes the value 0 if the household reports that
children are never involved in fuelwood collection, and 1 otherwise.
 female share of total work measures the percentage of the total time dedicated to
cooking-related activities (cooking, fuel collection, fuel purchase and preparations)
that is contributed by female members of the household.
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Table C.2: Summary statistics for variables used in the estimation of the benefits of using
non-traditional cookstoves.
Goudoubo Kakuma
mean sd mean sd
 treatment 
treatm. (non-trad stove) 0.62 0.49 0.72 0.45
treatm. adjusted 0.60 0.49 0.61 0.49
treatm. index 0.92 2.42 0.94 2.61
treatm. pca 0.66 0.43 0.71 0.44
 instrument 
stove donated 0.69 0.46 0.68 0.47
 outcomes 
fuelwood(kg/month) 108.79 151.21 40.94 45.32
fuelwood(kg)/hour cooking 0.62 0.83 0.28 0.41
smoke (dummy) 0.29 0.46 0.66 0.487
accidents (dummy) 0.04 0.19 0.61 0.49
hours/day stoves are on 5.61 2.71 9.87 8.20
hours/week cooking activities 46.52 32.24 22.78 26.03
female/tot cooking activities 0.82 0.21 0.74 0.36
children involv. 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.47
 other variables 
female respond. 0.43 0.50 0.67 0.47
female head of h. 0.35 0.48 0.58 0.49
respond. age 42.09 14.47 31.08 12.88
head of h. age 42.99 14.52 34.20 13.16
hh size 5.50 3.37 6.04 2.84
hh size, female 2.79 1.81 3.12 1.90
hh size, male 2.71 2.15 2.73 1.83
mobile dummy 0.81 0.40 0.88 0.32
radio or tv dummy 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43
expend. (usd/month) 91.93 68.43 36.30 66.58
top priority safe 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33
top priority less smoke 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.32
top priority less fuel 0.09 0.28 0.17 0.38
top priority cook cheap 0.04 0.19 0.08 0.28
top priority cook fast 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32
top priority trad. & habits 0.02 0.15 0.07 0.25
N 129 231
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C.3.1 Robustness checks - Goudoubo
Table C.3: First stage of the 2SLS IV estimator; stove donated is the instrument.
Goudoubo (1) Goudoubo (2)
treatm. index treatm. pca
stove donated 2.15∗∗∗ (0.558) 0.24∗ (0.094)
wealth index 1.22∗ (0.490) 0.15+ (0.079)
adult-equiv. size 0.16 (0.391) -0.03 (0.067)
adult-equiv. size2 -0.02 (0.026) -0.00 (0.004)
number of children -0.03 (0.176) 0.00 (0.031)
head's age -0.01 (0.014) -0.00 (0.003)
fem empower index 2.87∗ (1.446) 0.60∗ (0.287)
female respondent -0.50 (0.497) -0.07 (0.092)
" X fem empower index -1.32 (1.653) -0.37 (0.326)
top safe -0.14 (0.586) 0.03 (0.107)
top less smoke -0.97∗ (0.431) -0.20∗ (0.078)
top less fuel -0.68 (0.442) -0.11 (0.077)
top cheap -0.68 (0.637) -0.07 (0.129)
top cook fast -0.23 (0.459) -0.10 (0.088)
top traditions & habits -0.18 (0.495) -0.06 (0.091)
_cons -0.77 (0.958) 0.78∗∗∗ (0.181)
N 129 129
F 3.46 4.43
p 0.00 0.00
r2 0.29 0.29
r2_a 0.19 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.4: Estimates of treatment effects on energy efficiency, Goudoubo.
OLS IV,2sls
tot firewood qty (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -11.44∗∗ -91.57∗∗∗ -7.35 -60.50
(4.321) (24.762) (10.654) (88.312)
p-value [0.010] [0.000] [0.490] [0.493]
" weak IV-robust [0.505] [0.505]
sharpened q-value [0.073] [0.003] [0.674] [0.674]
N 104 104 104 104
r2 0.50 0.52 0.49 0.52
r2_a 0.41 0.44 0.41 0.43
OLS IV,2sls
firewood per hour (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.06∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.02 -0.16
(0.025) (0.133) (0.063) (0.518)
p-value [0.032] [0.001] [0.752] [0.751]
" weak IV-robust [0.758] [0.758]
sharpened q-value [0.105] [0.003] [0.674] [0.674]
N 104 104 104 104
r2 0.36 0.38 0.35 0.36
r2_a 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.25
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.5: Estimates of treatment effects on health and safety, Goudoubo.
OLS IV,2sls
smoke problems (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.05∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.07+ -0.59+
(0.016) (0.095) (0.037) (0.329)
p-value [0.002] [0.000] [0.076] [0.073]
" weak IV-robust [0.105] [0.106]
sharpened q-value [0.014] [0.001] [0.590] [0.590]
N 129 129 129 129
r2 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.39
r2_a 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.31
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.6: Estimates of treatment effects on time use, Goudoubo.
OLS IV,2sls
hours of stove use (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.11 -1.16 0.26 2.15
(0.117) (0.794) (0.223) (1.979)
p-value [0.337] [0.148] [0.248] [0.278]
" weak IV-robust [0.230] [0.230]
sharpened q-value [0.410] [0.227] [0.590] [0.590]
N 126 126 126 126
r2 0.15 0.17 0.06 .
r2_a 0.03 0.05 -0.07 .
OLS IV,2sls
tot time (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.33 -2.37 1.16 9.88
(1.079) (5.776) (2.418) (20.638)
p-value [0.760] [0.683] [0.630] [0.632]
" weak IV-robust [0.633] [0.633]
sharpened q-value [0.484] [0.519] [0.674] [0.674]
N 125 125 125 125
r2 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.33
r2_a 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.7: Estimates of treatment effects on women and children workload, Goudoubo.
OLS IV,2sls
female share of work (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.01 -0.01 -0.04+ -0.30
(0.008) (0.049) (0.020) (0.189)
p-value [0.268] [0.878] [0.080] [0.112]
" weak IV-robust [0.076] [0.076]
sharpened q-value [0.192] [0.336] [0.590] [0.590]
N 124 124 124 124
r2 0.28 0.27 0.20 .
r2_a 0.18 0.17 0.09 .
OLS IV,2sls
children involv. (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.03∗ -0.17∗ -0.04 -0.37
(0.014) (0.086) (0.032) (0.299)
p-value [0.031] [0.050] [0.205] [0.221]
" weak IV-robust [0.195] [0.195]
sharpened q-value [0.042] [0.053] [0.590] [0.590]
N 129 129 129 129
r2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.29
r2_a 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.20
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.3.2 Robustness checks - Kakuma
Table C.8: First stage of the 2SLS IV estimator; stove donated is the instrument.
Kakuma (1) Kakuma (2)
treatm. index treatm. pca
stove donated 1.30∗∗ (0.428) 0.34∗∗∗ (0.064)
wealth index -0.86 (0.534) -0.13 (0.080)
adult-equiv. size 0.11 (0.475) 0.03 (0.068)
adult-equiv. size2 -0.03 (0.044) -0.01 (0.007)
number of children -0.04 (0.114) 0.02 (0.018)
head's age -0.00 (0.015) -0.00 (0.002)
fem empower index -1.11 (0.761) -0.17 (0.131)
female respondent 0.34 (0.524) 0.04 (0.082)
" X fem empower index 0.39 (0.963) 0.03 (0.159)
top safe -0.08 (0.387) -0.02 (0.062)
top less smoke -0.68+ (0.409) -0.12∗ (0.063)
top less fuel 0.66+ (0.356) 0.06 (0.063)
top cheap 0.14 (0.428) -0.00 (0.070)
top cook fast 0.18 (0.460) -0.06 (0.073)
top traditions & habits -0.05 (0.404) -0.06 (0.063)
central_africa (baseline) . .
eastern_africa -0.07 (0.789) 0.06 (0.158)
somalia 1.45∗ (0.704) 0.30∗∗ (0.108)
south_sudan 0.57 (0.655) 0.16 (0.111)
sudan -1.20+ (0.638) -0.09 (0.107)
N 214 214
F 4.80 6.48
p 0.00 0.00
r2 0.25 0.30
r2_a 0.17 0.23
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.9: Estimates of treatment effects on energy efficiency, Kakuma.
OLS IV,2sls
tot firewood qty (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.90 2.48 15.78 47.88+
(1.504) (7.645) (11.711) (26.117)
p-value [0.551] [0.746] [0.035] [0.067]
" weak IV-robust [0.035] [0.035]
sharpened q-value [0.649] [0.511] [0.256] [0.256]
N 175 175 175 175
r2 0.26 0.26 . 0.10
r2_a 0.17 0.17 . -0.01
OLS IV,2sls
firewood per hour (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment 0.01 0.13+ 0.01 0.02
(0.015) (0.071) (0.071) (0.215)
p-value [0.629] [0.060] [0.936] [0.936]
" weak IV-robust [0.936] [0.936]
sharpened q-value [0.649] [0.136] [0.650] [0.650]
N 175 175 175 175
r2 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.23
r2_a 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.10: Estimates of treatment effects on health and safety, Kakuma.
OLS IV,2sls
smoke problems (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.03+ -0.09 0.02 0.07
(0.014) (0.077) (0.054) (0.203)
p-value [0.053] [0.258] [0.738] [0.735]
" weak IV-robust [0.731] [0.731]
sharpened q-value [0.140] [0.275] [0.650] [0.650]
N 214 214 214 214
r2 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.15
r2_a 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.07
OLS IV,2sls
accidents (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment 0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.17
(0.014) (0.077) (0.055) (0.202)
p-value [0.212] [0.230] [0.427] [0.414]
" weak IV-robust [0.409] [0.409]
sharpened q-value [0.362] [0.275] [0.650] [0.650]
N 214 214 214 214
r2 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.11
r2_a 0.07 0.07 -0.02 0.02
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.11: Estimates of treatment effects on time use, Kakuma.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV,2sls
hours of stove use (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.44∗ -2.89∗ 0.97 3.55
(0.211) (1.157) (0.955) (3.281)
p-value [0.038] [0.013] [0.311] [0.279]
" weak IV-robust [0.246] [0.246]
sharpened q-value [0.113] [0.05] [0.420] [0.420]
N 213 213 213 213
r2 0.34 0.35 0.19 0.25
r2_a 0.28 0.28 0.11 0.17
OLS IV,2sls
tot time (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment 1.15 0.65 -8.08 -22.30
(1.055) (5.055) (7.114) (16.294)
p-value [0.277] [0.897] [0.256] [0.171]
" weak IV-robust [0.155] [0.155]
sharpened q-value [0.383] [0.511] [0.420] [0.420]
N 200 200 200 200
r2 0.16 0.15 . 0.03
r2_a 0.07 0.06 . -0.07
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table C.12: Estimates of treatment effects on women and children workload, Kakuma.
OLS IV,2sls
female share of work (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.01 -0.06 0.07 0.17
(0.009) (0.050) (0.068) (0.146)
p-value [0.413] [0.215] [0.321] [0.253]
" weak IV-robust [0.224] [0.224]
sharpened q-value [0.525] [0.275] [0.420] [0.420]
N 192 192 192 192
r2 0.46 0.47 0.25 0.40
r2_a 0.40 0.41 0.17 0.34
OLS IV,2sls
children involv. (treatm. index) (treatm. pca) (treatm. index) (treatm. pca)
treatment -0.04∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗ -0.10+ -0.38∗
(0.013) (0.072) (0.055) (0.191)
p-value [0.006] [0.000] [0.069] [0.045]
" weak IV-robust [0.051] [0.051]
sharpened q-value [0.055] [0.004] [0.256] [0.256]
N 214 214 214 214
r2 0.21 0.23 0.11 0.22
r2_a 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Discrete-choice experiment material
Figure D.1: Example of choice-card used in the discrete-choice experiment.
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Figure D.2: Script used to introduce the discrete-choice experiment, in English and Odia.
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D.2 Description of the sample
D.2.1 Characteristics of the respondents
Table D.1 shows descriptive statistics for the demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics of the respondents, community engagement, safety nets, risk aversion and
impatience, cookstove and fuel use, and cooking behaviours. As a general descrip-
tion of the sample, respondents (whenever possible the survey was conducted with
the head of the household) are on average 43 years old, with half the sample between
32 and 53, and less than a third are women.
Most households cook for 4-5 members every day (hhsize_cookedfor), live in
houses with an estimated value between 50,000 and 200,000 INR (∼600-2500 GBP)
and 2 to 4 rooms. The caste composition of the sample is 8% scheduled castes, 12%
scheduled tribes, 63% other backward castes, and 17% open or general. 40% of the
households are below the poverty line. Further information on the wealth of the
household are provided by an asset-ownership index (constructed as the number of
different types of assets the household owns in a given list, which includes different
electrical appliances, transportation means, phones and television sets, different
pieces of furniture, etc.) and low quality of housing material index (higher value
means lower quality materials are used; the index is constructed using information
on the materials used for the floor, walls, and roof of the kitchen and of the living
area).
Expenditures in non-food items, a proxy for disposable income, are on average
27,000 INR (340 GBP) per year, with a median of 16,200 INR (200 GBP) denoting
a skewed distribution; expenditures for electricity and/or fuels for lighting are on
average 1,800 INR (23 GBP) per year, and 86% of households in the sample have
electric lighting. The credit constraint index measures how difficult it is for house-
holds to access credit, and is constructed using answers to the question If you have
to borrow Rs. 5000 (from a money lender or micro-finance groups, not from the
family member and friends) for one month, would this be possible?, with values (1)
yes, quite easy, (2) yes, but not easy, (3) may be not sure, (4) not possible, and 2
being the average and median response in the sample.
30% of the households are members of a self-help group and 28% participate in
community or neighbourhood cleaning activities, a signal of community engagement
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and awareness of hygiene and health issues. Most households live within a 3-10
minute walk from the center of their village, 1-10 minute from the nearest all-
weather road, and 5-20 minute from a mason or plumber. 23% of the respondents
reported cooking inside the living areas (i.e. the kitchen and living rooms are the
same, with or without a partition to separate them, but no walls). Fuel-stacking
behaviour is pervasive; details on the combination of cookstove technologies used by
sample households are presented in Table D.2. Values for cooking and fuel-related
variables are described by sample group in the next sub-section, as they are related
to the way the stratification groups are defined.
D.2.2 Characteristics and use of the existing biogas plants
Table D.3 presents descriptive statistics for variables related to the biogas plant and
the motivations for its adoption, for households in the sample groups with working
and broken biogas. All the biogas plants are fixed-dome (Deenbandhu model); with
a capacity of either 1 m3 (15% of the households) or a larger 2 m3 (85% of the
households; the variable biogasplantsize is coded 1 for the larger size, and 0 for
the smaller size). Most plants were installed between 2004 and 2010, with some
going back as far as the 1980s. On average, households paid 3,500 INR (44 GBP)
out of their own pockets for the plant, while the average subsidy was around 3,700
INR (47 GBP). Everyone in the sample received subsidies for the construction of
the plant, ranging from 17% to 82% of the overall cost; the vast majority (91%)
received them from OREDA, and the remaining 9% from other support schemes
from the government of Odisha. OREDA also played an important role in spreading
awareness about the subsidy scheme, as 72% of the households heard about the
program from them, while 22% found out through the person who installed the
plant and and 6% through family or friends.
On operation and maintenance, households with a broken biogas plant were
asked to answer with reference to when the plant was working properly. Households
spend between 2 and 6 hours each week (equivalent to about 15-50 minutes a day)
operating and maintaining the plant, of which 0.5-2 hours collecting the dung, 0.5-
2.5 hours feeding it into the plant, and 1-1.5 hours cleaning. Only one household
in the whole sample reported having to purchase dung for the biogas plant, while
the others have dung available that only needs to be collected (not reported in the
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table). One of the important co-benefits of using biogas, is that the slurry resulting
from the gasification process can be used as fertiliser in agriculture, and in fact this is
often of higher quality than the fertilisers available at the local markets or undigested
manure (Insam et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2010; Brown, 2006). 83% of the respondents
say they have noticed that agricultural yield increases with the slurry if compared
to purchased fertilisers or animal manure, while the remaining has either noticed
no difference or has no experience to makes the comparison; only one respondent
claimed that the yield decreases compared to the other fertiliser options. Yet, only
14% purposefully use the slurry as fertiliser, while most households (82%) simply
dump it in the field. 9% of the respondents make it into cakes to be burned as fuel
for cooking or other energy purposes1.
Finally, households with a biogas plant were asked what factors they had consid-
ered when deciding to install a biogas plant, and to rank the relevant ones in order
of importance. Table D.3 reports those that are listed as the top three. The most
cited factor is dung availability (88% of respondents), followed closely by saving
on fuelwood (80%). Important is also the cost factor, cited by about half of the
respondents (48%). Maintenance costs and health benefits were considered as top 3
motivations by 24% of respondents each, while air quality and credit availability by
11% and 10% respectively.
D.3 Additional tables
1Households were allowed to select more than one option, and 7.5% selected both dump it in
the field and make it into cakes for fuel, which is why percentages add up to more than 100
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Table D.1: Summary statistics of the sample of 503 households.
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
age_respondent 43.38 14.19 16 32 42 53 85
female_respondent 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
hhsize_cookedfor 4.62 1.25 1 4 5 5 9
children_cookedfor 0.70 0.94 0 0 0 1 4
general_caste 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 0 1
OBC_caste 0.63 0.48 0 0 1 1 1
SCST_caste 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
belowpovertyline 0.40 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
lowqltyhousematerial (index) 26.09 10.87 8 17 26 36 44
assetsownership (index) 9.19 3.98 2 6 9 12 21
housevalue (1,000 INR) 154.83 144.81 10.00 50.00 100.00 200.00 800.00
numberrooms 3.00 1.30 1 2 3 4 7
expenditures (1,000 INR/year) 26.97 31.30 2.55 8.90 16.21 32.69 343.00
electrnlightexp (1,000 INR/year) 1.79 0.95 0 1.10 1.68 2.30 4.90
electriclight (dummy) 0.86 0.34 0 1 1 1 1
receivelpgsubs (dummy) 0.09 0.28 0 0 0 0 1
receivekerosubs (dummy) 0.92 0.28 0 1 1 1 1
receivefoodsubs (dummy) 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1
receiveemploymsubs (dummy) 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
creditconstr (index) 2.16 1.02 1 1 2 3 4
shg_member (dummy) 0.30 0.46 0 0 0 1 1
cleancommunity (dummy) 0.28 0.45 0 0 0 1 1
distancevillagecentre (min. walking) 6.46 5.24 0 3 5 10 31
distanceroad (min. walking) 7.41 8.24 0 1 5 10 45
distancemason (min. walking) 15.71 18.83 0 5 10 20 130
plotarea (1,000 sq foot) 1.87 1.70 0.16 0.80 1.20 2.20 9.00
livestockqty_small 1.53 4.75 0 0 0 0 45
livestockqty_big 2.98 3.22 0 0 2 4 25
selreportriskaverse 2.76 1.34 0 2 3 4 5
riskaverse 3.28 1.10 1 3 4 4 4
selfreportimpatient 2.18 1.24 0 1 2 3 5
impatient 3.34 1.08 1 3 4 4 4
numberstovetypes 1.87 0.75 1 1 2 2 5
hastraditional (dummy) 0.91 0.28 0 1 1 1 1
haskerosene (dummy) 0.18 0.39 0 0 0 0 1
haslpg (dummy) 0.20 0.40 0 0 0 0 1
haselectric (dummy) 0.07 0.26 0 0 0 0 1
timeuseallstove (minutes/day) 237.34 77.13 0 180 240 280 910
timeusebiomassstove (minutes/day) 147.71 87.48 0 60 150 210 445
timeusecleanstove (minutes/day) 89.62 82.44 0 0 90 150 610
ventilqty (index) 0.93 0.52 0 1 1 1 4
cookinlivingareas (dummy) 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 0 1
believesmokeunhealthy (index) 2.23 0.85 1 2 2 3 5
woodqtyused (kg/week) 30.50 15.88 0 20 30 40 80
collectwood (dummy) 0.74 0.44 0 0 1 1 1
qtywoodcollect (kg/year) 1414.36 1559.89 0 0 1200 2250 12800
woodhardtofind (dummy) 0.67 0.47 0 0 1 1 1
usedailywood (dummy) 0.69 0.46 0 0 1 1 1
usedailylpg (dummy) 0.11 0.31 0 0 0 0 1
usedailykeros (dummy) 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 0 1
usedailyelectr (dummy) 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 1
N 503
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Table D.2: Fuel-stacking: combination of cookstove technologies for the full sample (503
households).
group include traditional clean only
# stove types
group 1
1 biogas (11%)
2 trad+biogas (66%) LPG+biogas (4%)
electric+biogas (1%)
3+ trad+biogas+keros (7%) keros+LPG+biogas (1.5%)
trad+biogas+LPG (3%)
trad+biogas+electric(1.5%)
trad+biogas+keros+LPG (3%)
trad+biogas+keros+LPG+electric (2%)
group 2
1 biogas (2%)
2 trad+biogas (78%) LPG+biogas (4%)
keros+biogas (1%)
3+ trad+biogas+keros (7%) LPG+electric+biogas (1%)
trad+biogas+LPG (5%)
trad+biogas+keros+LPG+electric (2%)
group 3
1 LPG (3%)
kerosene (1%)
2 trad+LPG (31%) keros+LPG (2%)
trad+keros (25%) LPG+electric (1%)
trad+electric (10%)
trad+ICS (2%)
3+ trad+keros+LPG (11.5%) keros+LPG+electric (2%)
trad+keros+electric (6.5%)
trad+LPG+electric (1%)
trad+ICS+keros (1%)
trad+keros+LPG+electric (3%)
group 4
1 trad. (100%)
total 91% 9%
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Table D.3: Summary statistics of the variables related to the existing biogas plants in the
sample (253 households).
mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max
installationyear 2005.74 6.36 1982 2004 2009 2010 2011
biogasplantsize_large 0.85 0.35 0 1 1 1 1
price_paidbyhh1 (INR) 3506.50 1746.31 580 2170 3225 4000 12000
subsidies1 (INR) 3731.61 1437.65 1300 2750 3510 4500 8000
subspriceratio (%) 0.52 0.14 0.17 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.82
time_total (hours/week) 4.34 0.97 2.10 3.50 4.50 5.00 6.00
time_collectdung (hours/week) 1.40 0.51 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.00
time_feedplant (hours/week) 1.46 0.62 0.50 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.50
time_cleaning (hours/week) 1.49 0.06 1.00 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50
slurry_dumpinfield 0.82 0.39 0 1 1 1 1
slurry_fertilize 0.14 0.35 0 0 0 0 1
slurry_cakeforenergy 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 0 1
increased yield 0.83 0.37 0 1 1 1 1
top3_dungavailability 0.88 0.32 0 1 1 1 1
top3_woodsavings 0.80 0.40 0 1 1 1 1
top3_cost 0.48 0.50 0 0 0 1 1
top3_maintenancecost 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
top3_health 0.24 0.43 0 0 0 0 1
top3_airquality 0.11 0.32 0 0 0 0 1
top3_creditavailability 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 0 1
N 253
1 Subsidies are defined as additional to the price paid by the household. The total price is therefore
the price paid by the household plus the subsidy.
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Table D.4: Regression table. Model (1) is a multinomial logit with outcome having a
biogas plant (baseline), other clean stoves and traditional only; model (2) is an ordinal
logit model for whether the household has only one type of cookstove, two types, or three
or more.
(1) (2)
stovegroup stovestacking
other clean traditional only stovestacking
age_respondent 0.004 0.004 -0.011
(0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
female_respondent -0.087 0.152 -0.394∗
(0.277) (0.246) (0.171)
distance_roadallweather -0.006 -0.019 -0.009
(0.015) (0.013) (0.011)
OBC_caste 0.725∗ 0.736 -0.123
(0.319) (0.404) (0.337)
SCST_caste 0.021 0.506 -0.034
(0.528) (0.509) (0.484)
belowpovertyline -0.235 0.149 -0.070
(0.355) (0.272) (0.250)
healthbelief -0.057 0.126 0.005
(0.184) (0.190) (0.144)
hhsize_adj_cookedfor -0.269 0.143 -0.137
(0.153) (0.141) (0.091)
children_cookedfor 0.082 0.001 0.040
(0.159) (0.130) (0.088)
assetsownership 0.030 -0.188∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.058) (0.042)
numberrooms 0.116 -0.039 0.122
(0.126) (0.131) (0.086)
lowqltyhousematerial -0.029 0.027 -0.036∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
lnyearexp 0.851∗∗ 0.243 0.103
(0.266) (0.220) (0.175)
creditconstr 0.305 0.116 -0.128
(0.159) (0.134) (0.098)
shg_member 0.040 0.153 -0.013
(0.294) (0.279) (0.255)
cleancommunity -0.146 -0.195 0.352
(0.377) (0.283) (0.182)
distancevillagecentre -0.046 0.003 -0.043∗∗
(0.026) (0.024) (0.016)
plotarea -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
livestockqty_small -0.040 -0.028 0.031
(0.028) (0.022) (0.022)
livestockqty_big -0.393∗∗∗ -0.268∗ 0.054
(0.090) (0.110) (0.029)
riskaverse -0.266∗ 0.057 -0.036
(0.133) (0.147) (0.113)
impatient 0.081 -0.094 0.008
(0.156) (0.163) (0.106)
_cons -7.004∗∗ -3.078
(2.602) (2.262)
N 503 503
pseudo R2 0.23 0.13
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.5: Regression table. Logit estimates for the likelihood of planning to build a
biogas plant, for households who do not currently have biogas.
(3)
plan to install biogas
plan_biogas
group4 (trad. only) 0.360 (0.358)
age_respondent 0.002 (0.014)
female_respondent -0.378 (0.384)
distance_roadallweather 0.014 (0.025)
OBC_caste 0.015 (0.508)
SCST_caste 0.217 (0.585)
belowpovertyline 0.451 (0.338)
healthbelief -0.218 (0.171)
hhsize_adj_cookedfor -0.012 (0.142)
children_cookedfor 0.066 (0.150)
assetsownership 0.043 (0.069)
numberrooms 0.266 (0.153)
lowqltyhousematerial -0.026 (0.015)
lnyearexp -0.073 (0.264)
creditconstr -0.351∗ (0.145)
shg_member 0.474 (0.358)
cleancommunity -0.198 (0.330)
distancevillagecentre -0.032 (0.024)
plotarea 0.000 (0.000)
livestockqty_small 0.064 (0.087)
livestockqty_big 0.103 (0.103)
riskaverse 0.053 (0.135)
impatient -0.232 (0.146)
_cons 1.437 (2.852)
N 250
pseudo R2 0.14
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.6: Regression table. OLS estimates for time and share of time stoves are used.
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d)
time, all stoves time, clean time, biomass share, clean
2.samplegroup 31.0∗∗ (11.02) -48.2∗∗∗ (11.33) 79.2∗∗∗ (8.32) -0.3∗∗∗ (0.04)
3.samplegroup -35.0∗ (16.28) -78.1∗∗∗ (13.17) 43.1∗∗∗ (9.63) -0.2∗∗∗ (0.03)
4.samplegroup -8.4 (9.35) -128.4∗∗∗ (7.58) 120.0∗∗∗ (9.25) -0.5∗∗∗ (0.03)
hastraditional 38.5∗ (16.35) -15.7 (13.71) 54.2∗∗∗ (10.69) -0.2∗∗∗ (0.04)
haskerosene 36.5∗∗ (11.21) 29.1∗∗ (9.27) 7.5 (7.00) 0.0 (0.02)
haslpg 13.8 (13.78) 54.8∗∗∗ (10.96) -41.0∗∗∗ (10.02) 0.2∗∗∗ (0.03)
haselectric 1.9 (21.80) 31.4∗ (15.02) -29.5∗ (11.69) 0.1∗∗∗ (0.03)
age_respondent 0.2 (0.27) 0.1 (0.20) 0.2 (0.18) -0.0 (0.00)
female_respondent -5.8 (7.07) 1.6 (4.90) -7.4 (5.42) 0.0 (0.02)
distance_roadallweather 0.0 (0.48) 0.4 (0.34) -0.4 (0.29) 0.0 (0.00)
OBC_caste -2.6 (9.26) 7.4 (8.43) -10.0 (8.05) 0.0 (0.03)
SCST_caste 6.0 (9.91) 14.3 (9.80) -8.3 (9.43) 0.0 (0.04)
belowpovertyline 6.3 (7.58) 5.8 (5.62) 0.5 (7.15) 0.0 (0.02)
healthbelief -2.7 (3.75) -0.0 (3.42) -2.7 (3.37) 0.0 (0.01)
hhsize_adj_cookedfor 17.0∗∗∗ (3.31) 2.9 (2.82) 14.0∗∗∗ (2.86) -0.0 (0.01)
children_cookedfor 0.0 (2.84) -2.1 (2.80) 2.1 (3.19) -0.0 (0.01)
assetsownership 3.1∗ (1.46) 1.9 (1.18) 1.2 (1.22) 0.0 (0.00)
numberrooms 0.2 (4.10) 1.3 (3.12) -1.1 (2.44) 0.0 (0.01)
lowqltyhousematerial 0.4 (0.33) -0.3 (0.34) 0.7∗ (0.32) -0.0 (0.00)
ln yearly expenditures -10.4 (5.48) 0.2 (3.70) -10.6 (5.69) 0.0 (0.02)
creditconstr 2.4 (3.53) -0.7 (2.32) 3.1 (3.20) -0.0 (0.01)
shg_member -8.9 (9.41) -7.6 (6.53) -1.3 (7.73) -0.0 (0.02)
cleancommunity 9.3 (6.11) -6.0 (5.35) 15.3∗ (6.38) -0.0 (0.02)
distancevillagecentre -1.7∗ (0.76) -1.0 (0.49) -0.8 (0.58) -0.0 (0.00)
plotarea 0.0 (0.00) -0.0 (0.00) 0.0 (0.00) -0.0 (0.00)
livestockqty_small -0.6 (0.71) -0.5 (0.41) -0.1 (0.62) -0.0 (0.00)
livestockqty_big -1.6 (1.29) -0.8 (0.92) -0.7 (0.86) -0.0 (0.00)
riskaverse -3.0 (2.99) 0.0 (2.39) -3.1 (2.48) 0.0 (0.01)
impatient -2.8 (3.74) -0.0 (2.70) -2.8 (3.12) 0.0 (0.01)
N 503 503 503 498
adj. R2 0.16 0.56 0.54 0.69
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.7: Regression table. Logit estimates for the likelihood of having a working biogas
plant, as opposed to broken (baseline).
(5a) (5b)
working biogas never broken
v. broken (baseline) v. has broken (baseline)
age_respondent 0.002 (0.011) 0.009 (0.011)
female_respondent 0.327 (0.354) 0.530 (0.360)
OBC_caste 0.654 (0.519) 0.893 (0.463)
SCST_caste 0.093 (0.760) 0.161 (0.646)
belowpovertyline 0.227 (0.344) 0.199 (0.296)
hhsize_adj_cookedfor -0.089 (0.170) -0.113 (0.160)
children_cookedfor -0.007 (0.230) 0.003 (0.212)
assetsownership -0.044 (0.054) -0.048 (0.057)
numberrooms -0.283∗ (0.132) -0.305∗ (0.139)
lowqltyhousematerial -0.026 (0.022) -0.023 (0.021)
lnyearexp 0.815∗∗ (0.308) 0.789∗∗ (0.304)
creditconstr -0.258 (0.227) -0.240 (0.190)
shg_member -0.443 (0.560) -0.508 (0.549)
cleancommunity 0.720 (0.496) 0.559 (0.466)
distancevillagecentre -0.082∗∗ (0.028) -0.062∗ (0.024)
distance_roadallweather -0.008 (0.019) 0.002 (0.020)
plotarea 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
livestockqty_small 0.077∗∗ (0.025) 0.081∗∗ (0.026)
livestockqty_big 0.075 (0.052) 0.057 (0.047)
healthbelief 0.341 (0.237) 0.433∗ (0.218)
riskaverse -0.483 (0.250) -0.429 (0.243)
impatient 0.280 (0.217) 0.294 (0.242)
top3_cost -0.400 (0.463) -0.418 (0.433)
top3_maintcost 0.405 (0.469) 0.117 (0.409)
top3_dungavailab 1.059 (0.562) 0.945 (0.533)
top3_creditavail -0.193 (0.746) -0.293 (0.736)
top3_woodsaving 0.671 (0.501) 0.423 (0.500)
top3_health 0.157 (0.410) 0.011 (0.426)
top3_airqlty 0.029 (0.528) 0.283 (0.466)
slurry_fertilize -1.079∗∗ (0.379) -1.188∗∗ (0.395)
slurry_cakeforenergy 1.091 (0.698) 1.181 (0.642)
noteyieldsup -0.610 (0.606) -0.548 (0.601)
biogasplantsize_large 1.460∗∗ (0.535) 1.213∗ (0.497)
totbiogasprice_imputed -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000)
totbiogassubs_imputed 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
subspriceratio_adj -2.105 (5.605) 0.719 (5.810)
timebiogas_collectdung_imputed -1.574∗∗∗ (0.409) -1.385∗∗∗ (0.377)
timebiogas_feedplant_imputed 0.845∗∗ (0.325) 0.834∗ (0.338)
timebiogas_cleaning_imputed 7.086∗∗∗ (2.140) 12.882∗∗∗ (2.344)
installationyear 0.154∗∗∗ (0.040) 0.133∗∗∗ (0.033)
N 253 253
pseudo R2 0.33 0.30
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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